Tom Barry

by Meda Ryan

  At the council meeting, Barry was among those who again put forward a demand on Lynch to call an executive meeting saying that Lynch ‘alone was responsible for not calling it’. Lynch’s argument was that they had no power to make peace or war because the imprisoned members would have to be released to produce a comprehensive decision.[5]

  Lynch listened to the men who had the pulse of the situation, and got a more realistic view of the position than he could have visualised from headquarters in Dublin. ‘The majority, while believing that military victory was no longer a possibility expressed a willingness to continue the struggle.’[6]Barry emphasised strongly that in the entire country their strength did not exceed 8,000. As Lynch heard the outspoken opinion of Barry and his comrades he became more convinced that they were in a crisis situation. But he was determined that the fight should go on.[7]

  Eventually Barry, using persuasive language with aggressive power, commanded that a meeting of the executive should be held – just as he would command that an ambush be carried out. He failed to understand why Lynch was so single-minded in his attitude and why Lynch failed to respond to requests from De Valera to see him.

  Barry said that if he believed that by continuing the struggle, success would be achieved, he wouldn’t hesitate for one moment. However, the strength of their forces was reduced, their armament supplies were diminishing and the general conditions as regards prisoners and the lack of people-support, all pointed to the fact that the continuation of hostilities was futile.

  Each of the 18 officers present expressed his opinion, and as Lynch listened to their outspoken views, he realised that a crisis had come and that a meeting of the executive could no longer be deferred. Finally, with full agreement from the group, a decision to call an executive meeting was taken. Throughout this period a number of churchmen and other dignitaries had made approaches to Barry to use his influence and persuasive powers to bring an end to hostilities; they were also in touch with Cosgrave and Mulcahy. Florrie O’Donoghue of the neutral executive (intermediaries negotiating peace) also found De Valera difficult. ‘No truce for him. Wish he were doing some of the fighting,’ he wrote.[8]

  While arrangements were being made for the executive meeting a proposal for the cessation of hostilities was addressed by the archbishop of Cashel, Dr Harty. A number of priests and laymen came to Barry with ‘a request that it should be circulated to IRA leaders … in the interests of the future of Ireland’.[9]Tom in a letter to the bishop and also to the press agreed to the ‘request’ as he felt it was his ‘bounden duty’ not to influence but to pass on the request. However, the army executive ‘unanimously rejected’ the proposals.[10]

  Lynch finally sent De Valera an invitation to attend an executive meeting in the Monavullagh Mountains in Co. Waterford. Sporting a beard he travelled with Frank Aiken and Austin Stack in a large car, posing as an American.

  Meanwhile, Tom Barry, Tom Crofts and some other officers joined Todd Andrews and Liam Lynch as they headed for the executive meeting. Andrews and Lynch were in bed one night when they were awakened abruptly as the door of their bedroom was kicked open. ‘A figure appeared with a lighted candle in one hand and in the other a sheet of paper. I was terrified by this sudden and violent intrusion,’ Todd Andrew wrote. ‘My first reaction was that the end had come at last, that we were at the mercy of the Staters. Liam recognised, more quickly than I, that the visitor was Tom Barry. He waved the piece of paper about shouting angrily “Lynch! Did you write this?” The paper in Barry’s hand was Liam’s order to withdraw from peace feelers. Liam merely replied, “Yes”.

  ‘A tirade of abuse followed from Barry, mainly directed at asserting the superiority of his fighting record. Barry’s peroration was dramatic: “I fought more in a week than you did in your life.” Liam said nothing. Having emptied himself of indignation, Barry withdrew slamming the door ... Barry’s dramatic entrance holding the candle-stick with the lighted candle struck me as having something of the character of an Abbey Theatre farce.’[11]

  Tom Barry, Crofts, Lynch, Andrews and other officers reached Carriganimma near Macroom for the first part of their journey to the executive meeting. A lorry had been provided to take them towards Araglin outside Fermoy. Todd Andrews says that everybody was in a good humour and there was ‘sly nudging’ when Tom Barry automatically took command.

  ‘We drove into the night and it was easy to see why Barry was probably the best field commander in the IRA. Before approaching any crossroads he dismounted, covering the passage of the lorry with the bodyguard. The operation he was commanding wasn’t complicated, but his air of confident authority impressed me. One felt safe with Barry in charge.’[12]

  Around midnight they arrived outside Kilworth where they previously decided to abandon the lorry and continue on foot towards Araglin. Feeling thirsty, they decided to call to a pub. Before they knocked up the proprietor, Barry placed a guard around the premises.

  They had one drink each and moved off in three pony-traps provided by the local company to pre-arranged billets organised by these North Corkmen. ‘The boys’ had some days previously commandeered a lorry-load of bacon from Sir John Keane’s factory at Cappoquin. They distributed it among the people of the area, so Barry, Lynch, Andrews and all the others had a wholesome meal in the morning before trudging 20 miles over the Knockmealdowns to Ballinamult, Co. Waterford. ‘It was a welcome addition to their monotonous diet which consisted almost entirely of bread, butter, eggs and tea’.[13]

  The available members of the executive assembled on 23 March 1923 at James Cullinane’s, Bliantas, Co. Waterford.[14]Anxious to stop the war, De Valera stated that Irish sovereignty and the abolition of the oath were pre-requisite. Tom Barry proposed that the executive recognise that continued resistance would not further the cause of independence. This meeting, with deep discussion, took three days. Three significant aspects of the situation were considered. First, the heavy losses by death or capture of officers and men; second, the policy of executions which had been suspended by the Free State authorities in February, but resumed again in March; and third, the lack of weapons which might enable attacks on posts to be made successfully.

  At this time the total strength of the Republican army was about 8,000. Jails and internment camps held an estimated 13,000 prisoners. Against the 8,000 still in the field the Free State government could muster 38,000 combat troops. There was no effective answer to the executions’ policy, short of retaliation, equally lawless and cruel, and Lynch had forbidden any such action. At the time Michael Cremin was negotiating the purchase of mountain artillery on the continent, but there was no indication that he would be successful.[15]

  On 25 March the members had to move into the Nire valley because of reports of raiding forces in the area. Here the session continued at John Wall’s, Glenanore, until 26 March. A motion which had clauses to be put before the next executive meeting, with terms for the Republican government to enter into negotiations, resulted in five for and five against. Lynch did not vote. Then Tom Barry proposed: ‘That in the opinion of the executive further armed resistance and operation against F. S. government will not further the cause of independence of the country.’

  De Valera spoke in favour of the motion, but was not allowed to vote. The motion, which Lynch voted against, was defeated by one vote. It proved impossible to reconcile the divergent views held by the executive members. Lynch still believed in possible victory. Finally, a decision was taken to adjourn the meeting and re-assemble three weeks later on 10 April.[16]

  Barry, Crofts and McSwiney returned to the Ballyvourney area. A few days later Fr Duggan approached Barry saying he hoped that some form of c ompromise could be achieved.

  The reconvened executive meeting was to be held near Goatenbridge at the foot of the Knockmealdown mountains. Before dawn on Tuesday 10 April, the scouts at Croagh schoolhouse reported a party of Free State troops moving in two files along the grass margins at each side of the road.

  Barry, Liam
Lynch and all the men were alerted. They assembled around 5 a.m. at Bill Houlihans, the house nearest the mountains and were having cups of tea and chatting while they awaited further reports. A scout rushed in about 8 a.m. saying that another column of Free State troops was approaching over the mountains to their left. Their line of escape was being threatened. They were about to be encircled. Lynch ‘turned to Barry, “You take charge Tom”, which he did and succeeded in getting the members of the government and those of the executive council away in safety.’ Leaving the house they dashed up a glen towards the mountains. Soon some Free State troops appeared over a rise, and the first shots were exchanged. Barry and all the officers carried only revolvers or automatics . None had rifles, so their fire was quite ineffective at the range. The party continued up the mountain, over a hundred yards. Again they came into the view of approximately 50 Free State troops. Heavy fire opened up.

  Liam Lynch, chief-of-staff and Seán Hyde were in the rear. There was another lull, ‘then one single shot rang out. Liam fell’. He died later that night in Clonmel Hospital.[17]

  Four of the eleven officers were captured while trying to make their getaway. Barry, with his creative imagination, foiled capture by pretending he was a farmer driving home his cows for milking as Free State troops combed the fields close by. Eventually he got to a dug-out in south Tipperary where he remained for a few days.

  Owing to Liam Lynch’s death, the executive, with Frank Aiken succeeding as chief-of-staff, did not meet until 20 April 1923. Aiken, Barry and Liam Pilkington were appointed as an army council. At this meeting the executive decided to call on De Valera, as head of the Republican government and the army council, to make peace under certain terms, with the Free State authorities. Barry had quite a controversial exchange with Frank Aiken. Aiken accused Barry ‘of running around making peace,’ while Barry accused Aiken ‘of dodging the fighting’ and conveying ‘utterances’ to ‘executive meetings’ that he (Barry) would be ‘responsible for a Republican defeat’.[18]

  With his army council comrades Barry attended a meeting on 26 and 27 April. De Valera presided. The main discussion centred round a cease-fire. Finally, a decision was taken that they would issue a proclamation announcing their readiness to negotiate an immediate cease-fire. Coupled with this was the order issued by Frank Aiken under the ‘Special Army Order’ for suspension of all operations from 30 April.[19]

  Shortly after the implementation of the cease-fire derogatory rumours circulated regarding Barry’s part in ‘peace feelers’. Tom wrote to Mary MacSwiney on 9 May saying he was annoyed regarding the rumours that he was personally negotiating with ‘the Free State people. I have not troubled to refute those falsehoods to any except a few who matter and I number you amongst those.’ He wanted to meet her to discuss the position.

  Personally my position is that I have given as my view that we cannot beat the Free State people. If we can force them to accept a negotiated peace on the basis of 1,2,3 of the published proclamation (see Appendix IV) we have saved the Independence of the country, established what we have been fighting for – Independence as a right – and preserved its continuity. We remain in the position of custodians of those agreed principles even though a Republican government be not in power and we shall be bound always to ensure that those principles are being acted on by any means in our power. Our moral right to do so is contained in those principles and they are agreed to by our present enemy. I should say that if we have to resort within a few days or years our position will from every point of view be much better.

  He would only agree to ‘a negotiated peace’ on the sovereign rights of the nation being derived from the people of Ireland. ‘I at any rate will not agree to any other basis.’

  When beaten to the ropes – and we are not beaten that bad yet – and then when I could fight no longer, say, you have beaten me in arms but you will never make me accept that “Treaty” on your conditions. I will never agree to a living lie. I would still say to them that they killed, tortured and destroyed our people, to uphold foreign domination and that the only thing that prevents my destroying that rotten immoral government is that I have not strength enough left to do so.

  If those negotiations are turned down by the Free State I favour going ahead with the war. That briefly is my position and I will ask you to believe that whilst the struggle for the Republic is going on that I will not be one of those who will drop out, although perhaps I have felt tired and depressed at such times as LD’s [Liam Deasy’s] action and prisoners, documents, etc.[20]

  Barry was correct in his observation of ‘the disturbing rumours’ because Florrie O’Donoghue in his diary believed that ‘the Barry business ended any chance of success by our arm’, by being in touch with ‘both sides’. (In later life Barry and O’Donoghue became close friends. The diary was written at the time when emotions ran high.)[21]

  The ‘peace feeler’ rumours angered Barry because he said he only acted ‘as courier’ to circulate to army executive members ‘the Archbishop Harty Proposals’ given to him by Fr Duggan.[22]

  It does appear that Barry was incorrectly blamed for informing the Free State government that the army executive was contemplating ‘A General Laying Down of Arms’ and wanted a peace settlement. Since 16 April they were aware of the position, because a notebook found on the captured Austin Stack contained ‘a draft of a memorandum, prepared for signature by all available members, which called’ on De Valera ‘for a general laying down of arms’. Stack’s hand written memorandum mentioned ‘the gravity of the situation of the army of the Republic’; the futility ‘of further military efforts’ necessitated ‘an immediate cessation of hostilities’. It concludes with the Volunteers’ requirement to hand in their arms ‘pending the election of a government, the free choice of the people.’[23]

  Barry said, ‘any Civil War is bad. Like within a family – daggers drawn! I believe the Civil War would have been over in three days [initially] if the IRA had acted properly.’ The Republicans ‘could have won it in Dublin’ he hadn’t the slightest doubt ‘anytime up to June – especially around March, when we were at conventions and discussions, appointing executive and issuing statements. We had about 30,000 men, and we had arms. If 10,000 were put into Dublin, we could take over … banks, the railway station, Beggars Bush and the rest … I have no doubt in the world but the British would come in, and we’d be forced back into hostilities,’ resulting in a lasting final outcome. Those were his views, he said, ‘as a military man’.[24]

  Now in May, with Senators Jameson and Douglas acting as intermediaries between the Free State government and the army council the negotiations went through stormy passages. The oath was the kernel of the problem. Finally the decision by the army council (Barry, Aiken, Pilkington) to ‘dump arms’ and ‘cease-fire’ which had been given, came into effect on 24 May 1923.[25]An intelligence report with the names of prominent leaders, states ‘T Barry is presently supposed to be in Liverpool’.[26]This information was incorrect.

  The ceasefire solved none of the problems brought about by the Treaty. It only induced a stronger hand by the pro-Treaty party and created more bitterness. Not alone were prisoners not released, but Republican combatants continued to be rounded up to add to the 15,000 by this time already interned. Fearing that they might return to their hidden arsenals, the leaders of the Free State knew what was already occupying prisoners’ minds, and how easy their companions outside could be induced to renew the struggle, so they resorted to a firm stance.

  A Public Safety Act passed by the Dáil in June allowed anti-Treatyites to be arrested without trial. As this was a body blow to Republicans, there were those who tried to save ‘the fighting men’. Tom Barry sent an appeal ‘as a matter of extreme urgency’ to the IRB Supreme Council ‘to intervene’ and use ‘its influence to stop the now unnecessary and therefore vindictive pursuit’ of IRA members countrywide ‘by the Free State troops’. The members ‘had dumped their arms for the most part’, he wrote. ‘Irres
pective’ of allegiance to ‘one side or the other’ he wanted men saved ‘for future work for the Republic’. A few weeks later he sent a document signed by Tom Crofts, Thomas O’Sullivan and himself to Frank Aiken C/S (20 June) stating that they, as executive members, would have to ‘appeal directly to men if something was not done immediately to secure immunity from arrest.’ This ‘document’ Aiken maintained, was ‘a threat’ and an ‘accusation’ of ‘government [Republican] and army neglect of duty’. Consequently, he issued an order (No. 20, 24 June) ‘pointing out that any man who attempted to usurp the powers of the proper authorities of the army would be severely dealt with.’[27]

  This order was read and discussed at a ‘government and army council’ meeting on 30 June. Barry said ‘he had no intention of accusing government and army council of neglect of duty, and read a letter, which he was sending to army officers who had seen a copy of his letter to C/S’. In the letter he explained that though he often disagreed with ‘the government and army council’ policy he believed that they ‘had always done their best for the country and the army.’ Discussion also centred on a memo Barry had sent to the president of the Republican government (De Valera) on the destruction of arms. All, ‘with the exception’ of Barry were ‘strongly against destruction of arms’. Barry believed that this gesture could help ease the plight of prisoners awaiting execution as the execution of prisoners went against all his beliefs of the code of war.[28]Barry had made ‘The Leinster House Proposals’ – an army council confidential document.

  During the June exchange, when Barry ‘realised that militarily’ they were sending a signal of defeat, he asserted that a way could found to turn it into ‘victory’. Being against the Treaty from its initiation, he proposed ‘that a picked force of Volunteers should rush and capture Leinster House and all its occupants’ thus putting ‘an end to the Free State government’. De Valera and Aiken questioned him ‘as to the feasibility’ of the operation. In Barry’s ‘considered opinion’ it was ‘quite feasible’. He ‘offered to take personal charge of the attacking party’. If agreed, it would bring ‘a successful conclusion’ to the war ‘from a Republican point of view.’[29]To ‘occupy Dublin for an honourable exit for our defeated force … would not have altered the result, but would have redeemed our defeat and thus hastened the Republican resurgence,’ Barry wrote. As Barry generally thought actions through, it is unlikely that this was an impulsive decision. Aiken C/S opposed these ‘Leinster House Proposals’.[30]Barry wrote later: