Descartes' Temporal Dualism
Page 13
Among the eternal truths/common notions described in Principles I.49–I.50, Descartes only lists propositions, for example, “what is done cannot be undone.”[49] Elsewhere, however, he describes ideas that can likewise reside within our minds and ground eternal truths. An obvious example of such is the idea of a triangle he describes in Med V. He claims of a triangle, “even if perhaps no such figure exists, or has ever existed anywhere outside my thought, there is still a determinate nature or essence, or form of the triangle which is immutable and eternal.”[50] Likewise in correspondence with Mersenne, he claims, “I use the word ‘idea’ to mean everything which can be in our thought, and I distinguish three kinds …[included among the innate are] the idea of Body, mind, body, triangle, and in general all those which represent true, immutable and eternal essences.”[51] It is particularly useful to note that Descartes lists triangles as being innate ideas that represent eternal essences, because he also discusses triangles when describing the abstracting efforts that give rise to universal ideas in Principles I.59.
When we see a figure made up of three lines, we form an idea of it which we call the idea of a triangle; and we later make use of it as a universal idea, so as to represent to our mind all the other figures made up of three lines. Moreover, when we notice that some triangles have one right angle, and others do not, we form the universal idea of a right-angled triangle.[52]
Insofar as I.59 shows Descartes describing the method by which we “form an idea” of triangle, it seems that this passage provides the same evidence for thinking that triangles are mere abstractions as for thinking that time-in-thought is a mere abstraction. Yet, to deny that Descartes thinks that one has an innate idea of triangle is simply false. Accordingly, it seems that when Principles I.59 explains how universal ideas are formed, this explanation does not entail that the ideas so “formed” are not innate. I would contend, rather, that a universal idea may be an innate idea and that Principles I.59 simply defines a method for directing one’s attention to the idea that may already reside within one’s mind. There are many passages one can find, where Descartes suggests that this sort of method might be needed.
Letter to Voetius, May 1643: Notice that all things whose knowledge is said to be naturally implanted in us are not for that reason expressly known by us; they are merely such that we come to know them by the power of our own native intelligence.”[53]
1st Set of Replies: For even if the nature of the triangle is immutable and eternal, it is still appropriate to ask why there is an idea of it within us.
3rd Set of Replies: When we say that an idea is innate in us, we do not mean that it is always before us. This would mean that no idea was innate. We simply mean that we have within ourselves the faculty of summoning up the idea.”[54]
5th Set of Replies: I do not, incidentally, concede that the ideas of [geometrical] figures ever came into our mind via the senses . . . Geometrical figures are composed for the most part of straight lines; yet no part of a line that was really straight could ever affect our senses…Hence, when in our childhood we first happed to see a triangular figure drawn on paper, it cannot have been this figure that showed us how we should conceive of the true triangle studied by geometers...but since the idea of the true triangle was already in us, and could be conceived by our mind more easily than the more composite figure of the triangle drawn on paper, when we saw the composite figure we did not apprehend the figure we saw, but rather the true triangle.”[55]
These four passages provide conclusive evidence that Descartes thought innate ideas are not necessarily ideas of which one is always aware. Indeed, they show him describing how one might come to be aware of such ideas. As such, I conclude that there is no inconsistency between me granting that Principles I.58 and I.59 show Descartes identifying time-in-thought to be a universal idea that rises into one’s immediate thought by means of an abstraction and my contention that it is an innate idea. Rather than indicating that time-in-thought is not an innate idea, Principles I.58 and I.59 show how one might draw one’s attention to this idea. Since my account seems perfectly consistent with Principles I.58 and I.59, I contend that the various arguments I offered for time-in-thought being an innate idea still hold. Thus, it is correct to regard time-in-thought as an innate idea rather than as an abstraction that one fabricates.
Conclusion
Presuming that I have made a compelling case for time-in-thought’s being an innate idea, I will now explain a few of the implications of this conclusion. Most significantly, by establishing that time-in-thought is an innate idea, I have explained how this “mode of mind” can serve as a universal measure for all durations, and why it is ontologically on-par with intrinsic duration. To clarify these points, I will indicate how each of these ends has been met.
Recall that an initial motivation for temporal dualism is to solve the problem of measurement. Since intrinsic duration is particular to an individual substance, it provides no means of comparing/measuring various durations against each other. As such, Descartes needed something non-particular that could be universally applied to all these durations. In the innate idea of time-in-thought, Descartes has this universal measure. As an innate idea, the content of the idea is a true and immutable nature created and guaranteed by the non-deceiving God. This idea is singular whether or not the idea happens to manifest in multiple minds. The true and immutable natures themselves are singular. The representations of these natures (i.e., the innate ideas found in minds) are many. This multiplicity does not inhibit the universal, singular character of time-in-thought. In Cartesian terminology, the content of the ideas (their objective reality) is identical even if the formal reality of the ideas is multiple. As it is the content which makes it possible for time-in-thought to serve its measuring function, the formal differences are no impediment.
The final point to note is how time-in-thought’s being an innate idea proves that the second temporal attribute is on an ontological par with the attribute of duration, and thus why Descartes’ temporal dualism is significantly different from that of Suarez.[56] Even though duration and time-in-thought are alike in being attributes, there were historical reasons to expect that these two attributes might not be ontological equals; namely, the significant similarities between Descartes’ account and that of Suarez. Given that these similarities suggest that Descartes may have intentionally followed the view of his predecessor, there were strong historical grounds to expect that Descartes might also follow Suarez in thinking that duration is something “real” whereas time-in-thought is just imaginary. On the contrary, by proving that time-in-thought is an innate idea for Descartes, I have shown that duration is not the primary temporal category for Descartes. By making time-in-thought an innate idea, Descartes bucks this historical precedent. Time-in-thought is not merely formulated by minds in order to serve a measuring function. Unlike Suarez’s extrinsic/imaginary time, time-in-thought cannot be created by one’s own mind. Time-in-thought cannot be a fictitious idea because the idea of an infinitely extended, necessarily successive, measuring stick is beyond the causal capacities of persons. Thus, for a person to possess this idea it must be innate. As an innate idea, time-in-thought is a much more significant and interesting idea than Suarez’s idea of extrinsic/imaginary time. It is more significant and interesting because this status indicates that our idea of time-in-thought is divinely caused and thus can be analyzed as entailing eternal truths.[57]
As duration and time-in-thought are both attributes, and time-in-thought is the idea of a true and immutable nature, there are no plausible grounds for claiming that duration is Descartes’ primary temporal attribute, with time-in-thought serving a mere supporting role. Time-in-thought is not subject to duration since it does not depend on duration for its existence. The true and immutable nature of time-in-thought would exist even if there were no bodies. The motions of celestial bodies only serve to make this immutable nature applicable by providing a convenient unit for comparisons. Nonetheless, like all in
nate ideas, the truths entailed by the idea would be true regardless of any minds possessing the idea, or even of there being any durations to be compared. Thus, time-in-thought is on an ontological par with duration because both are attributes and neither depends on the other for its existence.
Notes
1. Descartes explicitly claims (in correspondence with Arnauld) that there is successive duration in his own thoughts (See: AT V 223; CSMK 358). Indeed, as duration is just the enduring of any substance, and since minds are one of the two kinds of Cartesian substances, it unquestionably follows that Descartes would recognize intrinsic duration within the progression of minds.
2. In claiming this, I certainly do not claim that others have not noticed or commented on this mode of mind. Rather, I claim that the discussion of this mode has tended to be brief or underdeveloped in such a way that its potential significance has been largely missed.
3. This is of course odd insofar as an innate idea should depend on nothing other than its divine causation—certainly not on motion, and so forth.
4. AT X 440; CSM I.57.
5. AT X 448; CSM I.62.
6. AT X 449; CSM I.63.
7. AT X 449; CSM I.63, emphasis added.
8. AT X 448; CSM I.62.
9. AT X 447; CSM I.62.
10. AT VIIIA 27; CSM I.212.
11. Although the question of whether the “quantifying” of duration (i.e., the whole) consists of duration being broken up into merely potential or actual parts is relevant to the temporal atomism debates in Descartes, this is a question that I am currently setting aside.
12. AT X 448; CSM I.63.
13. AT VIII 27; CSM I.212.
14. AT VII 38; CSM II.26.
15. AT VII 51; CSM II.35.
16. AT III 383; CSMK.183.
17. One might worry that being an idea of a true and immutable nature is merely a sufficient condition for being an innate idea, not a necessary one. The wording in the letter to Mersenne, however, tells against this suggestion. Descartes claims in this letter (quoted above) that innate ideas are “in general all those which represent true, immutable and eternal essences.” Thus, I take being an idea of a true and immutable nature to be a necessary condition for being an innate idea.
18. AT VII 436; CSM II. 294. See also: AT VII 104; CSM II.76.
19. Stephen H. Daniel, “Seventeenth-Century Scholastic Treatments of Time,” Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981): 597.
20. AT VII 45; CSM II.31.
21. AT VII 45; CSM II.31.
22. AT VIIIA 15; CSM I.202.
23. AT VII 113, CSM II.81, emphasis added.
24. AT VII 136; CSM II.100.
25. Margaret Wilson, “Can I be the Cause of My Idea of the World?” in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 355.
26. AT VII 188; CSM II.132.
27. AT VII 370; CSM II.255.
28. For a discussion of this point, recall The Argument from Numerically Distinct Parts given in chapter 2.
29. AT XI 46; CSM I.97.
30. AT I 145; CSMK23, emphasis added.
31. AT VIIIA; CSM.I.240.
32. AT II 597; CSMK 139.
33. AT II 597; CSMK 139, emphasis added.
34. AT III 665; CSMK 218.
35. In calling it “extramental,” I don’t mean to imply that minds are not successive, but merely that this is a feature of the world that exists both within minds and without minds, and thus is not merely a mental entity. Thus, it is not a good candidate for being a “primitive notion.”
36. AT VII 20; CSM II.14.
37. AT VII 20; CSM II.14, emphasis added.
38. AT VII 20; CSM II.14, emphasis added.
39. CSM II.14ff.
40. AT VII 63-64; CSM II.44, emphasis added.
41. Geoffrey Gorham, “Descartes on Time and Duration,” Early Science and Medicine 12 (2007): 36. Likewise, Arthur claims, “the idea of generic time or duration-in-general…is an ideal concept, formed by abstraction from the durations of all particular substances, just as space or extension-in-general is an abstract concept formed by abstracting from all the particular extensions of pieces of existing matter.” Richard Arthur, “Continuous Creation, Continuous Time: A Refutation of the Alleged Discontinuity of Cartesian Time,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 (1988): 361.
42. AT VIIIA 27; CSM I.212, emphasis added.
43. AT VIIIA 27-8; CSM I.212.
44. AT VIIIA 27; CSM I.212.
45. To Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643: AT III 665; CSMK 218.
46. To Princess Elizabeth, 21 May 1643: AT III 665; CSMK 218.
47. AT VIIIA 24; CSM I.209.
48. AT VIIIA 24; CSM I.209.
49. AT VIIIA 24; CSM I.209.
50. AT VII 64; CSM II.45.
51. AT III 383; CSMK 183–184
52. AT VIIIA 28; CSM I.212.
53. AT III 166; CSMK222.
54. AT V11 189; CSM II.132, emphasis added.
55. AT VII 381-2; CSM II.262, emphasis added.
56. One might wonder why there is debate over how to compare duration and time-in-thought since I have argued that they are both attributes and thus both on the same ontological plane. Though it is true that duration and time-in-thought are both attributes and thus that they are both on a general ontological par, the question of how duration and time-in-thought are related is partially founded (and justified) on the comparison to Suarez and partially on a desire to determine if there is some primary temporal attribute for Descartes.
57. Likewise, it is very interesting since it seems to suggest an interesting precursor to Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic.
Chapter 5
Temporal Dualism as an Elegant Solution
Having completed my arguments for the two conclusions: 1) that Descartes offered a type of temporal dualism, and 2) that his dualism was composed of successive duration and the innate idea of time-in-thought, I will here present some important consequences that follow from these conclusions. In particular, I will show how interpreting Descartes in these ways provides a solution to some of the enduring puzzles that have plagued interpretations of Descartes’ account of time. Insofar as these puzzles have dominated the scholarship, by showing how my view addresses these puzzles, I show both how my interpretation relates to the broader scholarship and the particular strengths of my interpretation. Indeed, my interpretation’s ability to elegantly resolve a number of significant puzzles in the literature suggests final, compelling support for my overall view.
In this chapter, I argue that the continuity of duration is ontologically prior to its having successive parts, since it is continuous in its creation, but divided into parts as a joint consequence of its being conceived via time-in-thought and of God’s capacity to accomplish whatever can be clearly and distinctly conceived. The structure of the chapter is as follows: In section 1, I offer a brief sketch of how Descartes’ account of time has been commonly interpreted by scholars, while also indicating the difficulties found in these interpretations. In section 2, I indicate how interpreting Descartes as a temporal dualist avoids the pitfalls that hinder the standard interpretations, while also offering other interpretive benefits.
The Scholarly Debates
A quick glance at the secondary literature on Descartes’ account of time makes the general character of these debates quite clear. In general, scholars debate whether Descartes offered an account of time that is composed of continuous or discontinuous parts, and whether these parts are discrete, temporal atoms or instantaneously temporal slices. Despite the significant discussion on these questions, very little consensus has been reached (perhaps excluding the consensus that interpreting Descartes’ account of time is deeply problematic). The view that Descartes held time to be composed of discontinuous temporal atoms has been called the “received” view, but as there has been significant resistance to this view by those claiming that Cartesian time should instead be understood as
continuous,[1] it is now, as Geoffrey Gorham contends, more apt to call it the “traditional” or “classic view.”[2]