World War Trump

by Hall Gardner

  In his book Trump: The Art of the Deal, Trump stated: “My style of deal-making is quite simple and straightforward. I aim very high, and then I just keep pushing and pushing and pushing to get what I'm after.” But he also said, “I never get too attached to one deal or one approach…. I keep a lot of balls in the air, because most deals fall out, no matter how promising they seem at first.”1

  For all of his pro-Russian and anti-China rhetoric expressed during his presidential campaign, the Trump-Pence administration has totally reassessed his negotiation strategies with both Russia and China, among other states—much like his book The Art of the Deal suggested he might. In the case of Russia, is Trump now taking a much tougher line in which he fully expects Moscow to hand over Crimea to Kiev? Or is he taking a hardline stance on Crimea in order to make a compromise deal? And if so, what kind of compromise? In the case of China, can Trump be tough after initially backing down on the One-China policy? Or will Trump need to make concessions—and if so, which ones? And how will North Korea impact Trump's calculus? Will China agree to play a key role in mediation with North Korea? Should he renew the six-party talks? Or should Trump meet directly with Kim Jung Un? Or both? What will be the impact of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which could become the major trading bloc in the world, without US involvement? And will Moscow and Beijing be able to forge a full-fledged Eurasian military alliance?

  Will his potential deals succeed or “fall out,” in Trump's language? And if it is true that “most deals fall out, no matter how promising they seem at first,” as he himself had affirmed—then the world is in real trouble. Gambling with war and nuclear weapons is not quite the same thing as gambling in Trump's casinos; although one can lose a fortune in a casino, everyone loses in a nuclear war.

  INITIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH MOSCOW

  Despite his policy flip-flops and feigned efforts to engage in Nixonian madness in order to keep all sides guessing as to his actual policies and tactics, Trump has been more or less correct that the United States needs to begin to engage in a rapprochement with Russia, otherwise the situation could spiral out of control. But he initially moved much too fast to reach out to Moscow and raised suspicions that he sought to profit personally from his Russian contacts, while Putin's alleged efforts, whether effective or not, to interfere in the US elections caused a significant, and hopefully not irreconcilable, American backlash. (See chapter 3.) Given these circumstances, how is a more concerted US-European-Russian relationship to be established?

  Based on Russian reports of the January 2017 Putin-Trump conversation, the issues the two presidents began to consider included: The creation of an anti-IS coalition; the establishment of a US-Russia partnership on an equal basis; and the possible “restoration” of trade and economic relations. This implied that sanctions imposed on Moscow after its annexation of Crimea could be reconsidered—but coupled with a quid pro quo with respect to a reduction of nuclear weapons.2 Putin and Trump accordingly reviewed possible cooperation on a wide range of issues, including Syria, Ukraine, Iran, the Korean Peninsula, and nuclear nonproliferation.3

  At the same time, it was clear even then that the conditions were still not ripe enough to reach out for a full-fledged US-Russian accord. On the one hand, Trump's approach was opposed by US and European critics who argued that it was too soon to consider lifting sanctions, given the perceived Russian failure to implement the Minsk II agreements, and without pressing Russia to give Crimea back to Ukraine. On the other hand, Moscow did not completely accept Trump's proposals, either. Moscow was not prepared to give up elements of its nuclear weapons capability without a quid pro quo on the part of the Americans. Nor was Putin willing to give up Crimea.

  Despite the backlash caused by Moscow's efforts to influence the American elections, the dilemma now is how to put US-Russia relations back on course so that they do not spin totally out of control. A first step to ameliorate tensions would be a US-Russia summit that would address all the disputes between the United States and Russia (ranging from Ukraine, to the wider Middle East, to China and North Korea), while seeking measures to reduce, if not eliminate, nuclear weaponry, and finding ways move away from putting nuclear missiles on high levels of alert and launch-on-warning. Such a summit would lead both sides to pledge to engage in concerted cooperation to resolve these disputes and other issues of concerns where possible. (See discussion, chapter 10.) Perhaps most crucially, from an American domestic standpoint, a Trump-Putin summit could also issue a sincere pledge of noninterference in each other's domestic politics, given allegations that both sides have interfered in each other's elections. (See discussion, chapter 3.)

  A US-Russia summit should then be followed by a revival of talks between the NATO-Russia Council. The concern raised here is that the buildup US and NATO power capabilities through the deployment of “permanently rotating” forces in the Baltic region, as has been pushed by the Trump-Pence administration since February 2017, risks undermining the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and will only result in a counter Russia military buildup. This buildup will in turn further escalate US-European-Russian (and Chinese) tensions—if such an approach is not simultaneously accompanied by a detailed plan for an alternative system of European security and a full US, NATO, and EU willingness to compromise with Moscow over what some NATO members might consider to be “vital” interests.

  The point is that the United States/NATO and Europeans need to define clear objectives so that they can convince Moscow that they are sincerely seeking to forge a grand compromise on Euro-Atlantic security. The United States and Europeans thus need to provide positive incentives and enticements and not just threats and sanctions in order to convince Moscow that a general militarization is not in Russian interests and that a closer Russian military alliance with China is not in Russian interests either. The promise to lift economic sanctions, for example, must be only one of the levers of a much larger and coordinated bargaining strategy that is intended to reduce overall NATO-EU-Russian tensions. The dilemma is how to implement a systemic approach to these issues of contention and show how they relate to each other, while seeking to find compromises or concessions where possible. (Nuclear-weapons issues are discussed in chapters 2 and 10.)

  EASTERN UKRAINE

  In many ways, it does not seem that Germany and France possess enough political leverage to press both Ukraine and Russia into a compromise in the Minsk discussions that have been facilitated by Belarus. For this reason, the United States, and possibly Turkey, should soon join the Contact Group discussions between Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia—since this conflict cannot be completely resolved unless the issues of both the NATO and EU enlargements are also on the table.

  One major goal (backed by Moscow but thus far opposed by Kiev) is to work toward the “decentralization” of the country. Kiev has opposed what it calls federalism, or what is really “asymmetrical federalism,” in the not-entirely-unjustified fear that federalism could eventually lead regions to demand independence. The dilemma, however, is that no one can really force from the outside the two sides to cooperate—so the situation in the Ukraine needs to move toward one of a “mutually hurting stalemate,”4 in which each side realizes on its own volition that it needs to agree to a mutual accord. Once again, Washington should join the process to help press both sides into an agreement.

  From the Russian perspective, Ukraine has not yet fulfilled its part of the February 2015 Minsk II agreements.5 The latter involves the parliamentary vote on decentralization—a vote which was postponed in 2016, but which is a crucial part of the Minsk process. But more constitutional reforms may be needed in order to ensure that Ukraine develops a true separation of powers and a true “decentralization.”6 German proposals for a special status law, a broad amnesty law, and a special election law for the Donbas appear possible to implement—but only if the Ukrainian coalition government under President Poroshenko can press for a resolution to
the conflict in eastern Ukraine. But these already-difficult-to-implement measures are taking place in the midst of a Ukrainian financial crisis and need for deep structural and anticorruption reforms.7 Once again, a more engaged US diplomatic presence is needed.

  To achieve peace, Kiev (backed by the United States and Europeans) needs to take official steps to meet with autonomist leaderships in order to negotiate peace settlement. Efforts to meet with the leadership of Russia-backed eastern-Ukrainian autonomists, as proposed by Ukrainian lawmaker Nadia Savchenko (and former prisoner of war in Russia), and to engage in prisoner exchange or other issues, need to be officially backed by Kiev, rather than denounced as “negotiating with terrorists.”8

  If a political settlement can be found, one possibility is the deployment of a “multinational brigade of neutral but armed peacekeepers with unrestricted access throughout the Donbas”9 in order to enforce Minsk II—otherwise Minsk II will fail. This proposal has merit, and Russia and Ukraine have considered the possibility of deploying peacekeepers. Thus far, Moscow has agreed only to a temporary and limited presence, but which does not control the territory linking Russia with the autonomist movements. For its part, Kiev wants to set up a more permanent and expanded peacekeeping force.

  But if these steps, as proposed by the Minsk II accords, fail, another more pessimistic scenario might result in a highly instable partition of the country, which will not benefit either side and which will create permanent tensions beyond Ukraine. This possibility becomes more probable if the United States does provide lethal assistance to Kiev. (See chapter 5.) A partition of the country could, ironically, force Moscow to financially subsidize the secessionist region—which would prove to be a more daunting task than holding up the Russian-supported breakaway republics of Transnistria (claimed by Moldova), South Ossetia, and Abkhazia (claimed by Georgia), and it could further militarize Russian actions. This represents yet another reason for a concerted international solution.

  There is a real risk is that an eventual partition of Ukraine, coupled with the permanently rotating deployment of NATO forces in the Baltic region, could in turn lead to a new partition of Europe—followed by the polarization of the world into two rival alliances. (See chapter 5.)

  TOWARD UKRAINIAN NEUTRALITY

  Once, and if, the Minsk II accords can be implemented (assuming Kiev can eventually implement the necessary constitutional changes and negotiate directly with the Donbas “autonomists”), the United States, Europe, and Russia then need to establish Ukraine as an internationally recognized neutral and “decentralized” country—with Crimea as a free-trade zone, yet under Russian sovereignty, while providing aid and assistance for Ukraine's development.

  Both former US Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski have called for a “neutral” Ukraine. Yet the Kissinger proposal for the formal “neutralization” of Ukraine, coupled with the non-recognition of Crimea, will not put an end to US-Russian-European geostrategic and political-economic tensions. And the crisis will continue unabated if Kiev does not finally grant some form of decentralization or autonomy arrangement for eastern Ukraine, as demanded by the Minsk II accord. There will also be no settlement if Kiev, backed by the United States and NATO, continues to demand that Crimea be returned to Ukraine as well, while Kiev concurrently develops a strong independent military capability. In short, a settlement of the Crimean question is essential if the conflict is to be resolved in the long term. If bargained cautiously, a resource-rich yet “neutral” and decentralized Ukraine—with sufficient self-defense forces and that does not harbor irredentist claims to Crimea—could begin to defuse tensions between NATO, the European Union, and Russia.10

  To arrive at a full accord with Moscow, there needs to be formal agreement over NATO expansion, European security, and Ukrainian neutrality. To accomplish this, NATO should formally announce a full suspension of NATO enlargement—but as part of a larger negotiation process that is intended to reach a deal with Moscow over Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and the Caucasus. While NATO has claimed that Article X of the Washington Treaty is “one of the Alliance's great successes,” there is nothing in Article X that supports the contention that NATO must expand its membership. NATO members “may” invite other states by unanimous agreement—but there is no necessity to offer an invitation to other states.11

  Moreover, membership in both the US-led NATO and the Russian-led CSTO are against Ukraine's initial statement of sovereignty. The statement of Ukrainian sovereignty (adopted on August 24, 1991) affirmed that Ukrainian SSR “declares its intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three nuclear free principles: to accept, to produce and to purchase no nuclear weapons.”12 It is furthermore possible that Ukraine could define itself as a permanently neutral country in that its constitution contains principles that state that it will not participate in coalitions.13

  The United States and NATO would accordingly need to modify NATO's “open enlargement” policy—at least for the Black Sea/Caucasus region. Such a modification of NATO's open-door policy would take place in exchange for the implementation of a new regional, yet internationalized, system of cooperative/collective security for the entire Black Sea and Caucasus regions—much as was envisioned by Turkish proposals for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform in 2008. Here, Ankara could enter the Minsk talks in order to deal with security issues concerning Crimea and the Caucasus that impact NATO-member Turkey.

  In other words, instead of extending full NATO membership to Ukraine, Georgia, or other states, and then attempt to integrate these countries back into NATO's command structure, the United States, Europeans, and Russians would extend overlapping US, European, and Russian security guarantees for states in the entire Black Sea and Caucasus region in the formation of a neutral “peace and development community”—in working with Turkey and other regional powers. The purpose would be to implement a cooperative/collective security approach to the region under the auspices of the Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that seeks to protect “vital” Russian and Ukrainian interests, while at the same time looking for new forms of regional and international cooperation.

  A full suspension of NATO enlargement would accordingly be part of a larger negotiation process that is intended to reach a deal with Moscow over Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and the Caucasus—among other issues that are dividing the United States, the European Union, and Russia. The promise of NATO enlargement has done nothing but send mixed signals to Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia. NATO enlargement has antagonized Moscow, while it has been concurrently disingenuous with Kiev and Tbilisi—as full NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia remains a highly unlikely prospect. Guarantees of Ukrainian neutrality, coupled with a gradual reduction of NATO and Russian forces in the Baltic region, could also minimize the ostensible need to expand NATO membership to EU members Sweden and Finland, given the Russian military buildup in the Baltic region. (See chapters 4 and 5.)

  CRIMEA AS A FREE-TRADE ZONE

  There are many who argue that the United States and Europe should simply accept the Russian annexation as a fait accompli. Yet this position does not address the question of competing claims and the political, economic, energy and legal disputes over Crimea, energy resources, and other issues in the vicinity—and the need to develop and eventually demilitarize the whole Black Sea-Caucasus region that will serve Russian interests as well. To fully develop the region will require international assistance. (See chapter 5.)

  The establishment of Crimea as an international free-trade zone with relative autonomy—but under Russian sovereignty—and the opening of Sevastopol to regional security and development cooperation, could open the doors for Russia to cooperate with Ukraine, as well as with the United States and Europeans. This is despite the evident friction over the annexation of Crimea, which shows no signs of dissipating at the time of this writing. The eventual opening of Crimea could, in turn, lead
both Russia and Ukraine to forge new forms of memberships with a reformed (and renamed) NATO and the European Union, given deeper security and political-economic cooperation.

  One option is to call for a new Crimean referendum. Such a plan was proposed by Andrii Artemenko, who was one of the contacts of President Trump's former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn in Ukraine, before Flynn was forced to resign. Essentially, Artemenko's plan would have required the withdrawal of all Russian forces from eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian voters would then decide in a new referendum whether Crimea would be leased to Russia for a term of fifty or one hundred years. The plan also outlined a way to lift sanctions on Russia.14

  Yet, if such a plan could be implemented, it appears unlikely that Moscow would accept the results of a new referendum in Ukraine that could potentially lead Moscow to give up sovereignty over Crimea after having already gone to such great lengths to annex it. On the other hand, it is not entirely impossible that Moscow could accept a way to pay for a lease of the isthmus in a negotiated deal, given the need for a legal accord that would attract foreign investment to Russia in the face of sanctions.15 As proposed above, a more feasible option might be the establishment of a free-trade zone under Russian sovereignty, or even a system of joint Russian-Ukrainian sovereignty. (See chapter 10.)

  Artemenko claimed that he had “compromising” evidence on the Poroshenko government, yet his plan was opposed by a number of Ukrainian politicians, who saw it as capitulating to Russian interests, and who accused Artemenko of treason.16 Further, it appears highly unlikely that Moscow would have accepted that plan either. Whether the United States and NATO can propose a more feasible plan that Moscow might accept will depend on the evolution not only of relations between the United States, the European Union, and Russia, but also between the Trump administration and Congress. (See chapters 3 and 10.)