1812: The Navy's War

by George Daughan

  Unable to attack Kingston, Brown marched west to Buffalo. He was under the impression that Armstrong wanted him to move to the Niagara area, but the secretary had intended only to make a feint in that direction. Nonetheless, when Armstrong discovered Brown had traveled west, he approved the move. General Brown waited at Buffalo for further orders, and his subordinate Winfield Scott trained the troops, something they badly needed.

  At this point, the president still did not have a clear idea of how he was going to proceed. British forces in Canada were still relatively weak, and Madison continued to support an invasion, but without a definite plan. In the absence of a clear overall strategy, Armstrong, without the administration giving any thought to it, shifted the focus of the invasion west to the Niagara River, a peripheral area, when Kingston and Montreal were the original and more logical targets.

  WHEN THE Prince Regent and Princess Charlotte were finished in Kingston the third week of April, Admiral Yeo and Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond prepared to attack Sackets Harbor, but Prevost, judging the defenses to be too strong, restrained them. Yeo and Drummond then looked for an easier target and decided to attack Oswego, through which Chauncey routed nearly all his supplies.

  On May 5, the British fleet suddenly hove into view off the beach at Oswego, where U.S. Army Colonel George Mitchell prepared hurriedly to fight with only 290 men. Yeo opened fire on the American defenses a mile from shore. At the same time, he deployed fifteen boats loaded with troops. As they approached the beach, Mitchell’s accurate artillery fire created so much havoc the boats turned around and went back to the ships. Undeterred, Yeo attacked again the next morning. His flagship Wolfe pounded Mitchell’s batteries and the fort, while his huge landing force of as many as 1,000 rowed once more toward the beach.

  After putting up what fight he could against overwhelming odds, Mitchell retreated in good order to Oswego Falls, twelve miles up the Oswego River, and prepared to defend the important supply depot there. For some unknown reason Yeo did not follow. Instead, he settled for capturing the schooner Penelope, a supply vessel that was sitting in the harbor with a cargo of three long thirty-two-pounders and two long twenty-four-pounders; two bateaux with a cargo of one thirty-two-pounder and one twenty-four-pounder; some ordinance; naval stores; a large quantity of rope; and 2,600 barrels of flour, pork, salt, and bread. Yeo overlooked the far more important heavy guns, cables, and other supplies at Oswego Falls. Had he captured those, Chauncey’s shipbuilding would have been set back weeks. Secretary Jones wrote to the president that had the enemy destroyed what was at Oswego Falls, “the consequences would be disastrous indeed.”

  The following week Yeo began blockading Sackets Harbor. Chauncey was convinced that if the British had launched an attack right then, they would have taken the shipyard. “If Sir James had landed 3000 men when he first appeared off this harbor and made a simultaneous attack with the fleet,” Chauncey wrote to Jones, “he must have carried the place, for our new vessels (with the exception of the Jefferson) at that time were without their armament and the military force had been considerably weakened by five hundred of the best troops being ordered from this place to Buffalo and a few days ago about seven hundred more marched in the same direction.” General Brown, who was in charge of the army defending Sackets Harbor, strongly disagreed; he thought the defenses were more than adequate. He had placed General Gaines in command with 1,500 troops, and he thought Gaines had the matter well in hand. Yeo must have concluded the same thing, for he did not attack. Chauncey had a bad habit of overestimating the enemy’s strength and underestimating his own.

  Avoiding Yeo’s blockade was a constant problem for Master Commandant Melancthon Woolsey, who was in charge of moving heavy guns and other essential equipment and provisions from Oswego to Sackets Harbor. Woolsey ran bateaux at night along the coast, hugging the shore. On May 28, nineteen bateaux, carrying twenty-one thirty-two-pounders, thirteen smaller guns, and ten heavy cables, silently moved out of the Oswego River for the trip. One of the bateaux lost its way, however, and fell into British hands. A captured sailor was forced to reveal details of the shipment. Yeo immediately dispatched Commander Stephen Popham with two hundred men to seize it. On May 30 Popham attacked Woolsey’s remaining eighteen boats at Sandy Creek, twenty miles north of the Oswego and thirty miles south of Sackets Harbor.

  Commander Popham was in for a surprise, however. Woolsey had laid a clever trap. Major Daniel Appling of the U.S. Army, with 120 men and an equal number of Oneida Indians, supported by cavalry and light artillery that Chauncey provided when he learned what was afoot, waited for Popham and attacked when he least expected it. In the ensuing melee, Popham lost 14 men and had 28 wounded before he surrendered. Appling captured 6 Royal Navy officers, 55 sailors and marines, and 106 soldiers. He also took two gunboats and five barges. The defeat induced more caution in Yeo; he could ill afford to lose either the men or the boats.

  On June 6 Yeo returned to Kingston with his fleet. He was building the gargantuan 102-gun St. Lawrence, and he decided to wait for her to be completed and for more reinforcements from England before he attacked Chauncey. Drummond agreed that a delay was in order. Until Chauncey launched the Mohawk and the Superior, however, Yeo still had command of the lake. Drummond could move men and equipment wherever he pleased, and the Americans could not.

  WHILE YEO WAS concentrating on Lake Ontario, he neglected Lake Champlain. He used the new powers the Admiralty had given him to command all the operations on the lakes to put the lion’s share of his resources into building the St. Lawrence. His fixation with the giant ship drained men and materiel away from Commander Pring’s operation on Lake Champlain. Yeo had done the same thing to Barclay on Lake Erie the previous year, depriving him of the resources needed to compete with Perry. Pring continued to build at Isle aux Noix but not with the speed that would have allowed him to keep ahead of Macdonough. Yeo’s obsession also allowed Chauncey to regain superiority on Lake Ontario the first week of August, when the Mohawk and Superior were finally finished. Even by that time, the St. Lawrence was not yet launched. It would not be until September 10, and it would not be ready to sail until October 16, just as the season was ending.

  Meanwhile, Master Commandant Macdonough was working hard preparing his fleet at Vergennes, Vermont, twenty-two miles south of Burlington and approximately fifty miles from Plattsburg. He had moved his squadron to Vergennes in December 1813 and had established a secure dockyard on Otter Creek, one of the state’s largest rivers. The facility was situated at the head of navigation, seven miles from the mouth of the creek. Timber resources were plentiful, and Vergennes had a blast furnace, an air furnace, eight forges, a rolling mill, a wire factory, a grist mill, and a mill for fulling cloth.

  Macdonough’s biggest problem continued to be a lack of seamen. Even with added bonuses and more pay, finding sailors was difficult. Recruiting offices were opened in Boston and New York, but the bounties now being offered for service in the army, the attraction of privateers, the high price of clothing (which seamen had to pay for themselves), and little prospect of prize money on Lake Champlain continued to make recruiting slow. While Macdonough waited for sailors, he asked the army to fill the gap. General Izard loaned him 250 soldiers until more seamen arrived.

  Macdonough was competing for resources with Chauncey, just as Pring was with Yeo. Fortunately, Secretary Jones had a higher appreciation of the critical needs on Lake Champlain than the Admiralty did. Jones induced Noah Brown and his brother Adam, the shipbuilders who had worked miracles for Perry on Lake Erie, to do the same at Vergennes. They arrived in February 1814 and went right to work. By March 2, two new gunboats were in the water, and a 26-gun ship, the Saratoga, was begun. By March 7 her keel had been laid, and on April 11 she was launched—a remarkable feat. The ship’s timber had been standing in the forest less than six weeks before.

  By April 2 Lake Champlain was free of ice, and Macdonough had to worry about Pring destroying his operation before the Americ
an force got too powerful. Macdonough erected strong defenses along Otter Creek and at its mouth. He received support from Brigadier General Macomb at Burlington and General Izard at Plattsburgh. Federalist governor Chittenden of Vermont also helped. Chittenden did not approve of the war, but he was willing to call out the Vermont militia to defend Vergennes. He sent 1,000 men to guard Otter Creek and another 500 to strengthen Macomb at Burlington.

  On May 9 Commander Pring went after Macdonough, standing out from the Isle aux Noir with the new 16-gun Linnet, five sloops, thirteen galleys, and a bomb vessel. Five days later, he appeared off Otter Creek, where he planned to create an impassable obstruction by sinking two sloops in its mouth. Macdonough had been aware of Pring’s movements for days, and he was waiting for him with seven long twelve-pounders and one fieldpiece posted on the high ground overlooking the entrance to the creek. He also had ten galleys strung across its mouth.

  Pring’s bomb vessel and eight galleys tested the creek’s defenses, exchanging fire with the shore batteries for an hour and a half before it became obvious that Macdonough was too strong; Pring had no hope of putting obstructions at the mouth of the creek, so he withdrew. A short time later, observers at Burlington saw the British squadron sailing northward.

  Thanks to the Browns, by May 30 Macdonough’s fleet was superior to the British squadron. He assembled his ships at the mouth of Otter Creek—the 26-gun Saratoga, the 16-gun schooner Ticonderoga, the 10-gun sloop President, the 9-gun sloop Preble, the 6-gun sloop Montgomery, and six galleys with two guns each. The Ticonderoga was a former steamboat that the Browns had converted into a schooner, launching her on May 12, two days before Pring’s attack. Two weeks later, Macdonough sailed north toward the Canadian border and the Richelieu River with his entire squadron, forcing Pring to move his vessels back to the safety of the Isle aux Noix.

  Macdonough then moved his fleet to Plattsburg, anchoring in the bay on the twenty-ninth. Oliver Hazard Perry and Isaac Hull sent letters wishing him good luck with his mission. Macdonough was confident in his squadron. He wrote to Secretary Jones, “I find the Saratoga to be a fine ship.” And he told Izard that his men-of-war were “remarkably fine vessels.” He also informed the general that “the squadron is ready for service.”

  Pring was not sitting idle, however. Macdonough soon discovered the enterprising British commander had started a crash program to build the giant 37-gun frigate Confiance. In addition, eleven galleys had arrived at the Isle aux Noix from Quebec. With the new ship and boats the British would dominate the lake again. On June 11 Macdonough warned Jones of the imminent danger and requested funds to build another warship. Knowing how strapped the navy was for money, Jones hesitated. The president intervened, however, and ordered the ship built. Macdonough directed the Browns to start the 20-gun Eagle immediately, hoping it would be finished in time to help deal with the Confiance. Work went ahead at a furious pace, but the delay was potentially fatal.

  Macdonough now returned to Pointe aux Fer just above Chazy, where he could watch the Richelieu River, remaining there until the end of August. His blockade materially slowed progress on the Confiance, when he captured three parties of Vermont traitors attempting to run a mainmast, three topmasts, and other spars to the Isle aux Noix, along with twenty-seven barrels of tar.

  The Browns continued working hard on the Eagle. They did not begin until July 23, but they launched her in record time on August 11. And on August 27 she joined Macdonough, who by that time was back in Plattsburgh Bay.

  Two days before the Eagle joined Macdonough, on August 25, Pring launched the Confiance. When she was in the water, Admiral Yeo decided that in spite of Commander Pring’s excellent record, a higher ranking officer should be in charge at the Isle aux Noix, and he sent Captain Peter Fisher from Kingston. Pring remained as his second. The sudden, ill-thought-out change in command would have important consequences.

  MEANWHILE, ON MAY 14–15 at Presque Isle on Lake Erie, Captain Arthur Sinclair—the new naval commander on the lake—and Colonel John B. Campbell, on their own initiative, led a raiding party of seven hundred across the lake to Port Dover on the Long Point peninsula to destroy the town and a large quantity of flour. Campbell landed his men on the fourteenth at the village of Dover, and in retaliation for General Riall’s destruction of Buffalo, he burned all the private and public buildings in the defenseless town and three mills near Turkey Point. Campbell wrote to Armstrong, “I determined to make them feel the effects of that conduct they had pursued toward others.” Madison, however, was chagrined. Colonel Campbell was court-martialed and censured. Unaware of the president’s strong disapproval of Campbell’s actions, five days after his raid, American troops from Amherstburg burned Port Talbot on the northern shore of Lake Erie, midway between Amherstburg and Buffalo. Pro-American Canadian volunteers participated in the raid.

  When Lieutenant General Drummond informed Governor-General Prevost of Campbell’s attack and the wanton destruction, Prevost was bitter. Ignoring the depraved acts of his own troops, as he always did, he sought retribution. On June 2 he wrote to Admiral Cochrane, the new commander of the North American station, demanding attacks on American coastal towns.

  PRESIDENT MADISON SPENT the month of May 1814 at Montpelier. After he returned to Washington, he gathered the cabinet on June 7 to discuss strategy for the war. For weeks it had been obvious that the country faced a serious threat from Britain. Rear Admiral Cockburn was already sounding a loud alarm bell by ratcheting up his spring campaign in Chesapeake Bay. Madison recognized the danger. He warned Monroe that they had to be prepared for “the worst measures of the enemy and in their worst forms.”

  The major threat came from Canada, where troops from Wellington’s army were gathering in large numbers. A force of that size could only have Montreal as its base, with Plattsburgh and Sackets Harbor the most obvious targets. Additional British forces at Bermuda threatened Washington and Baltimore, as well as Philadelphia, New York, Newport, Boston, and Portsmouth, New Hampshire—indeed, the entire eastern seaboard. The situation required the United States to adopt a defensive posture and immediately strengthen Plattsburgh and Washington, the two weakest areas.

  Instead, Madison unaccountably decided to deploy a significant portion of his army west, away from the probable theaters of action. He ordered Captain Sinclair on Lake Erie to use four or five vessels from his small fleet to transport 800 to 1,000 men under Lieutenant Colonel Croghan and occupy the enemy’s new base at Matchedash on Severn Sound in Georgian Bay, take Fort St. Joseph, and recapture Fort Michilimackinac.

  The president also decided that when Chauncey acquired command of Lake Ontario, which the commodore predicted would be in mid-July, General Brown’s army at Buffalo would cross the Niagara River and invade Canada with a view to “reducing the peninsula, and proceeding towards York.” In addition, Madison approved building fourteen or fifteen armed boats at Sackets Harbor for use on the St. Lawrence after Chauncey had dominance on the lake. The boats were to interrupt water communication between Kingston and Montreal. The only role envisioned for Ralph Izard’s force of 5,000 at Plattsburg was to create a diversion by making a demonstration against Montreal. Amazingly, the president continued in an offensive mode, placing large numbers of scarce troops in places least likely to be attacked.

  THE EXPEDITION TO Lake Huron got under way from Erie, Pennsylvania, on June 19, at a time when the British were increasing their forces and activity in Chesapeake Bay. Arthur Sinclair sailed five vessels, Lawrence, Niagara, Caledonia, Scorpion, and Tigress, to Detroit, where for two weeks he loaded seven hundred of Colonel Croghan’s troops. Sinclair departed Detroit on July 3, but delayed by contrary winds, he did not enter Lake Huron until July 12.

  Sinclair’s first priority was to take St. Joseph’s and Michilimackinac. If possible, he was also to destroy the new enemy naval force building at Matchedash. Secretary Jones cautioned Sinclair to avoid burning private dwellings, as he and Campbell had done at Long Point in May. Jones em
phasized that wanton destruction “excited much regret” on the president’s part.

  Sinclair first attempted to sail to Matchedash, but he found the fog, sunken rocks, and islands too difficult to navigate and turned away. He then sailed for St. Joseph’s, which was abandoned. He destroyed the fort but not the town and then steered for Mackinac Island, arriving on July 26 to attack the fort.

  Croghan debarked his men on August 4. He had scant intelligence about what awaited him, but looking at the terrain for the first time, he feared the worst. Captain Sinclair described Croghan’s predicament: “Mackinac is by nature a perfect Gibraltar, being a high inaccessible rock on every side except the west, from which to the heights, you have near two miles to pass through a [thick] wood.”

  Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall directed the island’s defense. Prevost had sent him out in the spring to take command. McDouall skillfully deployed two hundred British regulars and three hundred fifty Indians to stop Croghan, using the terrain to full advantage. “Our men were shot in every direction,” Sinclair wrote, “. . . without being able to see the Indian who did it, and a height was scarcely gained, before there was another in 50 or 100 yards commanding it, where breastworks were erected, and cannon opened on them.”

  Seeing no way to attain his objective against a clever, hidden foe, Croghan soon ordered a retreat back to the boats. His losses were sixteen killed and sixty wounded. They might have been much worse had he not acted promptly. One of the dead was his second in command, Major A. H. Holmes. Croghan sent a flag of truce to the fort and asked McDouall for the body. The request was politely granted. McDouall also offered the fleet provisions and fruit, which were gratefully accepted. The body of Major Holmes was returned unharmed, but McDouall’s Indian allies scalped and buried the other bodies.