The First Clash

by Jim Lacey

  6. That Darius rewarded loyal Greeks was just good policy. It by no means discounts the hypothesis that there was a Persian force at the bridge to make loyalty the easiest option to take.

  Chapter 11: IONIA REVOLTS

  1. For the story of the tattooed messenger, see Herodotus, 5.35.

  2. See Evans, “Histiaeus and Aristagoras,” who is in general agreement with this position but goes further by stating that Histiaeus never revolted but ran afoul of Artaphrenes, who had him impaled because he was determined to crush the revolt with force and did not want his plans hindered by prolonged negotiations. (Histiaeus is Histiaios.)

  3. Denied plunder, the fleet and army would have been glad to get paid; Aristagoras paid them out of his own pocket.

  4. Bury, ed., Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 4, The Persian Empire and the West, pp. 218.

  5. That the Persians reassessed and lowered the tax burden at the cessation of hostilities is a strong indication the taxes were both ruinous and an underlying cause of the conflict. That the Persians were willing to lower the taxes demonstrates they were doing everything possible to avoid a recurrence of hostilities.

  6. According to Herodotus, Koes was a Greek who advised Darius not to dismantle the bridge over the Danube before plunging deep into the Scythian hinterland. For this good advice, Darius had granted him Mytilene to rule. If the bridge had been dismantled, there was a strong possibility that Darius and his army would have been lost.

  7. The term anabasis (a large military expedition) comes from the title of a book by Xenophon describing a Greek military expedition into the heart of the Persian Empire in 401 BC.

  8. Herodotus, 5.51.

  9. Ibid., 5.96.

  10. Plutarch, in a story impossible to evaluate, relates that Eretrian ships had defeated a Phoenician fleet off Cyprus that had been ordered to move against the Ionians.

  11. See The Malice of Herodotus (De Malignitate Herodoti), p. 24. This book is considered by many to be the first scathing literary review, and it does catch Herodotus in some errors; but mostly it’s a rhetorical exercise conducted by a writer who appears viscerally upset that Herodotus often makes negative comments of the Greek cities Plutarch worshiped.

  12. Grundy claims that it must have taken some weeks for the Persians to raise a force of this size. However, it is unlikely the Ionians would have remained in a ruined city where they did not control the citadel, while the Persians mobilized an army to fight them (Grundy, Great Persian War, p. 98).

  13. Various reasons were given for the Athenian desertion, including the very good one that war had just erupted with their close neighbor Aegina. Also, there was already a substantial peace party in Athens, and it would probably not have taken much to turn volatile public opinion against a war on far-off shores, when there were so many pressing threats nearer home.

  14. It seems obvious that Artaphrenes had been mobilizing his army at Sardis. Logistically, a force of any formidable size would have been difficult to maintain in one location. Prudence dictated that this army be dispersed throughout the region, making it easier to draw supplies off the land. After all, the army that defeated the Greeks at Ephesus did not spring up by magic and could not have force marched from Miletus in time to have affected the course of events.

  15. Herodotus, 5.105. There is no way to determine the veracity of this passage, but it is unlikely that the Zoroastrian Darius would have prayed to Zeus. (Of course, it’s possible Herodotus may have just inserted the name of a god that would be familiar to his Greek audience.)

  16. Grundy and others say that the defeat at Ephesus could not have been as terrible as Herodotus relates, or the revolt would not have spread as rapidly as it did in 497 BC (Grundy, Great Persian War, p. 101).

  17. Herodotus reports that Hymees became ill and died during these operations.

  18. Grundy, Great Persian War, p. 111.

  19. Herodotus, 5.121.

  20. Ibid., 6.1.

  21. Some historians, such as A. R. Burn, have a radically different take on the story Herodotus presents. They make the case that Histiaios’s squadron was actually there to prevent the Persians, who now controlled the southern coast, from interfering with shipments of grain heading for Ionia. (See Burn, Persia and the Greeks, p. 208). However, as there is no evidence to support this position, it remains purely speculative.

  22. Most historians tend to doubt the number Herodotus presents when he gives the size of Persian fleets, as three hundred and six hundred come up often. However, it is just as likely that the Persians may have considered these numbers to be somewhat standard. In any case, there is no doubt that Persia was capable of making a naval effort of this size, and since this fleet had been three years in the making, it must have been substantial. Sir John Myers, on evidence I have not been able to uncover, claims that of the 600 ships, only 353 ships were war vessels. See John Myers, “The Battle of Lade, 494 BC,” Greece & Rome, 2nd ser., 1, no. 2 (June 1954): 50–55.

  23. Assuming an average of 150 men on each ship (crews and marines).

  24. The great square sails used by the Greeks were bulky and would have been either stored securely or more likely left ashore so as not to get in the way. That the Lesbians appear to have had their sails at the ready is a strong indication that thoughts of desertion were probably on their minds before the Samians showed them the way.

  25. After the fall of Miletus, the dramatist Phrynichus composed a play, The Taking of Miletus, that brought his Athenian audience to tears. For reminding Athens of its desertion of the Ionian cause, he was fined one thousand drachmas.

  26. Herodotus, 6.32.

  27. This was probably not a universal policy, as tyrants are still reported in Samos, Chios, and other cities in 480 BC (and later).

  28. Mardonius was a son-in-law of Darius and the son of Gobryas (one of the seven co-conspirators who brought Darius to power). He became famous as the military commander for Xerxes’ later invasion of Greece. After Xerxes left Greece, Mardonius was killed and his army destroyed at the great Battle of Plataea.

  29. Herodotus, 6.44.

  30. Herodotus also says a number of them were devoured by sea monsters … possibly sharks?

  31. Herodotus, 6.45.

  32. Ibid., 7.133. The Athenians threw the envoys into a pit reserved for condemned prisoners. Sparta threw the envoys into a well and told them to gather earth and water from it.

  Chapter 12: SPARTA SAVES GREECE

  1. The next, of course, was the sacrifice of three hundred Spartans at Thermopylae, followed by the decisive Spartan assault that broke the back of the Persian army at Plataea in 479 BC.

  2. We have already noted the most famous of the oracle’s ambiguous predictions, when Croesus was told that if he went to war with Persia, a great empire would be destroyed.

  3. This date has been a matter of great historical debate, with the preponderance of historians convinced that the 494 date is correct. See Ignace H. M. Hendriks, “The Battle of Sepeia,” Mnemosyne, 4th ser., 33, nos. 3–4 (1980): 340–346.

  4. Herodotus, 6.76.

  5. Plutarch, Moralia (“Sayings of the Spartans”). This story can be found in Plutarch, Moralia, Loeb Classical Library, vol. 3, translated by Frank Cole Babbitt (New York: Harvard University Press, 1931), p. 336. This is the kind of story that would have been well-known at the time and just what Herodotus, who never has a kind word for Cleomenes, would have seized on. That he failed to do so is strong evidence that the veracity of this story is not all one could hope for.

  6. Ibid., p. 341. Plutarch also relates that Cleomenes would have seized Argos, but when he approached he found the walls were manned by women, and he decided an assault would be too costly. This is a late tradition, and if true, it would be strange that Herodotus had not heard about it.

  7. For a thorough analysis of what Herodotus has to say about the continuing war with Aegina, see A. J. Podlecki, “Athens and Aegina,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 25, no. 4 (1976): 396–413.

>   8. This is Burn’s interpretation; see Burn, Persia and the Greeks, p. 233.

  9. Herodotus (6.65) tells us that Leotychidas was preparing to marry Perkalos, but she was kidnapped by Demaratus, who made her his bride.

  10. Despite Demaratus’s treason, Herodotus treats him very well throughout his narrative. It is probably a safe assumption that a close relative or maybe an aged Demaratus himself was the historian’s informer (I am aware of the claims that Dikaios, an Athenian exile who knew Demaratus, may have filled this role; see Herodotus, 8.65). That would also account for how poorly Cleomenes is treated. As we noted at the start of this book, Herodotus, like many journalists today, tended to write favorably of those who spoke with him.

  11. For an excellent account of Cleomenes, particularly his final year, see George L. Cawkwell, “Cleomenes,” Mnemosyne, 4th ser., 46, no. 4 (November 1993): 506–527. In some particulars, such as what Cleomenes was doing in Arcadia in 491 BC, Cawkwell differs from my account, but he makes a compelling case that should be seriously considered.

  12. Herodotus, 6.85.

  13. As with almost everything in Herodotus, the date of this fighting is in dispute among historians, with some placing it after the Battle of Marathon. I believe there is sufficient evidence, however, to place these events prior to Marathon. For an excellent account of this period and an analysis of competing claims of historians, see L. H. Jeffery, “The Campaign Between Athens and Aegina in the Years Before Salamis,” American Journal of Philology 83, no. 1 (January 1962): 44–54.

  14. Otanes had captured these islands for Persia in the years immediately preceding the Ionian revolt.

  15. Details of Miltiades’ life and particularly the dates of key events are murky. I accept the work of H. T. Wade-Gery as authoritative on the topic. He gives the following chronology for key events in Miltiades’ life:

  1. Circa 550 (554?) BC: born.

  2. From 528 to circa 516: Hippias treats him well in Athens.

  3. 524: Appointed archon for 524/3.

  4. Between 528 and 516: First marriage.

  5. Circa 516: Death of his brother Stesagoras; Hippias sends Miltiades to take over the principality in Chersonese.

  6. 514: Danube episode.

  7. Circa 514: Scyths invade Chersonese; Miltiades retires (to Thrace? to Athens?) for a few months, then returns. At the same time, Hippias breaks with him and makes an alliance with his enemies in Lampsacus.

  8. Circa 507: Cimon (son of his Thracian wife) born.

  9. From 499 to 493: Ionian revolt.

  10. 499 or 498: Occupies Lemnos and Imbros.

  11. 493: Leaves Chersonese and comes to Athens; acquitted of “tyranny” at his first trial.

  12. 492–489: Elected strategos (tribal general) in successive years.

  13. 490: Paros fiasco; found guilty of “false public statement” at his second trial; dies in prison.

  See H. T. Wade-Gery, “Miltiades,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 71 (1951): 212–221. N. G. L. Hammond has written an excellent summary of the Philaidae in the Chersonese, which analyzes a number of details of Miltiades’ rule. His chronology is not in full agreement with that above, but it’s worth exploring further. See N. G. L. Hammond, “The Philaids and the Chersonese,” Classical Quarterly, new ser., 6, nos. 3–4 (July–October 1956): 113–129.

  16. For an excellent account of Themistocles’ archonship, see Robert J. Lenardon, “The Archonship of Themistokles, 493/2,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 5, no. 4 (November 1956): 401–419.

  Chapter 13: GIANT VS. LILLIPUTIAN

  1. For purposes of this analysis, I will focus on Athens as it faced the Persian assault at Marathon alone (I will add Plataea’s thousand-hoplite contribution). If this analysis were made for Xerxes’ invasion ten years later, there would be justification for including a larger number of Greek cities in the estimates.

  2. It is notoriously hard to find any convincing figures for Attica’s population. I have discounted Arnold Gomme, The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1933), in favor of Peter Garnsey’s analysis; see Peter Garnsey, Cities, Peasants and Food in Classical Antiquity: Essays in Social and Economic History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). I have extrapolated the numbers Garnsey presents back to 490 BC, using an estimated population growth rate of 3 percent.

  3. These calculations are my own, based on various estimates of the size of the Roman military establishment compared with estimated populations over time. These numbers do not hold up during the republic, when Rome was able to mobilize a far larger percentage, as the Greek city-states were, under a period of stress.

  4. Again, Rome had an advantage in this regard over other ancient civilizations. As its Egyptian and North African fields were highly productive and produced a tremendous annual wheat surplus, Roman society could maintain a large military establishment (or a mob) and still feed itself.

  5. I reject out of hand that it was possible for the Persians to manage or logistically support any force much larger than this. For some reason, the historical community has come to a consensus that Xerxes marched with 250,000 troops. Consider that the Romans put more than 200,000 men in the field only once, and to do that they had to supply both armies (the Battle of Philippi, during the civil wars). According to Richard Gabriel, Alexander the Great’s 65,000 men required 195,000 pounds of grain and 325,000 pounds of water to sustain it for a single day, plus 375,000 pounds of forage per day to sustain its animals. It strains credulity to believe that the Persians were able to supply four times this amount for a sustained period, particularly when they moved away from their established magazines within the empire. Moreover, expert calculations place the column length of a six-legion army at 22 miles. Extrapolating this for a Persian army of 250,000 gives a column length of over 160 miles. Given an average day’s march, that means the first troops made contact at Thermopylae while the rear of the army was still two weeks’ march from the battlefield (assuming they were all marching along the coast road). Even in multiple columns or in compressed formations, an army this size would be a nightmare to manage and supply.

  6. Sailors were relatively easy to mobilize, as the established merchant marine could always be conscripted. Of course, if it was away for any length of time, it would wreck the trading economies of the coastal cities.

  7. Herodotus gives the number of male citizens as thirty thousand (5.97).

  8. It helps to think of the purchase of a person’s own armor and weapons as a form of tax. It is doubtful that any able-bodied man who could afford it would have been able to avoid the obligation. Even if the state did not require it, the social pressure must have been irresistible.

  9. Typically, the entire hoplite panoply would cost seventy-five to one hundred drachmas, or about three months’ salary for a skilled worker; see Hans van Wees, Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities (London: Duckworth Publishers, 2004), p. 52.

  10. A. H. M. Jones, “The Economic Basis of the Athenian Democracy,” Past and Present, no. 1 (February 1952): 13–31. This paper covers the period through the Peloponnesian War but delivers a number of insights for the period covered in this book. The thetes class consisted of any Athenian citizen who held wealth of fewer than two thousand drachmas.

  11. Rachel L. Sargent, “The Use of Slaves by the Athenians in Warfare,” Classical Philology 22, no. 2 (April 1927): 201–212. For a good discussion dealing specifically with the use of slaves at the Battle of Marathon, see James A. Notopoulos, “The Slaves at the Battle of Marathon,” American Journal of Philology 62, no. 3 (1941): 352–354.

  12. Sargent, “The Use of Slaves,” p. 203.

  13. Bury, ed., Cambridge Ancient History, p. 248.

  Chapter 14: PERSIAN WARFARE

  1. The center of Assyrian power was at the upper Tigris, in modern Iraq. At its height, the empire ruled most of Mesopotamia and Egypt.

  2. Richard Gabriel, Empires at War, vol. 1 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), p. 177.
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  3. Jackson J. Spielvogel, Western Civilization (New York: Wadsworth Publishing, 2005), p. 41.

  4. Herodotus, 6.103.

  5. The Immortals were so named because whenever they lost a man, he was immediately replaced, so that their number never fell below ten thousand.

  6. Herodotus, 7.161.

  7. Ibid., 7.83.

  8. Of course, the army that Darius commanded during the civil war (and that proved so capable of rapid marches in day or night) was of a completely different nature from those that came after it.

  9. Paul A. Rahe, “The Military Situation in Western Asia on the Eve of Cunaxa,” American Journal of Philology 101, no. 1 (spring 1980): 79–96. I am indebted to this paper for a number of insights on Persian vs. Greek warfare.

  10. Ibid., p. 82.

  11. John Keegan gives the only known example of cavalry breaking a square. But on that occasion, both rider and horse were killed by musket fire while at full charge. Unfortunately for the infantry in the square, the momentum of the dead horse carried into and through their line. The rest of the cavalry regiment then swept into the gap. See John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 153–159.

  12. Herodotus, 1.136.

  13. As the inscription on Darius’s tomb states: “My body is strong. As a fighter of battles I am a good fighter of battles.… I am skilled both in hands and in feet. As a horseman, I am a good horseman. As a bowman, I am a good bowman, both on foot and on horseback. As a spearman, I am a good spearman, both on foot and on horseback.”