Tom Barry

by Meda Ryan

  It has been described as a ‘spectacular attack’ when they took the town having lured the Free State troops into action. They captured 115 rifles, two machine-guns and a large quantity of stores and clothing. They took Captain Balfe, OC of the pro-Treaty forces prisoner, but freed him after two days. All other 110 prisoners, ‘officers and soldiers’ were released ‘unharmed after a few hours’ despite the execution of seven more Republicans on the same day. The situation was farcical: Republicans continued to release prisoners while the state continued to execute Republicans in custody.[27]

  On13 December Barry and his men marched on Thomastown, put up a hard fight and took it. Within four days Barry’ column had forced the surrender of Callan, Mullinavat, as well as Thomastown.

  In Callan the commanding officer of the pro-Treaty forces, Ned Sommers, felt disillusioned, believed he had been lured into the Free State army under false pretences, and so switched sides. The move cost him his life some months later when he tried to shoot his way out to avoid being captured.

  On the way back from Kilkenny to Tipperary, the Republicans had to cross a marsh; Jack Hennessy remembered the bitter rain beating through them as they marched across north Tipperary. They were cold, wet and hungry yet Barry was determined, he planned to strike in the northern direction through Tipperary to Templemore, then eastwards to the Curragh, from where Dublin, the capital would be within sight. However, he had to lie low for a few days because of ‘enemy activity’.[28]

  By 19 December Barry believed that if he could muster the strength of all Republicans, victory would be theirs. Now as director of operations he had secured, for the first time ever, a typist. From field headquarters he set out his views in a long document for all OCs. He wanted to know the ‘strength of activities’ in each area, the ‘number of arms and ammunition dumped’ and ‘a survey of towns’ that could be attacked. He wrote, that with ‘a properly organised scheme of attacks on enemy’s communication lines we can make his position hopeless in towns, but this cannot be done effectively until a study of the area is made’. He was determined that this war should be on a more organised footing as ‘opportunities’ were ‘not being availed of owing to lack of direction and control of our armed forces. This must cease and officers in charge of divisional operations will be responsible that the activities and energies of our forces will be directed and controlled in an efficient manner in their areas. ‘[29]

  The winter and the war dragged on. During these frosty nights they huddled at the side of a ditch or in a hay barn, a stall or a shed being warmed by the breath of the cows. Barry, with some other leaders, led the men on to Templemore where there was an amount of ammunition worth capturing. ‘We had to fight all day,’ Jack Hennessy, who was wounded and brought to safety, said, ‘Two rifles and captured Free State topcoats were used as a stretcher.’[30]

  Could the men sustain this brilliant sweep? Men who were by now in the days of December and January at a low ebb due to lack of sleep, insufficient food and hard slogging through the frost and the rain? Yet the word of Tom Barry and his men’s arrival was enough; he marched through villages and towns where Free State forces hardly stood to fight. ‘They practically handed the places over to him.’[31]His reputation as the daring, elusive commander, the man who could neither be caught nor killed, had made him a legendary figure and a man to be feared. He led and drove his men depending on the circumstances. ‘Single minded and authoritative. He was quick to pick things up and quick to size things up!’[32]

  With troops he marched on Limerick, took over hotels, surrounded pro-Treaty forces on a Sunday morning as they were on parade. He told them he was Tom Barry, then said, ‘Drop your guns!’ And they did.

  He marched on to the Curragh and took 800 rifles from the civic guard. It began to look as if they were on ‘the comeback militarily’. De Valera said to him, ‘It’s a pity you weren’t out earlier, Tom. You’d have made a better job of the line fighting.’

  ‘Hang it all, if I had my way there would be no line fighting. It would be fought out in Dublin in three days and we’d have shifted them.’

  Barry maintained that when the Four Courts was attacked, anti-Treaty troops should have been brought in from the south and west and taken them [pro-Treaty forces] on in Dublin city. ‘Dublin might have been left in a shambles, but at least it would have been over.’[33]

  Meanwhile, the increasing strength of the Free State government forces in some areas accelerated the daily capture of Republicans. There was also the added threat of execution for those caught carrying arms. By the end of January 55 executions of prisoners had been carried out. In all, the total number of executions was to rise to 77 in the course of the war, as the policy of the Free State government was the ultimate destruction of Republicans.[34]

  Ernest Blythe said that for his part they would have gone on executing anti-Treatyites, ‘until we had got the last man, if they didn’t give in’.[35]

  Undaunted, Barry wrote to the adjutant general as he wanted the overall position to be assessed ‘from a proper angle and not from paper reports’. With this in mind he intended sending ‘a special messenger to CS requesting him to come down’ from GHQ. Aided by ‘six officers’ he wanted to front a further column ‘over the Third Southern area.’[36]

  The futility of the fight had taken a heavy toll on the enthusiasm of the guerrilla fighters. Ruthless tactics of the Free State on the prison population were found to influence the Republicans on the ground. Liam Deasy, another officer of the executive, commanding Lynch’s Southern Command and formerly of the Third West Cork Brigade, was captured in Clonmel on 18 January 1923, tried by court-martial and sentenced to death. Deasy was ready for death when at 4 a.m. a message came through from Mulcahy to send him to Dublin. De Valera described this as ‘the biggest blow’.[37]

  Deasy maintained that he had been endeavouring to try to end the war without actually surrendering the Republic. Now in prison he was in a difficult position. How much pressure was forced on him is unknown. In any case he signed a document which urged ‘unconditional surrender of arms and men as required by General Mulcahy. In pursuance of this undertaking I am asked to appeal for a similar undertaking of acceptance from the following …‘A total of fifteen names are listed, including Eamon de Valera, Tom Barry, Liam Lynch and Frank Aiken. He maintained that his ‘execution would not be suspended’ unless he signed the prepared statement. He was given time to consider and ‘in the best interests of the country’ he said, he agreed to sign.[38]

  Lynch answered the communiqué with a brusque refusal; he sent a message to all ranks urging them not to ‘surrender the strong position you have so dearly won. The war will go on until the independence or our country is recognised by enemies, foreign and domestic.’[39]In a letter to Fr Tom Duggan, Cork, Lynch ‘painfully noted’ Liam Deasy’s ‘communication’. He found ‘the enemy’ proposals were ‘that of mad men … Unless the enemy has completely lost his Irish outlook he would not ask such terms … Even if our last leader or volunteer is to be wiped out we will not accept being British subjects’. The ‘enemy in his non-Irish methods seems to forget that it was practically our forces alone who drove the common enemy to discuss peace terms with us,’ Lynch wrote. He was angry at the ‘savage’ war and ‘unchecked policy’ of daily executions, with the ‘energies’ of neutral people concentrated on the anti-Treaty ‘forces’.[40]

  Though the Liam Deasy document was sent out on 29 January 1923, it was not published until 9 February. Barry maintained that Deasy’s ‘Manifesto crippled’ the Republicans, it ‘put the tin hat on us’ as ‘we were at our very highest level of success’. Ernie O’Malley, who was totally against any compromise, was with Deasy in Mountjoy Jail; he found it difficult ‘to contain’ himself.[41]To clarify his position Deasy wrote a six-page letter to Liam Lynch stating that his views were ‘not altered as a result of imprisonment’ as ‘previous to my arrest I had decided to advocate a termination of the present hostilities’. When Barry was handed a copy of �
��Deasy’s apologia’ by ‘a senior brigade officer’s widow’ in the 1970s, he believed that ‘it probably never reached Lynch.’

  Barry wrote:

  For the record I must state: (1) I met Liam Deasy in the Glen of Aherlow a few days before his arrest and he never uttered one word that hostilities should cease. (2) At the first meeting of the executive after his arrest … the question was raised as to whether any of the members had heard Deasy mention or knew of any officer to whom Deasy suggested hostilities should be ended. The answer was, No.[42]

  The holding of an executive meeting now became a priority for Tom Barry. On 9 February accompanied by Tom Crofts, he went to Dublin to impress on Liam Lynch the gravity of the situation. Lynch was reluctant to hold a meeting. Back in Ballyvourney next day Barry and Crofts drafted a strong request to Lynch for an executive meeting.[43]

  As far as Barry was concerned he would like to get the views of other members; also for him timing was important – there was a time to fight and a time to stop. Fight from a position of strength. When there was a hope of winning – then fight. He had never wanted the Civil War. It was too painful, more painful then he had ever thought possible. Deasy’s ‘procedure had a bad effect’, Charlie Browne recalled. ‘We got a letter from Barry repudiating Deasy, and a letter from Liam Lynch, which was an order to be read to all ranks.’ The men ‘looked forward to an honourable settlement.’[44]

  After Seán Lehane had seen Liam Deasy in jail he told Jack Fitzgerald of Deasy’s position. ‘Why didn’t he die as well as the rest?’ Jack asked.

  ‘Dead men are no use to us now,’ Seán responded.[45]

  Notes

  [1]Tom Barry author interviews.

  [2]Gleeson in MacEoin, Survivors, p. 273.

  [3]Pat Buttimer, author interview 15/10/1980.

  [4]Eoin Neeson, The Civil War in Ireland 1921–1923, p. 168.

  [5]Dan Cahalane, author interview 30/1/1977.

  [6]Captured document, 3/10/1922, A/099/4, L3, Military Archives, Dublin.

  [7]Handwritten unnamed, 26/9/1922, A/0991/4, Military Archives, Dublin.

  [8]Tom Barry author interview.

  [9]Andrews, Dublin Made Me, p. 279.

  [10]Executive meeting, 28 October, 1922, Moss Twomey Papers, P69/39 (134), (136), (137), UCDA.

  [11]Liam Lynch to all divisions, 26/11/1922, MT Papers, P/39 (135), UCDA.

  [12]Ernie O’Malley Papers, P17a/58. Ernie O’Malley wrote to the D/P on 20 October saying he did not know what title Barry held at that stage. On the 27 October he reported on the officers’ titles, including Barry’s (from previous day’s meeting). List in No. 79. Phoblacht na hÉireann, 27 October 1922.; Military Registration Board, Dept of Defence.

  [13]Bill Powell, author interview 2/5/1976.

  [14]Liam Lynch to all divisions, 26/11/1922 (there is a typographical error in the report which dates the meeting 16/9/23 instead of 16/11/23), P69/39 (134), MT Papers, UCDA.

  [15]Billy Barry, author interview 17/3/1974; see Ryan, The Day Michael Collins was Shot, Appendix 1 – The Story of John McPeak and the Slieve na mBan – the stealing of the armoured car, pp. 151–161.

  [16]Connie Neenan to Tom, 30/7/1948, reminding Tom of the incident. TB private papers.

  [17]Bill Powell, author interview 2/5/1976.

  [18]Div. adj. to C/S, GHQ, 30/12/1922, P69/25 (59), MT Papers, UCDA.

  [19]C/S to O/C First Southern Division, 10/10/1922, MT Papers, P69/25(166) UCDA.

  [20]Jerh Cronin, author interview 10/1/1981.

  [21]Dorothy Macardle, Tragedies in Kerry, pp. 14–17; Pat Butler, RTÉ Documentary Ballyseedy, 12/11/1997, RTÉ/TV Archives; T. Ryle Dwyer, Tans, Terror and Troubles, pp. 366–371.

  [22]Bill (Liam) O’Donoghue, author interview 24/2/1980.

  [23]Bill Powell, author interview 2/5/1976.

  [24]Jennie W. P. to Sighle Humphreys, 22 December 1922, Sighle Humphreys Papers, P106/736, UCDA.

  [25]Jack Fitzgerald to Ernie O’M. and Stephen O’Neill to Ernie O’M. O’MN, P17b/ 112, UCDA; Jack Fitzgerald, author interview 16/8/1974.

  [26]Seán Hales, TD, pro-Treaty was shot dead on 7 December, then anti-Treaty prisoners Rory O’Connor, Joe McKelvey, Liam Mellows and Dick Barrett were executed by pro-Treatyites in retaliation.

  [27]Tom Barry to adj. general, 15/12/1922, MT Papers, P69/25 (84), also P69/25 (86) & P69/25 (27), UCDA.

  [28]Tom Barry, MT Papers, P69/25 (27), UCDA.

  [29]Tom Barry to O/C’s 19/12/1922, MT Papers, P69/25 (71), (72), (73), UCDA.

  [30]Jack Hennessy, RTÉ Sound Archives, n.d. not transmitted.

  [31]Dan Cahalane, author interview 25/8/1980.

  [32]Charlie O’Keeffe, author interview 6/11/1976.

  [33]Tom Barry to Griffith and O’Grady, Curious Journey, pp. 299, 300.

  [34]Ernest Blythe gave the official number as 84 or 85, see MacEoin, Survivors, p. 8.

  [35]Ernest Blythe, author interview 25/11/1973.

  [36]Tom Barry from Cappa, 26/1/23, MT Papers, P69/25 (7) UCDA.

  [37]De Valera to McGarrity, 5 February 1923, McGarrity Papers, 17440, NLI.

  [38]Deasy to O’Malley, O’MNB, P17b/86; Deasy’s statement, O’MP, P17a/22; also 30 January 1922, O’MP, P17a/99, UCDA; Statement/Proposal, FO’D, MS 31,260, NLI; Copy of statement Liam Deasy’s personal documents – to author – see Ryan, The Real Chief, p. 145.

  [39]Liam Lynch to his brother Tom, Lynch private papers; Ryan, The Real Chief, pp. 108–118.

  [40]C/S to Fr T. Ó Dubagháin, 1 February 1923, Pádraig Ó Maidín Papers, CCL.

  [41]Bill Quirke, O’MP, P17b/86; Ernie O’Malley to C.S. 10 February 1923, O’M P., P17a/40, UCDA.

  [42]Tom Barry to Pádraig Ó Maidín, 21/7/1976. Barry was handed Deasy’s ‘apologia’ by ‘a senior brigade officer’s widow’ after he had ‘attacked Liam Deasy’s “history” of the West Cork Brigade’, Pádraig Ó M Papers, CCL.

  [43]Ryan, The Real Chief, p. 149, 150; see also Longford and O’Neill, Eamon De Valera, 215; Hopkinson, Green, pp. 232, 233.

  [44]Charlie Browne, O’MN. P17b/112, UCDA.

  [45]Jack Fitzgerald to Ernie O’Malley, E. O’MN. P17b/112, UCDA.

  17 – Republicans ‘Dump Arms and Cease Fire’

  By February 1923 Barry realised that ‘the war of brothers’ was only bleeding the Irish people; the British were no longer in the war; an observation period was necessary; the iron hand of the Free State government needed some melting; that perhaps by some form of negotiations Republicanism might again be cemented, thus affording the opportunity of bringing about a united Ireland.

  Meanwhile Fr Tom Duggan who had been a British army chaplain with Republican sympathies was anxious to heal divisions caused by the Civil War. He met Liam Lynch but found him totally unco-operative and un-compromising. He then got in touch with Tom Barry and found him much more understanding and flexible. Despite the fact that Lynch wrote to Fr Duggan demanding that he discontinue with peace feelers, Duggan felt that Barry was one man who could differentiate between an ideal situation and a real one. Barry went to endless trouble endeavouring to effectuate an executive meeting.

  A meeting of the First Southern Division, to which Lynch was invited but didn’t attend, was held in Cronin’s of Gougane Barra, West Cork. Barry suggested, and it was again agreed, to send Lynch a further request to attend a meeting of the executive because he was the only member who was strongly opposed to negotiations. Todd Andrews believed that Lynch’s reasoning was that De Valera could easily be manipulated into ‘a compromise peace’ situation, and this was one of the reasons Lynch ‘opposed the holding of a meeting of the executive.’[1]

  Some weeks later when Barry heard of the ‘Free State atrocities’ in Ballyseedy, Co. Kerry, he was shocked. Nine prisoners were taken from jail, tied to a mine and blown to pieces, one, Stephen Fuller miraculously escaped by being hurled onto a tree. Five prisoners in Killarney were similarly treated. Four were killed. At Caherciveen a few days later five more met a similar fate. The incidents were spa
rked when Republicans who had placed a mine, off the main road near Knocknagoshal, killed four of the Free State forces and badly injured another. The turn events were taking saddened him very much. Was this what he had fought so hard for – Irishmen murdering Irishmen? Things seemed to have lost proportion; it just could not go on.[2]

  At this time, Flor O’Donoghue with Fr Duggan and other neutral men were endeavouring to have a truce called. On 13 February, before Barry’s request letter reached Lynch, Lynch had already left Dublin for his journey south. By mid-February he arrived in the Ballingeary district where he met Todd Andrews. On 25 February, Flor O’Donoghue and a few (neutral) men went to meet Tom Barry and ‘put the Truce idea to him and he approved’; it was worthy of consideration, though he had conditions, such as that ‘all men join an association.’[3]

  Then on 26 February 18 officers attended the first Southern Division council meeting in Ballingeary which lasted three days. Seán O’Hegarty arrived in disguise; he asked Mick Murphy what he thought. Through ‘the dark and dismal’ passages there was ‘the inevitable beam of humour. Mick looked him over, ‘saw the scraggy beard, the battered, weather-worn hat, the old coat and the hob-nailed boots. He stepped back from Seán and said, “you look like the fellow in the thirteenth Station of the Cross handing up the nails”.’[4]