The First Clash

by Jim Lacey

  13. Ibid., 8.98.

  14. He had linked the Nile to the Red Sea by means of a canal running from modern Zaqaziq in the eastern delta through Wadi Tumelat and the lakes Bohayrat al-Temsâh and Buhayrat al-Morra near modern Suez.

  Chapter 7: THE RISE OF ATHENS

  1. Later, Athens would have the silver from its Laurion mines to fall back on, but during this period the richest veins had yet to be discovered.

  2. Herodotus, 5.78. This was written after Athens had decisively defeated a Theban army and annihilated a Chalcidian army within twenty-four hours of each other.

  3. For a fuller example of Herodotus’s thoughts about democracy as compared with other systems of government, see Herodotus, 3.80–3.85.

  4. Some histories place this event in 612 BC.

  5. As quoted in Bury, ed., Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 4, The Persian Empire and the West, p. 36.

  6. Ibid.

  7. Plutarch in his Life of Solon tells this story and says the poem was one hundred lines long, but only small fragments exist today. Plutarch also states that Solon led the expedition against Megara, but given his age and the fact that other chroniclers make no mention of his participation, this appears unlikely.

  8. Solon fragment 1–2; see Ivan M. Linforth, Solon the Athenian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1919), 129–173. For an account of Salamis, see pp. 249–265.

  9. Plutarch’s Lives (New York: Modern Library, 2000).

  10. For an excellent account of Pisistratus (with a different spelling of the name), his family, and the basis of the family’s power, see A. French, “The Party of Peisistratos,” Greece & Rome, 2nd ser., 6, no. 1 (March 1959): 46–57.

  11. This short sketch of early Athenian political developments, of the reforms of Draco, and of the legal system instituted by Solon fails to do justice to these and many other important developments in Athenian society. This is a fascinating story, but not truly pertinent to the central theme of this work. For anyone interested in pursuing this background, see John Boardman and N. G. L. Hammond, eds., The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 3, part 3, The Expansion of the Greek World, Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); N. G. L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Bury, ed., Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 4, The Persian Empire and the West.

  12. For an excellent account of this period, see Brian M. Lavelle, Fame, Money, and Power: The Rise of Peisistratos and “Democratic” Tyranny at Athens (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005).

  13. The exact dates of Pisistratus’s seizure of power or, for that matter, any of the key events of his long career and those of his sons are still matters of dispute. The dates presented here are at best assumptions based on the estimates of numerous scholars in the field. For a thorough academic study of the matter, see P. J. Rhodes, “Pisistratid Chronology Again,” Phoenix 30, no. 3 (autumn 1976): 219–233.

  14. Herodotus, 1.61. According to Herodotus, Thebes gave more money to Pisistratus’s cause than any other Greek city.

  15. For reference, this is the year before the Spartans and the Argives began the war that led to the Battle of the 300 Champions in about 545 BC.

  16. Soon after the Battle of Marathon, a new rich vein was found in these mines, which at the behest of Themistocles was used to construct a fleet of two hundred ships. These ships won the great naval battle at Salamis a decade later and propelled Athens to empire. The silver from this mine would also finance much of the Peloponnesian War, particularly after Athens was cut off from the revenues of the Delian League.

  17. The importance of this grain trade became apparent in the Peloponnesian War. Although Athens had suffered many severe setbacks, it was not until their fleet was destroyed at Aegospotami and they were thereby cut off from the Black Sea that they finally surrendered rather than starve.

  18. Here I have taken a position that directly contradicts what since Victor Davis Hanson’s publication of The Western Way of War has become the widely accepted view of the historical community. I will not defend my position here but will come back to it in detail later in this work. See Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). Also see Victor Davis Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

  19. Herodotus recounts a fable in his version of events. He relates that the Dolonci asked the Delphi oracle and were told to walk along the Sacred Way until they met a man who offered them hospitality. They were instructed to offer that man, whoever he may be, the leadership of the Chersonese. After a long journey, Miltiades was the first man to offer them lodging and refreshment, so in accordance with the oracle’s orders, they asked him to be their king.

  Chapter 8: A STATE CREATED FOR WAR

  1. Cynosura, Mesoa, Limnae, Pitana, and Amyclae.

  2. As this is mostly a military history of the period, very little time will be spent on the development of the Spartan political system, its unique constitution (the Great Rhetra), or cultural developments. For those interested in pursuing these matters further, I suggest Paul Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia: States & Cities of Ancient Greece (New York: Routledge, 1979); or for some new viewpoints based on recent research, see Stephen Hodkinson and Anton Powell, Sparta: New Perspective (London: Classical Press of Wales, 1999). For the nonspecialist reader, see Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2003).

  3. During this period, Sparta was known to have established one colony at Taras (modern Taranto) in 706 BC. For what I consider one of the most interesting perspectives on Spartan society and politics, see Paul A. Rahe, Republics Ancient & Modern, vol. 1, The Ancien Régime in Classical Greece (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 122–171.

  4. Most of the histories of the period quote Pausanias, who lived at least eight hundred years after the events he relates (as far as the Fourth Crusade is from the present day). Moreover, it appears that his account can be traced only as far back as the Cretan poet Rhianus, who lived some five hundred years after the Messenian Wars. In the third volume of the 1925 Cambridge Ancient History, H. T. Wade Geary says of the Messenian Wars, particularly the revolt: “Of their course we know almost nothing. After the liberation of Messenia in 369 BC, the early wars of liberation were freely treated as themes for romance … conceived in romantic enthusiasm in the pages of Strabo and Pausanias, but almost certainly false history.” Historians have found very little since then to challenge this judgment, and the version presented in this book is presented in the full awareness that it is more legend than fact. However, it is upon these legends that Sparta built its warrior society and therefore they are integral to understanding the ethos that propelled the Spartan hoplite into battle.

  5. For an excellent in-depth discussion that attempts to separate the history from the legends about this revolt, see L. R. Shero, “Aristomenes the Messenian,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 69 (1938): 500–531. This article also presents an excellent analysis of each of the sources of the Spartan-Messenian Wars.

  6. Historical tradition has it that Sparta requested guidance from the Delphi oracle and was told “to ask Athens for a leader.” Athens, fearing to disobey the oracle but not wishing to aid Sparta, supposedly sent a lame schoolteacher named Tyrtaeus to command the Spartan army. More than likely, this version of events is an Athenian insertion placed into the story centuries after the event. What appears certain is that a man named Tyrtaeus did rise to command the Spartan army, but it is likely he was a born Spartan.

  7. Thomas Kelly makes the case that there was no traditional enmity between Sparta and Argos and this is a later invention of historians. As his own paper on the topic details three major wars between Sparta and Argos, in one of which a generation of Argive manhood was annihilated, I find his case less than convincing. See
Thomas Kelly, “The Traditional Enmity Between Sparta and Argos: The Birth and Development of a Myth,” American Historical Review 75, no. 4 (April 1970): 971–1003.

  8. In similar fashion to how the USSR, before its collapse, controlled the separate votes of its constituent parts in the United Nations.

  9. Some historians place the battle’s date at 546 BC.

  10. Some historians make the case that the humbling of Argos is what brought Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, and Aegina into the Peloponnesian League and that they had not been members prior to this war. See Terry Buckley, Aspects of Greek History 750–323 BC: A Source-Based Approach (New York: Routledge, 1996), 83.

  11. For a good general description of the agoge system, see W. G. Forrest, History of Sparta 950 BC–192 BC (London: Hutchinson, 1968). An argument has been made that what we know about the agoge is a result of Hellenistic and Roman myth making and that Sparta’s education of its youth was little different from that in any other Greek city. I remain unconvinced by these arguments, but for those who wish to pursue them, see: Nigel M. Kennell, The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education and Culture in Ancient Sparta (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

  12. Paul Cartledge says a more accurate term is a “similar,” as there were levels of society within Sparta and men were not peers, except when they took their place in the battle line.

  13. Willis West, Ancient World: From the Earliest Times to 800 A.D. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1905), 109.

  14. If a hoplite ran away from battle, the first thing he would discard would be his heavy shield. Also, a dead hoplite would be carried home or to his burial place on his shield.

  15. Jean-Pierre Vernant, ed., The Greeks (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 93.

  16. Herodotus, 5.39.

  17. Ibid., 5.42.

  18. Five ephors were elected annually. They could advise and influence the king and summon the assembly and the more powerful gerousia (selected only from Sparta’s noble families). They also acted as judges and punitive powers and could bring other officials to trial. Sparta was ruled by two kings, who to some degree were overseen by five ephors elected annually. The institution may have arisen as a result of a need for leadership while the kings were leading armies in battle.

  19. Sparta had two kings descending from two royal houses, the Agiad and the Eurypontid. Of the two, the Agiad was considered superior.

  Chapter 9: SPARTA VS. ATHENS

  1. There is some evidence that the Alcmaeonidae exile from Athens was not as clean a break as Herodotus reports, and even that during the rule of Hippias, Cleisthenes himself may have served as an archon. For a discussion of this possibility, see Wesley E. Thompson, “The Archonship of Cleisthenes,” Classical Journal 55, no. 5 (February 1960): 217–220; and James W. Alexander, “Was Cleisthenes an Athenian Archon?” Classical Journal 54, no. 7 (April 1959): 307–314.

  2. Herodotus, 6.108.

  3. J. A.O. Larsen, “A New Interpretation of the Thessalian Confederacy,” Classical Philology 55, no. 4 (October 1960): 229–248.

  4. Herodotus, 5.62.

  5. This is a pretty strong indication that the mass of people in Attica had not yet turned on Hippias, and he might even have still drawn considerable support from the countryside. This would mean that his more murderous tendencies were restricted largely to the noble classes and were of little interest to the mass of farmers, who still felt a lingering loyalty to the Pisistratidae for the rights to their land.

  6. A policy they happily put aside during the Peloponnesian War, when they accepted substantial Persian support in order to defeat Athens.

  7. Herodotus, 5.69.

  8. For an excellent discussion of the political maneuvering leading up to Cleisthenes’ assumption of power in Athens, see George Willis Botsford, “The Trial of the Alcmeonidae and the Cleisthenean Constitutional Reforms,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 8 (1897): 1–22.

  9. It is unclear if Isagoras was aware of his wife’s affair or even if Herodotus was just passing on malicious (but possibly untrue) gossip.

  10. The date for these reforms is still a matter of great debate. A straight reading of Herodotus seems to indicate that they were made while Isagoras was still in power. But how they could have been enacted during a time when Cleisthenes held no political power is a mystery. My belief is that the promise of reform was made to the people during Isagoras’s rule and later delivered on. For an excellent discussion of this dating problem, see Charles W. Fornara and Loren J. Samons, Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 169–171.

  11. For an excellent review of Athenian politics during this period, see C. A. Robinson Jr., “Athenian Politics,” American Journal of Philology 66, no. 3 (1945): 243–254.

  12. For an excellent discussion of these reforms and changing Athenian politics, see A. Andrews, “Kleisthenes’ Reform Bill,” Classical Quarterly, new ser. 27, no. 2 (1977): 241–248.

  13. There is some debate as to whether Cleisthenes was the first to enact laws on ostracism, as it may have been done during the time of Pisistratus. As it is not central to the theme of this book, we will not delve into the topic. For those with an interest in this unique legal development, see Antony E. Raubitschek, “The Origin of Ostracism,” American Journal of Archaeology 55, no. 3 (July 1951): 221–229.

  14. Historians have long disputed whether Cleisthenes actually enfranchised aliens and slaves. I have accepted the conclusions of Donald Kagan on the matter. See Donald Kagan, “The Enfranchisement of Aliens by Cleisthenes,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 12, no. 1 (January 1963): 41–46.

  15. This is the number of demes in the third century BC (according to Strabo), and the number during Cleisthenes’ time was likely the same or very close to it. Others give the number of demes at 139.

  16. For an in-depth look at the trittys concept, see Donald W. Bradeen, “The Trittyes in Cleisthenes’ Reforms,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 86 (1955): 22–30.

  17. For a thorough analysis of these reforms, see James H. Oliver, “Reforms of Clisthenes,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 9, no. 4 (October 1960): 503–507.

  18. Athens had developed a system of three concurrent archons: the archon eponymous, the chief magistrate; the archon basileus, for civic religious arrangements; and the polemarch, who commanded the army.

  19. Herodotus, 5.73.

  20. For an interesting analysis of the pro-Persian faction in Athens, see C. A. Robinson Jr., “Medizing Athenian Aristocrats,” Classical Weekly 35, no. 4 (October 27, 1941): 39–40; and James Holladay, “Medism in Athens 508–480 B.C.,” Greece & Rome, 2nd ser., 25, no. 2 (October 1978): 174–191.

  21. It is also likely that if one Spartan king did not wish to attack, there were a large number of Spartan hoplites present who also thought it was inadvisable.

  22. Athens was burned by the Persians in the 480 BC invasion, and apparently there was still significant scarring when Herodotus was writing.

  23. Colonies, once established, were politically independent entities, while settlers in cleruchies kept their Athenian citizenship, rights, and duties, which included serving as hoplites when needed.

  24. Pausanias, Description of Greece, 1.29.1, http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/pausanius-bk.html

  25. Elizabeth A. Myer, “Epitaphs and Citizenship in Classical Athens,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 113 (1993): 106.

  26. That Herodotus may have ignored his noble or even heroic death in combat (no mean undertaking for a man of his years) could be just one more example of the historian saying as little positive of the Alcmaeonidae as possible.

  Chapter 10: PERSIA’S RETURN TO WAR

  1. Herodotus, 4.97.

  2. Ibid., 4.142.

  3. See George Beardoe Grundy, The Great Persian War and Its Preliminaries (London: 1901) for an excellent analysis of how Herodotus came to believe so much of a story that was so obviously incorrect (pp. 55�
�70).

  4. The chronology of Miltiades’ adventures is open to argument. Apparently, at some unknown point he was forced to flee the Chersonese because of a Scythian incursion. Some important historians have stated that he was forced to flee not by the Scythians, but by Megabazos, who had learned of his disloyalty at the Danube bridgehead. The truth seems to be that this Scythian invasion took place well before Darius’s march through Thrace and that Miltiades soon returned to defeat the Scythians (or wild Thracians). The spoils of this victory were dedicated to Zeus at Olympia, and archaeologists have discovered his helmet there. Miltiades was definitely in the Chersonese when the Ionian revolt broke out in 499 BC, as coins he issued and dated to that period have been discovered. Some historians have argued that the Scythian invasion took place after Darius had returned to Sardis in 512 or 511 BC and that Megabazos, knowing of Miltiades’ supposed treachery at the bridge, refused to come to his assistance. There are two major problems with this thesis. First, letting a Scythian force large enough to menace walled cities penetrate that deep into Thrace uncontested would have risked everything Darius had gained in his expedition. There is no reason to believe Megabazos was that militarily incompetent. Next, this reasoning fails to explain why the Persians allowed Miltiades to return and remain in power for over a decade. For a defense of this position, see J. A. S. Evans, “Histiaeus and Aristagoras: Notes on the Ionian Revolt,” American Journal of Philology 84, no. 2 (April 1963): 113–128.

  5. Herodotus tells a story that the future Macedonian king Alexandros had Megabazos’s Persian envoys murdered because of their rude treatment of Macedonian women. He later covers up this crime by bribing Megabazos and giving his sister in marriage to the Persian envoy sent to discover what happened to his predecessors. This is almost certainly a fabrication that Alexandros sold to the other Greeks after the Persians had finally been defeated. That he had submitted and married off his sister to a Persian could not be denied or hidden. But it could be explained away as necessary after the slaughter of important Persian envoys. That the murders could have taken place and been left unavenged by Persia must be judged as unlikely.