Descartes' Temporal Dualism

by Lloyd Waller, Rebecca;

  Textual Support of a Cartesian, Innate Idea of Time

  At this point I can turn from arguing the reasons that Descartes should believe that time-in-thought is an innate idea, to showing the very good grounds for thinking that Descartes actually did believe this. By looking through a variety of texts, one finds very compelling grounds for thinking that Descartes knowingly and deliberately maintained the existence of an innate idea of time. Evidence of this can be found in The World, in some of his correspondence, and even in the Meditations.

  One bit of textual support can be drawn from Descartes’ discussion of the laws of nature. Descartes claims in both The World and in correspondence with Mersenne (15 April 1630) that his laws of nature are known a priori. In The World, he claims that his three laws of nature follow directly from the eternal truths. Descartes claims that through innate ideas “God himself has taught us that he has arranged all things in number, weight and measure. The knowledge of these truths is so natural to our souls that we cannot but judge them infallible when we conceive them distinctly.”[29] As a result of our innate knowledge of these truths, Descartes claims that it is possible to know his laws of nature via a priori demonstrations.

  Likewise, in his correspondence with Mersenne, Descartes claims that God “laid down these laws in nature just as a king lays down laws in his kingdom. There is no single one that we cannot grasp if our mind turns to consider it. They are all inborn in our minds.”[30] In claiming that the laws of nature are “infallible” and “inborn” in persons, Descartes implicitly adds further evidence for the innateness of time-in-thought. Minds must possess an innate idea of time in order for the laws of nature to be a priori derivable, because these laws themselves presume a temporal order. For example, there is an inherent presumption of time in any account of speed, insofar as speed just is the ratio of distance over time. As the following passage indicates, Descartes believes that there are truths about speed (and thus about time) that can be known through an a priori demonstration.

  If one part of matter moves twice as fast as another which is twice as large, we must consider that there is the same quantity of motion in each part; and if one part slows down, we must suppose that some other part of equal size speeds up by the same amount.[31]

  Since Descartes maintains that his laws of nature can be known a priori, and since these laws presume some idea of time (given claims about speed, etc.), it seems that these laws indicate an innate idea of time. Thus, these laws offer evidence in support of time-in-thought being an innate idea.

  Descartes offers more explicit claims about an innate idea of time in other correspondence with Mersenne (16 October 1639) and in a letter to Elizabeth (21 May 1643). In his letter to Mersenne, Descartes is discussing the meaning of ‘truth.’ He notes that ‘truth’ in the strict sense, denotes the conformity of thought with its object,” but he adds that it is also used to pick out things that “can be the objects of true thoughts.”[32] Given the truth-entailing nature of innate ideas, it seems this latter sense is the one Descartes employs when identifying “true and immutable natures.” These natures are ‘true’ insofar as the ideas of them can be analyzed to arrive at eternal truths. When Descartes discusses this sort of true nature, he claims, “no logical definition can be given which will help anyone to discover its nature. I think the same of many other things which are very simple and are known naturally, such as shape, size, motion, place, time, and so on.”[33] In this very interesting passage, “time” is not only listed among those things that can be objects of true thoughts, but also among those things that are known naturally. Such a description clearly implies an innate idea of time.

  Likewise, in his correspondence with Elizabeth, Descartes offers another passage which strongly hints at time-in-thought’s being an innate idea. In this correspondence, he describes “certain primitive notions which are as it were the patterns on the basis of which we form all our other conceptions.” Among the very few notions that he lists he includes ‘being, number, duration, etc.”[34] Given the terminology of this book, listing ‘duration’ rather than ‘time’ among these primitive notions seems confused, but since (as has already been seen) Descartes has a tendency to use the terms ‘duration’ and ‘time’ interchangeably, this terminological slip does not prevent us from interpreting the “primitive notion” here described as being his idea of time-in-thought. Indeed, since duration has been identified as the extramental,[35] successive enduring of substances, whereas time-in-thought is the “mode of mind” by which these endurings are conceived, it is certainly reasonable to suppose that the temporal idea Descartes describes as being a “primitive notion” is the idea that this book (consistently) calls time-in-thought.

  Though Descartes’ correspondence with Mersenne and Elizabeth are both quite indicative, Descartes’ allusions to an innate idea of time can also be found in the Meditations. In Med I, for example, when Descartes is considering the things that he can know whether or not he is dreaming, he describes certain “simple” and “universal things”[36] that are known to be real whether or not the things we seem to perceive are real objects or mere fictions formed in a dream. In listing the class of these simple and universal things, Descartes includes “corporeal nature in general…the shape of extended things…the quantity, or size and number of these things…the time through which things may endure…and so on.”[37] In such a list one clearly sees Descartes referencing things that he commonly classes as innate ideas—shape (e.g., triangle), number, and so forth. In referencing some sort of time that is known whether or not the things we perceive are mere fabrications of dreams, Descartes indicates a type of time that is the sort of thing “from which we form all the images of things, whether true or false, that occur in our thought.”[38] Understanding what kind of “time” Descartes is here referencing is clarified in the French version of this clause. In the French version, when Descartes lists the simple and universal things that he knows whether or not he is dreaming, he refers to “the time which measures their duration.”[39] Such phrasing clearly points to the Principles I.57 distinction, and thus clarifies that the kind of time that he is describing as being a thing he has and applies to all experiences (whether real or imagined); namely, he identifies the simple, universal idea as time-in-thought.

  Likewise, when looking at the introductory paragraphs of Med V, one again finds Descartes referencing an innate idea of time in a very significant text. In the beginning of Med V, before Descartes has attempted to prove his epistemic access to the external world, he does an inventory of the knowledge he already can know with certainty given that these things are both clearly and distinctly understood and that God is not a deceiver.

  Quantity, for example, or ‘continuous’ quantity as the philosophers commonly call it, is something I distinctly imagine. That is, I distinctly imagine the extension of the quantity (or rather of the thing which is quantified) in length, breadth and depth. I also enumerate various parts and local motions; and to these motions I assign various duration. Not only are these things very well known and transparent to me when regarded in this general way, but in addition there are countless particular features regarding shape, number, motion and so on, which I perceive when I give them my attention. And the truth of these matters is so open and so much in harmony with my nature, that on first discovering them it seems that I am not so much learning something new as remembering what I knew before; or it seems like noticing for the first time things that were long present within me although I had never turned my mental gaze on them before…I find within me countless ideas of things which even though they may not exist anywhere outside me still cannot be called nothing; for although in a sense they can be thought of at will, they are not my invention but have their own true and immutable natures.[40]

  When Descartes describes how he is able to enumerate parts of motions in order to assign durations to motions, it seems very clear what true and immutable nature he is referencing. If there is a true and immutable nature thro
ugh which Descartes is able to enumerate/measure durations, and this is something that he can be certain of before he is certain that an external world exists or is knowable, then the thing that that makes these enumerations possible must be an innate idea. As time-in-thought grounds the measure (and thereby the count) of all durations, if Descartes can “enumerate various parts and local motions; and … assign [these motions] various durations,” then he must possess an innate idea of time-in-thought. Only an innate idea could be known at this point in the Meditations, and only an innate idea would have its own true and immutable nature.

  Objections

  Given all of the evidence, I think it is quite clear that time-in-thought is an innate idea for Descartes. Before proceeding with these results, I will briefly pause to address two significant objections that may be raised against this conclusion. First, I will consider whether my claim that time-in-thought is an innate idea conflicts with my claims in chapter 3 that time-in-thought is really distinct from duration insofar as it depends on motion whereas duration does not. Since an innate idea should (it seems) depend on nothing beyond divine causation, this is an objection worth considering. Secondly, I will look carefully at another conception of time-in-thought that seems to suggest the best alternative to my own interpretation; namely, I will argue that it is better to interpret time-in-thought as an innate idea than as a mere abstraction. Though I believe this latter claim is already refuted by the above analysis, I will give it some specific attention since it’s a view that may seem to have its own textual support and that has been aptly defended elsewhere.

  Against the inconsistency complaint, I concede that innate ideas cannot be dependent on a feature of the physical world. Nonetheless, I believe that I can maintain that time-in-thought is distinguished from duration in virtue of its dependence on motion by noting that this is merely a functional dependence. I have repeatedly noted that Principles I.57 identifies time-in-thought according to its function. Time-in-thought is used to measure and thereby compare all durations. What was also noted is that the idea of a mental measuring stick can serve this measuring function only if one specifies a unit according to which all durations can be divided and thereby compared. The unit specified by Descartes is the cosmic motions—these provide the “common natures” which make the “measuring stick” applicable. Thus, time-in-thought, when understood functionally, is dependent on motion. Without the unit, the innate idea would not be applicable to the world (although it would still exist.) Thus, I conclude that time-in-thought is an innate idea which does not depend on motion for its being but does depend on the motion of the celestial bodies for its function, since this motion provides the unit which allows durations to be divided and thereby compared.

  Though I am certainly not the first to think hard about the ‘tempus’ distinguished from duration in Principles I.57, I do believe that I am the first to identify this mode as an innate idea. Among the others who have reflected on this mode, I think there is one best alternative to my view which warrants a closer consideration. I think the best alternative is offered in Geoffrey Gorham’s article, “Descartes on Time and Duration.” Below is a summary of his view.

  Tempus is a mode of thought for Descartes because it is generated by an ‘abstraction of the intellect.’ In the section of the Principles immediately following the account of time, Descartes declares that universals are modes of thought “in the same way” as time. For example, the universal two is a mere mode of thought because it results “when number is considered only in the abstract or in general, and not in any created things.” In this case, if we look at a pair of objects, and direct our attention not to their nature but simply to the fact that there are two of them” we can generate an idea of two and later apply it to other pairs. In the same way, time is an abstraction from the concrete duration of things. We attend to some particular feature of the sun, its regular motion, and exclude its size, color, and so on. We assign to this motion a number, numerus motus expressed in years or days, and extend this number arbitrarily to the duration of other things. We call this universal measure of duration ‘time.’[41]

  Gorham’s account in this passage seems plausible, and thus, it poses a significant challenge for my interpretation. Though I will indicate some of the good grounds that support Gorham’s interpretation, I will show why the weight of evidence still agrees with my view.

  In claiming that (what I call) time-in-thought is an abstraction that we “generate,” Gorham’s account clearly contradicts the view that it exists as an innate idea. Though I have argued that the content of this idea (i.e., that it is an idea of a limitless succession of necessarily related parts) is sufficient for showing that this idea is not one that could be caused via abstraction, Gorham does point to good grounds for thinking we might be the source of this idea. Most aptly, he notes that Descartes discusses universals in the Principles I.58—immediately after drawing the distinction between duration and the mode of mind by which it is conceived.

  Principles I.58: In the same way, number, when it is considered simply in the abstract or in general, and not in any created things, is merely a mode of thinking; and the same applies to all the other universals, as we call them.[42]

  Not only does Descartes preface this principle with the telling phrase “in the same way,” which does indeed suggest that he is identifying time-in-thought as being a universal, he then proceeds in Principles I.59 to explain how universals arise. This account, as Gorham correctly explained, is an account that shows how we give rise to our universal ideas. For example, to gain the universal idea of two from observing two things “we direct our attention not to their nature but merely to the fact that there are two of them, [and thereby] form the idea of the number which we call ‘two.’”[43] Since Descartes appears to identify time-in-thought as being a universal immediately before claiming that universals “arise” through a specific way of directing our attention (in particular by abstracting common features from those things upon which we attend), it seems reasonable to claim that Descartes held time-in-thought to be an abstraction we create as opposed to an innate idea. Not only does this seem like an obvious interpretation of Principles I.58–I.59, it is clearly significant that these passages are immediately adjacent to the distinction Descartes draws between duration and time-in-thought in Principles I.57.

  Given what I have just granted, it is evident why I claim that Gorham’s contention that time-in-thought is a mere abstraction is a good alternative to my interpretation. Though it is a good alternative, I maintain that the evidence that time-in-thought is an innate idea is stronger. In arguing this, I don’t deny that Principles I.58–I.59 do suggest solid grounds for supposing that time-in-thought is a universal idea, and that this idea can arise via a particular mode of attention. I argue, however, that these facts alone provide no reason for thinking that the idea is not innate.

  I concede these points both because of the textual evidence which supports them, and because they simply seem correct. I concede that time-in-thought is a universal idea for Descartes since, on my interpretation, it is a quintessential example of us “mak[ing] use of one and the same idea for thinking of all individual items which resemble each other.”[44] In particular, it is the single idea used to conceive of all substances which resemble each other in virtue of being things that endure. Of course, since every substance will resemble each other in this way, it follows that it is a single idea used to conceive every substance, and not just some subset of existing substances. Given that it is an idea that we use to conceive this feature that characterizes all substances, time-in-thought is a most universal idea. Indeed, it is properly described by Descartes as one of the “primitive notions which are as it were the patterns on the basis of which we form all our other conceptions.”[45] Recall that in his correspondence with Elizabeth he described such general notions, and claimed: “There are very few such notions,” the most general being: “those of being, number, duration, etc.—which apply to everything we can con
ceive.”[46]

  As a most general type of universal idea, time-in-thought allows us to conceive a resemblance amongst all substances. Insofar as this is a universal idea, and universal ideas “arise” through a method of abstraction, why do I still maintain that this idea is innate, and not merely an abstraction? To understand this, one can look to other useful passages, as well as simply consider what means might be employed in order to direct our minds toward thinking about an idea that one already has innately. First, consider the following two passages that are also from the Principles and given shortly before Principles I.57. First, in Principles I.49, Descartes offers a discussion on eternal truths/common notions. He claims that there are certain “eternal truths which reside within our mind. Such truths are termed common notions or axioms.”[47] Though he claims that these notions are “common,” and “reside within our mind,” he adds in Principles I.50 that “some of them do not really have an equal claim to be called ‘common’ among all people since they are not all equally well perceived by everyone.”[48] In this discussion, one sees that Descartes grants that it is possible for there to be certain eternal truths in our minds that are not (or at least not well) perceived by all. Accordingly, it is appropriate to wonder how one might be led to perceive (or better perceive) these sorts of truths.