Many Not the Few: The Stolen History of the Battle of Britain

by Richard North

  8 Prime Minister’s Personal Minutes, September 1940, op cit, M. 125.

  9 War Cabinet: (40) 256. National Archives.

  10 Diaries, KV4/186. National Archives.

  11 James, op cit, p. 272.

  12 Berlin Diary, op cit, p. 518.

  13 War Cabinet: (40) 257. National Archives.

  14 War Cabinet: WP (40) 383. National Archives.

  15 For instance, the Daily Mirror, 27 September 1940. In a leader headed “Major blunder”, it declared, “Narvik was quite a distinguished exploit compared with Dakar. Dakar has claims to rank with the lowest depths of imbecility to which we have yet sunk”.

  16 War Cabinet: (40) 259. National Archives.

  17 Lead story, p. 3.

  18 Megan Lloyd George, then Member for Anglesey. The debate was on 5 April 1939, in which she was highly critical of the Anderson shelter, asserting that shallow shelters could not reduce the risk of air raids to “tolerable dimensions”. She was supported by Sir Arthur Salter, friend and colleague of Jean Monnet, architect of the European Union. See: HC Deb 05 April 1939 vol. 345 cc.2811–78.

  19 Dixon, op cit, p. 69.

  20 Ibid.

  21 Berlin Diary, op cit, p. 523.

  22 War Cabinet: (40) 259. National Archives.

  23 Ibid.

  24 See: Gardiner, op cit, p. 372. The problem arose from Circular HO 197/4 “Domestic Surface Shelters” Memorandum No.14: use of certain limes in shelter construction, issued 29 April 1940. National Archives. The issue of weak shelters was first raised in parliament in an adjournment debate by Charles Ammon, MP for Camberwell North, shortly after Morrison’s appointment (HC Deb 09 October 1940 vol. 365 cc.373–464). It was further raised by William Gallacher, MP for Fife Western on 20 March 1940, when Morrison asserted that the memorandum had been “unfortunately not too clearly worded and was read by some 1ocal authorities as authorising the use of mortar ungauged with cement”. Any possible misapprehension, Morrison claimed, was removed by a circular issued on 17 July (HC Deb 20 March 1941 vol. 370 cc.304–5W). By then, there were major, if localized, cement shortages, and many local authorities continued using lime mortar. The issue was thus raised by several more MPs in early 1941, and also by the superbly robust Bishop of Birmingham in the House of Lords (HL Deb 17 June 1941 vol. 119 cc.417–42). Eventually, several thousand shelters had to be taken out of use and rebuilt.

  25 Consulting Engineer Ove Arup described a meeting with an unnamed senior civil servant on shelter policy, and recalled being told: “What really mattered was to keep people quiet, to give them confidence in the measures taken and to prevent panic; this psychological or political aspect was more important than the safety of the shelters”. A technical note which he produced, questioning the safety of brick shelters, was rejected for publication by a leading technical body on the basis that it was not “sound policy” to add to their unpopularity. See: Jones (2006).

  26 See: Richardson (1977). The Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) and its network of independent societies, planned and executed its own response to the bombing, setting up a system of “fall-back centres” and mutual aid to take over when distribution centres were damaged or destroyed. By this means, the largest food production and distribution enterprise in the country never failed to provide supplies to bombed areas.

  27 http://www.rjmitchell-spitfire.co.uk/otheraircraft/1932to1937.asp?sectionID=4

  28 The incident is described at length by McKee (1957). The girl was 16-year-old Evelyn Harmar. An account in the Daily Mirror, 18 January 1941, had her remaining at her switchboard for three hours, transmitting messages for the police incident post, in danger of further attack and delayed action bombs. The paper had a picture of the “pretty Evelyn”, about to travel to Scotland to get married to Pilot Officer Stanley Jefferson of Coastal Command.

  29 War Cabinet: WP (40) 386. National Archives.

  30 Diaries, op cit.

  31 On the day, the Evening Standard (p. 1) reported twenty-two killed.

  32 Diary, op cit, online version.

  33 Online text: http://ww2today.com/27th-september-1940-kennedy-the-british-are-a-lost-cause

  34 Observer, p. 7. In the days when the front page was given over to advertisements, and the news pages were further into the “book”, this was the equivalent of the front-page lead story.

  35 Roskill, op cit, p. 257. See: pp. 247–59 for the full context.

  36 War Cabinet: WP (40) 333. National Archives.

  37 Ibid.

  38 Hinsley, op cit, p. 44.

  39 Taylor (1982), p. 1256.

  40 London Transport Museum. A remarkable set of photographs is published on the museum website.

  41 See also: Gardiner, op cit, pp. 372–3, and Harrisson, op cit, pp. 116–18.

  42 War Cabinet: (40) 264. National Archives.

  43 This became public knowledge around 7 October – the front page of the Daily Express of that date refers.

  44 Diary, op cit, p. 113.

  45 War Cabinet: (40) 265. National Archives.

  46 von Leeb, op cit, p. 235.

  47 War Cabinet: WP (40) 401. National Archives.

  48 War Cabinet: WP (40) 403. National Archives.

  49 See also: Ciano, op cit, p. 387. He wrote in his diary: “there is no longer any talk about a landing in the British Isles, and preparations made remain where they are”.

  50 Berlin Diary, p. 538.

  51 Colville, op cit, pp. 302–3.

  52 War Cabinet: (40) 266. 4 October 1940. National Archives.

  53 Diary, op cit, pp. 539–40.

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 13

  1 War Cabinet: WP (G)(40) 280. National Archives.

  2 Hanson, op cit, pp. 276–7.

  3 Taylor (1982), op cit, p. 133.

  4 War Cabinet: (40) 267. National Archives.

  5 War Cabinet: WM (40) 267. National Archives.

  6 Daily Express, p. 1.

  7 Reported nationally, the following day. See, for instance: Yorkshire Post, p. 3.

  8 Daily Mirror, p. 1.

  9 Union history website: http://www.unionhistory.info/workerswar/display.php?irn=296&QueryPage=%2Fworkerswar%2Fimagesdocs.php

  10 War Cabinet: WP (40) 408. National Archives.

  11 HC Deb 08 October 1940 vol. 365 cc.261–352.

  12 An account is given in the Daily Mirror, 10 October 1940, p. 6.

  13 War Cabinet: (40) 268. National Archives.

  14 Ibid.

  15 Ibid. See also: War Cabinet. WP (40) 402. National Archives. A lengthy report, produced under the signature of Herbert Morrison, writing as Home Secretary, argued that it would be extremely difficult to demonstrate that the newspapers were breaching Defence Regulations.

  16 HC Deb 09 October 1940 vol. 365 cc.373–464.

  17 In addition, the Upton Colliery in Yorkshire, which employed 2,200 men, was at a standstill, owing to a strike by haulage hands. A week later, they had rejected an appeal by branch officials of the Yorkshire Mineworkers Association to go back to work. The owners, Dorman Long and Co. Ltd, were considering closing down the pit. See: Yorkshire Post, 17 October 1940.

  18 War Cabinet: (40) 269. National Archives.

  19 Garfield (2006), p. 103.

  20 http://www.hackney.gov.uk/hackney-archives-the-blitz.htm

  21 HC Deb 10 October 1940 vol. 365 cc.483–568.

  22 War Cabinet: WP (R)(40) 196. National Archives.

  23 Taylor, op cit, pp. 136–7.

  24 Anon (1942c).

  25 Hinsley, op cit, p. 45.

  26 Despite the general prohibition on identifying the location of bomb-damaged buildings, the press the following day was replete with pictures of the damage. Publication of the photographs, however, had been discussed by the War Cabinet on 11 October, and specifically approved. The Chief of the Air Staff saw no objection to publication “provided this was not taken as a ruling of general application”. War Cabinet: (40) 269. National Archives.

  27 War Cabinet: WP (40) 423. National Archives
.

  28 Details of this and the preceding actions drawn from online sources: http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/torpedoboats/torpedoboot1923/seeadler/operations.html and http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4010-23OCT01.htm, plus War Cabinet: WP (40) 423 (Weekly Résumé). National Archives.

  29 Ansel, op cit, p. 304. See also: Assmann, op cit, supplement p. 17. The OKW Directive read, in part: “The English must retain the impression from now on [that] we are prepared to land on a large scale. At the same time however, [the] German domestic economy will be released of a burden”. Klee, op cit, p. 245, has the OKW diary noting that “an outline Directive for the discontinuance of Sealion is to be prepared”. He puts the date of the order as 23 October.

  30 Taylor, op cit, p. 140.

  31 Gardiner, op cit, p. 347.

  32 After the war, a memorial was erected in Abbey Park Cemetery. It lists 173 names. http://www.flickr.com/photos/albedo/97603317

  33 Taylor, op cit, p. 142.

  34 Sunday Express, 13 October 1940, p. 1.

  35 Nick Cooper: http://www.nickcooper.org.uk/subterra/lu/tuawcafa.htm#balham

  36 War Cabinet: (40) 270. National Archives.

  37 War Cabinet: WP (40) 417. National Archives.

  38 A routine was developed, however, for the submission of statistical reports for time lost by major departments.

  39 http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/october15.html

  40 http://www.vauxhallandkennington.org.uk/forgottentragedy.pdf

  41 One particularly high-profile critic had been Sir Ove Arup, Consulting Engineer, designer of the world-famous Penguin Pool in London Zoo. He was a member of the government’s air-raid precautions organizing committee and advised Finsbury Council on the provision of bomb shelters, writing several lengthy monographs on the design of shelters, and shelter policy. Ironically, although many of his ideas were rejected – largely on political grounds – his construction firm had many clients for whom he built shelters. One was the Air Ministry. See: Jones (2006).

  42 War Cabinet: (40) 271. National Archives.

  43 Ibid.

  44 HC Deb 15 October 1940 vol. 365 cc.595–7.

  45 Ibid.

  46 HC Deb 15 October 1940 vol. 365 cc.653–78.

  47 See: Chapman (1998), pp. 98–9.

  48 HL Deb 16 October 1940 vol. 117 cc.527–44.

  49 War Cabinet: (40) 272. National Archives. Reference was also made to the bombing of the Carlton Club, home of the Conservative Party. The building was virtually demolished but no one was killed. A Labour MP was heard to remark that the devil looked after his own.

  50 Ibid. See also: King, op cit, pp. 81–2. King recalls that Attlee – a man he described as of “limited intelligence and no personality” – was most concerned about “irresponsible criticism”, but very “vague or silent” on what it constituted. When challenged, he could not give an example of a “subversive influence” which could endanger the nation’s war effort. King did not expect the government to do anything more, and of his papers, said only: “obviously we shall pipe down for a few weeks until the course of the war alters the whole situation”.

  51 Mason, op cit, p. 368.

  52 Evening Standard, 10 December 1940.

  53 Page 9, “The bravest men I ever met”. The FAA is recognized in the Battle of Britain Memorial Window in Westminster Abbey. The Roll of Honour contains the names of l,497 pilots and aircrew killed or mortally wounded during the Battle, of which it states 449 were in Fighter Command, 732 in Bomber Command, 268 in Coastal Command, 14 in other RAF commands and 34 in the Fleet Air Arm.

  54 Hanson, op cit, pp. 279–80.

  55 War Cabinet: (40) 274. National Archives.

  56 Page 5: “Nazi raiders fly six miles high”.

  57 http://www.warbirdforum.com/saga.htm

  58 War Cabinet: WP (40) 425. National Archives.

  59 http://www.kbismarck.com/testi.html

  60 War Cabinet: 275 (40). National Archives.

  61 Diary, op cit, p. 150.

  62 Klee, op cit, p. 237.

  63 See: Assmann, op cit (Appendix), p.17. The diary refers to an OKW directive of 22 October “for deception of the enemy”, signed on behalf of Keitel.

  64 Klee, op cit, pp. 237–8.

  65 Diary, op cit, pp. 150–1.

  66 Klee, op cit, p. 239.

  67 War Cabinet: WP (40) 425, op cit.

  68 Halifax Diary, cited in Lawlor, op cit, p. 146.

  69 War Cabinet: (40) 276. National Archives.

  70 Liddell, op cit.

  71 Gilbert (1991), op cit, p. 681. See also: Hinsley, op cit, p. 44. The CIC observed that, if the movement of shipping was maintained, it “could reduce the risk of invasion” (my italics).

  72 Colville, op cit, p. 283.

  73 Conveyed via the Daily Express the following day.

  74 War Cabinet: (40) 279. National Archives.

  75 War Cabinet: (40) 280. National Archives.

  76 War Cabinet: WP (G)(40) 275. National Archives.

  77 War Cabinet: WP (G)(40) 280. National Archives.

  78 Hinsley, op cit, p. 45.

  79 Roskill, op cit, p. 267.

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 14

  1 War Cabinet: WP (40) 393.

  2 Suchenwirth (1959), p. 67.

  3 (Anon 1941b).

  4 Jarman (1997).

  5 By far the best technical descriptions of the invasion craft comes from Schenk (1990), with an array of photographs and diagrams which make clear how difficult the landing would have been, merely from the technical aspects. These are often neglected in the grand political narratives. The sheer practicalities of delivering the fleet to the shores of England were so daunting that it is hard to see that an unopposed landing, even in ideal conditions, could have succeeded.

  6 Williamson (1983), p. 72.

  7 Liddell Hart (1948), p. 201.

  8 Blumentritt (1949), January.

  9 Guderian (1952), p. 138.

  10 Schenk (1990), p. 128.

  11 Cox (1982).

  12 Campion (2010).

  13 As in a UP syndicated article on 15 September 1945.

  14 HL Deb 05 September 1940 vol. 117 cc.365–81.

  15 Op cit. See: p. 235.

  16 See again: Ansel, op cit, pp. 295–6, and Wheatley, op cit, pp. 56–7. See also: Grinnell-Milne, op cit, pp. 163–5.

  17 See: Butler and Young (1952). Presented in the war-time British media as an overweight buffoon, Göring was a far more complex man. A skilled organizer, and ruthless street fighter, he was the man behind the “night of the long knives” of 1934, in which Hitler’s rivals were murdered, including Ernst Röhm, leader of the SA. When later asked why he had assented to the murder of Röhm, Göring was to say, “The man was in my way”.

  18 See also: Nuremberg transcript: 5 July 1946 – Dr Otto Stahmer.

  19 Nielsen (1968).

  20 Hitler’s pilots shoot down Battle of Britain “myth”. Observer. 16 July 2000.

  21 Statistical details from Bekker (1968).

  22 Jones (2006), p. 69.

  23 HC Deb 14 June 1917 vol. 94 cc.1283–92.

  24 HC Deb 21 December 1938 vol. 342 cc.2880–92.

  25 One such happened in Bethnal Green Tube Station on the night of 1 March 1943, when 173 people were crushed to death on the stairs while descending into the Underground.

  26 HC Deb 05 April 1939 vol. 345 cc.2811–78.

  27 The Committee had also produced a 24-page, printed report – dated 4 April 1939, and classified “secret”. It was appended to a note to the Cabinet, with a memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal, dated 12 April 1939 – also classified secret. The conclusions of the Civil Defence (Policy) Committee comprise the final document of the set. See: CP 86 (39). National Archives.

  28 Consulting Engineer Ove Arup claimed that the lack of a scientific base for dispersal policy reduced it to the status of a “religious confession”, accusing the government of “prophetic utterances of the future”. Jones, op cit, p. 84.

  29
HC Deb 12 June 1940 vol. 361 cc.1277–354.

  30 Churchill, op cit, pp. 287–8. As recorded earlier, his request for more information came after the Tubes had been opened to the public, asking why the policy had been changed, rather than urging that it should be changed.

  31 Calder (1969).

  32 See: Nuremberg Trial, transcript 25 July 1946. Dr Seidl. There were no surprises: “Such were the terms on which Hitler was prepared to make peace with Great Britain immediately after the conclusion of the French campaign, that it was deemed that the position of Hitler had undergone no further change”.

  33 There has been a continuing controversy as to whether Hess undertook his journey with the approval of Hitler. With the claimed discovery of papers in a Russian archive, it now seems more likely that Hitler was aware of the mission, and had approved it. Scotsman, 30 May 2011. http://news.scotsman.com/scotland/Historian-claims-to-have-solved.6765528.jp.

  34 See: Hewitt (2008), pp. 170–1. The implications for Sealion are obvious. The naval action took place at night, as would have any attack on the fleet sailing against England.

  NOTES ON CHAPTER 15

  1 Goulter et al. (2006), ‘The Royal Navy did not win the “Battle of Britain”’. RUSI Journal. October.

  2 HC Deb 04 July 1940 vol. 362 cc.1043–51.

  3 WP (40) 359, op cit.

  4 Foot (1962), p. 287.

  5 War Cabinet: WM (40) 267, op cit..

  6 War Cabinet: WP (G)(41) 1. National Archives.

  7 Hanson, op cit, pp. 301–6.

  8 Hanson, op cit, pp. 317–22.

  9 Daily Express, 1 July 1942. He refused to explain the reason for his “disappointment”.

  10 See: pp. 128 and 212.

  11 Masters (1941).

  12 Galland, op cit, p. 15.

  13 War Cabinet: (42) 130. National Archives.

  14 Daily Express, 11 November 1942, p. 2. Speech text: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/421110b.html

  15 War Cabinet: WM (43) 101. National Archives.

  16 Available from the Internet Archive: http://www.archive.org/details/BattleOfBritain

  17 A two-page photo-montage published on 4 June 1942 (pp. 558–9) illustrates exactly the same scene. A similar feature on air-sea rescue was published on 14 June 1941 (p. 411), but this shows only an RAF launch and a Lysander. There is no reference in the magazine to a Walrus in RAF service used in the air-sea rescue role prior to the June 1942 article.