19 Minutes to Live - Helicopter Combat in Vietnam

by Lew Jennings

  May 13 (Day 4)

  At 0330 hours, 13 May, all hell broke loose at Firebase Airborne up on the western ridge of the valley, that had been providing effective artillery support to Honeycutt’s Battalion and other units with their 105 and 155mm cannons.

  Sappers wearing nothing but a loin cloth or nude except for a bandana around their heads to keep the sweat out of their eyes, had slowly crept up the side of the steep mountain, somehow slithered through the tons of debris and fallen trees surrounding the firebase, disabled the trigger flares by tying them closed with string, disabled or turned around the Claymore mines that had been set out, cut through the wire and, with their satchel charges ready, entered the perimeter silently and unseen.

  The first signal that Airborne was under attack was a burst of enemy automatic weapons and mortar fire at one end by NVA Infantry, while the sappers ran through the base in the glow of torched ammunition stores throwing satchel charges into the bunkers of our sleeping troops.

  The attack lasted about 90 minutes with many of the Artillerymen fighting for their lives, firing their huge cannons at point blank range against the enemy infiltrators, using the rarely employed “Beehive” rounds that contained thousands of small flechettes, like nails, to inflict the most damage at close range.

  When the battle was over, friendly casualties included 22 killed, 61 wounded and five Howitzers damaged or destroyed.

  As dawn broke, our own Alpha Troop teams were up at Airborne searching the ridge and surrounding dense jungle terrain trying to find signs of the enemy who had inflicted so many casualties and covering Medevacs into and out of the firebase.

  2nd Battalion, 501st Infantry would be diverted from their mission reconning the west side of the valley later in the day and airlifted into Airborne to provide security and hunt down the attackers.

  Over at Hill 937 Eddy Joiner, call sign Assault 11 and Mike Talton, Assault 27 and myself, Assault 23 arrived on station. Eddy immediately saw enemy activity on the hill and adjacent ridgelines. We identified Honeycutt’s Companies and Headquarters locations and then began engaging enemy targets. Bilk 37 arrived on station too and we helped him bring in effective air strikes throughout the day.

  We in A Troop were maxed out, flying missions all over the valley supporting the 3rd Brigade. Major Curtin seemed to be everywhere, flying in his C&C Huey with rescue equipment on board in case we ran into more trouble on this day.

  Things were getting intense as more enemy activity was identified near Hill 937 and Honeycutt’s B and C Companies were running into more and more resistance, resulting in more of their guys getting killed and wounded.

  We were into the hot refueling and rearming mode to get back and forth to the battle as quickly as possible.

  No sooner had we arrived back to help 3/187th, when an Eagle Dustoff Medevac Helicopter, called in to evacuate more wounded, was hit by an RPG and crashed. They were hovering with their hoist basket down to rescue the wounded, when they were hit and plummeted down on top of the soldiers on the ground. Five were killed, including three of the Helicopter Crew, and three more wounded.

  B, C and D Companies of the Battalion were all on the move again trying to make progress up the steep, jungle covered slopes towards Hill 937. For the third time they met fierce resistance, especially B Company.

  By the end of Day 4, the Battalion had suffered four more soldiers killed and another 33 wounded.

  All the wounded and KIA were evacuated by nightfall as the Companies set up ambushes at their night defensive positions. An unknown number of enemy were killed or wounded by the near continuous strikes of TAC air, Artillery, mortars, ARA and our own Scouts and Gunships as well as by the valiant fighting on the part of our ground troops.

  The Battalion was now well aware they were facing a formidably large and well entrenched enemy force. Their total casualties since starting the operation were now nine killed and 83 wounded, including one killed and 36 wounded by friendly fire.

  Honeycutt ordered an alert posture to make sure they would not be surprised by the enemy during the night, while still trying to afford some rest for the troops; 100 percent on alert until 2400 hours (midnight), 50% until 0300 hours, then 100 percent again until 0600 hours.

  A strict STAND-TO was also ordered for 0500 hours daily, where every man and officer were to be in a fighting position; weapons at the ready and communications established with Headquarters.

  The rest of the time the troops could try and get some individual rest as the situation permitted. That’s how Army soldiers learn to fall asleep almost on command whenever the opportunity affords itself, even under the most trying conditions.

  May 14 (Day 5)

  Day 5 found us from Alpha Troop, 2/17th Air Cav once again out in the AO at dawn. Our teams spread out to support 3rd Brigade units from FB Airborne in the north, to Airstrip Aloui in the south and Honeycutt’s 3/187th Battalion in the middle.

  Lieutenant Colonel Honeycutt was determined to launch another attack towards Hill 937. It would again be a three-pronged attack; this time with D Company from the north and B and C Companies from the west.

  First, D Company was to recover the dead and wounded from the Medevac helicopter crash the day before and move them to the upper LZ for evacuation and then attack north towards Hill 937. A Company was to assist D Company in moving the victims to the upper LZ and then secure the saddle command post.

  We continued to provide reconnaissance and close air support throughout the day, attacking the enemy at every opportunity.

  We were hot refueling and rearming almost continuously to provide support to the grunts in contact. I was firing hundreds of rockets while Mike Talton was firing hundreds of grenades and thousands of bullets from the mini-gun, as we rearmed again and again.

  Bilk 37 was also on the scene, coordinating ten more airstrikes interspersed with ARA and artillery bombardments.

  Hill 937 and adjacent ridgelines were now becoming visible as jungle canopy and trees were stripped away and the ground laid bare by the airstrikes and artillery barrages. The enemy fortifications of spider holes, trenches and bunkers were coming into view.

  By mid-morning C Company had almost reached the top of the mountain, however was repulsed by heavy enemy fire, suffering more casualties, and had to withdraw back down the slope.

  B Company had reached the top of the adjacent ridgeline discovering many enemy bodies, pieces of bodies, blood trails, blown bunkers and fighting positions. They too were meeting continued heavy resistance from enemy forces in fortified fighting positions.

  Honeycutt ordered B Company to withdraw from the ridge top as their flank was exposed by C Company’s withdrawal.

  At the end of the day both Companies were ordered to set up night defensive positions, consolidate and report their unit strength.

  B Company had lost 25 percent of its soldiers and C Company had lost nearly 50 percent.

  In addition to providing close air support and fighting the bad guys, we were escorting a steady stream of Medevac helicopters from Eagle Dustoff coming in to the lower LZ, one at a time, to pick up the wounded. They were the Air Ambulances; unarmed Hueys with big red crosses painted on the nose. Their Pilots and crews were heroes to all of us.

  There was only one way in and one way out of the lower landing zone and only room for one ship at a time. As they came in and out from the same direction, it didn’t take long for the enemy to zero in on them. Consequently, they were under nearly constant fire as they continued to evacuate the wounded.

  As the last of six Dustoff helicopters took off from the LZ, Dick Dato and I were covering them and witnessed a sight that brought us to tears as he relates what happened:

  “The Dustoff was totally loaded as it lifted off from the landing zone. One last soldier on the ground apparently panicked and decided he wanted to leave on that last bird too. He grabbed onto the landing gear skid and held on for dear life as the bird rose from the landing zone.” Dick recalls.

  “The Dustoff
crew saw him hanging on, however couldn’t do anything to reach him or try to get him on board. I saw him hanging on too as we followed them out of the landing zone. He lost his grip a minute or so later and fell from about 300 feet back into the trees down the side of the mountain.”

  The Dustoff crews had dedicated their lives to saving others and all were devastated by this tragedy. We searched for days, however never found his body.

  Late that afternoon the Brigade Commander landed at the Battalion Command Post to meet with Honeycutt and talk with the soldiers. After his departure, Honeycutt ordered his Companies to prepare for another assault of Hill 937 the following day. He also notified A Company that they would be relieving C Company for the assault, as they had suffered so many casualties. C Company would stay back to secure the blocking position at the Battalion Headquarters. The battle would continue in the morning.

  Dustoff So That Others May Live

  May 15 (Day 6)

  Our teams were out there again early, along with Bilk 37, who started bringing in airstrikes to try and soften up Hill 937 for the next assault by A and B Companies. We continued reconnaissance, providing as much enemy information to Honeycutt as possible as they prepared to launch the attack.

  At 1200 hours A and B Companies began the assault nearly side by side. The NVA, which usually attacks at their time and place of choice, was remaining steadfast to defend this mountain, regardless of the cost.

  Both Companies began receiving heavy fire from enemy fortified positions. The NVA were using automatic weapons, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Our guys continued their advance using maximum firepower and creeping mortar and artillery fires in front of them. Our Pink Teams and ARA Cobras continued providing close air support.

  At 1400 both Companies were closing on the objective and were just 150 meters from the top of the hill when the unthinkable happened again. ARA Cobras mistakenly hit B Company soldiers, resulting in two killed and fourteen wounded. The wounded included the Company Commander, his Radio Operators and the First Sergeant.

  At the same time, C Company and the Battalion Headquarters were hit by enemy mortar rounds wounding eight, including Honeycutt and his Operations Officer again.

  By 1415 B Company was moving their wounded to the lower LZ and a new Captain, who had just come on board to be the Battalion Intelligence Officer, was given command of B Company.

  By 1500 A Company, which had continued the attack, reported they were within 75 meters to the top of the hill.

  Honeycutt called in the situation to higher Headquarters. He feared that while A Company might make it to the top, they would be understrength and alone as B Company’s Command Group had been taken out by the ARA friendly fire incident and were pulling back to their defensive positions of the night before. He recommended the Battalion pull back all their forces and the Air Force resume bombing.

  The momentum of the attack had been broken. A Company was ordered to withdraw.

  Within minutes the enemy sensed what was happening and counter attacked, following A Company down the hill, trying to outflank them and attack from the sides and rear. A Company returned fire all around them and made it back to the lower LZ, where they consolidated defenses with B Company.

  As evening fell and the Battalion set up their night defensive positions, things were really looking grim. A Company had lost nearly 20 percent of their people. B Company was in a bad way now, down nearly 50 percent and had lost their Command Group. C Company was also in bad shape at 50 percent strength. And the Battalion Commander and his Operations Officer were both wounded.

  The Brigade Commander ordered the 1/506th Battalion, located a few kilometers south and led by Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Bowers, to immediately head north to reinforce Honeycutt’s 3/187th.

  Intelligence had identified the enemy forces fighting 3/187th as elements of the 29th NVA Regiment, “The Pride of Ho Chi Minh”, with a force much larger than anyone had originally anticipated.

  As Air Force “Spooky” and “Shadow” Gunships flew throughout the night raining down cannon fire on the enemy in support of 3/187th, plans were being prepared to attempt yet another attack of Hill 937. This time it would be a coordinated two-Battalion attack with eight Companies on May 17: Bowers’ 1/506th Airborne Infantry with four Companies from the south and Honeycutt’s 3/187th with what remained of his Companies from the north.

  May 16 (Day 7)

  The 3/187th focused on rest and resupply to get ready for the assault planned for the following day. D Company replaced B Company for the planned assault as they had suffered so many casualties the day before. B Company would provide security for the lower LZ.

  Brigadier General Smith, the Assistant Division Commander, ordered LTC Honeycutt be evacuated to have the shrapnel removed that was near his spine. Honeycutt returned to be with his soldiers that evening.

  The Corps Commander visited the Battalion for a first-hand brief on the situation. The News Media also started arriving, taking pictures of the devastation; crashed helicopters and wounded soldiers being tended to by fellow soldiers and Medics.

  Our primary mission this day shifted to supporting 1/506th as they headed north to get into position to support 3/187th, to conduct the simultaneous two-Battalion assault the next day.

  It was slow going for 1/506th. They were initially making good progress and then were slowed down by attacks from enemy trail watchers and snipers. Then as they started climbing to higher ground, they ran into the enemy’s fortified defensive positions, receiving significant automatic weapons and RPG fire. Their casualties started mounting.

  May 17 (Day 8)

  The 1/506th Battalion would be assaulting Hill 937 from the south with three Companies abreast, while 3/187th would establish a blocking position on the north side and provide supporting fires. 3/187th was not to become “decisively engaged”. They were to only apply pressure on the enemy while 1/506th hopefully made more progress towards Hill 937 from the south.

  A new Aircraft Commander from our unit was first out to the AO. Mike Talton had somehow survived his time as my front seat Copilot and Bullet Catcher. He was now Assault 27!

  Talton was first to arrive on station with his team and started identifying friendly locations and reporting on enemy activity, as Honeycutt’s A and D Companies moved out to set up their blocking positions north of Hill 937 to support Bowers’ 1/506th forthcoming attack from the south. The attack was scheduled to commence at 1000 hours.

  I was out there too, flying with Keith Finley up front. Keith was another California boy like myself. He was a laid back, casual guy with a great sense of humor, yet totally professional. I liked him a lot. We would be rotating on station throughout the day with Talton and his team.

  Mike Ryan, another California boy, was flying as my teammate in his Scout bird. He had come over with the unit from Fort Campbell as a Slick Pilot and was now flying Scouts. He had testicles the size of basketballs and nerves of steel – prerequisites for great Scout Pilots.

  The plan called for the Air Force to drop 1,000 pound bombs with delayed fuses so they would go deep into the ground before exploding, thereby destroying the fortified positions on Hill 937. The bombings would be followed by Artillery using high explosive shells and CS teargas canisters, to force the enemy out of their fortified positions and into the open. Then we would come in to do a quick recon to assess the damage and employ additional supporting fire.

  The attack was delayed until 1130 to allow 1/506th more time to get in position. Then the Air Force and Artillery preparations got underway.

  Finley and I had relieved Talton’s team as they headed back to refuel.

  Bilk 35, an Air Force Forward Air Controller (FAC) flying in his little single-engine Bird Dog spotter plane, was doing a great job directing the fighters into targets on Hill 937. After watching the huge geysers of dirt created when the thousand pounders exploded and then the wispy white clouds of CS gas as the Artillery canisters hit, mixed with the gray of high explosiv
e detonations, we raced in to take a look at the damage. “How could anyone survive that?” I thought –mistakenly!

  “TAKING FIRE, TAKING FIRE!” Ryan yelled over the radio as he peeled off to the right. We could see enemy soldiers forced from their hiding places by the CS gas as Finley laid into them with the mini-gun to cover Ryan’s escape. They started dropping like flies and diving for cover.

  Ryan did a hard pedal-turn and covered us with the mini-gun on his Scout bird as we broke right and climbed to set up a rocket run. I gained about 500 feet in just a few seconds, turned back towards the target, got the bad guys in my sights and let loose with several pairs of rockets before peeling off again and calling in ARA. They came in right behind us letting loose dozens of more rockets.

  We all pulled off as 1/506th began their attack from the south at 1130 hours, while the 3/187th provided supporting fire from the north.

  The NVA had discovered our radio frequency and several times that morning transmitted Honeycutt’s call sign over and over; “Blackjack, Blackjack, calling Blackjack”. We could hear their accents though and knew to ignore them.

  The enemy also tried to confuse us by randomly popping colored smoke grenades. Our troops used smoke grenades a lot to mark their positions for our gun runs and fighter bombings, and to bring in Supply and Medevac Helicopters. Our guys would call us and say they were popping yellow smoke but then we would see yellow smoke rising in two or three locations. The bad guys were on to us!

  We immediately changed tactics for employing smoke. We asked our guys to pop smoke but NOT tell us the color. We then would identify the colors that appeared; “banana” for yellow, “goofy grape” for purple, etc. Our guys would confirm which color was theirs. If we saw other colors rising out of the jungle, we knew it was the bad guys and could go after them as they had marked their own locations!