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Somme

Page 47

by Peter Hart


  The cavalry officers must have had an inkling of the future as they gazed at the slow, rumbling, stinking tanks that seemed to have stolen their thunder.

  The tanks as a whole have been a success, the idea will probably be developed and we shall come back to the steel armour on land once more. This time it will be petrol driven, as opposed to the horses of the old days.73

  Brigadier Archibald Home, Headquarters, Cavalry Corps

  The Battle of Flers-Courcelette marked the writing on the wall for the old arme blanche as the world slowly awoke to a new era of mechanised warfare. A thousand years or more of cavalry achievements and tradition were being consigned to the dustbin of history.

  CHAPTER ELEVEN

  Hammering On

  COMPARED WITH THE NADIR of the August and early September operations the Battle of Flers-Courcelette had been a startling success. A considerable stretch of the German front line had been captured and their Second Line system had been significantly breached in the Flers sector. Even the long overdue capture of High Wood and the final portions of Bazentin Ridge can be seen as a success of sorts. High Wood opened up a far better tactical situation for the British with the much enhanced observation it offered over the German lines. A couple of days later the Germans bowed to the inevitable and made a limited, local tactical retreat back onto the low Le Transloy Ridge.

  Went for a walk to reconnoitre the ground towards Flers and walked to the Switch trench between Delville and High Wood. It is from here that one can see the value of the ridge we have gained and the reason why the Boche hung on to it. The ground on the other side lies in front of one like an amphitheatre. Le Sars, la Barque, Ligny Thilloy, Beaulencourt could all be easily seen and identified. The ground is open and even in its present state of shell holes could be quickly crossed by cavalry.1

  Brigadier Archibald Home, Headquarters, Cavalry Corps

  However, the British casualties all along the line had been atrocious and were comparable in percentage terms with the debacle of July. It has been estimated that the Fourth Army suffered over 29,000 casualties. In simple terms the army had captured about twice the number of square miles of territory, but twice not very much is still not much. Once again, Haig’s insistence that the Fourth Army should attempt to break through, and thus, by definition, smash its way through all three of the German trench-line systems meant that the available artillery resources were fatally diluted in the front lines that mattered. In any case, the German first line that had been taken was only the original German Third Line. Since early July new lines, redoubts and switches had been dug to replace those the Allies had so painstakingly captured. In the final analysis although the German line had been put under severe strain by the offensive on 15 September it still held. German morale was failing, but it had not failed completely; the artillery was struggling, but had not been overwhelmed by the British counter-battery fire; supplies and reserves were running short, but had not run out. There was no imminent prospect of a breakthrough and the German defensive system retained its amazing resilience. Contrary to the more optimistic intelligence forecasts the great German nation state was not yet ripe for defeat.

  The successes won in the centre by the New Zealand, 41st and 14th Divisions have been over-exaggerated in many ways. True, they had got forward and captured tactically significant German positions, but in doing so the three divisions had suffered severe casualties and there were no fresh reserve divisions lying behind the lines ready to surge forward and leapfrog to victory. The tanks had also clearly shot their bolt, brought down by a combination of persistent mechanical problems, heavy casualties and a general exhaustion amongst the shattered crews. Most significantly of all the German artillery were still not prevented from opening fire when the crucial moments of decision occurred. Though the Germans suffered from the attentions of the fifty-six British guns specially assigned to counter-battery work, the Royal Artillery undoubtedly needed to assign many more guns to the task if it was ever to have a chance of silencing the massed roaring batteries of German guns in the never-ending gunnery duel of the Somme.

  Rawlinson immediately ordered a further push all along the line of the Fourth Army, with the pious hope that the cavalry might be unleashed if the German line crumbled under the hammer blows. Yet his divisions were fully committed already and there were no immediate reserves to lend fresh push to the attack. The result was that little was achieved. One exception was the success of the men of the 6th Division who atoned in some senses for their perceived failure on 15 September when on 18 September they captured the Quadrilateral, backed by a strong preliminary bombardment and an effective creeping barrage. This, however, was not a breakthrough by any definition, merely another tactical objective achieved at high cost. By this time the rain had also started, which threatened to turn the battleground into a swamp.

  There was another problem facing the British High Command. The Battle of the Somme was envisaged from the start as a joint operation with the French Army. Despite the leaching away of French reserves necessitated by the never-ending horror of Verdun, the French were still needed to make a contribution on the Somme. They, too, had attacked on 15 September but had been repulsed with painful losses. In the days that followed it became apparent that the French had lost much of their enthusiasm for further attacks on the Somme.

  I cannot help thinking that we want more fresh troops here before we can break the line, also we must make an attack at the same time as the French so as to drive the Boche back on a broad front, I am afraid that the French are very difficult to deal with. I certainly think they are very jealous especially in the higher command. In a way it is natural as to commence with we had such a small army that they commanded us and now things are quite different. If only we can bring off a combined effort it might succeed. There is no doubt in my mind that the Boche is deteriorating. His counter-attacks lack sting and I also think he is tired. Prisoners are not as confident of winning the war now as they were. His whole attitude is chastened. This rain is real bad, it will make attacks impossible for some days to come. It will be better for us as we shall have more men. The French also may be ready.2

  Brigadier Archibald Home, Headquarters, Cavalry Corps

  The Battle of Morval

  After taking heed of the state of their Allies, it was decided that new troops would have to be moved forward before any joint attack could be attempted. The next stage of the offensive was eventually scheduled for 25 September and would become known as the Battle of Morval. In many ways this battle was a signpost to the future. It was a real ‘bite and hold’ affair, with objectives limited to the new German front-line system and a total advance of just 1,200–1,500 yards. The objectives were designed to achieve what had not been managed on 15 September. This simple change of plan allowed the British artillery to concentrate all its venom and bile on the targets that affected the initial progress of the troops. It also meant that the infantry would not advance beyond the range of their field artillery—which made up the bulk of their artillery support. As a result the guns could cover the infantry throughout the course of the battle and stand ready to defend the troops against German counterattacks without having to move forward and re-register targets. The artillery bombardment opened on 24 September and the thousands upon thousands of shells poured down on the German trenches to devastating effect. The Germans simply did not have the time to deepen their trenches or to prepare that deadly combination of deep dugouts, concreted machine-gun posts and massed belts of barbed wire.

  The tanks were now to be more sensibly integrated into the attack plan. Instead of sending them forward in advance or level with the assaulting infantry, they would follow behind and be directed to the capture of German strong points that were proving difficult. In particular, it had been recognised that tanks would be invaluable in the capture of the fortified villages. At a stroke the tanks had been placed in their proper context; they were not the war-winning machines of myth but merely a potentially useful adjunct
to the deadly combination of infantry and artillery. This time there would be an all-embracing creeping barrage sweeping forward in front of the infantry with no gaps as hostage to fortune. There was also a significant further advance in the counter-battery fire arrangements for the day of the assault. By dint of the various methods of observation some 124 German batteries were identified and forty-seven were engaged with the result that twenty-one appeared to have been silenced. Whilst still only a partial success, nevertheless, the loss of such a significant element of their artillery power was a handicap to the overall German defensive effort.

  The infantry went over the top just after noon at 1235, a time chosen mainly to coincide with the simultaneous assault to be carried out by the French, who once again had been inveigled to join the assault. The troops went over clinging as closely as possible to the skirt tails of the creeping barrage. In many places they found that the German front line had been utterly devastated by the concentrated power of the British guns. There were few deep dugouts available for the German garrison to ride out the storm of shells and for most there was nowhere to hide. The XV Corps (New Zealand, 55th and 21st Divisions) made some progress towards Gueudecourt, but the village was still holding out when night fell. The real success was on the right on the front of the XIV Corps (Guards, 6th, 5th and 56th Divisions) which was faced with the daunting task of capturing the fortress villages of Lesboeufs, Morval and Combles. The four divisions were again packed into a narrow frontage with the idea of maximising their penetrative power. Without the confusion inherent in using the tanks the infantry swept forwards to a dramatic success, seizing the whole of the German front-line system and securing possession of Lesbouefs and Morval.

  We were all ready at ten o’clock, waiting to go over. They promised a good artillery bombardment and everybody was ready. We were sat talking and smoking, making sure all your equipment was ready to be used, that everybody was in line and you knew who your corporal, sergeant or officer was that you had to follow. Prompt at the time, the whistle went and over we went. Out of the trench and there was no barbed wire in front. We met the usual machine-gun fire, the mistake to me was blowing a whistle before the attack; another way could have been found which was silent. As soon as the whistle went the Germans must have known the attack was on its way and they were ready.3

  Guardsman Horace Calvert, 4th Battalion, Grenadier Guards, 3rd Guards Brigade, Guards Division

  That afternoon, Private Arthur Russell had a good view of the attack across No Man’s Land from his position lying behind rocks at the top of a nearby quarry.

  We could look across No Man’s Land and follow the movements of both British and French infantry as they streamed across towards the German trenches and the village of Morval. The shells of our dense creeping barrage being placed upon the German positions rushed over our heads with a frightening intensity, but above all that we could hear the humming rushing sound of the thousands of bullets from the eight machine guns of the 13th Machine Gun Company to make that almost impassable barrier between the enemy reserves and their hard-pressed front-line troops.4

  Private Arthur Russell, 13th Company, Machine Gun Corps, 13th Brigade, 5th Division

  Generally things were going well, although Guardsman Horace Calvert ran into some localised heavy resistance.

  It was a green field, you could see the village of Flers just on the top and on the right was a German redoubt; we were getting fire across from that. Machine-gun fire and some artillery shells. We had to bomb the Germans out of one position. I was just a few yards away from where the bombers were throwing the bombs and when I passed it the corpses were piled up—our bombs had done a lot of work there. We were losing a few and the section corporal wasn’t far away from the when he was hit in the right arm. He said to me, ‘Keep going, I’ve got a Blighty, I’m no good, I’ll have to go back!’ He set off walking. Usual thing—there were snipers waiting and they got him on his way back. He was killed. We got near to the front-line trench when I got mixed up with some German bombers. These bombs came fast and furious amongst us. And I and one or two more caught the nasty side effects, shrapnel in the right shoulder. I couldn’t use the rifle—I knew I was no good, so I did what was usual. I dropped my equipment and rifle to be used in case it was necessary as a reserve and I set off back—I got back all right.5

  Guardsman Horace Calvert, 4th Battalion, Grenadier Guards, 3rd Guards Brigade, Guards Division

  Although Calvert had come to grief, this was the nature of such attacks: even successes concealed minor disasters and personal tragedies. In many places along the line the troops of the XIV Corps met little opposition from the front-line Germans and simply smashed their way through. No tanks were involved in these successful operations as they could not keep up with the marauding infantry. This achievement left Combles so isolated that the Germans were forced to abandon it without any further fighting next day.

  The results of this first day’s fighting of the new battle were promising, but once again the cavalrymen were thwarted. Their chance to play a significant role before winter rains made the going impossible for horses was slowly slipping away.

  Another most disappointing day for the cavalry. We had the 1st Indian Cavalry Division up ready with Neil Haig commanding the leading brigade. The attacks went splendidly except at the point at which we hoped to push through. The Guards took Lesboeufs and the 15th Division Morval. We got two battalions into Gueudecourt, but they were beaten back again. The French took Rancourt and advanced towards Fregicourt. It can be looked at as a successful day as a whole except for the cavalry. My heart bleeds for them, All they want is a chance and yet as today the chance was very near, but just out of reach. It has been a lovely day and we are all very disappointed. Kavanagh is a brick, he is very disappointed but does not show it at all. I suppose we shall now move backwards until the next big attack. I am certain that Douglas Haig means to go on pushing and if so our chance will come yet.6

  Brigadier Archibald Home, Headquarters, Cavalry Corps

  In truth there was never any hope of such a cavalry breakthrough. This was the inevitable quid pro quo of ‘bite and hold’. By only attempting to capture one trench system at a time there would always be at least two systems left still intact and barring any cavalry exploitation. The underlying problem with ‘bite and hold’ was that it was a slow and measured process that could not be rushed depending, as it did, on tremendous logistical and artillery preparations. As such, it also gave the Germans time to build new lines of defence. Thus, as the British edged forward the Germans dropped back, occupying the new lines as they went. The Royal Flying Corps uncovered the disturbing, but unsurprising, fact that the Germans had already constructed a more than adequate replacement trench-line system stretching from Thilloy to Le Transloy, while preliminary work could be discerned from the aerial photographs for a further two defensive lines.

  Following the successful action of 25 September it was obvious that Gueudecourt was vulnerable to a further attack and the next day 21st Division was once more ordered forward. This time a single ‘female’ tank showed the potential value of tanks in dealing with ‘hold ups’. The capture of the Gird Trench was the objective and the D-14, commanded by Second Lieutenant C.E. Storey, moved along the trench parapet pouring machine-gun fire into the trench and backing up the action of a party of bombers from the 7th Leicesters. In an early example of all-arms cooperation, a contact patrol aircraft above them not only brought down artillery support fire as required, but actually intervened itself with machine-gun fire. The Germans suffered heavy casualties having some 370 taken prisoner, while the British startlingly only lost five wounded. Gird Trench was captured with the help of the 15th Durhams and Gueudecourt was finally overrun later that afternoon.

  Thiepval Ridge

  Tuesday 26 September also marked the beginning of one of the most amazing battles in British military history. The fight for Pozières had been as an aperitif for the titanic struggle that would engulf
the Reserve Army at the end of September 1916. Haig was utterly convinced that the moment had come when the German reserves and resolve were finally failing and he ordered Gough to strike hard to attain some of the original objectives of 1 July. Once the bête noire of Thiepval Spur was captured, Haig planned an advance towards Serre, pushing out from Beaumont Hamel. Gough, too, was optimistic that the moment had come to strike hard.

  The Reserve Army had not so far been in a position to attack on so broad a front or to deploy so many divisions. The front of attack was well supported by artillery, and from many positions south-west and west of Thiepval we swept the defenders in enfilade and exposed them to a heavy cross fire.7

  Sir Hubert Gough, Headquarters, Reserve Army

  The attack was to be carried out on a total front of some 6,000 yards by the II Corps (18th and 11th Divisions) alongside the Canadian Corps (1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions). The artillery support would of course be crucial and some 230 heavy guns and 570 field guns were soon blazing away supplemented by the artillery further north, which could strike deep into the rear of the German positions. The Vickers machine guns were also used to supplement the artillery barrage, with a constant hosing stream of bullets directed into the air, carefully calculated to fall back to earth spattering across the German positions.

  The attack was once again timed for 1235. On the right of the front, the Canadians pushed forward from Courcelette, striking out towards the Zollern Trench and Zollern Redoubt. Next to the Canadians the 11th Division was faced with the task of capturing the ruins of Mouquet Farm; a task that had defeated the best efforts of all-comers in the previous month. The 8th Northumberland Fusiliers went forward alongside the 9th Lancashire Fusiliers, with the assistance of two tanks.

 

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