The Bloody Triangle

by Victor Kamenir

  When the VIII Mechanized Corps went into attack, the 12th Tank Division was in the center, the 34th Tank Division on the right, and the 7th Motorized Rifle Division was on the left. Despite being roughly on line with each other, these three divisions operated independently of each other, without coordination or assistance.

  While the fight for Leshnov raged on, the 7th Motorized Rifle Division under Colonel A. V. Gerasimov had its own tough fight, attempting to cross the Styr River. Gerasimov’s infantrymen went into the offensive without promised contact with the XV Mechanized Corps. After bitter fighting, Gerasimov was able to bring two battalions of riflemen across and hang on to a small beachhead on Styr River. However, this was the extent of its progress in the face of stubborn German resistance.

  Advancing to the right, the 34th Tank Division under Colonel I. V. Vasilyev also managed to cross Slonovka River, but was pinned down on the other side by a determined German counterattack.

  During this fight, Ryabyshev, instead of directing the battle from his command post, chose to follow the forward echelon. During the fight for Leshnov, Ryabyshev lost contact with his divisions, as clearly stated by Popel: “We did not have a clear picture of the situation, units’ locations. It was necessary to immediately return to corps headquarters.”18

  Popel was honest enough with himself about his and Ryabyshev’s role in the attack: “I asked Ryabyshev a question that was gnawing at me—were we right in going into the attack? The regiment gained two tanks, but the corps ended up without leadership.”19 Ryabyshev feebly assured him that they were correct, stating that in this fight it was necessary for the common soldiers to see that their commanders were sharing dangers with them. It is apparent that Ryabyshev, like Popel, noticed hesitation and reluctance among his green tank crews.

  In late afternoon after Leshnov was firmly secured, Colonel Volkov sent a company of KV tanks to cut the Dubno-Berestechko road. Reaching the road and attacking from ambush, this company caught a small German unit unawares and practically wiped it out.

  In the Soviet rear, the town of Brody suffered heavily from German air attacks, and some portions of it were on fire. When Ryabyshev’s tank made it to the area where the corps’ command post was supposed to be, it wasn’t there, delayed in the chaos. Only the chief of communications, Colonel S. N. Kokorin, was in place with a mobile radio station. Soon several more officers dribbled in, Commissar Popel among them. They got together to tally up events of the day.

  Despite fighting admirably, the VIII Mechanized Corps did not make significant progress. The 12th Tank Division advanced the farthest, but even that amounted to less than eight miles. For these eight miles, division paid dearly in men and equipment. Its artillery regiment was almost completely destroyed, and division headquarters was hit hard. The 34th Tank Division, while making less progress, also suffered lesser casualties. The 7th Motorized Rifle Division hardly advanced at all.

  As their meeting broke up, the poorly camouflaged corps command post was spotted by German aircraft and underwent a heavy attack. Ryabyshev, Popel, Chief of Staff Colonel Tsinchenko, and an enlisted radio operator were inside the radio truck when German bombs began falling on their position. A near hit flung the truck sideways, spilling out the men and destroying precious radio equipment.

  Lieutenant Ryabyshev was quickly back on his feet, attempting to restore order. Popel, suffering from a minor scalp wound and a light concussion, was able to move around in a little while. Colonel Tsinchenko received a more serious head wound and severe concussion, but refused to go to a hospital. The young radioman was killed.

  As Popel, leaning on a makeshift cane fashioned from a tree branch, hobbled around the command post, he was presented with a nightmarish view:

  Fifteen meters away the overturned frame of the radio truck was still smoldering. The woods were on fire. The flame ran along the bronze bark of the elms. Up, down, along the branches to the neighboring trees. The burning trees were falling, setting on fire trucks, tents, motorcycles. . . . Bodies of dead and wounded were at every step. There weren’t enough medical personnel. Healthy and lightly wounded men were helping their comrades.20

  After a while, the remaining men resumed operations:

  The headquarters were slowly returning to normal after the attack. I did not yet know how misleading the first impression was after an air attack. It seemed as if everything was destroyed, ground into dirt. But an hour goes by and picture changes. The dead are removed, wounded are evacuated, and the survivors pick up their interrupted tasks.21

  Scattered reports continued coming in. Positions of the 12th Tank Divisions were still undergoing heavy air attacks, and the two beachheads established by the 7th Motorized Rifle Divisions were being counterattacked. Communications were finally reestablished with command of South-Western Front’s Air Force, but there were no aircraft available to assist the VIII Mechanized Corps.

  During the fight for Leshnov communications with Col. I. V. Vasilyev’s 34th Tank Division were lost. There were reports that there was still fighting on his flank of corps’ deployment, but nothing clear. Lieutenant General Ryabyshev tasked Popel with visiting the 7th Motorized Rifle Division, while he himself set off to Colonel Vasilyev’s 34th Tank Division.

  Here, again, senior commanders set off in lone tanks to gather information by themselves. The VIII Mechanized Corps would have been much better served had General Ryabyshev stayed at his command post and directed his corps from there, instead of acting like a junior officer and motoring off in search of information.

  Following the wake of battle debris, knocked-out tanks, corpses, ironed flat by heavy tank treads, destroyed cannons, Ryabyshev located Colonel Vasilyev in the Khotin village. The small village was a collection of demolished houses and smoking ruins, a sad testimonial of a bitter fight.

  While happy with Vasilyev’s capturing the village, Ryabyshev, nevertheless, chastised him for not sending situation reports on schedule. After briefing Vasilyev and his command staff about corps’ overall situation, Ryabyshev moved off to his own command post at Brody.

  The night caught us on the Brody-Dubno highway. [My] tank turned southwest towards Brody. To the left and right of the road the haystacks, individual houses were burning. . . . Everywhere in our rear there was heavy rifle and submachine-gun fire. Bullets whistled in all directions. It was difficult to figure out who is shooting at whom. . . . German bombers were droning overhead nonstop. They flew east in wave after wave to bomb our peaceful cities and villages.22

  Following a similar path of destruction, Commissar Popel arrived at positions of 7th Motorized Rifle Division in the middle of a fight. The 27th Motorized Rifle Regiment under Col. Ivan N. Pleshakov was heavily engaged in holding the two beachheads on the western side of the Styr River. There were only several light regimental guns with Pleshakov, and several light BT tanks were attempting to support his regiment with gunfire from the east bank: “The woods butted up against Styr. Light tanks would dart to the edge of the river, quickly fire off several rounds from their 45mm cannons towards the west, and would again disappear among the thickets. Not a significant aid to the infantry.”23

  Popel did not find division’s commander Colonel Gerasimov at his command post. Instead, Popel was informed that Gerasimov was in the beachhead with his forward regiment. Again, an example of another senior commander going forward instead of directing the whole unit. Dodging shell and mortar explosions, Popel ran on foot across the flimsy combat bridge onto the beachhead.

  The narrow territory of the beachhead was blanketed by German artillery and mortars: “Dead were everywhere. Coming here, we stumbled many times over their bodies. There were no shelters for the wounded, and it was possible to evacuate only few of them.”24

  While Popel was visiting colonels Gerasimov and Pleshakov, the Germans crossed the Styr River approximately two miles south of the Soviet beachhead and attacked rear echelons of Pleshakov’s 27th Motorized Rifle Regiment. Division’s commissar, Y. A. Lisichkin, diverted a
battalion of BT tanks from division’s 405th Tank Regiment to restore the situation in the rear. Upon hearing of this threat, Colonel Gerasimov returned to the east bank, while Popel decided to remain in the beachhead a little longer.

  Soon, the situation on the eastern bank was restored. Fortunately for the Soviet side, the German probe was more of a feint than a full-scale attack. It hit the area of regimental headquarters and few rear echelon detachments. After the initial shock, survivors of the headquarters element put up a determined fight that held off the German attack. After the battalion of BT tanks sent by Commissar Lishichkin arrived to restore situation, the Germans pulled back across the river.

  Headquarters, South-Western Front, Tarnopol

  Since the early morning of June 26, situation reports were trickling into the headquarters of the South-Western Front in Tarnopol. Slowly, ever so slowly, the Soviet units were taking up positions in preparation for the offensive. A major concern was whether the mechanized corps that had already become engaged with the Germans could free up enough strength to conduct a concentrated offensive.

  All mechanized corps commanders were requesting air support, especially by fighter aircraft. But by this fifth day of the war, the Soviet fighter formations were so severely depleted that there were almost no fighters to go around. Still, some missions were flown by the Soviet bomber aviation into the areas now in German rear. Fifty-four Soviet bombers struck German concentrations near Rava-Russakaya, sixty more in the area of Lutsk, and further sixty-five at Sokal. However, these strikes were conducted at a steep cost; the slow bombers conducted their bombing runs at low altitudes and suffered heavily from lack of fighter cover and accurate German antiaircraft fire.

  Also on the 26th, commander of the Air Forces of the South-Western Front, E. S. Ptukhin, and his chief of staff, Major General Laskin, were recalled to Moscow. Within the next several months, both of them, along with a number of their counterparts from other fronts, were shot for their failures, real or imagined, during the first days of war.

  Ptukhin was replaced by Lt. Gen. F. A. Astakhov, who used to be chief of Air Forces of Kiev Special Military District until his transfer in the spring of 1941. Already knowing majority of his senior subordinates, he quickly went to work. One of the top priorities assigned to him by Kirponos was rebuilding aerial reconnaissance. Soon, information began coming in.25 Based on information delivered by Astakhov, in the evening of June 26 Colonel Bagramyan was able to make the conclusion that the rumors about German armor coming from Brest direction were just that, rumors.

  Despite efforts by the VIII and XV Mechanized Corps, Colonel General Kirponos was not generous in describing their actions in a situation report issued by his headquarters at 2000 hours:

  The 8th Mechanized Corps at 0900 hours on 06/26/41 indecisively attacked the enemy mechanized formations from the vicinity of Brody in the direction of Berestechko, and not having sufficient support from aviation and his neighbor on the left, the 15th Mechanized Corps was halted by the enemy in the area of its jump-off positions.

  The 15th Mechanized Corps, acting just as indecisively, did not carry out attack orders. By 0900 hours on 06/26/41 (beginning of the offensive by the mechanized corps), it was not concentrated in the staging areas.26

  Activities of the 36th Rifle Corps also received an unflattering review: “The 36th Rifle Corps reached the defensive line of Targovitsa-Dubno-Kremenets. Due to poor organization, poor cooperation, and inadequate supply with artillery ammunition, the units demonstrated lowered combat capability while fighting the enemy in the vicinity of Dubno.”27

  During a command meeting that evening, Purkayev expressed thoughts that the reserve XXXI, XXXVI, and XXXVII Rifle Corps needed to set up a defensive line along rivers Stokhod and Styr and towns of Dubno, Kremenets, and Zolochev. The remains of the mechanized corps would be pulled back behind them for refit and reorganization. Then, another offensive could be organized with joint cooperation of mechanized and rifle formations.

  Kirponos was in overall agreement with him; temporary defensive stance was completely necessary. At the same time, he issued orders to begin reactivating the old, mothballed fortified regions of Kiev, Shepetovka, Izyaslav, Staroconstantinov, and Ostropol and form machine-gun battalions to garrison them.28

  Because of the breakthrough by the 11th Panzer Division towards Ostrog, Kirponos was concerned with German encirclement of the right flank of his Sixth Army. Therefore, at 2100 hours he ordered Lt. Gen. I. N. Muzychenko, commanding the Sixth Army, to begin pulling back to new defensive positions and anchored his right flank on Kremenets. At the same time, the XXXVII Rifle Corps was transferred under Muzychenko’s command. The Twelfth Army under Maj. Gen. P. G. Ponedelin was to pull back its right flank as well in order to maintain cohesive lines with the Sixth Army.

  Colonel Bagramyan barely had time to send plans for disengaging the mechanized corps to Moscow for approval, when he received a prompt reply: “Immediately inform commander [Kirponos] that Stavka forbids the retreat and demands continuation of counteroffensive.” Kirponos rushed to the teletype room and contacted Stavka representatives in a futile attempt to get approval for his plans. He was refused and, dejectedly, instructed Bagramyan and Purkayev to inform the mechanized corps to continue the offensive on the 27th of June.

  Summarizing the situation for day, Halder wrote:

  Army Group South is advancing slowly, unfortunately with considerable losses. The enemy on this front has energetic leadership. He is continuously throwing new forces against the tank wedge, attacking frontally, as before, and now also the northern flank, and, on the railroad to Kovel, apparently also the northern flank. The latter attack will hardly develop to anything serious, but the southern flank at present is still vulnerable because we do not have sufficient forces available to give adequate infantry protection (the conveyor-belt system would be necessary here), and also because Armored Corps von Wietersheim (XIV Motorized Corps), which is still far in the rear, cannot get to the front at the moment because the bad roads are crowded with vital supply traffic. It will be the overriding task of OKH to maintain a steady flow of reinforcements behind Army Group South.29

  JUNE 27, 1941

  Morning of June 27 found the lines of the Soviet South-Western Front broken into two distinct fragments. The southern portion, composed of Sixth, Twelfth, and Twenty-Sixth armies, was firmly holding the Lvov salient and the Hungarian border. While the Sixth and Twenty-Sixth armies were heavily engaged, the situation along the front of the Twelfth Army was relatively calm, punctuated by minor skirmishes with Hungarian troops along the Carpathian Mountains. Of these three armies, the Sixth Army was the hardest-pressed, especially on its right flank, forcing it to hinge the right flank back and now face north.

  The Soviet Fifth Army was now almost completely separated from the rest of the South-Western Front. The German spearhead, composed of the von Kleist’s Panzer Group 1, was forcing the flanks of Fifth and Sixth armies farther and farther apart. The schwerepunkt of the German attack now shifted towards Ostrog with only Task Force Lukin preventing a German breakthrough deep into operational maneuver space. In the area stretching from Rozhysche to Lutsk-Rovno highway, the shattered remains of the XXXVII Rifle and XXII Mechanized Corps and 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade were attempting to stem the German advance along the strategic highway.

  The XV Rifle Corps with attached units, being the farthest forward, was preparing to begin falling back to come on line with the rest of the Fifth Army along the Goryn River. To bolster the chances of success of the mechanized corps’ attack, General Potapov detached the still-combat-capable 41st Tank Division, minus its motorized rifle regiment, away from the XV Rifle Corps and shifted it south to reinforce the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps.

  Chief of staff of the 41st Tank Division, Col. K. A. Malygin, described condition of his unit in the following manner:

  We had roughly 150 tanks, less than 100 dismounted tank crewmen, 24 howitzers; the motorized rifle regiment was left su
bordinated to the commander of the XV Rifle Corps. We did not have mortars or anti-tank cannon; our antiair defenses consisted of a lone air defense battery and four antiair machine gun systems. Obviously, it was extremely difficult to accomplish our mission in this situation. We could only temporarily halt enemy advance. German aviation bombed us nonstop until sunset. Even though casualties were minor, preparations for the counteroffensive were carried out in a difficult situation.30

  Following Stavka’s instructions, Kirponos again ordered the VIII Mechanized Corps to attack Dubno from the south, the XV, Berestechko, and the IX and XIX were to operate against Mlynov and Dubno from the northeast and east. However, the IX and XIX Mechanized Corps were in no shape to advance, barely hanging on to Rovno under intense pressure from Germans divisions advancing along the Lutsk-Rovno highway.

  General Kirponos became concerned that the Germans would turn their armored formations south, into the rear of Sixth and Twenty-Sixth Armies, in order to cut them off from the fortified districts along the old border. That was why he was deploying his reserve infantry corps and parts of three antitank brigades in the cutoff positions facing north. However, as I have already mentioned, the German command planned to carry out their southerly offensive later and further east—after breaching the old Soviet defensive line on the old border in the areas of Novograd-Volynskiy and Staroconstantinov.

  IX Mechanized Corps, Maj. Gen. K. K. Rokossovskiy Commanding

  While the XIX Mechanized Corps was falling back under intense German pressure, the IX Mechanized Corps made one last convulsive attempt to attack on Mlynuv. Its 35th Tank Division under Col. N. A. Novikov advanced to within ten miles north of Mlynov by 1300 hours. It was met by the German 299th Infantry Division and spent all day locked in combat with it. The 20th Tank Division under Col. M. E. Katukov, advancing on the left flank of the 35th Tank division, was engaged by German 299th and 13th Panzer Divisions. A spirited fight lasted most of the day. In the afternoon, the Germans discovered the unprotected flanks of the 20th Tank Division and gaps between its units and began to flank this division, threatening to take it from the rear and encircle it.