World War Trump

by Hall Gardner

  PEACEKEEPING IN THE CAUCASUS?

  In addition to the potential deployment of peacekeepers under a general UN or OSCE mandate so as to assure security and development prospects in the Donbas region, peacekeepers could also be considered for the states of the southern Caucasus. Instead of demanding that Russia “evacuate Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, as well as Crimea and Donbass”17—as the hardline position that seeks to isolate Russia advocates and which Moscow would definitely consider as a casus belli—joint NATO, Russian, EU, and international peacekeepers under an OSCE mandate could be deployed in the so-called frozen conflicts in the southern Caucasus. The problem here will be how to engage in joint US, European, and Russian arrangements in an effort to share or internationalize (but not monopolize) those nonvital Russian spheres of influence and security where mutual agreement is possible.

  Joint NATO-Russia/CSTO-EU or multinational Partnership for Peace (PfP) peacekeeping deployments (under an OSCE or UN general mandate) could accordingly be deployed in the Donbas region as well as in the frozen conflicts in the Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. These deployments could take place under a joint NATO-EU-Russian command structure in which Russia plays a positive role. These peacekeeping operations would be somewhat similar to joint deployments in the former Yugoslavia in 1995, but Moscow would be truly represented as an equal. Given the fact that the tense situation in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan appears to be heating up,18 it seems that joint US/NATO, EU and Russia/CSTO peacekeeping efforts could prove essential to sustaining peace in this region.

  The above proposals presume the absolute need to strengthen NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and an EU peacekeeping force that could be deployed under an OSCE or UN mandate and work with UN and Russian/CSTO peacekeepers as well.19 NATO's PfP and EU peacekeeping is an underused tool that can succeed on the ground in helping to build trust between warring parties—if given the proper resources. And these proposals furthermore provide a real mission for EU foreign and defense policy to cooperate with the local states, Russia, and the United States under a general OSCE mandate. Peacekeepers are real heroes, and they should be considered so by Trump.

  WHY SHOULD RUSSIA ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSAL?

  Washington and Moscow need to revisit the Obama administration's failure to “reset” US-European-Russian relations after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Both countries need to reexamine both Dmitry Medvedev's June 2008 call for a new European Security Treaty and Turkish President Erdoğan's call for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.20

  With respect to Russia and Turkey, both Medvedev's and Erdoğan's proposals raised critical questions as to whether it was truly necessary to enlarge NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia, among other states. And both proposals raised questions as to whether there might be other viable options that could provide security for the Black Sea region. The joint US/NATO and EU failure to address these Russian and Turkish diplomatic initiatives—and thus to reconsider the process of enlarging both NATO and EU memberships into Russian-defined spheres of influence and security—represented a major reason for the Russian backlash in early 2014. Moscow consequently took matters into its own hands and decided to annex Crimea and support autonomous movements in eastern Ukraine.

  There is a further danger that renewed tensions in Georgia and between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the rise of pan-Islamist movements in Dagestan and elsewhere in the Russian Caucasus, could set off a new series of terrorist acts. Moreover, conflicts in the general Black Sea region and in both the southern and northern Caucasus could begin to interlink with the conflict in Syria and in the wider Middle East—given the return of Islamic State fighters to these regions and given Trump's strong support for Saudi Arabia against Iran. Both Riyadh and Tehran possess interests throughout the region in support of differing Islamist factions that could spark significant conflict. (See chapter 8.)

  The establishment of a formally neutral Ukraine, coupled with a negotiated settlement over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, would provide the United States and Europe some bargaining leverage to at least seek a reduction of the ongoing buildup of military forces in the Black Sea region, while likewise seeking to restrain Kiev's demands for a return of the Crimean isthmus. At the same time, it could permit Crimea greater autonomy within the Russian Federation, and help protect non-Russian minorities, including Tatars and Ukrainians.

  The Russian Federation is divided into republics, krais, oblasts, cities of federal importance, an autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs. In 2014, Sevastopol and the Crimean Republic became the eighty-fourth and eighty-fifth federal subjects of Russia. But could they, along with Kaliningrad, become free-trade and development zones under Russian sovereignty? Or could some form of joint system of sovereignty between Ukraine and Russia be established?

  Unless absolutely strapped for cash, it is highly unlikely that Moscow would ever give up total sovereignty over Crimea, much like it is unlikely that it would give the Kuril Islands/Northern Territories to Japan. But for Russia to hold onto Crimea and try to develop it without some form of international investments and backing is already proving quite costly and difficult. (See chapter 5.) Putin needs an economic boost to help him rule, as domestic opposition movements have begun to strengthen. Putin has accordingly pressed for an end of sanctions in order to attract foreign investment and lift the economy out of recession. Russian presidential elections will take place in 2018, and the Trump-Pence administration could possibly try to push for a grand US-Russian compromise just after those elections—that is, if it is possible, given strong domestic US opposition to any accords with Russia. Given the fact that Putin is still seen by the general population as willing to assert presumed Russian interests and to stand up against the pressures of the United States in particular, he will most likely win the 2018 Russian elections—but without as much popular domestic support as in the past given the generally faltering economy. Yet this should not stop the United States and Europeans from engaging in negotiations with Moscow simply in the belief that Putin's rule might soon collapse. (See chapter 4.)

  ROLE OF EUROPE

  The Ukrainian conflict now holds the key as to whether Russia can ever move closer to the Euro-Atlantic community. On the one hand, if the brutal war in eastern Ukraine continues to rage, it will stimulate a general arms race and destabilize US-EU-Russian and global relations. On the other hand, an overarching geopolitical settlement could help defuse tensions throughout the region and the world.

  The dilemma is that even closer political-economic ties to the European Union will not prove to be a panacea for Kiev, given its deep financial crisis. It is accordingly essential that the European Union work out mutual political-economic and financial accords with both Ukraine and Russia as soon as possible once the disputes over eastern Ukraine can be resolved. This can be accomplished in the process of rescinding sanctions against Russia (and vice versa for Russia to rescind sanctions on the European Union and the United States). In addition, the United States, Europeans, and Japanese need to look for ways to reduce the prospects of a US-Russia energy rivalry that could lead to war. One step would be to bring Moscow back into the G8 discussions after Russian membership was suspended in March 2014. The global energy (and environment) question could be one of the main concerns of future G8 talks—even if the May 2017 G7 conference had failed to reach a significant compromise over the issue of global warming with Donald Trump. Both G8 and EU-Russian discussions could likewise lead the European Union to work out a political-economic association accord that better balances both Russian and Ukrainian financial and political-economic interests, given the European Union's failure/refusal to do so in 2013–2014.

  Such efforts must be taken to achieve reconciliation between Kiev and eastern Ukraine within Ukraine itself at the national level and at the international level so that a neutral (and non-nuclear) Ukraine could truly serve as a gateway between the United States, Europe, and Russia, much
as former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, among others, has proposed.21 It is in US, European, and Russian interests to prevent Ukrainian state collapse, bankruptcy, and sociopolitical instability from degenerating into a wider sociopolitical conflict. Evidently such an approach can take place only if all sides realize that compromise over presumed “vital” issues is in their mutual interests.

  TOWARD A NEW EU DEFENSE AND SECURITY CAPABILITY

  Trump's insistence that NATO was “obsolete” has ironically led the Europeans to consider other options—if they can coordinate policies. The possibility that Washington might no longer back NATO has led the French and Germans to consider forging a new post-Brexit European defense entity that would be more autonomous than NATO.

  In September 2016, the French and Germans called for a joint and permanent EU command headquarters for its civilian and military missions and a strengthening of the Eurocorps. The initiative would not create a European army as such. But it would seek to advance the European Union's own joint land, air, and sea transport; relief/medical capabilities; peacekeeping; plus its ability to participate in the Global War on Terrorism. It would also initiate a European defense research program that would be funded by the common EU budget by 2021–2027, with France and Germany initiating the program in 2017.22

  A more unified European defense and security capability, which would pool defense resources, could theoretically engage in peacekeeping, anti-piracy, and anti-terrorism operations, while more effectively handling the waves of immigrants trying to cross the Mediterranean.23 A new European defense force would represent a coalition of the willing and should be directed only toward defensive and peacekeeping measures. It would be more autonomous and could theoretically work with both NATO and Russia.24 But to do this, the European Union first needs to implement a Common Foreign and Defense Policy step-by-step. The European Union has outlined five possible scenarios for its future, but it needs US diplomatic backing if it is to succeed in creating a truly common defense.25

  Over the years, the Europeans have demanded greater defense autonomy from NATO. Now, following the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the Europeans need to put their money where their mouths are. The United Kingdom, the most powerful military actor in NATO after the United States, had previously blocked a more integrated European defense structure, due to its close defense ties with Washington. At the same time, the political-military dilemma is that Germany has been more supportive of a more federal system of European integration, while France's approach has been more intergovernmental.

  If the United States, Europe, and Russia can eventually reach a common accord over defense and security concerns in Europe, NATO can begin to wither way—but it must not totally collapse without first working to put in its place a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture that leads the Europeans to cooperate with both the United States and Russia. If, however, NATO cannot soon find ways to cooperate with Moscow, the defection of Turkey and France, among other states, from NATO is a real possibility.

  TOWARD GREATER EU POLITICAL-ECONOMIC COORDINATION

  It is also crucial that the Europeans begin to coordinate both its geostrategic and political-economic strategy toward Moscow by looking for ways to incorporate both Russia and the other post-Soviet states, including Ukraine, into new forms of European Associate Partnership agreements. Eventually post-Soviet states could enter the post-Brexit EU as “Associate Members,” as to be argued. The European Union likewise needs to work with the United States, Russia, and Turkey to establish a new system of Euro-Atlantic security based on cooperation over the Black Sea region. Such a practical project—the effort to bring peace and development to the Black Sea and Caucasus regions—could in turn provide a means for the Europeans to unify their divergent foreign and security policies, particularly if the conflict between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus can soon be resolved.

  Given the real possibilities of the further breakup of the European Union after Brexit, Washington needs to back strong partners, and these actors need to be politically and economically stable and possess governments that are perceived as legitimate. The rise of a number of anti-EU movements that seek to drop the Euro as a currency, dump their creditors, and then exit the European Union, means that the European Union needs to engage in substantial internal reforms and changes in its external policies as well, in order to surmount the financial crisis since 2008. The latter crisis largely stems from low US interest rates since 2001 the US mortgage and toxic-loans crisis, which in turn exacerbated the crises of banking and finance, public debt, and underinvestment in Europe.26

  The European Union needs to tighten the Franco-German relationship with the rest of its core members, step-by-step, but it also needs forge new kinds of loose linkages with the United Kingdom and other states, such as Russia and Turkey, that do not meet full membership requirements. Here, depending on how the separation between the European Union and the United Kingdom is negotiated (a process that could prove very lengthy and costly), Brexit could possibly provide a new model for forging new EU political-economic relationships with other states that could then develop differing forms of partnership and associated membership with a new, more decentralized, European Union, with a hard Franco-German core and looser appendages.

  In effect, a confederal approach to European unity should be pursued that addresses both intergovernmental relations and relations between the different European societies and their values—as opposed to a strong federal approach. The European Union, for example, needs to eliminate its “democratic deficit” and to decentralize some of its decision-making in accord with its own doctrine of subsidiarity, in attempting to better balance local, national, and European interests and concerns—so as to permit greater local and national input into the EU decision-making processes.27

  One possibility is, thus, for the full or “core” members of the European Union to create a new category of “Associate Membership.”28 European or even non-European states with important financial, trade, or even military interests in Europe—and which are willing to contribute to EU activities and responsibilities—could, if accepted, become Associate Members that possess limited membership rights. This Associate Membership category could possibly include limited voting rights in specific areas of mutual interests (thus going beyond the status of partnership). In such a way, Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey could become Associate Members—particularly if they work with the Europeans and the Americans to establish a new Black Sea regional peace and development community, for example.

  Even though Turkey remains a NATO member, it is highly unlikely that it will become a full EU member under present EU rules. But Turkey could become an Associate Member if the European Union begins to reform itself significantly after Brexit. Many politicians on all sides of the political spectrum have argued that it is time to end European hypocrisy and tell Ankara that it will never join the European Union. But this statement implies that the European Union itself will not reform and that it will not eventually morph into a new international regime after Brexit, with core and associate members. Despite President Erdoğan's significant turn toward authoritarianism and repression in Turkey, Berlin, for example, has thus far wanted to keep the door open to Turkish membership in the European Union.29

  From this perspective, the European Union will need to readjust its EU Partnership program so as to include Russian, Ukrainian, and Turkish political-economic interests. EU political-economic deals with Belarus and other states will also need to find ways to accommodate Moscow's interests as well. The Ukrainian financial crisis will prove almost impossible to resolve without Russian (and Chinese) finance along with European and American funding. This all implies the need for the Trump-Pence administration to work with the Europeans to reform, not abolish, the European Union. Otherwise, there is a real possibility of a new partition of Europe, running through eastern Ukraine.

  THE QUESTION OF TURKEY

  As argued above, it is highly unlikely that Turkey
will become an EU member—unless both the European Union and Turkey begin to reform themselves significantly after Brexit along the lines proposed in this chapter—given the extremely poor relations between the United States, the European Union, and Turkey in recent years. The fact is that Turkey, which is a NATO member but not an EU member, has made it very difficult for NATO and the European Union to fully cooperate. In particular, the need to resolve the intra-NATO dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, among other issues, is one of the keys to improve Turkish-EU relations.

  Turkish-EU relations have been in a bad state for years, given the EU refusal to accept Turkey as a member due to its large population, its predominantly Muslim culture, and its threats to bring back the death penalty. These issues have been made even worse in the aftermath of the immigrant crisis, which began in 2011, following the Arab Spring movements. This crisis led Ankara to threaten that it might unleash thousands of non-European immigrants into the European Union. In addition, since the July 2016 Gülen coup attempt, Turkey's Prime Minister Erdoğan has taken a significant turn toward authoritarianism, or “illiberal democracy,” given his still high level of popular support.30

  Nevertheless, it is crucial that Turkey plays a balancing role between the United States/NATO, Russia, and the Europeans. But here, even if Ankara continues to veer toward authoritarianism and “illiberal democracy,” there may still be ways to mitigate its authoritarian tendencies and reconcile Europe and Turkey. One way would be to negotiate a federated accord between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, guaranteed by Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom under UN auspices. A UN-brokered deal between Greek and Turkish Cyprus that could resolve property disputes and population displacement could then permit Cyprus to become the first major outlet of maritime trade outside the Suez Canal. And the European Investment Bank/European Bank for Reconstruction and other funds could help develop massive energy reserves in the eastern Mediterranean. If proportioned carefully and fairly, the vast reserves of the eastern Mediterranean could then benefit littoral states, including Greece, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria.31