Grant The Forgotten Hero
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W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 75
In fact, Jefferson Davis was making a trip through what remained of the Confederacy telling all who would listen that Sherman's army was about to be cut off from its supplies and that he would have to retreat or starve. Davis had met with General Hood and piecing this together meant the Confederates were about to begin an offensive against Sherman's extended supply line which stretched all the way back to Louisville. One thing was for certain, if Sherman and Grant did not develop their plans soon, Hood would force his own agenda.
Events began to accelerate and with them the plans for the march. On September 26th, Grant sent Sherman this telegram.
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 26, 1864--10 A.M.
Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta:
It will be better to drive Forrest out of Middle Tennessee as a first step, and do any thing else you may feel your force sufficient for. When a movement is made on any part of the sea-coast, I will advise you. If Hood goes to the Alabama line, will it not be impossible for him to subsist his army?
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 76
To this Sherman replied:
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 26, 1864.}
GENERAL: I have your dispatch of to-day. I have already sent one division (Newton's) to Chattanooga, and another (Corse's) to Rome.
Our armies are much reduced, and if I send back any more, I will not be able to threaten Georgia much. There are men enough to the rear to whip Forest, but they are necessarily scattered to defend the roads.
Can you expedite the sending to Nashville of the recruits that are in Indiana and Ohio? They could occupy the forts.
Hood is now on the West Point road, twenty-four miles south of this, and draws his supplies by that road. Jefferson Davis is there to-day and superhuman efforts will be made to break my road.
Forrest is now lieutenant-general, and commands all the enemy's cavalry.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 77
The barrage of telegrams continued.
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 27, 1864-10.30 A.M.
Major-General SHERMAN:
I have directed all recruits and new troops from all the Western States to be sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you. I was mistaken about Jeff. Davis being in Richmond on Thursday last. He was then on his way to Macon.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 78
As the fear of Forrest's men cutting his supply lines mounted, Sherman dispatched General Thomas on September 29th, with still another division, to guard against a possible Confederate invasion of Tennessee. Later that day, in a telegram to Halleck, Sherman first proposed what later became the March to the Sea. "I take it for granted that Forrest will cut our road, but think we can prevent him from making a serious lodgment.....Our roads should be watched from the rear, and I am glad that General Grant has ordered reserves to Nashville. I prefer for the future to make the movement on Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah.....79
On October 1st, Sherman's plan was maturing and he began to defend the plan in a telegram to Grant.
"Hood is evidently across the Chattahoochee, below Sweetwater. If he tries to get on our road, this side of the Etowah, I shall attack him; but if he goes to the Selma & Talladega road, why will it not do to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has, and the reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroy Atlanta and march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, breaking roads and doing irreparable damage? We cannot remain on the defensive." 80
By October 5th, Hood's army began to attack Sherman's supply line. Sherman was forced to follow Hood back to Chattanooga in order to keep his lines open.
On October 9th, Sherman telegraphed Grant about the inevitability of what had to be done. "It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turned loose without home or habitation.....I propose that we break up the railroad from Chattanooga forward, and that we strike out with our wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless for us to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people, will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads, we will lose a thousand men each month, and will gain no result. I can make this march, and make Georgia howl!.....81
Sherman, realizing the futility of chasing Hood, was ready for Grant's approval of his proposed march. Even though Grant had come to the conclusion about the advance toward the sea long before Sherman, he was reluctant to give his approval owing to the changed circumstances allowing Hood to remain at large. In response to the telegram from Sherman requesting permission to make the march, Grant replied on October 11, 1864.
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
October 11, 1864-11 A.M.
Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect could not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN." 82
As always, Grant’s primary objectives were the rebel armies for without them, the Confederacy would be unable to wage war. With Hood, still controlling a viable army, Grant was reluctant to give Sherman permission to make the march. From here on, Sherman had the right to claim the March to the Sea, as his own, for even though Grant had originated the idea, he was now reluctant to approve it.
Noteworthy from the above telegram, is that Grant foresaw Hood's later movement to the vicinity of Decatur, Alabama, and his subsequent movement upon Nashville, Tennessee. Such foresight is rare for a person to exhibit on one occasion, but Grant manifested uncanny foresight on innumerable occasions throughout the entire war.
Sherman, afraid of losing the use of his telegraph replied immediately.
"KINGSTON, GEORGIA,
October 11 - 11 A.M.
"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city--send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee.
"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.
"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
"LIEUTENA
NT-GENERAL GRANT." 83
While Sherman was brilliant, he clearly lacked Grant's foresight as the above telegram illustrates.
Finally, adhering to his long standing practice of allowing the on-scene commander to exercise his best judgment, Grant gave his approval for the march.
"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,
October 11, 1864--11.30 P.M.
"Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN." 84
Sherman had the permission he needed and began to make preparations for the movement. During the month of October, Sherman was kept busy on the road between Chattanooga and Atlanta keeping an eye on Hood and his railway open. He ordered all the supplies he needed for the march to Atlanta and transferred the wounded and sick back North. This left him with a fit army of 60,000 men. He decided to carry only 65 pieces of artillery and ammunition enough for 200 rounds per soldier and field piece. The wagon trains were stripped to only carry essentials allowing for swift movement.
Sherman divided his army into two wings. The right wing was commanded by General O. O. Howard and was comprised of the 15th and 17th Corps. The left wing was under General Slocum and was made up of 14th and 20th Corps.
As the preparations to cut loose progressed, Grant observed that Hood had moved his army to the vicinity of Decatur, Alabama, just as he had predicted. From Decatur, Hood moved to Florence, Alabama, where he crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River on October 31st. This caused Grant anxiety about the march with Hood on the loose, so he sent Sherman the following dispatch offering his suggestions.
CITY POINT, November 1, 1864--6 P.M.
Major-General SHERMAN:
Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north, to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign? With Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please with impunity. I believed and still believe, if you had started south while Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have been forced to go after you. Now that he is far away he might look upon the chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while you are pushing in the other. If you can see a chance of destroying Hood's army, attend to that first, and make your other move secondary.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 85
Sherman sent his reply the next day.
ROME, GEORGIA, November 2, 1864.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia:
Your dispatch is received. If I could hope to overhaul Hood, I would turn against him with my whole force; then he would retreat to the southwest, drawing me as a decoy away from Georgia, which is his chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee River, I may turn in that direction, and endeavor to get below him on his line of retreat; but thus far he has not gone above the Tennessee River. General Thomas will have a force strong enough to prevent his reaching any country in which we have an interest; and he has orders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma, Alabama. No single army can catch Hood, and I am convinced the best results will follow from our defeating Jeff. Davis's cherished plan of making me leave Georgia by manoeuvring. Thus far I have confined my efforts to thwart this plan, and have reduced baggage so that I can pick up and start in any direction; but I regard the pursuit of Hood as useless. Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee, I will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direction; but, unless I let go of Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 86
The tone and the wording of the letter above indicate that Sherman was trying to assuage Grant's anxiety. Sherman never intended to chase Hood like he said because Hood had already crossed to the north side of the Tennessee on October 31st. Sherman had confidence in Thomas to repulse Hood, so all he was looking for was Grant's blessing. Later that day an anxious Sherman again telegraphed his superior.
KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 2, 1864.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia:
If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By my movements I have thrown Beauregard (Hood) well to the west, and Thomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him until the reenforcements from Missouri reach him. We have now ample supplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta, and can stand a month's interruption to our communications. I do not believe the Confederate army can reach our railroad-lines except by cavalry raids, and Wilson will have enough to checkmate them. I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow my contemplated movement through Georgia.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 87
In the above dispatch, Sherman is desperate to receive Grant's approval. Not only did he telegraph twice within a few hours, but he even pulled out the heavy guns in his argument. He subtly played on Grant's superstition about ever turning back once he set out for a destination. He was willing to use any argument he thought necessary to win approval of his plan. His arguments succeeded for later that morning, Grant telegraphed his final approval.
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, November 2, 1864--11.30 A.M.
Major-General SHERMAN:
Your dispatch of 9 A.M. yesterday is just received. I dispatched you the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it had worked so far north ought to be looked upon now as the "object." With the force, however, that you have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him.
I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 88
Sherman had his final approval and Hood would be left to Thomas. On November 6th, Sherman telegraphed to Grant his final plans and Grant sent Sherman his last communiqué on the subject.
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, November 7, 1864--10.30 P.M.
Major-General SHERMAN:
Your dispatch of this evening received. I see no present reason for changing your plan. Should any arise, you will see it, or if I do I will inform you. I think every thing here is favorable now. Great good fortune attend you! I believe you will be eminently successful, and, at worst, can only make a march less fruitful of results than hoped for.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 89
The time for talking had ended. The ongoing discussion of the last two months was finished. The planning and preparing was done. On November 12th, Sherman headed for Atlanta. The final evacuation of supplies and people from Atlanta was complete. The railroad and telegraph lines to the rear were broken. Sherman was now deep in a hostile country and all alone, and Grant was to be proved right. Hood did march on Nashville and the only resistance Sherman encountered was from little boys and old men. In fact, the biggest battle of having the mission approved was behind him. The actual March to the Sea was a veritable picnic.
On November 14th, all his forces were concentrated in the vicinity of Atlanta. During the night of the 14th, all war material in Atlanta was burned. The actual march from Atlanta began on the morning of November 15, 1864. The right wing under Howard began its march toward Jonesboro and Macon, while the left wing, under Slocum headed toward Decatur and Stone Mountain. The forces were split to threaten both Macon and Augusta and disguise his real objective which was Milledgeville. Both were to rendezvous at Milledgeville within seven days.
As the movement progressed, Sherman's men wreaked havoc on the railroads in their path, destroying everything beyond repair. They also devastated the country as they went for miles on either side of the line of march with regard to food stuffs. The country was rich in livestock and grains which the army confiscated for its own use.
By November 23rd, Sherman and the left wing were at Milledgeville and in communication with Howard who was in Gordon some 15 miles south. While in the ca
pital of Georgia, a number of Union officers constituted themselves the Georgia Legislature and voted to rescind the ordnance of secession.
On November 24th, the march resumed, headed for Sandersville. By the 3rd of December, the army reached its second objective, the city of Millen.
While at Millen, Sherman was informed that Bragg was in Augusta and Wade Hampton had been ordered there to organize forces to resist his progress. He also learned that Hardee was in front of him with 10,000 men to impede his advance toward Savannah.
By December 9th and 10th, all four corps reached the defenses of Savannah and completely invested the city. General Hardee was in command of the rebel forces within Savannah. As soon as the investment was in place, Sherman wanted to make contact with the Union fleet which was to rendezvous with him at Ossabaw Sound. They were to have fresh supplies on hand for the army. General Howard had, some nights before, one of his scouts make contact with the fleet, so everyone was aware that Sherman had made it to the coast safely.
On December 13th, General Hazen assaulted the Confederate Fort McAllister on the Ogeechee River near Ossabaw Sound. The fort was strongly fortified with cannon to guard against an approach by the sea, but its land defenses were weak. The assault was a success and with it Sherman gained unimpeded access to the Union fleet and contact with the outside world.