A Memoir- the Testament

by Jean Meslier

  This is how he expresses himself in Latin, which will show how well I’ve grasped his thought:

  Deus, he says, est sui ipsius principium et finis, utriusque carens: neutrius egens: utrinque parens atque autor. Semper est sine tempore: cui praeteritum non abit, nec subit futurum. Regnat ubique sine loco, immobilis absque statu: pernix sine motu: extra omnia omnis, intra omnia, sed non includitur ab ipsis. Extra omnia sed non ab ipsis recluditur. Intimus haec regit: extimus creavit: Bonus sine qualitate: magnus sine quantitate: totus sine partibus, immutabilis, cum caeteras mutat: eujus velle potentia ejus: cujus opus voluntas; simplex, in quo nihil est in potentia, sed in actu omnia imo ipse purus, primus, medius et ultimus actus. Denique est omnia, super omnia, extra omnia, praeter omnia et post omnia omnis.[726]

  This description is obviously full of absurdities and palpable contradictions: which clearly shows that it can only be understood of a Being who is, as I’ve said, completely imaginary and fanciful. By which it is evident that the system of creation necessarily relies on an almost infinite number of inexplicable difficulties, full of contradictions and unsustainable absurdities. This has also given rise, among those Philosophers and Theologians who accept the system of creation, a nearly infinite multitude of diverse and mutually opposed opinions, on which they never have nor ever will agree, which should surely tell us all we need to know about the system of the creation. Things are different with that of the natural formation of things, carried out by the same matter of which they are composed, because this system contains no contrariety and nothing repugnant, and consequently it can be safely said that it contains nothing impossible. One has only to assume that matter is eternal, that it is, of itself, what it is, and that it has its beginning of itself, which assumption is very simple and very natural, and it’s quite obvious that there is nothing impossible about this assumption. For, 1) it is obvious that matter exists and that it’s not an imaginary and chimerical Being. 2) It is clear that a certain portion or extent of matter is susceptible to division, and that all matter is susceptible to movement; and we also see that matter is presently in motion; we cannot doubt any of these things; why, then, can it not be supposed that matter is indeed eternal, and that it actually moves itself; since there is nothing repugnant in this; since we neither see nor can find anything that might have created it, nor which might have set it in motion? Finally, there is no doubt that the universal Being has its existence and its movement of itself, for who or what might have given it either of these? Certainly, it can’t have received it from anything else. For matter itself is this universal Being, which can only have received its own existence and movement from itself, and assuming this, you have a clear principle, which can not only suddenly remove all difficulties, all the contrarieties, and all the absurdities which are necessarily entailed in the system of creation, but it can also open an easy path to the knowledge and the physical and moral explanation of all natural things. For, the very idea of a universal matter which moves in various ways, and which, by these various configurations of its parts, can change every day in countless different ways, clearly shows us that everything in nature can be made by the natural laws of motion, and simply through the configuration, combination, and modification of the various parts of matter.

  67. IT IS FUTILE TO RECUR TO THE EXISTENCE OF AN OMNIPOTENT GOD TO EXPLAIN THE NATURE AND FORMATION OF NATURAL THINGS.

  I know well that it’s not easy to conceive what it is that makes matter move, or what makes it move in this or that way, with this or that force or speed. I admit that I’m unable to conceive of the origin and effective principle of this motion; however, I find nothing repugnant or absurd in attributing it to matter itself. I fail to see how there could be any; and even the partisans of the opposing system are unable to provide any. All they can object is to say that bodies, large or small, don’t have an inherent power of movement, because there is, they say, no necessary connection between the idea they have bodies and the idea they have of their movement. But this certainly proves nothing, for if we found no necessary connection between the idea of a body and the idea of a motive force, it wouldn’t follow from this that there isn’t one; our ignorance of the nature of a thing doesn’t disprove this thing; but the absurdities and manifest contradictions necessarily entailed in the hypothesis of a false principle are convincing proofs of the falseness of this principle. And thus, we are powerless to conceive of and to rationally demonstrate that matter has an inherent power of motion, is not a proof that it doesn’t have it, but on the contrary, all the absurdities and manifest contradictions which follow from the supposed principle of the creation are, once again, convincing proofs of the falseness of this principle. And, since it is certain that the matter moves, and since nobody can deny or doubt this, except for a complete Pyrrhonian, it must necessarily have received its existence and its movement from itself, or it must have received them from something else, both of these. It can’t have received them from something else, as I’ve already shown, and which I’ll show more amply in what follows, it necessarily follows, then, that it has its being and its motion of itself, and that, consequently, it is futile to seek outside of itself the principle of its being and its motion.

  But let’s also see whether we might show, with a few examples, that, although we can’t perceive the necessary connection between a cause and an effect, this doesn't mean that there truly isn’t one. Here are a few examples. We don't see, for example, any necessary connection between the natural construction of our eye and the sight of some object; we don't comprehend how the sight of an object can take place; and yet, it is sure that we ourselves see with our eyes. Thus, there must be some natural link between the composition of the eye and the sight of an object; although we can’t see in what this link consists. We don’t see, for example again, any necessary link between our will and the movements of our arms or legs, we can’t grasp their nature, or the use of these hidden springs which perform the movements of our arms and legs, and we see every day that those who know least about the natural construction of their bodies, are often those who move their bodies most easily and skillfully; therefore, there must be a natural link between our will and the movement of the parts of our body, although we don’t know wherein this link consists, or how it occurs. Beyond doubt, it is the same with the connection between the motion and quivering of the fibers of our brain and our thoughts; we don’t see that there is a link between the two things, or how there could be one, and yet there is one, since our thoughts depend on this motion or this quivering of the fibers of our brain, or the motion of the animal spirits, which are continually in motion. But let’s take the example of our own origin and our own birth. I maintain that the most capable Philosopher and most subtle Mind in the world might never form a true idea of his own origin and birth, if he has never seen or heard of the generation and birth of men or any other animal. Would he ever guess, for example, relying only on the only natural lights of one’s reason, that he had been conceived and formed gradually in a woman’s womb, by means of a liquid and watery kind of seed, which a man, like himself, had poured and introduced, by certain canals, into the womb of a woman? Would he guess or imagine, with the aid of his reason alone, that he had spent nine months inside the womb of a woman and that he would then have emerged in this or that way? Surely not; he could never imagine that, and he would never even think that he’d ever nursed on a woman if, to repeat, he had never seen or heard of such things. And if this capable Philosopher or this subtle Mind, by wishing to reason on the basis only of things he’s learned or seen, sought to deny his true origin, and attribute it to something else that he might dream up, on the pretext that he could perceive no necessary connection between the belly of a woman and the formation of a man, wouldn’t he bring ridicule upon himself?

  Yes, certainly. But this is exactly what those who deny the Eternity of matter, and who deny its inherent motive force, on the pretext that they see no necessary connection between the idea of matter and its movement
; for they refuse to acknowledge the unique and true cause of the common origin of all things, on the pretext that they can’t understand that it is so, and at the same time they accept a false one, which is a thousand times more incomprehensible than the one they reject, on the pretext of being unable to understand it, and of failing to see any necessary link between something and the property of the thing. That’s no way to clear up the difficulty, or to advance in the knowledge of natural things. Thus, when our idea of matter doesn’t present us with, or clearly show that it has, of and by itself, the power of self-motion, this doesn’t mean that it doesn’t actually have it, especially since it moves itself and there is nothing repugnant about its self-movement. If present movement were of the essence of matter, I would believe that we could see a necessary link between the idea we have of it and its motion; but since it’s certain that the present motion is not essential to it, that as it’s only a property of its nature, there’s no surprise that we do not see a necessary connection between the idea that represents it to us, and its motion. For, since its motion is not it essential and necessary to it, there must not be any necessary connection between the two; and thus, if the idea that we have of matter fails to show us any necessary connection with its motion, this is not a proof that it can’t move itself.

  68. EXISTENCE CAN’T HAVE BEEN CREATED.

  But, to highlight the truth of these things, and to better show that matter comes from itself, that it received its motion from itself, and that it truly is the first cause of all things, let’s start with a principle which is so clear and evident that nobody can doubt it: this is the principle. We clearly see that there is a world, i.e., a Sky, an Earth, and an infinity of things that are, as it were, closed in between the sky and the earth; of which nobody can reasonably doubt, unless they expressly want to play the Pyrrhonist and doubt everything; which would be to close one’s eyes to all the lights of human Reason and set oneself completely against all natural sentiments. If anyone could go that far, they would have to have lost their judgment, and if they absolutely wanted to persist in such aims, it would be more appropriate to call them insane than to have fruitless recourse to argumentation to instruct them. But I don’t think there’s any Pyrrhonist, mad as you like, who doesn’t know, who doesn’t feel, and who isn’t quite convinced that there is at least some difference between pleasure and pain, between good and evil, and between the nice bit of bread that he eats with one hand and the curd he holds in the other. Pyrrhonism doesn’t go as far as to doubt everything, thus it can be called more imaginary than real, and that it’s more a mental game than a true conviction of the soul. That’s why, setting aside this universal and affected doubt of the Pyrrhonists, we follow the brightest lights of Reason, which clearly show us the existence of Being; for it is clear and evident, at least to ourselves, that Being is, that we would not be, and that we couldn’t even have any thought of being, if being were not. But we certainly know that we are and that we think, we can’t doubt this at all; therefore, it is certain and evident that being is, for if Being were not, we would certainly not be; and if we were not, we would certainly not think at all. Nothing is clearer, or more evident than that.

  With that assumption, it’s necessary to recognize the existence of being, and not only to recognize the existence of being, but also to recognize that being has always been and, consequently, that it was never created; for if it hadn’t always been, it surely could never have been possible for it to be, or to ever begin to exist. 1). It could never have begun to exist by itself, by something that is not, can by no means make itself, or give itself existence. 2). Nor could it ever begin to exist through any other cause, or by any other Being, who would have produced it, since there wouldn’t be any other Being or any other cause to produce it, as would be assumed when saying that being hadn’t always been. Since, then, Being is, and since it is obvious that it is, we must recognize that it has always been, and not only is it absolutely necessary to recognize that Being is and that it has always been, it is also necessary to recognize what Being, the first principle and the first foundation of all things, is. For, it is obvious that all things are in no way and truly are what they are only because they possess Being, and because they themselves are participations of Being, and it is clear and certain that nothing would be, if Being were not. Which obviously means that Being in general is that which is first and principal and fundamental in all things; and consequently, that Being is the first principle and the first foundation of all things. And, since Being has never begun to be, and has always been, as has been shown, and as, moreover, all things are only diverse modifications of being, it obviously follows that nothing was created, and consequently, that there is no creator. All of these propositions necessarily follow, and they are incontestable.

  69. THE POSSIBILITY OR IMPOSSIBILITY OF THINGS DOESN’T DEPEND ON THE WILL OR THE POWER OF ANY CAUSE.

  I expect our God-cultists to jump on the chance here to say that the being they call immaterial and divine, never came into being, and that He has always been, as the argument demonstrates; but that material and perceptible being has not always been, and that it will not always be, nor could it have been, if the divine and immaterial Being hadn’t created it. But it is easy to show the weakness and vanity of this response. To start with, it is vain because it assumes, without evidence or merit, the Existence of an unknown, uncertain, and doubtful Being, which is nowhere to be seen or found, and of which it’s impossible to even form a proper idea. And the immaterial and divine Being assumed in this response is a Being who is completely unknown, who is uncertain and doubtful, who is nowhere to be seen or found, and of whom it’s impossible to form a proper idea; in addition, it assumes without proof or basis the existence of this Being, for it’s beyond anyone’s power to give any strong and adequate proof of its existence, as will be shown more detail later on: therefore, the above response is vain. 2). It is vain, since, being absolutely necessary to acknowledge the eternity of some Being, it is obvious that we should rather attribute eternity to a real and veritable Being, the nature and existence of which is known with certainty, of which no one can show the origin, or the beginning, than to attribute it to an uncertain and doubtful Being, whose nature and existence are unknown, and which, by consequence, can only be an imaginary Being; I say imaginary, for a Being which is uncertain and doubtful, and who is nowhere seen or found, and of which none can even form a proper idea, should certainly rather be considered an imaginary than a real and true Being. And besides, this supposedly divine Being is so uncertain and doubtful that, despite so many thousands of years during which its existence has been debated, we are still waiting for any demonstration or clear and firm proof of this. 3). A first Being must necessarily be recognized, by which all things were made, of which all things are made, and to which, finally, all things are reduced; now, the material Being is obviously in all things, and all things are made of the material Being and that all things are ultimately reducible to matter, which is the material Being. The same cannot be said of a Being who isn’t material: thus, it’s the material being who should be recognized as the first Being. If it is the first Being, there can’t have been others before it, it can’t have been made or created, and consequently it has always been. Thus, the response, which supposes, without any proof or basis, that the material Being has been created by an immaterial and divine Being is a vain response. 4). The above response is vain, because the above Argument clearly demonstrates the eternity of the Being that is conceived of, and of which one has a clear and distinct idea: Now, Being is the only material that is conceived of, and of which we have a clear and distinct idea: thus, it’s the existence and the eternity of the material Being, demonstrated by the above argument. The Being whose existence is demonstrated by the above argument, can only be the Being in general, which is known and which is conceived by a clear and distinct idea, and which is even conceived as extended, and as being generally and equally everywhere. For it will not be said that this argum
ent demonstrates the existence of a Being who is not known, and of which no clear and distinct idea is held. Equally, it will not be said that it demonstrates the existence of a Being who would be nowhere, or who would only be in some particular place: for there is not and there cannot even be any reason to say or to think that the Being in general would be here and not there, or that it would be in one place and not another; and thus the Being whose existence is demonstrated by this argument, can be none other than that which is extended, and which is generally and necessarily everywhere. And the Being which is extended and which is generally and necessarily everywhere is none other than the material Being: therefore, it’s the existence of the material Being which is demonstrated by this argument, and not the existence of any other, since there can be no other one, and therefore, the response given to this argument is completely vain and frivolous. And it’s necessary to agree with this; for it can’t be said that it clearly demonstrates the eternity of an unknown Being, an uncertain and doubtful Being, and of which no true idea can be formed: for then He would no longer be unknown, or uncertain and doubtful, if the above argument truly demonstrated His existence and eternity. It’s not, therefore, the eternity of an intangible and unknown Being, which is demonstrated by the above Argument; but it’s the eternity and existence of a Being which is evidently known, certain, and beyond doubt, which is demonstrated by the above argument. And only the material Being is evidently and generally known to all; it alone is certain and indubitable, and the only one of which a clear and distinct idea is held. And, on the contrary, the supposed immaterial and divine Being is entirely unknown, it is uncertain and doubtful, and it’s not even possible, as has been said, to form any true idea of it: therefore, it’s the existence and the eternity of the material being that is demonstrated by that argument, not the existence or the eternity of an alleged divine and immaterial Being, which nobody knows about; and consequently, the above response is vain. 5). It is vain since, even supposing that one wished to doubt the eternity of the material Being, or that one wished to doubt that it has always been, it can’t be doubted that it has at least always been possible, and that it has even been possible in itself, independently of any other cause. I say 1). That it can’t be doubted that it hasn’t at least always been possible: for if it hadn’t been possible, it is evident that it couldn’t have been, or existed, as it did. And if it hadn’t always been possible in itself, it is also evident that it could never have been, or existed, as it did; for it is clear and evident that which is not possible per se can never exist or become possible. 2). I also say that it can’t be doubted that it has always been possible in itself and independently of all other causes, 1). Because, as the first Being, as has been sufficiently demonstrated already, it could not depend, for its possibility, on any other cause. 2). Because things which are possible, which are impossible, do not derive their possibility or impossibility from the arbitrary power of any external cause, as some might imagine; but their possibility or impossibility comes only from themselves, and as if from the depths of their own nature: such that, there is no external cause which might, as it pleases or through its will, make possible something which is absolutely impossible, or make absolutely impossible something that is possible. I’m not referring here to a possibility or an impossibility which is only moral or relative, for it’s no secret that even men can often do many things at a certain time and in certain circumstances, which they couldn’t do in other times and other circumstances. Similarly, there are often many things that are impossible for them at certain times and in certain circumstances, which wouldn’t be impossible for them at different times and in different circumstances. So, this is not the sort of possibility or impossibility that I mean; but I’m only referring to a real and absolute possibility or impossibility: and it’s imperative to agree that there is no Being which may, at its whim or wish, make something possible which per se is absolutely impossible, or which could, at its whim or wish, make absolutely impossible what is possible per se. Thus, things are inherently possible or impossible, independently of any power and the will of any Being at all. And here’s the proof. It’s that, if it were only up to the power or will of some Being, to make things absolutely possible or impossible, as it likes, then nothing would be possible or impossible, but what this Being wanted to make possible or impossible: and thus, if it has wished, for example, that heaven and earth should be impossible, and that they’d always been impossible, then they would have always been impossible; and now as they are possible, since they are presently in existence, it might then, this Being, if it wished, render them completely impossible. Similarly, if it had wished to or if it now wished to make it possible to have a mountain without a valley, then this would be possible. Similarly, if it had wanted, or now decided to wish for two and two not to add up to 4, or for the whole not to be greater than its part, it might then do so. And, for the same reason, if it had wished or decided now to will that triangle should have no angles, He might therefore make it happen. So again, if it had willed it, or now decided to want a thing to be and not to be at the same time, it would therefore truly be and not be at the same time. And finally, if this Being conceived a wish not to exist, then it wouldn’t exist; and if it didn’t exist, it certainly wouldn’t be possible itself, because that which is not can neither make itself nor make itself possible; and there would be nothing to enable it or to be able to make it possible; and thus, there would be nothing that is absolutely possible. All of these conclusions are clearly absurd; and hence it is evident that things are possible or impossible in themselves, i.e., that they obtain, as it were from themselves and from the depths of their nature, their possibility or impossibility, and this independently of the power and will of any other cause.