World War Trump

by Hall Gardner

  In May 2016, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe advocated an eight-point plan for Vladivostok that was designed to ameliorate Russia-Japanese tensions. His goal was to “make Vladivostok a city that links Eurasia and the Pacific Ocean…. Let's diversify Russia's industry and make it more efficient. Let's turn the Russian Far East into an export base for the entire Asia-Pacific region.”46 As this action seemed to break US- and EU-led sanctions on Russia, it was purportedly opposed by President Obama.

  These accords include a joint $1 billion Russian-Japanese investment fund between Russian Direct Investment Bank and Japan's Bank for International Cooperation; a special system for joint economic activity for Kurile Islands/Northern Territories; and an easing of travel restrictions to the islands.47 The ultimate goal is to achieve a peace treaty—but there was no accord signed that would resolve the territorial dispute. Nevertheless, Putin did admit, “that the absence of a peace treaty between Russia and Japan is, of course, an ‘anachronism.’”48

  To prevent the real possibility of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, particularly given the North Korean threat, Japanese efforts to seek out a rapprochement with Russia eventually need to be backed (at least tacitly) by the Trump administration with a focus on joint US-Russian-Japanese energy projects on Sakhalin island, among other bilateral Russian-Japanese accords. Given the fact that Tokyo took the first step in engaging in a rapprochement with Russia after the sanctions placed on Moscow in 2014 (after Russia's annexation of Crimea and political-military interference in eastern Ukraine), the first steps toward a US-Russian entente could possibly take place in Asia, and in particular by working cooperatively to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. (See chapter 7.) But steps toward a full US and Japanese rapprochement with Russia will prove very difficult without a political and legal settlement with respect to Ukraine and Crimea.

  Concurrently, the United States, ASEAN states, Japan, Russia, and China will need to work out new joint development projects over disputed islands in the South China Sea and East China Sea. New multilateral agreements could involve joint naval patrols and combined task forces in combating terrorism, piracy, and trafficking of illicit materials (to North Korea, for example). Trump's offer, on his trip to Asia in November 2017, to negotiate island disputes in the South China Sea between China and its neighbors appears extremely positive—assuming Trump will actually provide the State Department with sufficient resources to do the job correctly.49

  But the possibility of a concerted approach has thus far been undermined by the buildup of tensions with North Korea and the inability of the United States and China to coordinate strategy, while also involving Moscow. Here, Japanese and South Korean efforts to engage in positive relations with Moscow, through trade and investments in Russia, for example, are crucial to obtain Russian assistance in helping to settle the North Korean crisis. These steps in Asia could eventually open the door to much stronger US-EU-Russian relations in Europe—that is, if Trump does not also inadvertently destabilize relations with South Korea by renegotiating or terminating the US-South Korean free-trade agreement (KORUS FTA) because of a $17 billion US trade deficit with Seoul in 2016.50 (See chapter 7.)

  THE CRISIS OF NORTH KOREA

  Finding a common policy among the United States, China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan toward North Korea is absolutely crucial to preventing war on the Korean Peninsula. (See chapter 7.) The United States, Russia, China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea had already taken part in six-party talks from 2003 to 2009 in an effort to denuclearize North Korea. The problem now is how to reinitiate those Contact Group talks that had stalled in the aftermath of renewed nuclear and missile testing by North Korea, and in the aftermath of the US refusal in September 2005 to provide North Korea with light-water nuclear power plants as Pyongyang requested.51

  Although North Korea and China are said to possess a closely interrelated relationship of “lips to teeth,” Beijing does not support North Korea's nuclear provocations, as it would prefer to preserve its own nuclear hegemony over Pyongyang. In effect, Beijing would prefer the “denuclearization of the peninsula,”52 But this demand might not prove realistic. Beijing has thus far tried to take a balanced position between North Korea and the United States. Beijing fears that an effort to engage in a complete embargo on coal and food supplies or to engage in regime change, polices proposed by the United States, will eventually destabilize the country and thus undermine its sphere of security and influence against Japanese, South Korean, and American political-economic and military influence, while also undercutting Chinese economic interests within the country.

  For its part, the United States is prepared to impose sanctions not only on North Korea but also on other countries where companies or individuals are known to have helped North Korea's military programs. This is in accord with UN Security Council Resolution 2270, which Beijing had supported in the UN Security Council, and which gives a mandate to all countries to search every ship and aircraft coming in or out of North Korea to make sure there are no illicit goods and to prevent nuclear proliferation.53 The latter UN sanctions are important in that they impact the Strategic Rocket Force of the Korean People's Army and systems of illicit financing arranged by the Koryo Bank, in addition to sanctions placed on certain individuals. Both China and Russia did agree to consider even tougher UN sanctions, and they could possibly consider an oil embargo. But so far, sanctions do not seem to be stopping North Korea from testing its missiles.

  Beijing signed the UN Security Council Resolution 2270 on sanctions, yet it does not believe sanctions alone are sufficient. China would thus prefer to press Pyongyang to freeze its missile and nuclear weapons programs in exchange for a halt to US-South Korean annual drills and freezing the deployment of missile defense systems—positions thus far opposed by Washington. China does not want war, nor does it want a destabilization of the Korean Peninsula, which could result in a massive refugee crisis. Nor does Beijing want a South Korean buyout of the North in which South Korea, backed by the United States, would dominate North Korea in a way similar to how West Germany, backed by the United States, bought out East Germany. At the same time, Beijing fears that a nuclear North Korea with effective delivery capabilities could provoke Japan and South Korea to obtain nuclear weaponry—as is being proposed by both Japanese and South Korean nationalist groups. Despite Chinese objections, Kim Jung Un appears determined to keep North Korea's nuclear weaponry as a deterrent against any rival, Japan, South Korea, the United States—and potentially China itself.

  China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, has been worried that the region is faced with a “precarious situation” in which “one has the feeling that a conflict could break out at any moment…. If a war occurs, the result is a situation in which everybody loses and there can be no winner.”54 In addition to urging both North Korea and the United States to calm down, Wang Yi has also urged Moscow to play a diplomatic role as well. Both Beijing and Moscow hope to revive six-party talks over North Korea—if the Trump administration will agree.55

  Yet the Trump position, as thus far formulated by Rex Tillerson, is that the United States would not negotiate with Pyongyang unless it first gave up both its nuclear and missile programs. This is a nonstarter, as North Korea has already declared itself to be a “nuclear state” much as NATO has declared itself to be a “nuclear alliance.” President Trump and his Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have accordingly tried to put the onus on China to resolve the Korean issue through diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. Here, Trump has hoped to attract China by offering a good trade deal if Beijing helps out with North Korea. At the same time, Trump has threatened to act alone militarily if Beijing does not put sufficient pressure on the North Korean regime to prevent it from expanding its nuclear and missile-delivery programs.56 In this regard, South Korean government officials and the Pentagon have discussed the option of deploying US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea to counter the North Korean nuclear threat—an option that could cause a
dangerous counter-reaction by Pyongyang.57

  As previously argued, Trump and Kim have entered into a personal radioactive pissing match without any end in sight. This was indicated by Trump's visit to South Korea in November 2017, during which Trump once again warned North Korea (but in less apocalyptic language) not to test the resolve of his administration, which he claimed was tougher than past US administrations. But for Trump, the only way for the United States to begin negotiations with North Korea is for Kim Jung Un to take the first step, by stopping the development of his nuclear missiles and by accepting a “complete, verifiable, and total denuclearization.”58

  Once again, it is dubious North Korea will accept Trump's formula. Nevertheless, from the perspective of China, and possibly for North Korea as well, the option of denuclearization could prove feasible, but only if the United States denuclearizes its own armed forces in the area or if the two sides can engage in step-by-step downsizing of their conventional and nuclear capabilities with international verification. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has accordingly called for the denuclearization of the entire peninsula and for an end to US-South Korea military exercises: “The use of force does not solve differences and will only lead to bigger disasters…. [China should not be] a focal point of the problem on the peninsula…. The key to solving the nuclear issue on the peninsula does not lie in the hands of the Chinese.”59

  While Beijing has wanted Washington to engage in quiet talks with Pyongyang, Rex Tillerson has replied that it was up to North Korea to take the first concrete steps, not Washington: “We will not negotiate our way back to the negotiating table…. We will not reward their bad behavior with talks.”60 As Tillerson indicated on Trump's tour of the Asia-Pacific in November 2017, the United States has accordingly been reluctant to initiate talks with Pyongyang—as it has not wanted to be seen as caving to North Korea, which could reinitiate nuclear weapons and missile tests unexpectedly, even if peace talks were announced. Tillerson had previously affirmed that the United States is not seeking “regime change” in North Korea, even though it is not absolutely certain that Trump is in full agreement.61 (See chapter 7.) In his November 2017 trip to Asia, Tillerson then argued that he could envision the possibility that the United States and North Korea could agree to hold talks at some point, but only as a precursor to formal negotiations. Tillerson stated that he would seek a signal from Kim Jong Un himself indicating that he would like to have some type of a meeting, communicating through one of the two or three communication channels that the United States possesses with North Korea. But Tillerson also forewarned that the United States would continue to threaten North Korea as long as Kim did not give up his nuclear weapons program.62

  US policy is faced with a real conundrum. On the one hand, Washington wants to halt North Korea's nuclear and missile program while also “containing” the ambitions of both China and Russia. On the other hand, Washington also wants Russia to resolve its dispute with Ukraine on Washington's terms and argues that China should be the prime agent in resolving the dispute with North Korea. This evidently makes positive support from both Moscow and Beijing difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, China appears to possess greater incentive to act in the North Korea case because it feels more threatened by a potential war on the Korean Peninsula than Moscow feels threatened by a potentially wider war over Ukraine that could encompass the Black Sea and eastern European regions.

  Another dilemma is that the Trump-Pence administration needs to figure out how to demonstrate a minimum show of American force as a deterrent in support of South Korea and Japan, while also engaging in an informal dialogue with Pyongyang—an option that has been urged by Beijing for the last couple of years, but had been refused by the Obama administration, and thus far by the Trump administration. Without real dialogue with Pyongyang, the Trump administration could fail to prevent a nuclear war. Such an initial dialogue, which need not be interpreted as capitulation, could then help strengthen the Chinese position and permit Beijing apply more pressure, including tighter sanctions, on North Korea, if necessary.63 The problem remains: How much should Washington rely on Beijing to do the negotiating? And how much of the negotiating with Pyongyang should be led by Washington? Beijing has purportedly told Washington that it had informed North Korea “that if they did conduct further nuclear tests, China would be taking sanctions actions on their own.”64 And in November 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping did say he was unequivocally against North Korea sustaining a nuclear capability.65

  At some point in the near future, the United States should begin to offer Pyongyang some practical proposals through quiet diplomacy.66 Washington should promise to normalize US-North Korean relations and no longer threaten preemptive strikes against Pyongyang's nuclear program, if North Korea would agree to a “nuclear freeze,” rejoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and permit comprehensive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), along the lines of Iran JCPOA nuclear accord. (See chapter 8.) Hopefully, North Korea could then promise to eventually eliminate all of its nuclear weapons, but most likely only in exchange for firm joint security guarantees from the six powers. A step-by-step process of gradual demilitarization by both the North and South Koreans, in which both sides would then begin to withdraw their forces from the Demilitarized Zone, could then be matched by a step-by-step withdrawal of US forces and elimination of economic sanctions on North Korea. The United States would be prepared to return to the assistance of South Korea if necessary but would work with all the permanent members of the UN Security Council to provide joint security assurances for North Korea. This would ensure that North Korea remains a “buffer” between China and South Korea and that South Korea (whose economy is fifty times the size of North Korea's) would not buy up the North as West Germany bought up East Germany. Both North and South Korea could then enter into a very loose confederation until other political arrangements could be made. In the meantime, the United States, South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia would fund North Korean energy needs and development, while seeking ways to decommission North Korea's heavy investments in the military (Pyongyang may spend as much as 22 percent of its GDP on the military, at the expense of the population67) and convert its economy to more useful and productive consumer activities. Hopefully this approach will prove feasible, as even a very limited and inspected North Korea nuclear deterrent, as perhaps demanded by Pyongyang, appears unacceptable to Washington, Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing.

  Trump could eventually propose something like this in meeting with Kim Jung Un. The realist side of Trump has stated that he would be “honored,” to meet directly with Kim Jung Un, but “under the right circumstances.” Yet Trump also stated: “There is a chance that we could end up having a major, major conflict with North Korea. Absolutely, We'd love to solve things diplomatically but it's very difficult.”68

  The United States needs to take a less self-righteousness approach and engage in a real and intensive dialogue—which is the only way to end the impasse and prevent the real risks of either a collapse of the North Korean regime or a possible regional war. It seems informal US-North Korean dialogue leading to a direct meeting between Trump and Kim Jung Un could begin to provide North Korea with the international respect and attention that it has been craving in the aftermath of the 1950–1953 Korean War, in which the United States devastated the country with conventional bombs and Napalm while threatening the use of nuclear weaponry.69 International aid and assistance could then help to develop the country in exchange for step-by-step demilitarization and informal accords between North and South Korea. North Korea would then be backed by mutual security assurances by the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom (as outlined above).

  The question remains, Will Trump eventually meet with the North Korean leader in direct bilateral diplomacy if North Korea does eventually agree to a freeze on its nuclear and missile tests? Could this result in US capitulation to North Korean demands? Or could it result in a mutual compromis
e, which could then prevent the real possibilities of a more general conflagration? No one has yet accused Trump of seeking business deals with North Korea or seeking to construct a Trump Tower in the midst of Pyongyang, but would anyone really complain if he is able to make peace with Kim Jung Un by way of eliminating North Korea's nuclear threat? But can he eliminate that threat without provoking war?

  Trump's proposed military buildup and American First nationalism appear intended to press from a position of strength Moscow, China, Iran, Syria, and North Korea, among other countries, into a settlement of a number of disputes. But is Peace through Strength to be achieved on American terms, in accord with a posture of power-based bargaining? Or will such power-based bargaining bring about mutual compromise? Will one side or the other capitulate? Or will major power war be the consequence?

  Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has warned that “no problem is more urgent today than the militarization of politics and the new arms race. Stopping and reversing this ruinous race must be our top priority.”1 Gorbachev has proposed “that a Security Council meeting at the level of heads of state adopt a resolution stating that nuclear war is unacceptable and must never be fought. I think the initiative to adopt such a resolution should come from Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin—the Presidents of two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world's nuclear arsenals and therefore bear a special responsibility.”

  TOWARD NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS/ELIMINATIONS

  Because the United States and Russia have entered into a new nuclear and conventional arms race since at least 2002–2008, the dilemma is that the more the Ukrainian crisis blocks Russia from cooperating fully with the United States and the European Union, the more it will prove difficult to cooperate on other issues of common concern, including the need to reduce arms expenditures, concentrate on social and environmental concerns, and deal with the dangerous crisis unfolding on the Korean Peninsula. (See chapters 5 and 9.)