1812: The Navy's War

by George Daughan

  Admiral Cochrane and Admiral Malcolm were on Pea Island with General Keane, making final decisions on how to proceed. Three possible invasion routes presented themselves east of the Mississippi. Cochrane had already ruled out the two routes to the west, as well as the Mississippi River itself. One possible route of attack was by way of the shallow, difficult Rigolets passage into Lake Pontchartrain and thence by boat to a point two miles north of the city. Cochrane did not have enough shallow draft vessels for this otherwise attractive course, and Fort Petites Coquilles, which guarded the Rigolets passage, presented an important obstacle. The second approach was to row to Bayou Chef Menteur and then to the Plain of Gentilly, where the Chef Menteur Road went from the Rigolets directly to the city. The road was narrow, however, and could be easily blocked. Jackson, aware of its attractiveness, had it well guarded.

  The third potential route was by way of Bayou Bienvenue to a narrow branch, Bayou Mazant, and then to Villeré Canal, which would take the British to a point one mile from the Mississippi and seven miles south of the city. Cochrane chose this final route. Keane had little say in the matter. The entrance to Bayou Bienvenue was sixty miles west of Cochrane’s fleet and thirty miles from Pea Island.

  General Keane prepared to transport 1,600 men from Pea Island to the entrance to Bayou Bienvenue. He did not have enough boats to move them all at once, so the exhausting work had to be performed three times. At midnight on December 22, eight days after the Battle of Lake Borgne, the first of Keane’s troops arrived at Bayou Bienvenue. Colonel William Thornton, the same intrepid officer who led the charge for General Ross at the Battle of Bladensburg, was in command.

  It had been fourteen days since Admiral Cochrane’s flagship dropped anchor off Cat Island—precious time for Jackson to prepare. Colonel Thornton immediately captured Jackson’s post at the fishing village beside the entrance to Bayou Bienvenue. Keane then led the army up Bayou Bienvenue (one hundred yards wide) to the much narrower Bayou Mazant, which ran to the Villeré plantation at the edge of the Mississippi. Keane arrived undetected on the morning of the twenty-third. No obstructions had been placed anywhere to delay them, although Jackson had ordered them. Obstacles blocked the other invasion routes, but not this one. Remarkably, Jackson had no idea the British had a large force only seven miles south of the city. Keane’s advance party captured a small detachment of militia—thirty men led by Major Gabriel Villeré. Fortunately for Jackson, Major Villeré escaped and alerted him to Keane’s presence.

  WHILE KEANE WAS moving his army unseen to within easy striking distance of New Orleans, Jackson, unaware of the danger, continued preparing for some sort of attack. When word of Jones’s defeat at the Battle of Lake Borgne reached the city on December 15, Jackson redoubled his efforts, and New Orleans panicked. Jackson called out the entire Louisiana militia and sent urgent calls to William Carroll, who had 2,500 Tennessee militiamen on the way, and to John Coffee with 1,300 men, and to Kentucky militiamen, hoping for a large contingent, perhaps 2,500 or more. He declared martial law in the city on December 16. He also did something he never thought he’d have to do—accept help from Jean Lafitte and his pirates. Jackson had some regulars, as well, from the Fourth and Forty-fourth U.S. regiments (about 600 men). He was woefully short of arms, however; Monroe had promised them but had not delivered any as yet.

  Jackson had indispensable help from the redoubtable Commodore Daniel Patterson, who after Jones’s defeat was left with only the 15-gun schooner Carolina , the 16-gun Louisiana, and a single gunboat. But he had a large supply of munitions captured during a successful raid on the Baratarian pirate base on September 16. Secretary Jones had ordered Patterson specifically to attack the pirates and had sent the Carolina from Charleston for that purpose. She arrived in New Orleans in August. But for the secretary’s action, the Carolina would not have been available. She was a well-built schooner, made in Charleston and purchased by the navy in November 1812. She had five six-pounders a side and two twelve-pounders at the bow and stern on swivels that allowed them to be fired on either side. Her seventy-man crew were tough navy veterans, many of them from New England.

  The Louisiana was a converted merchantman, purchased in New Orleans by the navy in 1812. She was not put to use, however, until August 1814. Until then, she sat idle with no crew. She carried four twenty-four-pounders, eight twelve-pounders, and four six-pounders. Unlike the Carolina’s crew, the Louisiana’s was gathered from the streets of New Orleans—men from all nations (except England). Two-thirds of them could not speak English. After Jackson declared martial law, Patterson could impress whomever he needed. The Louisiana’s skipper, Lieutenant Charles C. B. Thompson, used coercion to round out his crew.

  Laffite’s pirates did not serve in the Carolina or the Louisiana, as many historians have supposed. Patterson and the pirates hated each other. Jackson sent the Baratarians to man the guns at the forts guarding the city—Petites Coquilles, St. Philip, and Bayou St. Jean. A few of them later manned two batteries on Jackson’s line and performed well, but that was all.

  Admiral Cochrane made no attempt to get any warships, even small ones, up the Mississippi before the main battle. The mouth of the river was 105 miles south of New Orleans. The current and the bar at Balize made it impossible for large warships to ascend and difficult for smaller ones. Jackson had made it even more unattractive as an invasion route by reinforcing Fort St. Philip, situated fifty miles from the mouth of the river at a difficult turn in the river. The swamps around the fort made a land attack impossible. Cochrane thus conceded naval supremacy on the Mississippi to Commodore Patterson, who had only two small warships and the number 65 gunboat. Cochrane’s decision was a great help to Jackson.

  AT NOON ON December 23, Jackson finally was alerted to the threat from Keane’s army. He had to act fast to prevent the British from overrunning the city. Fortunately, Keane’s troops were in a weak condition, and reinforcements were not coming for a while. The normally aggressive Keane would have liked to strike unprepared New Orleans that day, but his troops were in no condition to attempt it.

  Recovering quickly from his surprise, Jackson decided to attack the enemy that night. He worried that Keane’s threat was only a feint, and that a second British force, perhaps the main one, would attack the city using the Chef Menteur Road. To guard against that, he left General Carroll’s force and the city’s militia to protect the road. By a Herculean effort, Jackson mustered 1,500 troops of various kinds, and at five o’clock in the afternoon he marched to meet Keane, planning to attack with infantry (including 200 free men of color) and Major Thomas Hind’s Mississippi dragoons. Jackson believed the British force to be 3,000, or twice his own. He arrived at Villeré’s plantation around seven o’clock. Jackson’s movements had gone entirely undetected by the British sentries.

  Meanwhile, Commodore Patterson and Master Commandant John D. Henley had silently brought the Carolina downriver to the British flank, and at 7:30 began pouring deadly grape shot into their camp. Keane’s surprised troops fired two ineffective three-pounders at her and then ran for cover. The ship’s cannon going off was the signal for Jackson to attack. Coffee charged from the left along the cypress swamp, while Jackson moved along the Mississippi with the main force and struck from the right directly at the camp, which was close to the river. The Carolina ceased firing when Henley judged Jackson and Coffee’s Tennessee riflemen were within range of her guns.

  The two armies battled in the dark singly and in small groups hand to hand. Around eight o’clock, a fog descended over the battlefield, and around ten, Jackson withdrew. He wrote, “Fearing the consequence, under this circumstance, of the further prosecution of a night attack with troops, then acting together for the first time, I contented myself with lying on the field that night.”

  He rested less than a mile from the battlefield, remaining on the river road leading to the city. At four o’clock in the morning he withdrew two more miles to a stronger position in back of Rodriguez Canal. “As the safet
y of the city will depend on the fate of this army,” Jackson wrote, “it must not be incautiously exposed.”

  Even though Keane had been reinforced during the fighting, he did not pursue the retreating Americans. Jackson had inflicted so much pain that Keane thought he was up against 5,000 militiamen. Keane lost 46 killed, 167 wounded, and 64 missing. Jackson had 24 killed, 115 wounded, and 74 missing.

  As a result of Jackson’s daring raid, Cochrane committed his entire army to the confined area south of Rodriguez Canal, which meant that Jackson did not have to divide his small force and defend the city against simultaneous attacks coming from two or more directions. Cochrane was making a major strategic blunder on the spur of the moment with little thought and no consultation.

  After Jackson withdrew, the Louisiana joined the Carolina, and the two ships kept peppering Keane’s camp. Their guns protected Jackson at the Rodriguez Canal and the road leading to New Orleans, although Keane was so shaken by Jackson’s surprise night attack that there was no chance he’d move on the city immediately. He ordered heavy naval artillery brought up to counteract the deadly fire from the warships, but it would not arrive soon.

  The following morning, December 24, Jackson began building a defense barrier at Rodriguez Canal that stretched from the Mississippi for nine hundred yards to a huge cypress swamp. The canal was twelve feet wide and four to eight feet deep. At the same time, Jackson cut a levee below the canal to swamp the British. He did not accomplish his objective, but the water was a problem for them, as were the two warships, which continued shelling Keane’s camp from time to time, keeping him off balance and thus preventing a surprise attack on Jackson. Close collaboration between Patterson and Jackson characterized their operation throughout.

  ON THE MORNING of December 24, the frigate Statira arrived off Cat Island with thirty-seven-year-old Lieutenant General Edward Pakenham, the new British commander. Later that night, Pakenham met Captain Sir Thomas Hardy on the brig Anaconda, and Hardy brought him up to date on the naval battle with Jones and Keane’s fight with Jackson. On Christmas morning, Pakenham and his party were rowed to Fisherman’s Village near the mouth of Bayou Bienvenue, where Cochrane had his headquarters. Over breakfast, the admiral gave Pakenham his version of what happened the previous night.

  Later that day, Pakenham moved on to the base at Villeré’s plantation. For the first time, he saw the terrible position Cochrane had placed him in, including the Americans having command of the water. In fact, a few more enemy warships would have made attacking New Orleans from Keane’s camp unthinkable. Pakenham had to immediately decide if he was going to abandon the site and develop a new strategy or make the best of what he had. He chose to stay. His regard for American militiamen was so low that he decided to press on. By now the British force had dwindled to 5,500, what with losses in the battle, desertions, sickness, and the all-black West Indian regiments finding the weather intolerable. General Lambert’s 2,200 reinforcements had not yet arrived.

  Having made the critical decision to remain at Villeré’s plantation, Pakenham now had to stop the enfilading fire from the Carolina and the Louisiana. He brought with him from Wellington’s army in France one of the best artillery officers in the world, Alexander Dickson. A two-day delay followed while Dickson assembled a battery of nine field pieces. At eight o’clock on the morning of December 27, Dickson’s guns opened up on the Carolina with red-hot shot. Master Commandant Henley could not get away. The current was running against him, and he was becalmed. In a little over two hours the Carolina blew up. Before she exploded, however, Henley and his crew took to the boats, narrowly escaping. Patterson was not on board at the time. One of Henley’s men drowned, and six were wounded; the rest survived. Somehow they managed to rescue two heavy guns. While Dickson was directing his fire exclusively at the Carolina, Lieutenant Thompson got his boats out quickly and warped the Louisiana upriver, beyond the range of the deadly guns.

  Jackson in the meantime continued strengthening the fortifications in back of Rodriguez Canal. While he did, many of New Orleans’s prominent Creole citizens were getting nervous, wondering how Jackson was going to withstand the obviously superior numbers, training, and munitions of the British. Jackson had already announced that the enemy would never take the city. If he were defeated, he intended to destroy New Orleans before he left. No one doubted that he would. The concerned citizens did not want their great city ruined by Jackson or by Pakenham. To protect themselves and New Orleans, they were seriously considering surrendering.

  Sinking the Carolina emboldened Pakenham. On the twenty-eighth, he decided to make a reconnaissance in force. If things went well, a full-fledged attack would immediately follow. At daylight, he moved his troops to within half a mile of Jackson’s line and began firing bombs and Congreve rockets. Jackson responded with an unexpectedly strong, well-directed artillery barrage from behind the canal and from the Louisiana. A fierce battle ensued, with the Louisiana’s twelves and twenty-fours wreaking havoc on Pakenham’s flank. The Louisiana’s fire and Jackson’s were so accurate and powerful that Pakenham was forced to pull back and order more heavy artillery brought up from the fleet. Jackson could not counterattack. “I lament that I have not the means of carrying on more offensive operations,” he wrote. “My effective force at this point, does not exceed 3000.”

  The following day, December 29, Commodore Patterson removed some of the guns from the Louisiana and placed them on the west bank of the Mississippi. He was afraid Dickson would sink the ship, as he had the Carolina, and they would lose the guns. Patterson thought the cannon could be put to better use and be better protected on the riverbank. The Louisiana was thus retired from further action. She had done great service, however, in two battles on December 23 and the 28. Jackson ordered Brigadier General David Morgan and five hundred sixty Louisiana militiamen to protect Patterson’s new batteries.

  Pakenham was confident that heavy naval artillery would blast Jackson out of his stronghold. More time was consumed as Pakenham brought four twenty-four-pound carronades and ten eighteen-pound long guns from the distant fleet. While this arduous operation was in progress, Jackson continued strengthening his line, increasing his artillery platforms from five to twelve.

  On the opposite side of the Mississippi, three-quarters of a mile from Pakenham’s big guns, Commodore Patterson was busy installing a strong battery with some of the Louisiana’s cannon. He soon had one twenty-four-pounder and two twelve-pounders ready to enfilade Pakenham’s line and blast his artillery. Master Commandant Henley had a battery of two twelve-pounders on the west bank of the river overlooking the city.

  On January 1, 1815, Pakenham’s artillery was ready to blow a big hole in Jackson’s line through which the infantry could rush into the city. Thick fog covered the battlefield until about ten o’clock. When it lifted, Pakenham’s guns blasted away at Jackson’s headquarters (from which he barely escaped) and his fortifications. A ferocious artillery duel developed, as Jackson, with thirteen heavy guns, and Patterson with three, targeted Pakenham’s artillery. On and on the big guns roared, until, after three hours, Dickson ran out of ammunition. His shooting was unexpectedly poor because of the inadequate gun platforms he had to contrive and also because of the unexpected, deadly accuracy of the American artillery. Jackson’s gunners had serviceable platforms, and they had plenty of ammunition.

  It galled Pakenham to have to stand down a second time. It was a blow to the morale of the troops, who had dreams of spending the night in New Orleans. In the artillery exchange, Pakenham had forty-four killed and fifty-five wounded. Jackson had eleven killed and twenty-three wounded. When Pakenham withdrew, Jackson did not pursue. He remained behind his barricade, as he had after the battle on the twenty-eighth.

  Pakenham now decided to wait for Lambert’s brigade to arrive. When it did, he planned to assault Jackson with everything he had. He intended to capture Patterson’s battery and turn the guns on Jackson, while Dickson’s artillery on the east bank blasted th
e American fortifications and the infantry stormed them.

  Pakenham ordered Colonel Thornton to organize a surprise night attack on Patterson with 1,200 troops. To accomplish this, Cochrane widened and deepened Villeré’s Canal, so that boats could carry a large raiding party to the other side of the river. This took more time, and while the British were doing it, Jackson extended his line well into the cypress swamp to protect his left flank. The previous battles had shown that area to be vulnerable. General Coffee was in charge of Jackson’s left.

  Patterson was also strengthening his position. He brought up four more twelve-pounders and two twenty-four-pounders from the Louisiana and erected another battery. And he added a twelve-pounder to General Morgan’s force. Patterson now had ten big naval guns ready to use against Pakenham’s left flank. The batteries themselves were weakly defended, however. Morgan had fewer than six hundred inexperienced, poorly trained Louisiana militiamen. Jackson was not giving Patterson and the west bank full support because he was convinced the main British thrust would come on the east side of the river.

  General Lambert reached the fleet off Cat Island on January 1, but getting his troops to the battlefield consumed four days. By January 5 all the men were at the camp below Rodriguez Canal. Again, the delay helped Jackson. On January 3, more than 2,300 green Kentucky militiamen, under Major General John Thomas, arrived in New Orleans. They had only seven hundred guns, however. Jackson immediately ordered 500 of the troops to cross the river and reinforce Morgan.

  Each night, a few of Jackson’s sharpshooters stole up to the British outposts and picked off the sentries with deadly accurate rifle fire. The riflemen created such havoc that Pakenham actually protested this method of warfare to Jackson, who scoffed at him, reminding him that he was invading another country.