World War Trump

by Hall Gardner

  Such an accord could open up Turkey to tremendous trade opportunities with Greece and the European Union, while likewise more closely linking the European Union with NATO member Turkey, in order to limit Turkey from shifting too close to Moscow. Nevertheless, Turkey could still play a key role in bringing NATO, the European Union, and Russia into a closer confederated relationship.32 After resolving the Cyprus issue, it might prove easier to resolve somewhat-similar disputes in the Caucasus, if not in Crimea as well. Once again, this appears plausible if, after Brexit, the European Union could forge differing membership criteria that would permit Turkey, Russia, and other states to enter the European Union in a new form of associate partnership. As previously argued, Associate Members of the European Union could possess limited voting rights on certain issues that would not be related to their size of population and would possess clearly defined responsibilities related to those issues.

  COOPERATION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

  Donald Trump has made US-European-Russian cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism one of the major themes of his presidency. This is a legitimate goal, if carried out appropriately, but one that has proved very difficult to implement, particularly given the rise of strong anti-Russian sentiment in the United States and the difficulties involved in finding ways for Russia and the United States to agree about what to do with the Assad regime in Syria. Despite the difficulties, a truly concerted approach involving Russia and the other major and regional powers is crucial for preventing the further spread of the Islamic State, al-Nusra, and other anti-state, partisan “terrorist” groups.

  This approach seeks ways to put an end to what is essentially a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran throughout the wider Middle East. What is needed is joint US-European-Russian cooperation to press for a cease-fire in Syria and Yemen and to eventually press Saudi Arabia and Iran into cooperation, thus putting an end to their proxy wars and the regional arms race.33 These steps will require finding ways to balance conflicting domestic socio-political groups, while co-opting some Islamist parties and isolating or destroying others. The key dilemma will be finding an accord with Iran and Hezbollah. If it is given some encouragement and incentives by the European Union, among other incentives from the United States, as argued above, then Turkey could play a key role in helping to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as between Russia and the United States.

  One option may be for Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to take asylum in either Russia or Iran in order to permit the formation of a new Syrian governmental coalition backed by the United States, Europeans, and Russia. This is because most of the Syrian opposition has thus far refused to participate in peace talks that permit the Assad leadership a future role in the governance of the country. On the other hand, a resolution to the Syrian conflict that could result in a loose confederation, or else a possible partition, might mitigate the need for al-Assad to step down, as he would hold power in the Alawite regions along the coast.

  Yet the only way Syria could be held together in a confederal arrangement would probably be if some form of joint Arab-Turkish or international peacekeeping force could be deployed under a general UN mandate. The dilemma is that Turkish forces have threatened to move into Syria to check the formation of separate Kurdish enclaves that could, Turkey fears, support Kurdish independence movements inside Turkey. This means the United States, Europeans, and Russia need to find some mutual accords between Syrian Kurds and Kurds in Turkey itself. In this view, Ankara and differing Kurdish movements in Syria, Turkey, and Iraq need to forge Kurdish autonomy agreements, with US, EU, and Russian backing.34

  Here, instead of demanding full independence, which is nearly impossible to sustain in a highly interconnected world, and particularly as a landlocked society, Kurdish parties in Syria, Iran, and Turkey could opt for autonomy arrangements, much as the Kurds have achieved in Iraq after the 2003 US-led military intervention. Yet the regional situation will prove even more complicated and dangerous if Iraqi Kurds continue to demand independence from the Iraqi federal government due to disputes with Baghdad over the issues of autonomy and taxation in the aftermath of the nonbinding September 2017 referendum on the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurd leader Marwan Barzani claimed victory for independence demands even before the ballots were counted, while Ankara and Baghdad threatened strong sanctions. Baghdad, backed by Iran, then began to seize Kirkuk and other oil-rich territories formerly controlled by the Kurds, potentially opening the door to a new regional conflict.35 (See chapter 8.)

  ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

  Trump was furious when the Obama administration had refused to veto the UN Security Council's resolution that condemned Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.36 Obama's ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, abstained from voting, on the basis that Israeli irredentist claims and plans to expand settlements in Palestinian territory could undermine any prospect of reaching a possible “two-state” solution to the ongoing conflict. At that time, a neophyte Trump supported not only expanding Israeli settlements but also Israeli claims to Jerusalem as the Israeli capital.

  To obtain Jewish American votes, Trump, like many presidents before him, had suggested moving the US embassy to a new Israeli capital in Jerusalem. Trump has, however, appeared to back off on such a position after becoming president, just as he has on so many other questions. King Abdullah II of Jordan purportedly warned Trump that moving the embassy to Jerusalem could threaten the two-state solution, exacerbate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and augment recruits for the Islamic State.37 At the same time, Jordan is concerned that the radicalization of the Palestinian movement might lead to secessionist or Islamist Palestinian movements inside Jordan, due to the large number of Palestinian refugees (more than two million) who have settled there. The president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, also warned Trump against supporting Israeli claims to all of Jerusalem.

  And while Trump appears to have backtracked on his previous support for the renewed expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the Trump administration has not yet developed a full-fledged policy—except that it could be secretly pressing for a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Israel.38 Trump has met with both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian leader of the West Bank, but it is still not clear what kind of accord can be achieved. To achieve peace, Trump will need to eventually press both sides into a settlement. Here, however, Trump may be pressing Israel and Saudi Arabia into a deal that would take Palestinian interests only into limited consideration in the effort to forge a united front against Iran. If so, such an unholy alliance could enrage many Islamist groups throughout the Arab/Islamic world.

  Yet as an alternative strategy to achieve peace in the long term that would not rely primarily on Saudi Arabia, the United States could reach out to both Saudi Arabia and Qatar for diplomatic support and financing through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, in an effort to press Israel to accept a modified Arab peace plan with further negotiations. This could open the door to greater Arab investment not only in Palestine (which would also expand Israeli markets) but also in Israel itself. The Arab Gulf states have agreed to set up telecommunication lines with Israel, open trade negotiations, and allow Israeli planes to fly over their airspace. In exchange, Israel would need to freeze settlement construction in the West Bank and relax trade restrictions with the Gaza Strip.39

  The two-state solution is the Arab and the UN-sponsored approach.40 There have been reports that the president of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, might present a plan to the Israelis in which the Palestinians would give up 6.5 percent of their lands to Israel—three times as much as previously offered. The proposal would not include Jerusalem. In exchange, one option is for Israel to return to the Palestinians land equivalent to 5.8 percent of the West Bank, along with lands that would connect the West Bank to the Gaza Strip.41

&
nbsp; The political dilemma is that Benjamin Netanyahu appears determined to implement a “one-state” solution with Saudi support. President Trump, after his meetings with the Israeli leader, publicly voiced the option of a one-state solution. While it appears feasible that Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, and Jordan might support such an approach, it appears unlikely that the rest of the Arab world, Iran, and the divided Palestinians would acquiesce.

  A third option is a confederal solution, but as a slight modification of the two-state concept. This is feasible given the fact that Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza have largely separate leaderships and will need to forge power-sharing accords, perhaps like those in Northern Ireland. At the same time, Hamas has been trying to change its image in part due to its own mismanagement of Gaza. Israeli sanctions are not the only factor undermining the full development of the Gaza enclave. The fact that Hamas also opposes groups like the Islamic State also leads it to seek new backers. Concurrently, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar impacts Hamas, but also represents a major issue over which Doha and Riyadh could find compromise, particularly if assisted by US and multilateral diplomacy. (See chapter 8.)

  An Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement is not a panacea that will suddenly put an end to the Global War on Terrorism, and it will not put a sudden end to the conflicts that have been raging between Shi'a and Sunni, between Kurds and Turks, and among differing Sunni factions. But it would help bring the majority of “moderate” and undecided individuals and groups of Arab/Islamic background (plus others who may support Palestinian rights but not Islamist movements) closer to the positions of the United States, Europeans, and Russia. Concrete steps toward a full-fledged Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement would begin to socially and politically isolate those who continue support violent pan-Islamist movements.

  Without concrete progress toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Trump will find it very difficult to forge a concerted approach to the Global War on Terrorism that involves both major and regional powers—including those states most impacted by differing Islamist movements. Trump's rhetoric has only tended to inflame the already-grave crisis.

  THE IMPORTANCE OF THE IRAN NUCLEAR ACCORD

  What is needed to resolve the crisis with Iran is a new regionally based diplomacy, backed by Washington, that brings Iran into differing multilateral discussions with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, the Kurds, the Palestinians, and Israel, if possible, among other states in the region. Placing heavy political and economic sanctions and military pressures on Tehran in the effort to force it to stop developing its ballistic and cruise missile capabilities and to stop it from supporting Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen, as Trump has proposed in opposing the Iran nuclear accord or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), will not succeed without regional negotiations. Nor will such pressures help deal with the Kurdish independence question. In addition, the possibility that the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel will focus primarily on the Iranian “threat” will tend to sidetrack the Global Coalition against Daesh from fully focusing on efforts to destroy the Islamic State and al-Qaeda—while undermining the possibility of a nuclear accord with North Korea.

  First, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq need to find ways to compromise with Iraqi Kurdish demands for independence through mediating the formation of loose confederal arrangements among Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian Kurds, for example, but without engaging in a major alteration of borders. With respect to Iranian support for Hamas, Washington needs to encourage Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and other states, to settle their differences with respect to the Palestinian “two-state” solution and toward Hamas in particular. By the same token, the questions of Hezbollah and Houthis need to be addressed in the process of settling the ongoing wars in Syria and Yemen, by means of finding a domestic power-sharing settlement in Yemen, as proposed by the United Nations. (See chapter 8.) Evidently none of these proposals represent an easy process, but they can be dealt with only by diplomacy, not by force.

  With respect to the Iranian nuclear issue, it is highly unlikely that Israel would give up its purported “existential” nuclear deterrent, as demanded by most Arab states and Iran. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have all threatened to develop a nuclear weapons capability—particularly if Iran acquires a nuclear weapons capability in addition to Israel. But given Israel's intransigence to even discuss its nuclear weapons capabilities, another possible option is to pursue an agreement involving a “no-first-use” of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) for all states in the wider Middle East region. Such a “no-first-use” of WMDs accord would permit states in the region to engage in a new strategic dialogue that could eventually result in the control and reduction of conventional weaponry, including ballistic and cruise missiles. Washington could help initiate multilateral negotiations intended to limit missile capabilities through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), for example, while seeking compromise on a number of geopolitical disputes. And instead of seeking an Israeli-Saudi alliance against Iran, the United States should not drop out of the Iran nuclear accord; it should try to improve the JCPOA verification procedures and its implementation—but gradually, as confidence is restored over time.

  A Trump administration and US congressional effort to suddenly try to renegotiate perceived weaknesses in the JCPOA nuclear accord will not succeed—as it will prove very difficult, if not impossible, to restore mutual confidence between the United States and Iran, whose revolutionary guards have threatened war if Washington labels them as a terrorist organization. (See chapter 8.) It is thus up to Washington to build upon the JCPOA, not by undermining that treaty, but by negotiating a new series of multilateral treaties. New multilateral treaties would seek to establish an agreement over the “no-first-use” of WMDs; the control and limitation of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities; joint development of alternative energies, such as solar and geothermal, in an effort to reduce Iran's demand for nuclear power; plus diplomatic agreements that seek to ameliorate regional rivalries (between Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, the Palestinians, the Kurds, and Iran, among other states and populations) that have resulted in horrific acts of state-supported and anti-state terrorism.

  The JCPOA can significantly reduce the threat of further nuclear proliferation throughout the wider Middle East, but the treaty will only work in the long term if the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran can sustain full confidence. Trump's demands that the JCPOA Iran nuclear accord be renegotiated is doomed to failure and will only exacerbate the conflicts that are now confronting the wider Middle East and the world—and could lead other regional states to develop a nuclear deterrent, in addition to North Korea.

  INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND KASHMIR

  Areas of mutual US-Russian-Indian interest need to be explored for the development of joint policies: A Taliban victory in Afghanistan, for example, does not appear to be in Russian, Chinese, or US/NATO interests. This represents a major area in which these three sides could potentially find ways to cooperate. India could also engage more effectively in a Contact Group to help resolve disputes in Central and Southwest Asia, if not the Indo-Pacific as well. At the same time, however, Moscow has opened up talks with the Taliban in expectation of NATO withdrawal and an eventual Taliban victory. But India would most likely oppose recognition of the Taliban, given the latter's links to Pakistan. These issues need to be thoroughly discussed in a new Contact Group format.

  The fact that India joined the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2017,42 and that India has sought to speed up the signing of a free-trade agreement (FTA) with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, which includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan in 2017,43 has raised questions as to whether India will move out of relative neutrality and move closer toward a Eurasian alliance—despite its ongoing disputes with Pakistan and China. Given the development of closer defense ties with the United States and Japan, how India's relations
with both Russia and China will develop remains to be seen. (See chapter 7.)

  Yet instead of siding with one alliance or the other, India could play a mediating and balancing role. But this will also require India-Pakistan reconciliation over Kashmir and other issues.44 Here New Delhi has been reticent to engage in such discussions, whether mediated by the United States or more recently by China. As the situation in Kashmir appears to be getting worse,45 one option is to propose joint Pakistani-Indian sovereignty agreements. But this will prove difficult to implement, given the rise of militant groups that seek total independence—as if total independence would be possible in today's highly interconnected world.

  Could India shift toward Russia and China despite the apparent development of even closer Russian-Chinese ties to India's rival Pakistan and to the Taliban? Or could China, as it seeks to develop areas in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir and in Pakistan itself, mediate the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir, for example, as has been suggested by the Chinese media, but opposed by New Delhi? Or will India continue to tilt toward the United States, Europe, and Japan? Or could New Delhi eventually play a mediating role between the United States, Europeans, and Japan on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other?

  TOWARD PEACE IN ASIA