A Short History of the Mughal Empire (I.B.Tauris Short Histories)

by Fisher, H, Michael

  Substantial popular uprisings punctuated his reign. In reaction, ‘Alamgir deputed imperial forces, sometimes under his personal direction, to support provincial officials in suppressing them. Extensive Afghan revolts recurred. Starting in 1667, the Yusufzai, Afridi and Khatak Afghan communities each expelled Mughal authorities. Imperial armies sent to crush them instead suffered major defeats (1674, 1675). Only after ‘Alamgir himself went to supervise were these risings suppressed by combining force and subsidy-payments (protection money), thus securing the vital route to Kabul (by 1676).

  Peasant communities in the Mughal heartland also persistently rebelled. Through the late 1660s, Hindu Jats around Mathura rallied under their popular leader, Gokula. Eventually in 1670, Mughal troops subdued this insurrection (albeit temporarily) and captured Gokula’s children. ‘Alamgir renamed Mathura ‘Islamabad’ and ordered the demolition of the major temple there built by Bir Singh Dev (recycling its stonework into a mosque in nearby Agra). ‘Alamgir also had Gokula’s son and daughter converted to Islam, made respectively a Qur’an reciter and a wife of an imperial servant. Yet, Jat uprisings re-emerged in the late 1680s.

  In 1672, members of the Satnami religious movement in eastern Punjab revolted. Imperial accounts disparaged them as a ‘rebellious horde of low people like goldsmiths, carpenters, scavengers, tanners and members of other menial professions.’19 But ‘Alamgir personally oversaw the imperial forces that gradually repressed them.

  In the Punjab, another popular religious movement, the Sikhs under their Gurus, revolted repeatedly against Mughal rule and repulsed several imperial suppression campaigns.20 After the death of the seventh Guru, Hari Rai (r. 1644–61), who had aided Dara Shukoh against ‘Alamgir, he tried to arbitrate this succession—as Mughal emperors had done for many other dynasties. Instead, the Sikh community chose Guru Har Krishnan (r. 1661–4), who died very young in Delhi. Then, Sikhs recognized Guru Tegh Bahadur (r. 1665–75), who proselytized widely, especially among Jats in the Punjab. ‘Alamgir had him arrested and executed. Nonetheless, the tenth Guru, Gobind Singh (r. 1675–98), mobilized increasingly militant resistance against Mughal authorities for decades. Other uprisings by various Jats and other regionally based groups would persist well beyond ‘Alamgir’s reign.

  The Marathas of the western Deccan were the community on the Mughal frontier most powerfully resistant to both imperial arms and also enticements. Many Marathas had rallied under their charismatic leader, Shivaji (1627–80), as he maneuvered against Deccan sultans and Mughal governors. ‘Alamgir sent some of his best commanders and troops against Shivaji, but they repeatedly failed. In a daring, lucrative and politically significant expedition, Shivaji sacked the rich strategic port of Surat in 1664, which Mughal authorities proved incompetent to defend. Unable to stop Shivaji, Mughal commanders allied with him against Bijapur (1665–6), but with limited imperial gains. In 1666, ‘Alamgir sought to incorporate Shivaji by investing his seven-year-old son, Sambhaji, with mansab 5,000 and by summoning them both to the imperial court at Agra.

  Like many outsiders to the court, Shivaji was alienated rather than assimilated. One courtier reflected their condescending attitude toward Shivaji (and other newcomers):

  … this wild animal of the wilderness of ignorance, who knew not the etiquette of the imperial court, went into a corner and made improper expressions of dissatisfaction and complaint …. His brainless head led him to make a tumult. The Emperor ordered that he should return to his lodging … in view of the fraud and satanic trickery of this arch-deceiver.21

  Shivaji deceived his guards, dramatically escaped back to his homeland and rallied his followers there.

  As Bijapur, Golkonda, various other rulers and rival factions within the Mughal administration all engaged in multi-sided conflicts in the Deccan, Shivaji intermittently supported or opposed each of them. In 1670, Shivaji plundered Surat again, adding to his own wealth and fame and humiliating its imperial defenders. In 1674, Shivaji further enhanced his status through an elaborate Brahminical enthronement as Maharaja Chatrapati (Sanskritic ‘Universal Emperor’). Shivaji had made the Maratha coalition the most expansive force in the Deccan, mobilized around potent Hindu cultural symbols—like so many other rebellions against ‘Alamgir’s regime and policies.

  After Shah Jahan’s death, ‘Alamgir implemented his own programs even more forcefully. He expressed his deep commitment to Sunni Islam by particularly favoring mansabdars, other officials and subjects who did likewise, including converts. But ‘Alamgir increasingly resented rival international leaders of Sunni Islam. After sending several missions with gifts to the Sharif of Mecca, and after receiving even more missions seeking more presents, ‘Alamgir expressed his frustration in a letter to the Sharif: ‘Having heard about the great wealth of India, Sharif-i-Mecca, for taking an advantage for himself, sends me every year an envoy. This sum of money which I sent is for the needy. We should take care whether the money is distributed among the poor or is wasted by the Sharif…’22 In his 1690 mission to the other most powerful Sunni ruler, the Ottoman Sultan, ‘Alamgir recognized him only as Caesar of Rome, not Caliph (although the Ottoman sultans had claimed the Caliphate since 1517 and had long governed Mecca). Further, ‘Alamgir gave high mansabs to successive Ottoman governors of Basra who defected and immigrated.23

  ‘Alamgir increasingly ordered constraints on non-Muslims. He was both offended by the non-Muslim ideologies that motivated many opponents and also swayed by his own self-identification as leader of the Muslim community. Among other policies, he reinstated the pilgrim tax for non-Muslim religious festivals and tried to curtail them. While ‘Alamgir gave financial support to some Hindu temples, he also cancelled revenue grants and directed the destruction of others, especially those belonging to rebels. In 1679, ‘Alamgir re-imposed the long-abolished jizya, sparking popular demonstrations against him even in Shahjahanabad’s streets. Shivaji reportedly wrote ‘Alamgir, protesting the re-imposition of jizya as an unjust burden on non-Muslims. Theoretically, this tax was payment for the privilege of living under Muslim rule while not serving it, so many Rajputs and other Hindus working for the Empire were still exempt.

  During the succession war, far more Rajput mansabdars had supported ‘Alamgir than Dara or their brothers.24 Nonetheless, ‘Alamgir imposed policies that especially burdened Rajputs. To help alleviate the overstressed jagir system, he largely limited Rajput mansabdars to jagirs in their homelands, reducing their effective income. Rajputs also tended to receive less prestigious postings. By 1678, the proportion of Rajputs with mansab 1,000 or above was 15 per cent and declining; indeed, Rajputs comprised an even smaller proportion of high mansabdars than immigrants to India.25

  Overall, despite ‘Alamgir’s considerable expenditures of manpower and financial resources, his reign’s first dozen years proved disappointing to him and to many khanazad mansabdars, who formed the imperial core. Many also resented the appointment to high mansabs of former enemies, particularly those considered culturally inferior. This resentment intensified since there were insufficient available jagirs and since even those jagirs usually failed to produce their nominal income. As ‘Alamgir admitted, ‘We have a small sum of money and many have a demand for it.’26 All this led many inside and outside the imperial establishment to question ‘Alamgir’s authority and act in their own interests.

  THE RAJASTHAN WAR AND EARLY DECCAN CAMPAIGNS, 1679–89

  In 1679, ‘Alamgir left Shahjahanabad, never to return to that city or Hindustan. Until then, he had largely reigned from Shahjahanabad, travelling out relatively rarely: supervising campaigns in Afghanistan, visiting Agra and Allahabad and once (severely exhausted) resting in Kashmir. His 1679 departure initiated the pattern that would dominate his remaining four decades: ‘Alamgir moving among military encampments and provisional capitals to deal personally with imperial crises, sometimes himself commanding battles.

  Ever since Emperor Akbar had incorporated Rajputs into the Mughal core—receiving brides and ser
vice in exchange for advancement—they had provided much of the Empire’s military manpower. Imperial armies almost all had significant Rajput contingents. But ‘Alamgir’s policies alienated many Rajputs. For example, Maharaja Jaswant Singh Rathor of Marwar had risen under Shah Jahan to mansab 7,000/7,000 (5,000 2-3h). During the succession war he had repeatedly backed ‘Alamgir’s brothers, intermittently forgiven each time he rejoined ‘Alamgir. In 1678, Jaswant Singh died serving at the distant Khyber Pass, leaving no living sons but two pregnant wives (only one newborn survived). ‘Alamgir determined to decide the Marwar succession, as emperors customarily did for such subordinated dynasties. However, ‘Alamgir uncustomarily took into the imperial household a newborn, allegedly Jaswant Singh’s son (converting him to Islam as Muhammadi Raj). Further, ‘Alamgir selected as Marwar’s ruler an unpopular but compliant nephew of Jaswant Singh.27

  Many Rathors objected to such blatant interference. Some rebelled, claiming they had Jaswant Singh’s real newborn son. To suppress this uprising, ‘Alamgir himself oversaw the annexation of Marwar, converting long-standing Rajput watan jagirs into much needed khalisa. The Sisodia Rana of neighboring Mewar, fearing a similar intrusion into his territories and rights, joined the rebellion. To break the economy and spirit of these Rajputs, ‘Alamgir supervised as Mughal armies devastated both Marwar and Mewar—seizing crops, looting cities and destroying temples.

  ‘Alamgir entrusted direct imperial military command to his fourth and currently favorite son, Akbar. After initial victories, however, Akbar suddenly switched in 1681 to the Marwar side, proclaiming himself emperor. He nearly captured ‘Alamgir, who only saved himself by deceiving Akbar’s Rathor allies into deserting him. Akbar refused to surrender and beg his father’s forgiveness. Instead, Akbar fled south for refuge with the current Maratha leader, Maharaja Sambhaji (the late Shivaji’s eldest son and main heir). ‘Alamgir confined for life his own eldest daughter and former favorite, Zeb-un-Nissa, for allegedly encouraging her traitorous brother.

  After the Sisodia Rana of Mewar died, ‘Alamgir forced the newly enthroned successor into ceding territories in lieu of jizya. However, in Marwar the guerilla war continued for decades (until 1709, after ‘Alamgir’s death). These struggles deeply damaged the long-standing and mutually advantageous alliance between the Mughal dynasty and many Rathor and Sisodia Rajputs. Further developments in the Deccan would also weaken ‘Alamgir’s relationship with many other Rajput mansabdars.

  In 1681, ‘Alamgir returned to the Deccan which he had governed as a prince for 15 years (1636–44, 1652–8). He had three main objectives: punish errant Akbar; complete his conquests of Bijapur and Golkonda (interrupted by the succession war); and suppress Akbar’s Maratha hosts. During ‘Alamgir’s first decade there, he apparently accomplished all three.

  While ‘Alamgir offered his rebellious son forgiveness if he would submit, Akbar instead continued to challenge his father’s regime. Akbar launched ineffective raids into Hindustan. He sent his father scolding letters:

  in your Majesty’s reign the ministers have no power, the nobles enjoy no trust, the soldiers are wretchedly poor, the writers are without employment, the traders are without means, the peasantry are down-trodden …. Men of high extraction and pure breeding belonging to ancient families have disappeared, and the offices and departments … are in the hands of mechanics, low people and rascals,—like weavers, soap-venders and tailors … buying posts with gold and selling them for shameful consideration.28

  He urged ‘Alamgir to retire and make the Hajj, taunting ‘Alamgir about overthrowing his father.

  But Akbar could not mobilize sufficient support from Deccanis or mansabdars. In 1683, he fled to the Safavid court, emulating several of his Mughal predecessors. Unlike Babur and Humayun, however, Akbar never returned as triumphant conqueror of India. Instead, he died in exile there, predeceasing his father.

  ‘Alamgir’s presence in the Deccan strengthened the resolve and resources of his soldiers fighting against Bijapur, Golkonda, the Marathas and kingdoms further south. ‘Alamgir first concentrated his armies against Bijapur, the weaker sultanate (which he had fought when a prince). Imperial forces under his third son, ‘Azam, besieged Bijapur. ‘Alamgir went in 1686 to command the final victory personally. Triumphant, ‘Alamgir imprisoned the youthful Sultan for life and annexed Bijapur into the Empire, recruiting as mansabdars select courtiers and commanders from the conquered regime.

  Next, ‘Alamgir focused his forces against still wealthy Golkonda Sultanate. His second son, Mu‘azzam, had captured Hyderabad city in 1685 but the Sultan had withdrawn to nearby Golkonda Fort, which seemed impregnable. ‘Alamgir took command himself. Convinced that the Sultan had bribed Mu‘azzam, ‘Alamgir had Mu‘azzam, his wife and sons imprisoned in 1687 (and not released until 1695). Finally, after a costly eight-month siege, the fortress fell. ‘Alamgir seized the 60 million rupee treasury, imprisoned the Sultan forever, and annexed the Sultanate. ‘Alamgir appointed as mansabdars select members of the Golkonda court—24 Muslims, including the ex-king’s adopted son, received mansab 1000 or more. But ‘Alamgir gave mansabs to only two Hindus: a Brahmin and a Telugu Nayak, although these communities had been especially prominent in Golkonda’s administration. For the next 15 years, most of Golkonda’s local officials remained in place so links between zamindars and imperial officials were consequently weak.30 Additionally, the eastern Deccan had suffered devastating war, famines and plague. Consequently, many mansabdars assigned jagirs there could not collect their full revenues. Further, the relatively few imperial troops, based in scattered forts, struggled to suppress local uprisings and Maratha raids.

  Cannon from Bijapur Fort, c. 168829

  ‘Alamgir next committed most of his troops against Marathas in the western Deccan. Shivaji’s main heir, Sambhaji, had lived at the imperial court and received mansab 5,000, later 7,000. But Sambhaji had not assimilated well into the Empire and now led Marathas against it. As ‘Alamgir had moved his troops against Bijapur and Golkonda, light, mobile Maratha troops harassed them, seizing people and property. In 1689, however, a rapid raid by a former Golkonda commander who had joined ‘Alamgir captured Sambhaji. ‘Alamgir had him publicly humiliated, blinded and executed. ‘Alamgir also seized his capital, Raigarh. Many Marathas next recognized Shivaji’s younger son, Rajaram, as their leader against the Empire. However, ‘Alamgir tried to determine the Maratha succession by recognizing instead Sambhaji’s nine-year-old son, Shahu, as Raja, awarding him mansab 7,000/7,000, and raising him within the imperial household.

  Indeed, ‘Alamgir awarded mansabs to many Marathas, until they outnumbered Rajputs. This raised the proportion of Hindu mansabdars (suggesting ‘Alamgir did not exclude Hindus per se). But these new Maratha mansabdars rarely received prominent administrative posts and, largely alienated by the imperial culture, lacked commitment to the Empire. Nonetheless, by 1689, ‘Alamgir had seemingly succeeded in his three main objectives in the Deccan and his regime superficially appeared stable everywhere.

  EXTENDED DECCAN WARS AND IMPERIAL DETERIORATION, 1689–1707

  Below the surface, the Empire was losing effectiveness due to structural stresses from financial imbalances, over-expansion and conflicting interests among ‘Alamgir, mansabdari factions, his diverse subjects, rival powers and his own heirs. The Empire had always needed to expand in order to capture enemy treasuries and gain productive territories. This income paid for its armies that enabled the expansion and for its administration that collected the revenues. But over ‘Alamgir’s final two decades, the costs of empire came to outweigh the benefits for many mansabdars and subjects. Neither the imperial center nor its armies nor its administration had the policies, technology or manpower to control such a vast territorial expanse and array of regionally based rulers and communities.

  As ‘Alamgir passed through his seventies and eighties, he struggled to manage the Empire as a whole. Imperial commanders raided kingdoms as far south as Tanjavur during the early 1690s, making
those rulers nominal tributaries. But the imperial administration exerted little control there, or even over earlier captured Deccani territories.31 Seeing few of his goals accomplished unless he directed them personally, ‘Alamgir concentrated imperial revenues and manpower in his own hands. He doled out resources only temporarily to his mansabdars and distrusted sons, instead ensuring that the most productive lands were designated khalisa, funneling their revenues into his own establishment.

  Emperor ‘Alamgir, As Remembered (detail), c. 1725. Courtesy Los Angeles County Museum of Art (M.72.88.1). www.LACMA.org

  Throughout his reign, ‘Alamgir never spared himself. While he occasionally visited the capitals of defeated Deccani rulers, he did not live in their luxurious palaces. Instead, from 1699 to 1706, ‘Alamgir stubbornly moved his vast imperial encampment around the western Deccan countryside, assaulting a dozen hill-forts held by Marathas and their allies. He eventually captured each fort after long and costly sieges, but often had to negotiate their surrender with little benefit to him and little cost to their defenders. Further, overstretched imperial forces could retain only transient possession of these forts and the territories they controlled; most soon reverted into Maratha hands. One imperial official lamented: ‘‘Alamgir, who is not in want of anything, has been seized with such a longing and passion for some heaps of stone [i.e., hill forts].’32

  During the decades before ‘Alamgir’s death, leading mansabdars were divided into particularly strong and antagonistic factions, each seeking advantage, often at the Empire’s expense. While these factions contained various ethnicities, the two strongest were respectively headed by Shi‘i Irani and Sunni Turani mansabdars. Many mansabdars needed powerful patrons to protect their interests, since their expenses often far outweighed the actual income from their jagir—if they were influential or fortunate enough to receive a jagir. Some had to wait five years for any jagir. Consequently, many mansabdars left their soldiers and retainers long unpaid, which fostered disloyalty. Many mansabdars also extracted as much licit and illicit revenue as possible from jagirs they obtained, and resisted relinquishing them to the next assignee. Several mansabdars eventually turned their jagirs into hereditary kingdoms, since the imperial center was losing control over provincial administrations.