The Bloody Triangle

by Victor Kamenir

  Lack of coordination from the higher echelons could be further demonstrated by the fact that Rokossovskiy thought that the XIX Mechanized Corps would be advancing on his left and the XXII, on his right. He had no idea that XXII Mechanized Corps was so thoroughly disordered that it no longer functioned as a corps.

  Not being able to completely ignore his attack orders, Rokossovskiy made a display of being on the offensive, while basically maintaining his positions. In mid-afternoon on June 26, he conducted limited counterattacks. While not achieving territorial gains, Rokossovskiy’s attack relieved some pressure from the hard-pressed XIX Mechanized Corps, allowing it to fall back in some semblance of order.

  Accepting enormous responsibility, Rokossovskiy decided not to continue attacking. Instead, he assumed a completely defensive posture, shifting his 20th Tank Division to his right flank to further strengthen defense of Lutsk-Rovno highway.

  During this day, as already became norm, Rokossovskiy was severely hampered by lack of information, especially from the headquarters of the Fifth Army:

  We were forced to gather information ourselves. Staff officers headed by General Maslov quickly adapted to the seemingly impossible situation in which we found ourselves and were able to provide us with the necessary information. But this was accomplished at a steep price—many staff officers were killed while carrying out their missions.

  Judging from disjointed reports, we were somewhat able to piece together what was happening in our direction. We did not know what was happening on the other sectors of the South-Western Front. Apparently, General Potapov was not in a better situation. During the time I commanded the 9th Mechanized Corps, his headquarters were not able to assist us in these matters even once. Besides, communications with him were cut most of the time.6

  Despite being proud and satisfied with performance of his own corps, Rokossovskiy realized that he was not faced with the main German thrust. He was very frank in his memoirs: “It is difficult to imagine how we would have performed if we would be facing the main German attack.”7

  Attack of the Southern Group: VIII and XV Mechanized Corps

  While the threat posed to the German Dubno group of forces by the Soviet southern mechanized group was much greater, it was defeated piecemeal in a similar fashion. Unlike the Soviet northern group of forces, the southern one was facing more German infantry divisions, with their higher antitank defense capabilities. Also, the terrain over which the VIII and XV Mechanized Corps were to advance was more difficult to navigate. Between the starting point of Toporov to Berestechko and Dubno, there were five small rivers, running along the northwest to southeast axis. Although small, these rivers had muddy banks and swampy valleys, some of them over a mile wide. There was a dearth of suitable fords and bridges capable of bearing tanks.

  After overcoming natural obstacles, Soviet tankers were faced with bristling antitank defenses of German infantry divisions. To make the matters even worse, German air attacks in this area were especially effective, causing great damage and confusion among Soviet mechanized columns strung out along narrow dirt roads.

  The XV Mechanized Corps was slotted to move onto Berestechko, with the VIII Mechanized advancing on Dubno on its right. The left flank of the XV Mechanized and the right flank of the VIII were unsupported.

  XV Mechanized Corps, Maj. Gen. I. I. Karpezo Commanding

  On June 25, Major General Karpezo did not think that the 10th Tank Division of his corps was in any shape to participate in the offensive on the 26th. Still, working feverishly during the night, the command cadre of this division cobbled its remains into some sort of readiness for the attack.

  The corps’ motorized rifle division, the 212th, would not be participating in the offensive, protecting Brody in a semicircle extending from northwest to northeast. The 8th Tank Division from the IV Mechanized Corps, assigned to reinforce the XV Mechanized Corps, was still a full day away, around Busk.

  Even within this one corps, there was little, if any, cooperation between divisions, and they operated independently. The 10th Tank spent most of the day in local counterattacks. The 37th Tank Division was able to conduct a more telling offensive, but in the end was brought up short.

  Both divisions would carry out their counterattacks with their ten KV-1s in front ranks, covering their lightly armored brethren. Still, in a battle between armor and armor-piercing shells, the heavy projectiles of German corps-level artillery, greatly aided by the versatile 88mm air-defense guns used in direct-fire role, carried the day, and the Soviet tankers suffered heavily from punish-ingly accurate antitank fire.

  Russian historian A. V. Isyaev quotes memoirs of former Capt. Z. K. Slyusarenko, then-commander of the 1st Battalion, 19th Tank Regiment of the 10th Tank Division:

  The enemy shells could not penetrate our armor, but damaged treads, knocked off turrets. A KV went up in flames to my left. . . . My heart skipped a beat: “Kovalchuk is burning!” I can not help this crew at all: twelve other vehicles are charging ahead with me. Another KV came to a halt: a shell knocked off its turret. KV tanks were powerful vehicles, but sorely lacking in speed and maneuverability.8

  In addition to extremely effective German artillery, the XV Mechanized Corps was subjected to heavy German air attacks. The slow-moving Soviet artillery was hit hard on approaches to forward positions. Without their support, the Soviet tank units lacked sufficient firepower to deal with German field artillery.

  Dearth of Soviet infantry was also severely felt. Between the two attacking Soviet tank divisions, there were barely four motorized rifle battalions. Attacking without close cooperation from the Soviet armor, the rifle battalions took heavy casualties and could not provide close support for the tankers. Without infantry support, the Soviet tanks could not hold on to their hard-won gains and were forced to pull back at the end of the day.

  Around 1800 hours, a particularly punishing air strike was delivered upon the command post of the XV Mechanized Corps. While personnel losses were minor, one of the casualties was the corps commander, Major General Karpezo.

  A bizarre episode is connected to his wounding. After debris from the explosions stopped raining, Karpezo’s body was discovered amid wreckage of his command post. One of the doctors examined Karpezo and pronounced him dead, and he was promptly buried by headquarters personnel. Several minutes after the commander’s body was buried, corps commissar Ivan V. Lutai arrived at the command post.

  Hearing upon Karpezo’s death and burial, Commissar Lutai, a close friend of Karpezo, flew into rage. Pulling out his pistol and screaming like a mad man, Lutai demanded that Karpezo’s body be dug up so he could see for himself that his friend was indeed dead. Cowed staff workers quickly unearthed Karpezo’s body. When he was examined again, shocked officers discovered that Karpezo was breathing.

  As Karpezo was quickly evacuated to the rear, his deputy, Col. G. I. Yermolayev, took over command of the XV Mechanized Corps. Later Karpezo recovered from his ordeal; however, he was never again sufficiently healthy for a line command. He toiled in obscurity in several rear-echelon postings for the rest of the war, quietly retiring in 1950s. Lutai himself did not survive the war, being killed in a cauldron battle in September 1941 east of Kiev.

  With nightfall, attack of the XV Mechanized Corps petered out, and Colonel Yermolayev ordered it to pull back. At the end of the day the XV Mechanized Corps numbered 260 tanks, most of them in the 37th Tank Division. Among them, 44 tanks were the new KV-1 and T-34 models, still a very respectable force. The XV Mechanized Corps started the war with at least 733 tanks. Now, four days later, it was reduced to approximately 35 percent strength.

  VIII Mechanized Corps, Lt. Gen. D. I. Ryabyshev Commanding

  Because of the limited capabilities of the XV Mechanized Corps, the lion’s share of fighting in the southern sector fell to Ryabyshev’s VIII Corps. As mentioned previously, this corps was one of the strongest among Soviet mechanized formations. Aggressively led as well, this corps achieved the most success on June
26. Marching and countermarching over the previous several days and covering approximately four hundred miles along poor roads cost the VIII Mechanized Corps dearly. Out of roughly nine hundred tanks in the corps at the beginning of the war (sources vary from 858 to 933), approximately 50 percent were left along the routes of march, broken down, damaged by air attacks, or out of fuel.

  These endless marches were especially difficult on the older heavy T-35 tanks. A veritable land dreadnought, it mounted five turrets and was operated by a crew of ten. It was also very finicky and at the end of its useful life. Out of forty-eight T-35s in the corps at the beginning of the war, less than five made it to the area of operations at Dubno.

  Starting off from the vicinity of Brody in the morning of June 26, the VIII Mechanized Corps began steadily pushing back German screening forces. It was advancing over similar unfavorable terrain like the one facing the XV Mechanized. After advancing approximately ten miles, Ryabyshev’s VIII Mechanized came up against prepared defensive positions of German 57th Infantry Division. This German division, reinforced with its corps’ artillery assets, defended the line of Kozyn-Berestechko. The VIII Mechanized Corps spent the rest of the day disputing the line of Plyashevka River and could not advance any further, suffering heavy casualties in the fighting.

  Attacking shortly after 0900 hours, the 12th Tank Division of this corps went into the fight without any artillery support. In a particularly brutal air attack, German aircraft destroyed or disabled all the tractors towing the cannons of the division’s artillery regiment. Division’s chief of staff, Col. N. A. Popov, was killed in a similar attack. The infantry support for the attack came late as well, with Col. A. V. Gerasimov’s 7th Motorized Rifle Division going forward around 1300 hours.

  We are fortunate that its two senior leaders, Ryabyshev and corps’ commissar Popel, left behind their memoirs with very descriptive recounting of the events. A majority of material in the following section describing operations of the VIII Mechanized Corps on June 26 was taken from Ryabyshev’s and Popel’s memoirs.

  Commissar Popel decided to join the attack of corps’ spearhead 12th Tank Division under Maj. Gen. T. A. Mishanin. Before climbing into his T-34 tank, he turned to Ryabyshev and shook his friend’s hand:

  “If anything happens, let my family know.”

  “Of course. You too.”9

  Popel’s tank took place among the ranks of the 24th Tank Regiment under Lt. Col. P. I. Volkov. This regiment was a very powerful formation, its 1st Battalion composed of one company of KV tanks and two companies of T-34s. The second battalion, forming the second echelon behind their heavier brethren, was composed of fast and light BT-7s. East of Volkov’s regiment, its sister 23rd Tank Regiment under Major N. S. Galaida took up its attack positions.

  The 12th Tank Division was to cross three rivers, Styr, Syten’ka, and Slonovka, capture the village of Leshnov, and advance to Berestechko. If it could carry out this maneuver, German lines of communications between Rovno and Dubno would be cut, and its forward mobile group would be left unsupported.10

  At the coded command “seven, seven, seven, seven,” the 24th Tank Regiment surged from its starting positions in the woods towards the Slonovka River. While command tanks of senior officers like Colonel Volkov and Commissar Popel had radios, the rest of rank-and-file vehicles still relied on signal flags for directions from their commanders: “Binoculars were in Volkov’s left hand, signal flags—in his right.”11 As the regiment advanced closer to Leshnov, German interdictory artillery fire began landing among Soviet formations, causing momentary delay and confusion.

  Quickly traversing an open field, the 24th Tank Regiment reached the bank of Slonovka River, where it was halted by the impassable terrain. During the previous night, nobody scouted the ground over which the unit was to advance. Now, several leading tanks charged over the muddy bank and became stuck.

  Cautiously, Popel ordered his driver to slow down and watched in frustration other floundering tanks:

  First, second, third vehicle plunges into the swamp. The tankers, as often before during maneuvers, were counting on charging right through the narrow river and the swampy river bank. It’s possible that they did so impetuously, not able to hold back once their blood was up. But one swamp is different from another. Also, during the night the combat engineers did not scout out the river bank. The companies halted in full view of the enemy anti-tank crews.12

  Colonel Volkov quickly turned his unit east towards a bridge. Popel notes how after relaying his command over the radio, Volkov stood up in his turret and three times relayed the same command using the signal flags for those tanks without radios. While moving along the river, Volkov’s tanks were forced to turn sideways, presenting vulnerable sides to German antitank battery on the other side of the river. One Soviet tank immediately paid the price, knocked out and catching on fire.

  However, the bridge was not scouted out either, and now, under accurate German fire, it was the wrong time to discover that the bridge was destroyed. Popel noticed confusion reigning around it. As the German artillery fire concentrated on the bridge and approaches to it, some tanks bunched up in disorder behind Popel, while some began slinking away back towards the tree line where they started from. With difficulty, Volkov and Popel organized a somewhat orderly pull back and began returning ineffective counterbattery fire with their tank cannons.

  Major General Mishanin sent in some infantry to repair the bridge. Some of the BT-7 tanks from Colonel Volkov’s regiment managed to bring up parts of a disassembled combat bridge, which greatly facilitated repairing the bridge over Slonovka River. Forced to work under fire and taking heavy casualties in the process, Soviet infantrymen managed to repair the rickety bridge well enough to allow one tank across at a time.

  One after another, Volkov’s tanks went across. In his turn, Popel’s tank charged over the shaky bridge, followed in quick succession by several more T-34s. “The Germans zeroed-in on the bridge, and a shell hit a crossing tank head on. The plume of reddish sparks is brighter than the sun. However, the tank, completely unaffected, turns to the right and follows us. Looks like the German antitank guns can not punch through the frontal armor. What is their caliber?”13

  As more and more tanks crossed over the bridge, Colonel Volkov sent a platoon along the river bank to clear out the German antitank battery there. While this task was being carried out, Volkov began reorganizing his regiment for its main mission—capturing Leshnov village. Slightly shifting its aim, Volkov’s 24th Tank Regiment charged at the village from the east. Major Galaida’s 23rd Regiment went in from the west.

  As the 24th Tank Regiment approached closer to the village, heavier German artillery opened up, immediately knocking out one T-34 tank. At the same time, approximately a battalion-sized force of German Pz III and Pz IV panzers left the woods northeast, attempting to catch the attacking Soviet force in the flank.

  A tank-on-tank fight ensued in the tall oat fields. Artillery on both sides joined in the fight. Popel mistakenly stated that a whole howitzer regiment was supporting the attack of the 24th Tank Regiment. This was highly unlikely, since almost all of the 12th Howitzer Regiment, belonging to the 12th Tank Division, was destroyed in an air attack.

  Popel again:

  Hundreds of black plumes flare up and disappear above the oat field. Suddenly, my breath caught. Ears felt as if plugged up. This happens when a plane hits an air pocket. [My] T-34 was lifted up as if on wings and gently lowered to the ground. Once the dust cleared, I saw a smoking hulk in place of neighboring tank. The enemy shell hit its ammunition supply. . . . There is no more field, nor land, forest or sky. Only thunder and fire, smoke and dust. I am trying to figure out whose loses are greater. I try to count knocked out and burning vehicles. I can’t, I lose count. Can’t see the right flank. Can not tear my eyes from the gun sights.”14

  Outnumbered by Soviet tanks, the Germans pulled back, pursued a short distance by a company of KV tanks. The rest of the 24th Tank Regiment res
umed its attack on Leshnov. At the village’s edge, German gunners stayed as long as they could at their guns, attempting to stop the attack. The heavy Soviet tanks rolled right over the German cannons. Popel described an incident in which his T-34 tank rammed an antitank cannon: “I notice that one soldier still stayed at his gun, frantically working behind the shield. There is no salvation for him. Instinctively, I close my eyes. The tank tilts sideways and straightened out again. It left behind what a second ago was an antitank gun with its gunner or gun commander.”15

  Soon thereafter, Popel’s tank suffered a hit which knocked off a tread. As the rest of the regiment moved forward, Popel’s crew had a chance to climb out of the tank and catch their breath:

  Our faces are bloody. When the German shells dented the frontal armor, on the inside, small steel slivers flaked off and imbedded themselves in cheeks and foreheads. We are deaf, poisoned by gun smoke, worn out by turbulence. . . . It seems that if enemy tanks or infantry would suddenly appear from around the corner—we wouldn’t be able to move.16

  As the fight raged on Leshnov’s outskirts, Popel and his crew worked frantically to replace two damaged tracks. While they were working, Lieutenant General Ryabyshev’s KV-1, with “200” painted on it, pulled up next to them. In another interesting anecdote, Ryabyshev told Popel that his own KV-1 tank had a breakdown: “The brake track failed, and KV spun like a top near the edge of the river.”17

  The fight for Leshnov must have been much fiercer than Popel described in his memoirs. He briefly tells of an encounter with a crew of a T-34 tank that pulled out of fighting and attempted to slink away. Popel returned it back into the fight.

  After a bitter fight, the 12th Tank Division took Leshnov, losing at least fifteen tanks near the village and further ten irretrievably stuck in the swampy ground near the river. These loses are even more significant because they were suffered mainly by battalions equipped with the precious new T-34s and KV-1s.