A Memoir- the Testament
Page 51
It might be said, contrary to the last conclusion I’ve drawn, that the Essence and Existence of this one first immaterial and divine Being are absolutely necessary and independent of all power and of all will, and therefore that this first Being can’t render itself impossible, or even cease to exist and to be what it is; but that, with respect to all other material and perceptible things, visible or invisible, that they are truly as possible or impossible in themselves, independently of any other power and will; but that they cannot and couldn’t now exist of themselves, independently of this first immaterial and divine Being, which is called God, nor consequently can they exist independently of His power and His will; and, as we see that they presently exist, it’s necessary, as it will be said, and as our God-cultists will say, to recognize the existence of an immaterial and divine Being, who created them.
But this cannot be, and should not be said: 1). Because this is to still want to assume, without proof or basis, what is in question; thus, this argument proves nothing and it’s inconclusive. 2). Because if all material and sensible things are possible or impossible in themselves, independently of the power and will of any other Being, as has been shown, and which must be acknowledged, they are equally possible or impossible, independently of its Existence; for nobody will say that things which can’t depend on the power or will of another cause, can or should depend on its Existence, and thus material and perceptible things being, as has been demonstrated, and since it must be acknowledged as possible or impossible, regardless of the power or will of any immaterial and divine Being, i.e., regardless of the power and will of a God, they are also necessarily impossible or possible, regardless of His existence. And if they are possible regardless of His existence, then they can exist independently of the existence of a God, i.e., even if there were no God, they wouldn’t cease to be able to exist; and if, even in that case, they wouldn’t cease to be able to exist, one would still have to say that they wouldn’t cease to be able to exist, but one would also have to say that they wouldn’t even effectively fail to exist; for if in this case they wouldn’t effectively exist, they couldn’t exist at all, since they couldn’t give themselves a Being or existence which they didn’t have, and there would be no God to give it to them, or to be able to give it to them.
And, as It is acknowledged that, nevertheless, in that case, they couldn’t fail to be possible and to able to exist, it must also be acknowledged that they wouldn’t fail to exist effectively, even if there were no God; and that being so, it is clear and evident that it’s not necessary and that it's even completely futile to assume the existence of a God, creator of the world, and of all the material and tangible things it contains, since it must be acknowledged that all these things would not fail to be able to exist, and even to effectively exist, even if there were no such creator. From which it follows, of course, that material and perceptible things are inherently possible or impossible, i.e., that they derive from themselves, and from the depths of their nature, their possibility or their impossibility, and that without regard, as I’ve said, to the power and will of any other cause, and therefore, the material and perceptible Being, having always been possible, as has just been shown, can’t derive its possibility from elsewhere than itself and from the depths of its own nature, independently of any other cause; and if it has always been possible in this way, then the natural conclusion is that it could also exist of itself, independently of any other cause. For, as things are only possible to the extent that they can exist, and as they can only exist to the extent that they are possible, and in the way they are possible, it’s imperative that the material and perceptible Being, having always been possible by itself and independently of any other cause, as has just been shown, it’s imperative, I say, that it was always able to exist, of itself and independently of any cause, and if it was always able to exist of itself and independently of any cause, we must necessarily recognize that it has effectively always been and that it has always existed; for it is clear and evident that if it hadn’t always existed, it wouldn’t have been able to give existence to itself, when it didn’t have it to give. And, as it can’t be doubted that it now has existence, we must necessarily conclude that it has always had it, or say that it hasn’t had it and that it couldn’t even have it except due to some other cause, but this can’t be said, since it’s just been shown that, having always been possible by itself, from the depths of its own nature and independently of any other cause, it was also able to have existence inherently, independently of any other cause.
This argument quite clearly proves the independence and Eternity of material and perceptible Being, but what confirms all the more the independence and, at the same time, the eternity of this material and perceptible Being is that there is no link, and no necessary relationship between the idea of material and perceptible Being and the idea of this supposed immaterial and divine Being, or between the existence of one and the existence of the other: for it is manifest that we have a clear and distinct idea of material and substantial being: we know its existence, its nature and properties clearly, without any knowledge of this alleged spiritual and divine Being itself, without thinking about it at all, and, consequently, without having any idea of it. In addition, if we suppose that there is no spiritual and divine being, we don’t cease to have a clear and distinct idea of the material and perceptible being and all things wouldn’t cease to persist in their being and to retain their shape; Heaven and Earth and all we see in them wouldn’t fail to exist, we would still retain a clear and distinct idea of them, as I’ve said, and we would still see their existence, as we now do, even if there were no spiritual and divine being. In sum, the destruction or denial of God does not entail the destruction or denial of the material and be perceptible being; but, on the contrary, the destruction or negation of the material and perceptible being simultaneously destroys the idea of all perceptible being. For, by assuming that there were any material and perceptible being, and you will at the same time destroy heavens and earth and all that they contain: for it is plain to see that if there were no material and perceptible being, there would be no heaven or earth or anything we see in them, but it’s not evident that there could be any material and perceptible being, if there were no spiritual and divine being.
Finally, people can posit as much as they like the existence of one of many immaterial and spiritual beings, as our God-cultists mean it, i.e., posit as one likes, one or many beings who would have neither form nor shape, no body or any extension, posit these al you like, I say, but for all that you won’t see the existence of any material and perceptible being, and you won’t see for that the existence of a sky or the earth, or even the existence of a single fly, or even that it could exist, because there is no relationship between a material and tangible being and an alleged, unknown being, which would have nothing material and perceptible about it. Equally, posit the complete destruction of every immaterial and spiritual being, this wouldn’t point to the destruction of heaven or earth, or even the destruction of a single fly, since there is no relationship between the destruction of one and the destruction of the other.
It's not the same with the assumption of the existence or the destruction of the material and perceptible being; for, by merely positing the existence of the material and sensible being, you have also the essence and the nature, or at least the depths of the essence and nature, of any other actual or possible material being, you have the essence of nature, or at least the depths and essence and the nature of heaven and earth and all they contain, and not only all they contain presently, but also of all they once contained, and all they might contain, because it’s only in the material and perceptible material, and in the modification of the material and perceptible being, that all the essence and all the nature of all that is presently consists, of all that has been, of all that will be, or of all that might ever be in the future.
Our God-cultists must acknowledge this, since it is explicitly noted in their own so-called holy and d
ivine books: that nothing new happens in the world and that everything that is presently is nothing else, but what has already been in past ages and which will be again in the ages to some. Quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod futurum est. Quid est quod factum est? Ipsum faciendum est. Nihil sub sole novum, nec valet quisquam dicere: ecce hoc recens est: jam enim praecessit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos. Non est priorum memoria[727]. “Nobody,” he says, “can say that this or that is new”; and on the contrary, suppose the destruction of material and perceptible being, you will simultaneously destroy heaven and earth and everything that can be contained in them. That being the case, it is clear and evident, that the material and perceptible being has no link, nor any relationship with the spiritual and divine being; it is clear and evident that it presupposes no being but itself, and if it presupposes no other being, it necessarily must exist of itself, independently of every other being.
70. SIMILARLY, THE FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL TRUTHS ARE ETERNAL AND DON’T DEPEND ON ANY BEING.
There are, in a way, and even from the eternity and independence of certain first and fundamental truths, which are so necessary and immutable in themselves and by themselves, that there is no power which is capable of changing their nature, i.e., making them false, or keeping them from being true. Here are a few examples of such truths: 2 x 2 = 4; three times 4 equal 12; 15 plus 5 equals 20; the whole is greater than its part; a triangle has three angles; nothing can be and not be at the same time; all that which presently is, is possible; nothing that can be done is impossible, and nobody can do what is absolutely impossible, etc.…. And many other similar propositions, which are so true by their nature that they can never be false; for it is not possible for 2 x 2 not to be 4; that three times 4 are not 12; and that the whole should not be greater than its part. Nobody can deny or question these sorts of primary and fundamental truths, without completely renouncing all the lights of Reason and wanting to reject all human reasoning. For those truths make themselves known, and require no proof, being themselves clearer and more certain that all other proofs. It is, therefore, certain and indubitable, clear and evident that these truths are eternal, that they are necessary and that they are so thus independent of any other power.
But the eternity and independence of those truths show even more clearly the eternity and independence of the material and perceptible being, for it is clear and obvious that, for these truths to be eternal and independent, as they are, it’s necessarily the case that they should always have been true and that they can never have been false, and consequently, for it to be true and for it to always have been true that 2 x 2 equal four, it’s necessary for there to always have been 2 x 2; for if 2 x 2 hadn’t always existed, it wouldn’t always have been true that 2 x 2 equals 4, for in order that 2 x 2 equals 4, the existence of 2 x 2 is a prerequisite, and consequently, if it has always been true that 2 x 2 equals for, as can’t be doubted, it is necessary that 2 x 2 must have always existed. Equally, for it to be true that the whole is greater than its part, it’s requisite that there must have been a whole with parts in this whole; for if there were no whole, or parts in this whole, it would not be true to say that the whole would be greater than its part, and if there hadn’t always been, along with some whole, various composite parts, it wouldn’t always have been true to say that the whole is greater than its part. If, then, it has always been true to say that the whole is greater than its part, it’s necessary that there was always some whole with parts in this whole. And, as it is demonstrated that these sorts of truths are eternal and even that they are such independently of any power, we must necessarily conclude that 2 x 2 has always existed, that for 2 x 2 to truly equal 4, and for there to always have been a whole with parts in this whole, to make the whole truly greater than its parts, which also demonstrates sufficiently and clearly the eternity and independence of the material being: for only the material being could truly compose or form a whole, which would be composed of many parts; we could even say, generally speaking, that the truth is so independent of anything we might think or imagine, that even if there were no mind or body, or even any form, or any matter, or any creator, or creature, or anything else at all in the world, still there would be, at least, a truth, because even in that case it would be true that there would be nothing there, so true it is to say that the first and fundamental truths of things are eternal and immutable in themselves, and completely independent of any power whatsoever.
But it may be objected here, against what I have said about the independence, and the possibility and the present existence of the material being, that a house, for example, a city, a man, a horse, a tree, a clock, etc., are possible in themselves, even independently of all human power, and yet they could only exist contingently, on the basis of some other cause which makes them exist, or which gives existence to them. A house, for example, a castle, a city can’t exist due to themselves, unless the workers make them; a man, a horse, a tree, or any other plant or animal can’t have acquired their existence by themselves, and they wouldn’t exist if they weren’t begotten or produced by some other cause, and therefore, it will be said, although the material and perceptible being is possible of itself and has always been possible, independently of all power, it doesn’t follow that it should equally, or that it could have had its existence of itself, since we see every day that the things which are possible in themselves can’t, for all that, actually come into existence.