1812: The Navy's War

by George Daughan

  Liverpool’s basic policy in America differed markedly from the one he and Castlereagh pursued in Europe, where they sought to restore a balance of power that would prevent a single country from gaining dominance, as Napoleon had, and directly threatening British security. In America their policy was to reassert dominance on the continent through the acquisition of territory. The central question, as Castlereagh put it later to Liverpool, was “Is it desirable to take the chance of the campaign, and then to be governed by circumstances? If the latter is advisable, we have the means of doing so.” Being governed by circumstances meant taking advantage of opportunities presented by the military campaigns to be waged in North America during the spring, summer, and fall of 1814.

  Although Liverpool’s goals were extensive, they were also flexible. He could extend or contract them as the success of British arms warranted. Realities on the ground would ultimately determine the extent of his demands at the negotiating table. In the spring of 1814, with British hubris soaring after the great victory over Napoleon, the prime minister’s expectations were high indeed.

  On April 22, 1814, Albert Gallatin was in London witnessing the effect of Napoleon’s abdication on Britain, and he was understandably concerned. He sent a letter to Henry Clay in Gothenburg, Sweden, analyzing why the British cabinet was adding substantially to its land and sea forces in North America instead of settling the war with the United States. “A well organized and large army is at once liberated from any European employment, and ready, together with a super abundant naval force to act immediately against us,” he wrote. Gallatin was careful to point out that the Liverpool ministry “profess to be disposed to make an equitable peace.” But the sheer weight of opinion in Britain, he thought, might move them in the opposite direction. “The hope not of ultimate conquest but of a dissolution of the union, the convenient pretense which the American war will afford to preserve large military establishments, and above all the force of popular feeling may all unite in inducing the Cabinet in throwing impediments in the way of peace.... That the war is popular, and that national pride inflated by the last unexpected success cannot be satisfied without what they call the chastisement of America, cannot be doubted.”

  Gallatin underestimated the extent of the cabinet’s plans for North America. His portrayal of the ministers as reasonable men carried away by public opinion was inaccurate. Liverpool and his colleagues were as much caught up in the spirit of the moment as the rest of the country.

  The euphoria of the spring and early summer led Liverpool to expect operations in America to be completed in a relatively short time. After fighting the French for twenty-two years, a long-term commitment of massive forces in North America would be too onerous for already overburdened British taxpayers. Liverpool expected that Madison would cave in quickly. British newspapers like the Times were constantly pointing out how weak American finances were, how difficult it was for Madison to increase the army and navy, and how divided the country was. Liverpool and Castlereagh also assumed that sufficient harmony existed among the European powers to make a peace settlement on the continent relatively easy to arrange, freeing their hand in North America.

  Dispatching the land and sea forces necessary to carry out the ministry’s ambitious strategy required time, however. Although plans for operations in America had been developing since November, nothing could be done until Napoleon actually abdicated, which did not occur until the second week of April. Assembling the troops necessary for the invasion of America and then transporting them would take weeks. The earliest the expeditionary forces would reach Bermuda and Canada was the summer.

  Also, the number of troops that would be available was limited by conditions in Europe. Although Liverpool and Castlereagh were optimistic in the spring of 1814 about prospects of an early and satisfactory settlement in Europe, they still had to wait for it to happen before they diverted too many troops to North America. They were confident enough, however, to begin dispatching veterans from Wellington’s army in France before a settlement in Europe was finalized. They were taking a big chance, but their confidence in the spring was so strong they were willing to assume the risk.

  It is not surprising that the forces they actually dispatched were small, given their expectations. The hubris of the cabinet was so high the ministers vastly underestimated how many troops it would take to cow a nation of nearly eight million, divided though she might be. Only 13,000 were dispatched to Canada, bringing the total of British regulars there to 29,000. Of these, 3,000 were sent from Portsmouth and Cork in May, but the bulk of them, some 10,000, would come from Wellington’s veterans in France. They would be sent later in June from Bordeaux and ports on the Mediterranean to Canada, traveling first to Bermuda and then to Quebec under their own generals. These troops and their officers were Wellington’s best, but they had been fighting in the Iberian Peninsula and France for seven years without relief. By the time they reached Quebec they were not the crack troops they had once been.

  To conduct raids along the American seacoast the ministry thought in terms of 4,000 to 5,000 men, and to invade New Orleans they planned to use the men conducting the seacoast raids and add enough troops to bring the total to 10,000. Thus, for the invasion of a country as large as the United States, they planned to use a tired army of fewer than 35,000. Of course, these forces could be augmented as the need arose, but London did not think that would be necessary.

  The army Liverpool was sending was considerably smaller than George III had dispatched in 1775 and 1776 to subdue the colonies when their population was no more than two and a half million. In 1776 the number of British troops sent to occupy New York City alone had been over 30,000. An additional 8,000 had been in Canada, poised to invade, and 4,000 more had been on troop transports off the Carolinas preparing to subdue the South, bringing the total of the king’s forces in America in 1776 to over 42,000.

  Changing from defense to offense against America in 1814 required new leadership. On November 4, 1813, when the results of the Battle of Leipzig were first becoming known in London, and the British believed their long battle with Napoleon was finally coming to an end, the Admiralty decided to recall Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren and replace him with fifty-six-year-old Vice Admiral Alexander F. I. Cochrane. The son of a Scottish peer and a longtime navy veteran, Cochrane had plenty of experience during the American Revolutionary War and in the West Indies, where he was commander in chief on the Leeward Islands Station and governor of Guadeloupe. The Admiralty expected him to act far more aggressively along the Atlantic coast than Warren had and to invade New Orleans. Cochrane’s fleet captain would be Trafalgar hero Edward Codrington.

  Cochrane received his orders on January 25, 1814. After long discussions with Lord Melville (First Lord of the Admiralty) in London, Cochrane sailed for Bermuda, arriving on March 6 raring to go. His assumption of command was delayed for a month, however, until Admiral Warren finally departed on April 1. To make effective use of Cochrane, the Admiralty relieved him of some administrative responsibilities that had burdened Warren. Cochrane’s new command was limited to the North American coast. The Jamaica and Leeward Islands Stations were once again separated, and Admiral Yeo was given an independent command on the lakes. To further support Cochrane, Rear Admiral Edward Griffith would direct the fleet from Nantucket to the St. Lawrence River. At the time the British were making these changes they were feeling an extravagant sense of their power, and they expected spectacular results. Cochrane understood the optimism in London. He wrote to Bathurst, “I have it much at heart to give them a complete drubbing before peace is made, when I trust their northern limits will be circumscribed and the command of the Mississippi wrested from them.”

  Cochrane was expected to work closely with Major General Robert Ross—one of Wellington’s best generals—who would command the troops raiding the eastern seaboard as well as direct land operations against New Orleans. Ross departed Bordeaux with his soldiers on June 2, 1814, and reached Bermuda on
July 25.

  Governor General Prevost and Admiral Yeo were not replaced, however. They were expected to direct the land and naval offensives from Canada, even though they had shown no capacity for offensive operations in the preceding months nor even an ability to work together. Nonetheless, Prevost was expected to attack Sackets Harbor, the Champlain Valley, and possibly the Hudson Valley. Success, it was thought, would protect Canada from another American invasion, while encouraging New England to break away from the Union, and justify a radical adjustment of Canada’s boundary southward.

  WHILE LIVERPOOL AND his colleagues had a clear idea of the North American strategy they intended to pursue in the spring of 1814, President Madison, uncertain about British plans, was in a quandary. He hoped that faced with the monumental task of redrawing the map of Europe, Liverpool would end the war with America on reasonable terms. But that did not appear to be happening. Even though Castlereagh had proposed direct negotiations and Madison had accepted, the president was fearful that Liverpool was bent on achieving stunning military victories before undertaking any serious talks. Madison responded to the potential threat by continuing to attack Canada and hoping that meaningful negotiations would begin soon.

  Thus, in the winter and spring of 1814, while London waited for Napoleon’s final capitulation, Madison continued with his quixotic campaign against Canada. As had been the case during the previous two years, however, neither the army nor the navy was strong enough to accomplish the president’s goals. In January, what remained of the army of the north was at Detroit and Amherstburg, under Lieutenant Colonel George Groghan, and at French Mills, New York, under General James Wilkinson. Bitter cold, poor food, inadequate clothing, filthy camps, and uncontrolled disease, especially dysentery, plagued Wilkinson soldiers. At the end of January, Secretary Armstrong ordered him to send Jacob Brown with 2,000 men to Sackets Harbor and march the rest of his army to Plattsburgh, where the troops could find some relief.

  Wilkinson knew he was going to be cashiered for the disasters of the previous year. He spent the next few weeks recuperating and planning an action that might retrieve some of his lost reputation, perhaps even allow him to keep his job. On March 27, in what can only be described as a bizarre stunt, he marched 4,000 men and eleven pieces of artillery five miles across the Canadian border to attack a tiny British outpost at Lacolle Mill. It took three difficult days of plodding through deep snow and getting lost before he found his way to a giant, fortresslike millhouse made of thick stone and defended by 180 men. Wilkinson tried blasting them out with heavy guns, but the building remained intact. The British garrison at Isle aux Noix was ten miles away, and it attempted a rescue, but Brigadier General Alexander Macomb’s brigade turned it back in some sharp fighting. Instead of then besieging the millhouse with his overwhelming numbers, Wilkinson called off the attack and marched back to Plattsburgh.

  Eleven days later, he learned that Major General Ralph Izard would relieve him. Wilkinson claimed he was being persecuted. Actually, replacing him was part of a long overdue change in the army’s leadership. The president and the secretary of war wanted generals who could perform better than relics like Wilkinson, Hampton, Hull, Dearborn, Boyd, and Morgan Lewis. Armstrong advised that the new leaders be appointed regardless of seniority. The president agreed, and he promoted two brigadier generals, Izard and Jacob Brown, to major general and six colonels to brigadier general: Winfield Scott, Alexander Macomb, Thomas Smith, Daniel Bissell, Edmund Gaines, and Eleazer E. Ripley. William Henry Harrison, pressured by Armstrong, resigned in May, opening up a slot for Brigadier General Andrew Jackson to become a major general. Peter B. Porter replaced Amos Hall as head of the New York militia. The average age for generals in the U. S. Army was now thirty-six instead of sixty. For the first time in the war, the army had leadership that was as good as the navy’s. Madison and Armstrong also created a general staff for the army that markedly improved the efficiency of the War Department.

  To further strengthen the army, Congress approved Madison’s request to raise enlistment bounties to a whopping $124, plus 320 acres of land. As a result, the recruitment of regulars for five years or until the end of the war increased significantly. By the spring of 1814, the army had risen to 40,000 men, and by the end of the year to nearly 45,000. The president retained Armstrong, however, even though the secretary bore a major part of the responsibility for the failures of the previous year. Madison wasn’t happy with him, but he evidently thought replacing him was more bother than it was worth.

  GAINING NAVAL SUPREMACY on lakes Ontario and Champlain was as essential, in Madison’s view, as reinvigorating the army. Secretary Jones spared no effort to carry out the president’s policy, but he thought the forces building on the lakes should be part of a defensive, rather than an offensive, strategy. He did not think it wise, given the government’s limited resources, to continue attacking Canada. He urged that emphasis be placed on the oceans, “where twenty of his ships cannot check the depredations of one of our ships or prevent the capture of his single ships.” Secretary Armstrong disagreed; he wanted to move aggressively against Canada. He continued to support attacking Kingston as a prelude to moving on Montreal, but if that failed, he was open to making an effort in the Niagara area and farther west with a view to acquiring all of Upper Canada. The administration gave little thought to defending the eastern seaboard against attacks.

  Secretary Jones wrote to Commodore Chauncey on January 15, 1814, emphasizing again the president’s urgent desire to obtain supremacy on Lake Ontario. “Every possible resource and effort must be directed to the creation of such a force at Sackets Harbor as will enable you to meet the enemy on the Lake the moment he may appear, and with means competent to ensure success.”

  Jones also urged Master Commandant Macdonough to do whatever was necessary to regain supremacy on Lake Champlain so that he “could meet the enemy on the first opening of navigation.” Macdonough had a monumental task ahead of him. At the end of December 1813 he had only the 6-gun sloop President, the 7-gun sloop Preble, and the 7-gun sloop Montgomery, along with four gunboats carrying one long eighteen-pounder each. The British had four men-of-war at Isle aux Noix, including two captured the year before. The ships were small, the largest carried only 13 guns, but Commander Daniel Pring was building the 16-gun Niagara (renamed Linnet). Pring, who had been Yeo’s flag captain in the Wolfe, was appointed commander of the Lake Champlain fleet in July 1813. He was one of the better officers in the Royal Navy.

  To help Yeo win the arms races on both lakes, and to restore British supremacy on Lake Erie, the Admiralty sent him sailors, ships in frame, shipwrights, dockhands, guns, ammunition, and naval stores. The added resources were having an effect. During the winter of 1813–14, Chauncey fell seriously behind in the “war of the dockyards,” as the great Canadian scholar Robert Malcomson called it. The energy and optimism that had marked Chauncey’s work when he first arrived at Sackets Harbor in the fall of 1812 had considerably diminished. He estimated that it would not be until July that he had supremacy again on Lake Ontario.

  During the winter, Yeo raced ahead at Kingston, building the 58-gun Prince Regent, the 40-gun Princess Charlotte, and three gunboats, Crysler, Queenston, and Niagara. Three more would come later. To help man them, the Admiralty sent seven hundred ten seamen and a battalion of marines—a considerable reinforcement. The ice broke on Lake Ontario the first of April, and two weeks later Yeo’s ships and crews were ready to fight.

  At Sackets Harbor, on the other hand, Henry Eckford and his men did not begin construction on new ships until January. He was building two brigs, the 20-gun Jefferson, under Master Commandant Melancthon Woolsey, and the 20-gun Jones, under Master Commandant Charles Ridgely. Both were launched the second week of April. Eckford was also building the 58-gun Superior and the 42-gun Mohawk. When completed, Chauncey would have unquestioned supremacy on Lake Ontario, but the Superior was not even launched until the first of May and the Mohawk not until the eleventh of June.<
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  Obtaining enough men remained a problem for Chauncey. Madison tried to help by signing a law increasing wages for service on the lakes by 25 percent and increasing the bounty by a third. On March 7 the commodore wrote to Jones, “The increase pay and bounty I think will insure men for this service, and in fact they deserve it for they suffer much beyond what anyone can form an idea of unless they witness it—we seldom have less than 20 percent of our whole number sick and sometimes 30 percent—within three days we have buried seven marines out of a corps of 180 and have this day on the sick report of the same corps 40—and our seamen in nearly the same proportion.” The commodore’s own health was being compromised by long service on the lake, just as Oliver Hazard Perry’s had been on Lake Erie.

  IN PURSUANCE OF Secretary Armstrong’s orders, General Brown split off from Wilkinson’s army and marched west to Sackets Harbor with 2,000 men, arriving on February 16, 1814. In early March Brown received orders from Armstrong indicating he wanted to attack Kingston as soon as practicable. A direct attack on Montreal was ruled out because it was thought to be too strong. Moving on Kingston proved impossible, however. The mildness of the winter made traveling across the ice too hazardous, and Chauncey would not be ready with his fleet until July at the earliest.