Grant The Forgotten Hero

by Charles Henry Vessey

  As previously stated, one has a difficult time deciphering from General Lee's correspondence when the Confederates suffered a reverse. It is unknown whether Lee was intentionally trying to paint a brighter picture than existed to the authorities in Richmond or whether he had a hard time reporting bad news or whether he was an eternal optimist. The Union victories at Fisher's Hill and Cedar Creek were disastrous routs for the rebels, so it is interesting to see how Lee viewed things. The telegrams which follow were directed to James A. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War.

  Dunn's Hill

  September 23, 1864

  Genl Early reports that late yesterday the enemy attacked his position at Fisher's Hill & succeeded in driving back the left of his line & throwing a force in his rear, when the whole of his troops gave way. This resulted in a loss of 12 pieces of artillery, though but few men.

  R. E. LEE 69

  Chaffin's Bluff

  October 21, 1864

  Dispatch from Genl Early just received states that he lost twenty-three(23) pieces of artillery on the 19th. His loss in killed & wounded in the early part of the day was not more than one hundred(100). His loss in prisoners not known. Enemy's loss believed to be severe. He has secured over thirteen hundred (1,300) prisoners.

  R. E. LEE 70

  Whether General Lee wanted to admit the end was in sight or not, the reader can conclude for himself, but one thing was for sure, the Union victory at Cedar Creek marked the last major battle in the Shenandoah Valley. The campaigning in the valley was over and the thoroughfare to the North was closed. The Confederates would reap no more from the Shenandoah Valley.

  March to the Sea

  Atlanta fell to Sherman on September 2, 1864. The question in both Grant and Sherman's minds must have been, where do we go from here? Grant had always wanted to move against Mobile, Alabama as one of the next strategic moves to cripple the Confederacy. He had proposed such an operation in 1863 after Vicksburg and renewed his request during the winter of 1863-64 after Chattanooga, but now, in the autumn of 1864, such a move had lost much of its luster thanks to Admiral Farragut. In his naval victory of August 6, 1864, his forces had closed Mobile Bay to the blockade runners.

  With Mobile losing significance, the question became what to do with Sherman's army. There were still strategic sites which required destruction of the Confederate war-making ability such as the Selma and Montgomery, Alabama areas, but such a move would be in a direction opposite Grant's original plans. Recall when he took command of the Union army, in the spring of 1864, he devised a grand strategic plan which called for Grant to hold Lee in position in Virginia and allow Sherman to pivot in a giant wheel eventually coming in upon Lee's rear as was the case in so many of Grant's moves.

  When Grant first arrived in Washington in March of 1864, he asked Halleck for a map showing all the areas under Federal control through the first part of 1864. On this map, Grant proceeded to lay out the proposed campaigns for the spring in blue. Some were ideas for campaigns which failed to materialize, while others were campaigns which were thrust upon Grant, but the significant ones depicted in blue were Grant's campaign through Richmond and on to Danville and the much cherished idea of a movement against Mobile. In addition, there was Sherman's move from Chattanooga to Atlanta and another one from Mobile to Atlanta via Selma and Montgomery, but the most astonishing advance etched in blue on this map were lines running from Atlanta via Milledgeville to Savannah. This was the precursor of what was to become known as the famous March to the Sea.

  There can be no doubt Grant originated the idea of Sherman's march, but that was not important to Grant. These provide more examples of his strategic foresight and his magnanimity.

  When Grant finished making his plans on the map he had a copy forwarded to Sherman who was ecstatic seeing the upcoming campaigns spelled out in such graphic detail. He immediately grasped the strategic thrust behind Grant's thinking.

  That had been six months earlier. The Mobile expedition was never made, but the port had been closed. To move against Selma and Montgomery would be contrary to Grant’s original plan. The only route of any consequence remaining was the route to the sea, but Hood still had a large viable army, so questions remained about what to do with Sherman's army. To get Sherman's input on the matter, Grant sent Horace Porter to confer with Sherman on September 13th. Prior to his leaving for Atlanta, on September 12th, Grant called Porter into his tent and told him of his mission and the reason for it. "Sherman and I have exchanged ideas regarding his movement about as far as we can by correspondence, and I have been thinking that it would be well for you to start for Atlanta to-morrow, and talk over with him the whole subject of his next campaign. We have debated it so much here that you know my views thoroughly, and can answer any of Sherman's questions as to what I think in reference to the contemplated movement, and the action which should be taken in the various contingencies which may arise. Sherman's suggestions are excellent, and no one is better fitted for carrying them out. I can comply with his views in regard to meeting him with ample supplies at any point on the sea-coast which it may be decided to have him strike for. You can tell him that I am going to send an expedition against Wilmington, North Carolina, landing the troops on the coast north of Fort Fisher; and with the efficient cooperation of the navy we shall no doubt get control of Wilmington harbor by the time he reaches and captures other points on the sea-coast. Sherman has made a splendid campaign, and the more I reflect upon it the more merit I see in it. I do not want to hamper him any more in the future than in the past with detailed instructions. I want him to carry out his ideas freely in the coming movement, and to have all the credit of its success. Of this success I have no doubt. I will write Sherman a letter, which you can take to him." 71 Like always, he always wanted his subordinates to receive the accolades they deserved.

  Porter left City Point on the 13th going by way of Cincinnati, Louisville and Chattanooga, arriving in Atlanta on September 20th. Porter carried with him a letter Grant had written to Sherman asking for his opinion on the next move.

  HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,}

  CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 12, 1864.}

  MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

  commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

  GENERAL: I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. This line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or Lynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the Danville Road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force of six to ten thousand men against Wilmington.

  The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do with the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties of supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements Canby would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as you proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever was abandoned by the
enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer is not so much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. It will probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will be executed. If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward, and I will approve them.

  In conclusion, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I feel you have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any general in this war, and with a skill and ability that will be acknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled. It gives me as much pleasure to record this in your favor as it would in favor of any living man, myself included.

  Truly yours,

  U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 72

  In his conversation with Porter before the he left for Atlanta, Grant mentioned conversations he and Sherman had been having regarding anticipated operations. In the above letter, Grant cited Savannah as a possible destination from a previous telegram to Sherman dated September 10, 1864. Up to this time, Grant was the only one bringing up Savannah as a possible destination.

  After Porter arrived at Sherman's headquarters, he spent a couple of days conversing with the general on various possibilities for action, relaying what he knew to be Grant's feelings on certain topics. After ascertaining Sherman's thoughts on what should be done and what was expected from Hood, Porter set out on his return to City Point arriving on September 27th two weeks after he began.

  On his return, he carried a letter from Sherman to Grant.

  HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE}

  MISSISSIPPI }

  IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, }

  September 20, 1864. }

  Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT,

  Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Virginia.

  GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge, at the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of your staff, your letter of September 12th, and accept with thanks the honorable and kindly mention of the services of this army in the great cause in which we are all engaged.

  I send by Colonel Porter all official reports which are completed, and will in a few days submit a list of names which are deemed worthy of promotion.

  I think we owe it to the President to save him the invidious task of selection among the vast number of worthy applicants, and have ordered my army commanders to prepare their lists with great care, and to express their preferences, based upon claims of actual capacity and services rendered.

  These I will consolidate, and submit in such a form that, if mistakes are made, they will at least be sanctioned by the best contemporaneous evidence of merit, for I know that vacancies do not exist equal in number to that of the officers who really deserve promotion.

  As to the future, I am pleased to know that your army is steadily reenforced by a good class of men, and I hope it will go on until you have a force that is numerically double that of your antagonist, so that with one part you can watch him, and with the other push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the Southside Railroad, compel him to attack you in position, or accept battle on your own terms.

  We ought to ask our country for the largest possible armies that can be raised, as so important a thing as the self-existence of a great nation should not be left to the fickle chances of war.

  Now that Mobile is shut out to the commerce of our enemy, it calls for no further effort on our part, unless the capture of the city can be followed by the occupation of the Alabama River and the railroad to Columbus, Georgia, when that place would be a magnificent auxiliary to my further progress into Georgia; but, until General Canby is much reenforced, and until he can more thoroughly subdue the scattered armies west of the Mississippi, I suppose that much cannot be attempted by him against the Alabama River and Columbus, Georgia.

  The utter destruction of Wilmington, North Carolina, is of importance only in connection with the necessity of cutting off all foreign trade to our enemy, and if Admiral Farragut can get across the bar, and move quickly, I suppose he will succeed. From my knowledge of the mouth of the Cape Fear River, I anticipate more difficulty in getting the heavy ships across the bar than in reaching the town of Wilmington; but, of course, the soundings of the channel are well known at Washington, as well as the draught of his iron-clads, so that it must be demonstrated to be feasible, or else it would not be attempted. If successful, I suppose that Fort Caswell will be occupied, and the fleet at once sent to the Savannah River. Then the reduction of that city is the next question. It once in our possession, and the river open to us, I would not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with sixty thousand men, hauling some stores, and depending on the country for the balance. Where a million of people find subsistence, my army won't starve; but, as you know in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable streams, an inferior force can so delay an army and harass it, that it would not be a formidable object; but if the enemy knew that we had our boats in the Savannah River I could rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and could so threaten Macon and Augusta that the enemy would doubtless give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move so as to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give us Augusta, with the only powder-mills and factories remaining in the South, or let us have the use of the Savannah River. Either horn of dilemma will be worth a battle. I would prefer his holding Augusta (as the probabilities are); for then, with the Savannah River in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be a mere matter of time. This campaign can be made in the winter.

  But the more I study the game, the more I am convinced that it would be wrong for us to penetrate farther into Georgia without an objective beyond. It would not be productive of much good. I can start east and make a circuit south and back, doing vast damage to the State, but resulting in no permanent good; and by mere threatening to do so, I hold a rod over the Georgians, who are not over loyal to the South. I will therefore give it as my opinion that your army and Canby's should be reenforced to the maximum; that, after you get Wilmington, you should strike for Savannah and its river; that General Canby should hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to take Columbus, Georgia, either by way of the Alabama or Appalachicola River; that I should keep Hood employed and put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston; and start as soon as Wilmington is sealed to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession.

  I think it will be found that the movements of Price and Shelby, west of the Mississippi, are mere divisions. They cannot hope to enter Missouri except as raiders; and the truth is, that General Rosecrans should be ashamed to take my troops for such a purpose. If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah from your centre, and let General Canby have command over the Mississippi River and country west of it, I will send a force to the Alabama and Appalachicola, provided you give me one hundred thousand of the drafted men to fill up my old regiments; and if you will fix a day to be in Savannah, I will insure our possession of Macon and a point on the river below Augusta. the possession of the Savannah River is more than fatal to the possibility of Southern independence. They may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of all Georgia.

  I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him everything that may occur to me of interest to you.

  In the meantime, know that I admire your dogged perseverance and pluck more than ever. If you can whip Lee and I can march to the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us twenty days' leave of absence to see the young folks. Yours as ever,

  W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 73

  When one reads the two letters above, it becomes obvious what is transpiring is a conversation between these two men. It is a conversation contained completely within the bounds of written words, but a conversation nevertheless. These two could have been sitting at a table conversing. As one listens to this dialogue it becomes evident that as late as September 20th, Sherman had in no way determined to March to the S
ea with Savannah as the ultimate destination, but Grant had mentioned it no fewer than three times. Yet history records this as Sherman's idea.

  During the course of this long-distance conversation, it also became apparent these two were brainstorming, to use a modern day term. A final decision had not been reached, so they are bouncing ideas off one another in an effort to arrive at a workable solution to the present state of affairs. These letters provide a glimpse of these two generals thinking out loud. One can visualize the plans being formulated as they speak and being built upon as the next worthwhile idea is promulgated. What comes to mind is General O. O. Howard's description of the strategy session prior to the Battle of Chattanooga. "Before long the meeting at headquarters got down to a serious discussion of how General Bragg was to be dealt with, and Howard suddenly realized that he never attended a strategy conference like this one: matters were not handled so informally in the Army of the Potomac. Grant and Thomas and Sherman simply talked things out, putting a whole campaign in review--Sherman bubbling with ideas, as always, Thomas full of solid facts about the roads and mountains and rivers where they would have to fight, Grant listening to both men and now and then putting in an observation of his own. Howard, who was not especially fanciful, felt that it was almost like being in a courtroom: Thomas was the learned judge, Sherman the brilliant advocate, and Grant was the jury whose verdict would settle everything." 74 That same scene was being played out again in these letters.

  While the correspondence would continue between Sherman and Grant as they matured their plans, other events occurred which hastened the decision. On September 25th, Sherman telegraphed Halleck that Hood appeared to be on the move.

  Hood seems to be moving, as it were, to the Alabama line, leaving open the road to Macon, as also to Augusta; but his cavalry is busy on all our roads. A force, number estimated as high as eight thousand, are reported to have captured Athens, Alabama; and a regiment of three hundred and fifty men sent to its relief. I have sent Newton's division up to Chattanooga in cars, and will send another division to Rome. If I were sure that Savannah would soon be in our possession, I should be tempted to march for Milledgeville and Augusta; but I must first secure what I have. Jeff. Davis is at Macon.