Valentino

by Niccolo Machiavelli

appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent man, who

  from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man

  had taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the

  Florentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their

  enemies they had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they

  must obey him. The Venetians, if their achievements are considered,

  will be seen to have acted safely and gloriously so long as they sent

  to war their own men, when with armed gentlemen and plebians they did

  valiantly. This was before they turned to enterprises on land, but

  when they began to fight on land they forsook this virtue and followed

  the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their expansion on land,

  through not having much territory, and because of their great

  reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when

  they expanded, as under Carmignuola,[#] they had a taste of this

  mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man (they beat the Duke

  of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand, knowing how

  lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer conquer

  under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they

  able, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had

  acquired, they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to

  murder him. They had afterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da

  Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino, the count of Pitigliano,[&] and the

  like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened

  afterwards at Vaila,[$] where in one battle they lost that which in

  eight hundred years they had acquired with so much trouble. Because

  from such arms conquests come but slowly, long delayed and

  inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.

  [*] Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.

  [+] Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.

  [%] Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John

  Hawkwood. He fought in the English wars in France, and was

  knighted by Edward III; afterwards he collected a body of troops

  and went into Italy. These became the famous "White Company." He

  took part in many wars, and died in Florence in 1394. He was born

  about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married

  Domnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti.

  [#] Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390,

  executed at Venice, 5th May 1432.

  [&] Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San

  Severino; died fighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of

  Austria, in 1487. "Primo capitano in Italia."--Machiavelli. Count

  of Pitigliano; Nicolo Orsini, born 1442, died 1510.

  [$] Battle of Vaila in 1509.

  And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled

  for many years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously,

  in order that, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better

  prepared to counteract them. You must understand that the empire has

  recently come to be repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired

  more temporal power, and that Italy has been divided up into more

  states, for the reason that many of the great cities took up arms

  against their nobles, who, formerly favoured by the emperor, were

  oppressing them, whilst the Church was favouring them so as to gain

  authority in temporal power: in many others their citizens became

  princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell partly into the

  hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church consisting of

  priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms, both

  commenced to enlist foreigners.

  The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,[*]

  the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others,

  Braccio and Sforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy.

  After these came all the other captains who till now have directed the

  arms of Italy; and the end of all their valour has been, that she has

  been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis, ravaged by Ferdinand, and

  insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has guided them has been,

  first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might increase

  their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without

  territory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few

  infantry did not give them any authority; so they were led to employ

  cavalry, with a moderate force of which they were maintained and

  honoured; and affairs were brought to such a pass that, in an army of

  twenty thousand soldiers, there were not to be found two thousand foot

  soldiers. They had, besides this, used every art to lessen fatigue and

  danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing in the fray, but

  taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not attack

  towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments

  at night; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or

  ditch, nor did they campaign in the winter. All these things were

  permitted by their military rules, and devised by them to avoid, as I

  have said, both fatigue and dangers; thus they have brought Italy to

  slavery and contempt.

  [*] Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in

  Romagna. He was the leader of the famous "Company of St George,"

  composed entirely of Italian soldiers. He died in 1409.

  CHAPTER XIII

  CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN

  Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a

  prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by

  Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the

  enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries, turned

  to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,[*] for

  his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in

  themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always

  disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is their

  captive.

  [*] Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples),

  surnamed "The Catholic," born 1542, died 1516.

  And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish

  to leave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which

  cannot fail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw

  himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune

  brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his

  rash choice; because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and

  the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all

  expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did not

  become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his

  auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.

  The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand

  Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other

  time of their troubles
.

  The Emperor of Constantinople,[*] to oppose his neighbours, sent ten

  thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not

  willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece to

  the infidels.

  [*] Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.

  Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these

  arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with

  them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience

  to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time

  and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of

  one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third party,

  which you have made their head, is not able all at once to assume

  enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy

  is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore,

  has always avoided these arms and turned to his own; and has been

  willing rather to lose with them than to conquer with the others, not

  deeming that a real victory which is gained with the arms of others.

  I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This

  duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French

  soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,

  such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,

  discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;

  whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and

  dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference

  between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one

  considers the difference there was in the reputation of the duke, when

  he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he

  relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count

  and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than

  when every one saw that he was complete master of his own forces.

  I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am

  unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I

  have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by

  the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted

  like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him

  that he could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut

  to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with

  aliens.

  I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament

  applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight

  with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul

  armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had

  them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that he

  wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion,

  the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down,

  or they bind you fast.

  Charles the Seventh,[*] the father of King Louis the Eleventh,[+]

  having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English,

  recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he

  established in his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and

  infantry. Afterwards his son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and

  began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is,

  as is now seen, a source of peril to that kingdom; because, having

  raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the

  value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether;

  and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they

  are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear

  that they can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the

  French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers

  they do not come off well against others. The armies of the French

  have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of

  which arms together are much better than mercenaries alone or

  auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one's own forces. And this

  example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if

  the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.

  [*] Charles VII of France, surnamed "The Victorious," born 1403, died

  1461.

  [+] Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.

  But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks

  well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I

  have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a

  principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not

  truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first

  disaster to the Roman Empire[*] should be examined, it will be found

  to have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from

  that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all

  that valour which had raised it passed away to others.

  [*] "Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the

  reduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance

  of the conditions under which the British Empire maintains its

  existence. When Mr Balfour replied to the allegations that the

  Roman Empire sank under the weight of its military obligations, he

  said that this was 'wholly unhistorical.' He might well have added

  that the Roman power was at its zenith when every citizen

  acknowledged his liability to fight for the State, but that it

  began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer

  recognized."--Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906.

  I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having

  its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good

  fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And

  it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing

  can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its

  own strength. And one's own forces are those which are composed either

  of subjects, citizens, or dependents; all others are mercenaries or

  auxiliaries. And the way to make ready one's own forces will be easily

  found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected upon, and if one

  will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, and many

  republics and princes have armed and organized themselves, to which

  rules I entirely commit myself.

  CHAPTER XIV

  THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR

  A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything

  else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is

  the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force

  that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often

  enables men to rise from a private station to that rank. And, on the

  contrary, it is seen that when princes have thought more of ease than

  of arms they
have lost their states. And the first cause of your

  losing it is to neglect this art; and what enables you to acquire a

  state is to be master of the art. Francesco Sforza, through being

  martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan; and the sons,

  through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from dukes became

  private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed brings you,

  it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those ignominies

  against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown later on.

  Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the

  unarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield

  obedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man

  should be secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one

  disdain and in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to

  work well together. And therefore a prince who does not understand the

  art of war, over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned,

  cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought

  never, therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and

  in peace he should addict himself more to its exercise than in war;

  this he can do in two ways, the one by action, the other by study.

  As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well

  organized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he

  accustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of

  localities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the

  valleys open out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of

  rivers and marshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which

  knowledge is useful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his

  country, and is better able to undertake its defence; afterwards, by

  means of the knowledge and observation of that locality, he

  understands with ease any other which it may be necessary for him to

  study hereafter; because the hills, valleys, and plains, and rivers

  and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany, have a certain

  resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a knowledge of

  the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a knowledge of

  others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the essential which

  it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it teaches him to

  surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to array the

  battle, to besiege towns to advantage.

  Philopoemen,[*] Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which

  writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he

  never had anything in his mind but the rules of war; and when he was

  in the country with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with them:

  "If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should find ourselves

  here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should one

  best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to

  retreat, how ought we to pursue?" And he would set forth to them, as

  he went, all the chances that could befall an army; he would listen to

  their opinion and state his, confirming it with reasons, so that by

  these continual discussions there could never arise, in time of war,

  any unexpected circumstances that he could not deal with.

  [*] Philopoemen, "the last of the Greeks," born 252 B.C., died 183

  B.C.

  But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and

  study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne

  themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and

  defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above

  all do as an illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had

  been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds

  he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated