Grantville Gazette Volume 27

by edited by Paula Goodlett

  Murad was also restrained to some degree by the need to conform to the Sheriat (holy law). Any order he gave could be rendered invalid if not approved by the Şeyh-ül-Islâm, who acted as the chief juriconsult of the Empire. However, Murad seems to have had few problems with getting such approval (his execution of Şeyh-ül-Islâm Ahizade in 1633—the first execution of a Şeyh-ül-Islâm in history—had nothing to do with problems getting decrees approved by Ahizade).

  [5] Unlike both his immediate predecessors and successors, Murad actually attended at least some meetings of the divan. He also seems to have been very careful to keep aware of what was going on in his government.

  [6] The men of the ulema are the recognized religious scholars of the Empire. From their ranks were drawn the preachers of the mosques, the teachers for the schools, and the judges. The Ottoman state regularized their activities through the institution of the İlmiye, which controlled appointments to and salaries for various positions. The Şeyh-ül-Islâm was the most important, or at least prominent, member of the ulema.

  [7] It is also possible that the Ottomans might have asked Gustavus Adolphus what he knew about Grantville. In 1631 Gustavus II Adolphus had sent an envoy, Paul Strassburg, to the Ottoman Empire to discuss the possibility of Ottoman assistance against the Habsburgs (or the Poles). What he wanted was less than what he seems to have received, which was a promise by the Ottomans that the prince of Siebenbürgen (Transylvania) could make war against the Habsburgs if he wanted to, and the Ottomans would have troops ready to exploit any opportunities. Mehmed Pasha seems to have had some quiet contacts with the Swedes dating back at least to Paul Strassburg's mission, and he might have queried them about Grantville. However, this would have taken a relatively long time due simply to the mechanics of travel in this period and any information that came from the Swedes would have been suspect because of their alliance with Grantville.

  [8] The practice of making collective decisions, along with very short terms for certain offices (the rector, who acted as the head of state, served for only a month at a time) was quite useful in dealing with the Ottomans, since they didn't know exactly who to punish if a decision they didn't like was made.

  [9] Travel time between Ragusa and Constantinople was about two weeks. When they got the request the Ragusans would have responded by sending a message assuring the Grand Vizier that they were working on it and a separate message to the Ragusan representative in Constantinople asking what was going on. They would also have begun preparing reports for the Ottomans based on various assumptions about what would be best for Ragusa. Once a response was received from their man in Constantinople—which would have been at least six weeks after the original request was dispatched—the Ragusans would have sent the appropriate report to Constantinople. So at least two months would have elapsed from Ottoman request to Ragusan response (and the Ragusans could have added some additional delays if needed).

  [10] More specifically, this opinion-shaping information will be that provided at the time of the meshveret, which will be an unusual opportunity for direct input by the foreigners into Ottoman decision making. Once a course has been decided on, any latter changes in the opinions of the Europeans will have at best an effect on the tactics, but not the strategy, of the Empire. There is an inertia inherent in this process. In particular, if an originally negative view were to change into something more positive, this would most likely be viewed as evidence of the pernicious influence of the up-timers rather than an indication of an original misinterpretation.

  [11] Indeed, the Venetians were pursuing a policy, similar to the détente of the Cold War, which they called bilancia (balance) in this period. They had not reached the stage of "Trust but verify."

  [12] Schmid was by birth a Swiss Lutheran, but he seems to have given unswerving loyalty to the Catholic Habsburgs, perhaps owing to the fact that they were responsible for ransoming him from the Ottomans after twenty years as a slave, for at least part of which he acted as a dragoman for the Ottomans. His period as a dragoman may also explain his extraordinary success in intelligence operations against the Ottomans. The archives containing Schmid's reports are the richest single source of information on Ottoman diplomacy of this period in Europe.

  [13] Sir Peter had been appointed by Charles I contrary to tradition over the objections of the Levant Company, which paid the ambassadors salary in exchange for his acting as their factor in Constantinople.

  [14] This was a myth. But it was a widely believed myth, since most people could imagine no other way to explain the close relationship between Catholic France and the Muslim Ottoman Empire.

  [15] Philippe de Harlay, Comte de Césy, who was ambassador from 1620 to 1631 and again from 1634 to 1639, enjoyed amicable relations with Ottoman officials but managed in his first term as ambassador to run up debts so large that they had imperiled French trade with the Ottoman Empire. Henri de Gournay, Comte de Marcheville, sent to replace Césy and defuse the debt crisis, set the tenor for his term as ambassador when he ordered the ship bearing him to Constantinople to fire its cannons at the flagship of the Kapudan Pasha (commander of the Ottoman Navy) when the latter called on him to dip his colors to show respect for the sultan. After a series of incidents, Marcheville was deported abruptly in 1634 and Césy was recalled (by the Ottomans, he did not receive official confirmation from France until 1635). Reflecting their special relationship with France, the Ottomans took some pains to clarify that it was Marcheville the person, and not the ambassador of the king of France, that had been expelled.

  [16]Koran Sura 33:40 states that Muhammad is the Khatim-an-Nabiyyin (Seal of the Prophets). The majority of Islamic commentators have accepted that this means he is the last of the prophets. Anyone claiming to be a prophet after Muhammad is automatically an infidel.

  [17] The Kadizadelis took their name from the fundamentalist Kadizade (son of a judge) Mehmed Efendi, who was a very popular preacher. Although the son of a kadi, he was highly critical of the religious establishment, following the traditionalist teachings of Mehmed of Birgi. Despite this, he had moved steadily up in the ranks of the ulema until he was appointed to preach in Constantinople's Ayasofya mosque (the former Church of Divine Wisdom, or Hagia Sophia). He used his position to attack innovation and those of the ulema who did not share his views, including the Şeyh-ül-Islâm. He had also acquired his own followers, including a group of members of the ulema who became known as fakĭs.

  Murad IV used Kadizade's ability to mobilize the populace to support certain of his policies, notably the closing of the coffeehouses. Kadizade seems to have been willing to support Murad in part because Kadizadeli doctrine held that "obedience to the ruler at all levels of rule is equal to obedience to God and His Prophet" and also in the hopes of gaining more influence for his goal of reforming the religious hierarchy (Sheik Mehmed seems to have made several efforts to gain influence—for instance, he wrote a treatise on horses for presentation to Sultan Osman II because of the latter's reputation as a horseman). However, Murad resisted Kadizade's efforts, preferring to use him rather than to be used by him. Indeed, Murad went out of his way to reassure the followers of other (Muslim) traditions that their rights would not be abridged.

  Kadizade Mehmed fell ill at Konia while traveling to join the Ottoman army led by Murad against the Persian forces at Revan. He returned to Constantinople and died on October 9, 1635, after which the popularity of the Kadizadelis entered something of a decline. Of course, the butterfly effect means that his death is far from certain in the 1632 timeline.

  [18] In short, the information about the current Ottoman leadership that Grantville can offer is inadequate to downright wrong as well as insulting.

  [19] One possible exception to the lack of detailed information has to do with Fahkr al-Din—Grantville has a lot of former soldiers and sons of soldiers, and there is a reasonable possibility that one of these may have been involved in one of the American expeditions to Lebanon (1958, 1982-1984). If so, the brief histor
y lecture that was received would have mentioned Fahkr al-Din, since he is regarded as the first to attempt to unite the various religious groups in Lebanon. The information was limited, but invariably included the facts of his capture and execution by the Ottomans. This information is probably not widely known—it probably isn't in the library. However, it is not unreasonable that someone in Grantville might provide it to the Italians (the Tuscans may wish to mount a rescue mission—of course, it would also be reasonable for Grantville to do something, if someone realizes it in time—having an ally who could exert control over a large part of Syria might be useful—although such an action, officially sanctioned or not, would also reinforce the negative view of Grantville held by the Ottomans). And, while it is unlikely, nothing in the existing canon rules out the possibility that someone in Grantville was a scholar of Ottoman history who had a bunch of copies of dissertations about the period.

  [20] While Jews within the Empire were (like Christians) considered "people of the book" eligible for protected status as zimmis, this status was always conditional on the zimmis' voluntary acceptance of their status as second class citizens. Further, while Jews in Constantinople were generally well treated (especially in comparison with their European counterparts in many cases), the Ottoman Empire was not free from anti-Semitic attitudes. While Murad himself seems to have held the relatively benign position that zimmis of whatever persuasion were fine as long as they kept to their place, there is ample evidence (in the writings of Evliya Çelebi, for instance) of prejudice against Jews.

  [21] Should any of the hostile powers have learned that the up-timers are apparently in the habit of referring to Sultan Murad as Murad the Mad, this will give them a bit of icing for the cake. It is unclear where this sobriquet originated, but it may have come from a popular history that was released up-time shortly before the Ring of Fire. (No serious historian believes that Murad was insane, although he did enjoy his wine.) Whatever its source, if Murad hears about it he may well become "the Mad" in the sense of angry.

  "The Mad" was not an appellation that was used by his contemporaries. The common descriptors appended to his name after the events of 1632 by contemporaries intending to be less than complimentary were "the Cruel" or "the Bloody." The Venetian assessment of him was that he was an unparalleled tyrant. This harsh assessment was predicated in large part on his willingness to execute Ottoman government functionaries (including some who had been special friends of the Venetians) for corruption, incompetence, or due to a belief they were plotting against him. His fear of plots is, of course, understandable in light of the events of 1632, although Murad's habit of preemptive action certainly resulted in some unnecessary, and politically problematic, executions. At the same time, the common people of the empire welcomed his actions, as the officials who had oppressed them under previous sultans began, from fear, to attend strictly to their duties. Papasynadinos, a Greek Orthodox chronicler who had no reason to praise a Muslim ruler, noted that Murad acted against anyone who was abusing the people whether ". . . they were vezirs or pashas, muftis or kadiaskers, kadis or beys, agas or agas of the janissaries, odabashis [janissary officers] or zorbabashis [leaders of a bandit band]."

  [22] Murad ordered the closing of the coffeehouses (using the pretext—which held some truth—that they constituted a fire hazard) because he believed they were centers for sedition and plots. It is difficult to imagine him viewing the Freedom Arches with anything approaching equanimity.

  [23] The Persian War has forced other compromises on the Ottomans. The renewal of the Treaty of Zsitvatorok, which kept the peace between the Austrian Habsburgs and the Ottomans, was not welcomed by the Ottomans, as can be seen from the observation of the English Ambassador Sir Thomas Roe in a letter of January 1629 (the date of the letter is December 28, 1628, but this is the old calendar) in which he observes that "All the ministers of the Grand Signor know and confess their dishonor and disadvantage by this peace, to which they were constrayned to yield by the Asian war . . ."

  [24] The French had a habit of representing their enemies, real and potential, as also enemies of the Ottomans, at least when speaking to the Ottomans. While in our timeline the French were primarily promoting an alliance against the Spanish, it is likely that, particularly in the early period, they will have presented a particularly negative view of Grantville to the Ottomans with an eye to securing their aid if needed. There was always a certain amount of cynicism in the French actions—with regard to the efforts to form a French-Ottoman alliance against the Spanish, Louis XIII is supposed to have explained to his confessor that "I should like the Turk to be in Madrid, so as to force the Spaniards to make peace with me; and afterwards I would join the Spaniards to make war upon the Turk."

  [25] While it might seem to outsiders that the logical thing for the Muslim Ottomans and the Muslim Persians to do would be to unite against the possible Christian threat, this is not likely to happen. To begin with, neither the Sunni Ottomans nor the Shi'ite Persians regard the other as Muslim. Indeed, both sides pursued alliances with Christians to aid them with their war. Further, the emotions raised in the Ottoman public by the Persian desecration of Sunni shrines after their capture of Baghdad means that Murad must recover Baghdad to retain his legitimacy as a ruler, while Safi has no motive to surrender it. Not to mention that Shah Safi has his own issues of legitimacy.

  [26] The legitimacy of sultanic orders, when they are questioned, is decided by the Şeyh-ül-Islâm. The sultan appoints the Şeyh-ül-Islâm, and the sultan can depose (or, as Murad did, execute) a Şeyh-ül-Islâm. If Sultan Murad decides something is needed, it is likely that any decision about whether it is allowable will go in his favor.

  [27] While efrenci strictly speaking refers to the French, it was used as a sort of catch-all for foreign at this point in time. There were foreign technical experts employed throughout the government and military in Murad's day. Treasury records show that, in 1629, there were forty-four foreigners directly employed by the palace, for instance. Of course, given how things seem to be going in mid-1630's France, it is certainly possible that the Ottomans may soon be able to find a glut of French "up-timer specialists" desirous of employment.

  [28] While the French will be an important conduit, especially in the early period, they will not be the only route for technology transfer. There will be two factors affecting this.

  The first is that, as time passes, informal sources will proliferate. For instance, the story "A Pirate's Ken" (Iver P. Cooper, Grantville Gazette 15) tells us that Murad Reis of the "Sallee Rovers" has sent a son to Grantville. The Ottomans will be able to count on at least some intelligence from this quarter.

  The second is that the Ottomans will not wish to rely solely on the French, who have their own interests. In addition to other nations and the informal sources, the Ottomans will wish to establish a conduit that is under their control. The most likely candidate for this will be their regular supplier of intelligence, the tributary state of Ragusa. Ragusa offers several advantages to the Ottomans in terms of arranging for covert technology transfer. As a Christian state, its buyers will not attract the attention that an Ottoman delegation would, and shipments to Ragusa will not generate the concerns that shipments to the Empire would. Ragusa also routinely shopped for military technology that would give it the edge a tiny state with big enemies (e.g., Venice) needed, and its interest in up-time weapons would be seen as natural. Indeed, tiny Ragusa may even be the beneficiary of sympathy from up-timers, who traditionally root for the underdog.

  [29] It is also important to realize that the Ottomans will not be attempting to acquire large quantities of weapons (although they will certainly happily accept any offered). The Ottomans have a large network of military industries. This means they will wish to acquire the knowledge (perhaps in the form of experts) to produce them, with a sufficient quantity of weapons to serve as patterns for their artisans to reproduce.

  Indeed, one can imagine that they might pay for technology with
finished products. For instance, the French "Cardinal" rifles will be of obvious interest to the Ottomans, since they will not be subject to the reliability problems that kept the Janissaries using matchlocks in preference to flintlocks. The Ottomans might offer to produce the weapons and cartridges for the French in significant quantities while still being able to produce enough to start arming their troops. (And, of course, using the French pattern weapons would probably lead USE intelligence analysts, accustomed to discounting Ottoman technical capabilities, to regard reports of Ottoman troops armed with rifles as arising from a few gifts sent by the French.)

  [30]Jinn are not necessarily evil—they can choose to follow Allah just as people can. However, arguments similar to those that rule out the possibility that the up-timers are mala'ikah would rule out the possibility that they are pious Jinn.

  [31] There are some relatively simple ways to deal with evil Jinn in Islam. Simply reciting the Koran will help. Ibn Mas`ud offers a formula given to the Prophet by Gabriel in his presence which causes jinn to disappear "as a flame is extinguished": "I seek refuge in the incomparable Glory of Allah that can not be violated by the righteous or the cunning from the evil of what goes into the earth and all that comes out thereof; all that comes down from the sky and all that ascends thereto and from the evil of night visitants except for good ones. You are the Most Merciful!" Reciting the call to prayer is also supposed to provide protection.

  [32] A list of Ottoman diplomatic missions to Venice in the 1630's may be found on page 334 of volume 9 of von Hammer's Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches.

  [33] This attitude is displayed in things like the simplistic and incorrect characterization of Murad IV as Murad the Mad. It is most probably the result of the teaching of history in the US, which deals only briefly with the Ottoman Empire, usually in the context of its final collapse, and the fact that the most recent experience of Grantville's inhabitants with the region is in the context of the enormously one-sided first Gulf War in which victory was declared over an Ottoman successor state after ground-based military operations lasting only 100 hours. As a result of their experience, it is probable most Americans will have a tendency to presume that the down-time Ottoman Empire will suffer from similar systematic weaknesses. These opinions in turn may well feed into European down-timer prejudices. This may well lead to serious problems. While there are problems in the empire, they not quite those of its up-time successors. The Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century is very different from what it had become in the twentieth century.