Valentino

by Niccolo Machiavelli

Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life

  of Cyrus, written by Xenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life

  of Scipio how that imitation was his glory, and how in chastity,

  affability, humanity, and liberality Scipio conformed to those things

  which have been written of Cyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to

  observe some such rules, and never in peaceful times stand idle, but

  increase his resources with industry in such a way that they may be

  available to him in adversity, so that if fortune chances it may find

  him prepared to resist her blows.

  CHAPTER XV

  CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES,

  ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

  It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a

  prince towards subject and friends. And as I know that many have

  written on this point, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in

  mentioning it again, especially as in discussing it I shall depart

  from the methods of other people. But, it being my intention to write

  a thing which shall be useful to him who apprehends it, it appears to

  me more appropriate to follow up the real truth of the matter than the

  imagination of it; for many have pictured republics and principalities

  which in fact have never been known or seen, because how one lives is

  so far distant from how one ought to live, that he who neglects what

  is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his

  preservation; for a man who wishes to act entirely up to his

  professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him among so much

  that is evil.

  Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how

  to do wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity.

  Therefore, putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince,

  and discussing those which are real, I say that all men when they are

  spoken of, and chiefly princes for being more highly placed, are

  remarkable for some of those qualities which bring them either blame

  or praise; and thus it is that one is reputed liberal, another

  miserly, using a Tuscan term (because an avaricious person in our

  language is still he who desires to possess by robbery, whilst we call

  one miserly who deprives himself too much of the use of his own); one

  is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one compassionate; one

  faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and cowardly, another bold

  and brave; one affable, another haughty; one lascivious, another

  chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard, another easy; one

  grave, another frivolous; one religious, another unbelieving, and the

  like. And I know that every one will confess that it would be most

  praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities that are

  considered good; but because they can neither be entirely possessed

  nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is necessary

  for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid the

  reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to

  keep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him

  it; but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon

  himself to them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at

  incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can only

  be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully,

  it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed,

  would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet

  followed brings him security and prosperity.

  CHAPTER XVI

  CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS

  Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I

  say that it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless,

  liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation

  for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should

  be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the

  reproach of its opposite. Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among

  men the name of liberal is obliged to avoid no attribute of

  magnificence; so that a prince thus inclined will consume in such acts

  all his property, and will be compelled in the end, if he wish to

  maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh down his people, and tax

  them, and do everything he can to get money. This will soon make him

  odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be little valued by

  any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many and rewarded

  few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled by

  whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and

  wishing to draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of

  being miserly.

  Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of

  liberality in such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if

  he is wise he ought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in

  time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that

  with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself

  against all attacks, and is able to engage in enterprises without

  burdening his people; thus it comes to pass that he exercises

  liberality towards all from whom he does not take, who are numberless,

  and meanness towards those to whom he does not give, who are few.

  We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who

  have been considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the

  Second was assisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for

  liberality, yet he did not strive afterwards to keep it up, when he

  made war on the King of France; and he made many wars without imposing

  any extraordinary tax on his subjects, for he supplied his additional

  expenses out of his long thriftiness. The present King of Spain would

  not have undertaken or conquered in so many enterprises if he had been

  reputed liberal. A prince, therefore, provided that he has not to rob

  his subjects, that he can defend himself, that he does not become poor

  and abject, that he is not forced to become rapacious, ought to hold

  of little account a reputation for being mean, for it is one of those

  vices which will enable him to govern.

  And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and

  many others have reached the highest positions by having been liberal,

  and by being considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact,

  or in a way to become one. In the first case this liberality is

  dangerous, in the second it is very necessary to be considered

  liberal; and Caesar was one of those who wished to become pre-eminent

  in Rome; but if he had survived after becoming so, and had not

  moderated his expenses, he would have destroyed his government. And if

  any one should reply: Many have been princes, and have done great

  things with armies, who have been considered very liberal, I reply:

  Either a prince spends that which is his own or his subjects' or else

  that of others. In the first case he ought to be sparing, in the


  second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for liberality. And to

  the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it by pillage,

  sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others, this

  liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by

  soldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects' you

  can be a ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it

  does not take away your reputation if you squander that of others, but

  adds to it; it is only squandering your own that injures you.

  And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst

  you exercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor

  or despised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a

  prince should guard himself, above all things, against being despised

  and hated; and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to

  have a reputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred,

  than to be compelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to

  incur a name for rapacity which begets reproach with hatred.

  CHAPTER XVII

  CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER

  TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED

  Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every

  prince ought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel.

  Nevertheless he ought to take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare

  Borgia was considered cruel; notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled

  the Romagna, unified it, and restored it to peace and loyalty. And if

  this be rightly considered, he will be seen to have been much more

  merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a reputation for

  cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.[*] Therefore a prince, so

  long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought not to mind the

  reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be more

  merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to

  arise, from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to

  injure the whole people, whilst those executions which originate with

  a prince offend the individual only.

  [*] During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi

  factions in 1502 and 1503.

  And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the

  imputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers.

  Hence Virgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her

  reign owing to its being new, saying:

  "Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt

  Moliri, et late fines custode tueri."[*]

  Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he

  himself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and

  humanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and

  too much distrust render him intolerable.

  [*] . . . against my will, my fate

  A throne unsettled, and an infant state,

  Bid me defend my realms with all my pow'rs,

  And guard with these severities my shores.

  Christopher Pitt.

  Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than

  feared or feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish

  to be both, but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person,

  it is much safer to be feared than loved, when, of the two, either

  must be dispensed with. Because this is to be asserted in general of

  men, that they are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and

  as long as you succeed they are yours entirely; they will offer you

  their blood, property, life, and children, as is said above, when the

  need is far distant; but when it approaches they turn against you. And

  that prince who, relying entirely on their promises, has neglected

  other precautions, is ruined; because friendships that are obtained by

  payments, and not by greatness or nobility of mind, may indeed be

  earned, but they are not secured, and in time of need cannot be relied

  upon; and men have less scruple in offending one who is beloved than

  one who is feared, for love is preserved by the link of obligation

  which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every opportunity

  for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of punishment

  which never fails.

  Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he

  does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well

  being feared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as

  he abstains from the property of his citizens and subjects and from

  their women. But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the

  life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for

  manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the

  property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their

  father than the loss of their patrimony. Besides, pretexts for taking

  away the property are never wanting; for he who has once begun to live

  by robbery will always find pretexts for seizing what belongs to

  others; but reasons for taking life, on the contrary, are more

  difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince is with his

  army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it is quite

  necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for without

  it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties.

  Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that

  having led an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to

  fight in foreign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or

  against the prince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This

  arose from nothing else than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his

  boundless valour, made him revered and terrible in the sight of his

  soldiers, but without that cruelty, his other virtues were not

  sufficient to produce this effect. And short-sighted writers admire

  his deeds from one point of view and from another condemn the

  principal cause of them. That it is true his other virtues would not

  have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case of Scipio, that

  most excellent man, not only of his own times but within the memory of

  man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain; this

  arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his

  soldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. For

  this he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the

  corrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a

  legate of Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the

  insolence of the legate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature.

  Insomuch that someone in the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there

  were many men who knew much better how not to err than to correct the

  errors of others. This disposition, if he had been continued in the

  command, would have destroyed in time the fame and glory of Scipio;

  but, he being under the control of the Senate, this injurious

  characteristic not only concealed itself, but contributed to his


  glory.

  Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the

  conclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing

  according to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish

  himself on that which is in his own control and not in that of others;

  he must endeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.

  CHAPTER XVIII[*]

  CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH

  [*] "The present chapter has given greater offence than any other

  portion of Machiavelli's writings." Burd, "Il Principe," p. 297.

  Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and

  to live with integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience

  has been that those princes who have done great things have held good

  faith of little account, and have known how to circumvent the

  intellect of men by craft, and in the end have overcome those who have

  relied on their word. You must know there are two ways of

  contesting,[*] the one by the law, the other by force; the first

  method is proper to men, the second to beasts; but because the first

  is frequently not sufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to the

  second. Therefore it is necessary for a prince to understand how to

  avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been figuratively

  taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and

  many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse,

  who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as

  they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is

  necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and

  that one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being

  compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and

  the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and

  the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is

  necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the

  wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they

  are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith

  when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons

  that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely

  good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will

  not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with

  them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to

  excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern examples could be

  given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void

  and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has

  known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.

  [*] "Contesting," i.e. "striving for mastery." Mr Burd points out that

  this passage is imitated directly from Cicero's "De Officiis":

  "Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem,

  alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum;

  confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore."

  But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic,

  and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and

  so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will

  always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived. One recent

  example I cannot pass over in silence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing

  else but deceive men, nor ever thought of doing otherwise, and he

  always found victims; for there never was a man who had greater power

  in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing, yet

  would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded

  according to his wishes,[*] because he well understood this side of

  mankind.

  [*] "Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum)." The

  words "ad votum" are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.