Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain

by Richard North

  39 HC Deb 05 September 1940 vol. 365 cc.28–48.

  40 Diary, op cit, 31 August 1940, p. 103.

  41 HC Deb 05 September 1940 vol. 365 cc.48–82.

  42 Klee, op cit, p. 73.

  43 Grinnell-Milne deals with this at length in his Chapter 11, pp. 119–26.

  44 Sunderland Library Service, who have provided a publicly accessible photo montage: http://www.flickr.com/photos/sunderlandpubliclibraries/3150054025/in/set-72157611894055230

  45 War Cabinet: WP (40) 361. National Archives.

  46 James, op cit, p. 359: Instructions to Controllers No. 12.

  47 War Cabinet: WP (40) 366, op cit.

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 10

  1 Cited in Anon (1942c), p. 71.

  2 The full text and the context of the warning was published in a written statement by the then Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, on 18 November 1946, in response to repeated questioning by MPs (of himself and his predecessor) on how close Britain had come to being invaded. See: HC Deb 18 November 1946 vol. 430 cc.52–7W.

  3 Diary, op cit, p. 105.

  4 Orange, op cit, p. 104. Terraine (1985), p. 206, was to observe that there was foreknowledge of the raid on London, which “enabled fire-engines and other appliances to be assembled and positioned …”, thus suggesting that Park had been “caught on the wrong foot”. This assertion rests in part on Terraine relying on Winterbotham (1974) claiming that Ultra intelligence was available. This is denied in Probert and Sebastian (1991) – see: Edward Thomas, “The Intelligence Aspect”, p. 42 et seq. Hinsley (1993) affirms that neither Enigma nor any other source was giving precise information at this time.

  5 See: Ray (1996), pp. 13–16 for a comprehensive narrative of the air action. James, op cit, pp. 233–44, also covers the raids in considerable detail.

  6 Hill (1990).

  7 From accounts recorded by Mass Observation workers. See: Harrisson (1976), pp. 63–6.

  8 Stansky (2007), p. 28.

  9 Mack and Humphries (1985), pp. 40–1.

  10 See: pp. 407–8.

  11 Anon (1942c), pp. 12 and 14.

  12 National Archives online provides one set of figures and preliminary police reports: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/airraids.htm There is, however, a considerable variation in reports of numbers killed and injured. A contemporary news agency report (UPI, 8 July 1917 – on the occasion of the second major raid), gave figures of 157 killed and 432 injured. There is no dispute, however, that the ratio of deaths to explosive weight dropped in the First World War raids was substantially greater than in the Second World War, leading the authorities vastly to overestimate the expected casualties (while also underestimating the number of homeless survivors).

  13 On 11 September, the War Cabinet was advised that the tonnage of ships totally lost was about 29,000. In addition 15,000 tons of shipping were probably capable of salvage and ships totalling 72,000 tons had suffered minor damage. However, the Cabinet members were also told, “Such an attack had been anticipated with the result that there was not so much shipping in the Thames as usual”. War Cabinet: (40) 247. National Archives.

  14 Evidence of this emerges in an analysis of home opinion, disclosed by the censorship of mail to the USA and Eire. See: War Cabinet: WP (40) 407. National Archives.

  15 As a result of the heavy censorship at the time, the chaos arising from the bombing and the smothering effect of “Blitz spirit” recollections, much of the detail in the immediate aftermath of these first major raids has been obscured. In its daily report Home Intelligence (pp. 405–6) resorted to the use of anodyne phrasing, stating that there was “much anxiety”, the paucity of “official reassurance” and “lack of guidance”. Clues remain, however, to indicate that in the hours and first days after the raids there was a lack of organization and direction – not least because it was a weekend and most Council offices were closed. Survivors in West Ham, angry at the lack of help, turned on the air-raid wardens, and threatened to “smash” their post. Levine, op cit, p. 282.

  16 Raymond Challinor (1995), Class War in the Blitz. Workers’ Liberty, 18 February 1995.

  17 Cited in Stansky, op cit, p. 120.

  18 See: Gardiner, op cit, 369–70.

  19 Daily Express, 14 October 1940, p. 5. The service was discontinued in October, ostensibly because it had been found to be “too expensive”. The travellers found homes thirty to fifty miles away from London and travelled in by season ticket night and morning.

  20 Cited in Calder, op cit, p. 186. See also: King (1970), pp. 74–5.

  21 Boothby (1978), p. 181.

  22 Challinor, op cit. See also: Piratin (1948) and Zeigler (1995).

  23 Schwarz (2003), pp. 297–8 and p. 299.

  24 Irving (1987a), p. 87. See also: p. 107. The letter did not arrive in London until early November.

  25 Waller (1996), pp. 177–9. These events are also widely documented online, for instance: http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERhaushoferA.htm Irving, ibid., also refers. See also: Lipgens, op cit, pp. 376–9. He has Haushofer meeting Hess on this day, and reproduces the text of a “peace plan” sent to a former pupil of his, Legation Secretary Stahmer in Madrid, with instructions for it to be handed to Hoare. The Ambassador is said to have refused any contact.

  26 Wheatley, op cit, p. 53.

  27 Gilbert (1991), p. 675.

  28 Hanson, op cit, pp. 259–62.

  29 Brief report in War Cabinet: (40) 245. National Archives. More detail from http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4009-22SEP01.htm

  30 Details of the incident, including site plans and witness statements were supplied by the Peabody Trust. Personal Communication 13 October 2010.

  31 See: pp. 408–9.

  32 Much of the propaganda effort was directed at the American audience, addressing the government’s strategic objective of enticing the USA into the war. A good overview of the techniques employed is in Cull (1995), pp. 99–108.

  33 Personal communication. GOSH. Daily Mirror, 18 January 1941, p. 7.

  34 War Cabinet, (40) 246. National Archives.

  35 Nicolson, op cit, pp. 114–15.

  36 War Cabinet: (40) 246. National Archives.

  37 Gardiner (2004), pp. 339–40. A more detailed account is in the Daily Mail, 28 August 2010, by Gardiner, which forms the basis of this account. Curiously, Angus Calder, son of Richie Calder, whose book covers much the same territory, does not appear to mention the incident. The AP report was widely circulated – it appeared as the front-page story in the Melbourne Argus on 12 September under the headline “German bomb hits school – 500 persons inside”. Most, the story ran, were believed killed.

  38 Ansel, op cit, p. 288. A draft order, provisionally labelled Führer Directive No. 18, was prepared, but not signed. The draft was withheld and has gone missing.

  39 Assmann, op cit, p. 59.

  40 Cited in Anon (1942c), op cit, p. 25.

  41 New York Times, 10 September 1940. Unlike the British press, US newspapers often published German war communiqués in full.

  42 Waller, op cit, pp. 177–9, refers. See also: Daily Telegraph, 5 April 1999.

  43 Lipgens, op cit, p. 73.

  44 Prime Minister’s Personal Minutes, September 1940, D. 51. CAB 101/240. National Archives.

  45 Gardiner, op cit, pp. 374–5.

  46 Calder, op cit, p. 166.

  47 See: p. 412. Earlier (30 August), a report on “home opinion”, from monitoring of letters sent abroad, suggested that Lord Haw-Haw’s broadcasts were getting “stale”. War Cabinet: WP (40) 359. National Archives.

  48 War Cabinet: (40) 247. National Archives.

  49 See: entry for 5 September. WP (40) 366, op cit, and Roberts, op cit, p. 251, refer.

  50 Gilbert (1997), op cit, p. 799.

  51 Online text: http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1911Broadcast version online (audio): http://www.archive.org/details/EveryMan ToHisPost

  52 http://www.bbm.org.uk/Spra
gue.htm

  53 Dobinson, op cit, p. 243.

  54 For instance, the Daily Express, p. 1, which offered a single column, headed “Palace Bomb”.

  55 Anon (1942c), p. 65.

  56 Diaries, op cit, online version.

  57 Wheatley, op cit, p. 54.

  58 Wheatley, ibid. See also: Ansel, op cit, pp. 290–1.

  59 Diary, op cit, p. 107.

  60 See: Ansel, op cit, pp. 291–6 and Wheatley, op cit, p. 89.

  61 War Cabinet: (40) 249. National Archives.

  62 Ibid. Subsequently, Lord Reith, having returned to his room, recalled having been “pressed” by Churchill on the subject of Tube stations being used by “refugees”. He had said that he thought their use “inadvisable”, although as Minister of Transport, “he couldn’t be completely impartial”. Gilbert (1997), op cit, p. 806.

  63 Not everyone was so awed by the news. An anonymous member of the public told Mass Observation that it was better for the Germans to have bombed Buckingham Palace, in preference to his own home. It was alright for these people, they can go somewhere else, he said. “It’s us working people can’t go anywhere else”. Mass Observation Archives (MOA): Topic Collection (TC) 23/5/C Air Raids 1939–45: Observations Gathered. September 1940.

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 11

  1 See also: Daily Mail, 14 September 2009. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1213027/As-biography-launched-Queen-Mothers-account-day-Luftwaffe-came-town-released.html

  2 War Cabinet: WP (40) 371. National Archives.

  3 Summarized from Ansel, op cit, pp. 295–6, and Wheatley, op cit, pp. 56–7. See also: Grinnell-Milne, op cit, pp. 163–5.

  4 This extremely contentious issue is summarized by Ray (1994), pp. 155–8, and rehearsed at length by Dixon, op cit.

  5 A full account of the incident is given in Piratin’s book, first published in 1948.

  6 Diary, op cit, p. 107.

  7 Warrington Museum: http://museum.warrington.gov.uk/Local_History/war.aspx

  8 http://www.mybrightonandhove.org.uk/page_id__6962_path__0p116p182p446p.aspx

  9 Famously, in the 1969 film Battle of Britain – based loosely on the narrative offered by Wood with Dempster – with Dowding played by actor Lawrence Olivier, this was the high point. The Churchill misquote was in the film, which actually related to the second battle of El Alamein, and a speech given in November 1942.

  10 Churchill, op cit, pp. 273–6.

  11 Orange, op cit, p. 110.

  12 This issue is rehearsed fully by Robinson (2005). He, in turn, relies on Bekker (1968), who argues that the reason for the German failure was the inadequate resource in the first place, and then the failure of Göring to concentrate on one point of effort. The 15 September battle, in the grander scheme of things, was a minor footnote.

  13 Hinsley, op cit, p. 44.

  14 See: Challinor, op cit, and Piratin (1948). Writing eight years after the event, Piratin puts this action at “two or three days” after the Savoy Hotel incident. However, on 16 September, Home Secretary John Anderson referred to “organised demonstrations” in the War Cabinet meeting – which suggests that the Underground break-ins could have been on this day. Piratin’s memory is, in any event, faulty. He has the Home Secretary as being Herbert Morrison, who was not appointed until October. Until then, it was Sir John Anderson. However, Cull (1995), p. 106, claims that Piratin broke into Goodge St Tube Station on September 17.

  15 http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stories/69/a2388369.shtml

  16 Irving (1973) covers this meeting briefly, citing the Milch Diaries. Bishop, op cit, has it that the change of tactics to night bombing was decided at this meeting. He does not quote a source. Bekker (1968) offers a detailed narrative, having Göring “blustering” when presented with complaints of large numbers of RAF aircraft. “If they come at us in droves, we can shoot them down in droves.” Taylor, op cit, details an OKW report which observes that the operations had been “unusually disadvantaged”, with the major losses having occurred while the bombers were homeward bound, in small groups and without fighter escort. This was undoubtedly due to the Me 109s operating at their extreme range, having to turn for home before the raid was complete.

  17 Group instructions to controllers. Reproduced in James, op cit, p. 371.

  18 War Cabinet: (40) 250. National Archives.

  19 In Dixon, op cit, p. 139, we are reminded that, in 1917 during the German air raids, Churchill was Minister for War Munitions and Minister for Air, and had then been alarmed at the wave of violence in the East End – arson, rioting and strikes – that had followed. In those then revolutionary times, the then government had good reason to fear an uprising. Dixon suggests that Churchill in 1940 would have remembered those events, and was “thoroughly alarmed” about the morale of people in the East End.

  20 War Cabinet: WP (R)(40) 192. National Archives.

  21 HC Deb 17 September 1940 vol. 365 cc.121–38.

  22 Ansel, op cit, p. 299.

  23 The most often cited source for this is Terraine (1985). However, he relies on Winterbotham (1974). Edwards (in Probert and Cox (1991)) asserts that Winterbotham’s claims are “utterly without foundation”. Churchill does not refer to the events in Finest Hour, but that is not conclusive. He deliberately omitted references to Ultra material. The intelligence is mentioned in Mckay (2010), and although no source is given, he relies on Winterbotham for other claims. Churchill’s biographer (Gilbert) does not mention these events, the intelligence is not mentioned in War Cabinet minutes and there is no reference to it in the official history of British Intelligence (Hinsley, 1993), who suggests that the first indication of a unit being disbanded was on 25 October – see: p. 44. In the absence of independent corroboration, the claim cannot be taken as reliable.

  24 Churchill, op cit, p. 259.

  25 Diary, op cit, pp. 114–15 Nicolson.

  26 Contemporary reports, however, seem to indicate that the violence was directed at German interests, pacifists and the like, rather than the government. See: United Press International Report, 8 July 1917.

  27 Diary, op cit, online edition.

  28 HL Deb 17 September 1940 vol. 117 cc.401–15.

  29 Wartime letters from the Tottenham Home Front: http://tottenham-summerhillroad.com/wartimeletters_tottenham_homefront.htm

  30 Diary, op cit, p. 109.

  31 Prime Minister’s Personal Minutes, September 1940, op cit, D. 61.

  32 Cited in: Anon (1942c), op cit, p. 60.

  33 See: http://www.westendatwar.org.uk/page_id__11_path__0p2p.aspx

  34 See: pp. 431–4.

  35 The Daily Telegraph the following day noted that “it is impossible to hint at the nature of the device, but it is simple, and costs little to manufacture. It does not need a large number of men to operate it. It is neither a gun, ray, nor a balloon. When the device has been developed, London’s defences will be enormously strengthened by it”. The device was almost certainly airborne radar, to equip the RAF’s fleet of night fighters.

  36 CAB 101/240: the printed set of minutes for September – excludes the last day of the month.

  37 Diary, op cit, p. 109.

  38 Reported in the Glasgow Herald, 20 September 1940. Also reported in the Daily Mirror (p. 7): “Looking round at the destruction, in the middle of which were two unharmed Anderson shelters, the King remarked, ‘These Anderson shelters are wonderful, wonderful’”. The Yorkshire Post had: “The marvellous escapes from death of men and women whose houses had been wrecked by a direct hit led the King to say: ‘These Anderson Shelters are wonderful’”.

  39 Diary, op cit, pp. 115–16.

  40 Wheatley, op cit, p. 58.

  41 Prime Minister’s Personal Minutes, September 1940, op cit, M. 99.

  42 Wheatley, op cit, p. 60.

  43 Diary, op cit, p. 383.

  44 Hinsley, op cit, p. 44.

  45 Diary, op cit, p. 245.

  46 War Cabinet: WM (40) 255. National Archives.

  47 Ibid.


  48 Prime Minister’s Personal Minutes, September 1940, op cit, M. 116.

  49 Gilbert, op cit, p. 850.

  50 Challinor, op cit. http://www.workersliberty.org/system/files/wl18classwarblitz.pdf

  51 Date from the Daily Mirror, 21 September. Text from the Argus, Melbourne, 23 September 1940. National Library of Australia. Empire newspapers at this stage of the war did not have the paper rationing affecting the British industry and were, therefore, often able to offer fuller accounts of British events than the London papers.

  52 It transpired that Churchill, having learned of the radio-navigation devices used by German bombers, assumed – without even any evidence that the system could work at sea level, much less that it was fitted to naval vessels – that the invasion fleet could use the same system to navigate through the fog. He was not aware that few of the invasion barges even had radios, and relied for communication on flags and signal lamps. See: CAB 101/240 23 September 1940.

  53 Brooke, op cit, p. 110.

  54 Sunday Express, 22 September 1940, front page. However, there is no record of such an attack in wartime diaries of islanders. See: The German Occupation of Jersey 1940–1945, A Complete Diary, by Leslie P. Sinel, published by Evening Post, Jersey, November 1945, p. 21. Unpublished notes from K. Troy – a 14-year-old schoolboy living in Jersey during the occupation years – affirms this. Also, there is no reference to an RAF raid in September 1940 (or at any time) by Charles Cruickshank either in The German Occupation of the Channel Islands (1975), or in The British Channel Islands under German Occupation 1940–1945 (2005). And finally, there is no mention of a raid in the detailed dairies of the occupation years (at date unpublished) kept by William Troy MM who at the time of the occupation was the news editor of Jersey’s only wartime newspaper.

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 12

  1 Sunday Express, 22 September 1940, p. 5.

  2 Berlin Diary, op cit, p. 514.

  3 Diary, p. 110.

  4 Diary, op cit, p. 117.

  5 Editorial: ‘Poster patriotism’, p. 7.

  6 War Cabinet: 254 (40). National Archives.

  7 King, op cit, pp. 76–7.