Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  However, the duke was not through, and he had not been idle. September 19, he unceremoniously unleashed a large reconnaissance party of some 400 horse on Wahlstädt; which move was also done to screen his nearby main Prussian force and protect it from enemy scouts. The latter was poised at Koischwitz, and as soon as the Austrians were made aware of this important post, the main body was shifted to Herzogswaldau. This was done strictly to put the best foot forward against the nearby enemy, while the headquarters stayed at Jauer, along with the attempt to form a more “permanent” camp. Also, an Austrian force under Count Fillippi, aide-de-camp to Marshal Daun, sent to Wahlstädt discovered the enemy had flown the coop. Meanwhile, the Austrians spent much of the day singing Te Deum in honor of the news the Russians had bested old Marshal Lehwaldt in East Prussia. Their reaction to the news the Russians swung round and marched back into Poland almost immediately afterwards is, fortunately, not recorded here.

  Meanwhile, the Prussians of Bevern did indeed stay put for a time. Charles and Daun resolved to consolidate their current position. Scouts kept up patrolling, observing and keeping track of enemy movements. Field barriers were ordered set up. The bakery was brought forward, and the whole post started to take on the appearance of one the whitecoats would occupy a while (except, of course, under the circumstances, that was not going to happen). Then, hearing the intelligence reports that Bevern might be preparing to retreat, the main Austrian army rose and moved on Nikolstadt, the left leaning on some heights in front of Wahlstädt. A Prussian reconnaissance force posted near Wahlstädt had to be driven off.

  The Austrian right was deployed towards Bernsdorf, and detachments roamed far and wide searching for enemy movements. Nádasti was making his way towards Schweidnitz. Draskovitch and Lt.-Gen. Benevenuto Count Petazzi were unbuckled upon Schweidnitz in advance of Nádasti.

  Bevern was ensconced to the east-southeast and the east of Liegnitz, with his left near Gross-Beckern, center concentrated about Barschdorf and right in front of Weissenrode.

  On September 25, following a thorough reconnaissance of the Prussian lines, newly-promoted General Lacy was ordered to go occupy Koischwitz. A small Prussian force there showed just a hint of resistance, but when the Austrians sent a few hot cannon balls their way, they skedaddled. With the foe making off, Lacy took over the village. Simultaneously, the main army moved yet again, although slightly, trying to keep ahead of Bevern’s endeavors. The new Austrian headquarters was at Greibnig, where the powerful right flank deployed. This was back around by Wahlstädt. General Sprecher commanded a force ahead of the right wing that was itself now nearest the main Prussian force.

  Bevern, far from becoming anxious or nervous about the enemy being in such proximity, reacted to all of this by greatly strengthening his posts before the village of Barschdorf. This happened to be the post closest to Sprecher’s men. At the same time, the bluecoats put up works in front of their left near Gross-Beckern. Bevern’s aim was to make the enemy’s task as difficult as possible. Daun, early on September 26, observed the Prussian dispositions in front of Sprecher’s post. It was clear to him, if the enemy were to be forced to retreat, a little “persuasion” was needed. About 1400 hours, several different batteries commenced a lively bombardment. Prussian guns began replying as best they could, but Bevern did not know what the whitecoats intended.

  Then the Prussians observed the main Austrian army deploying for something. Bevern at once drew his own force out into shape for action. The available Prussian cavalry formed up on the left, and the duke placed his center behind Barschdorf. He also quickly unleashed his own guns in reply. This artillery duel lasted for more than an hour. Barschdorf was soon leveled and some of the parked Prussian munition wagons literally went off with a bang.

  At dusk, with the firing over, and still no ground attack in the offing, Bevern pulled up stakes and made off. The retreat was so rapid that 80 wagons filled with flour had to be abandoned to Beck, who took up a belated pursuit. Horace St. Paul puts Prussian losses at 80 killed and wounded, while the Austrian loss was six killed.2 The hasty retreat also left a rumored 200,000 rations of forage in reserve at Liegnitz.

  September 28, the main Austrian army marched to Rayn.3 Bevern was still moving. The following day, a more favorable post at Kamose was occupied, the left anchored at Rausse and the right at Schadewinkel. The duke was trying to pull back on Breslau, it was feared, so, on October 1, the main Austrian army moved directly to Lissa, the next day reaching the Lohe River. The whiecoats seized Masschnitz, and there was some skirmishing. But Bevern was nothing if not clever. He made a smart flank march across the Oder at Leben-Wöhlau and looked for a moment as if he were heading for the great fortress of Glogau, but marched to Breslau instead. Before the whitecoats realized what was happening, Bevern’s troops were filing through the streets of the Silesian capital (October 1). However, this bold dash left Schweidnitz hemmed in by the Austrians.

  The Austrians stood between the Silesian capital and Schweidnitz, in the vicinity of Liegnitz. Schweidnitz had just been reinforced by Major-General Johann Karl von Rebentisch with some eight battalions from Bevern’s army. Prince Charles could now lay siege to Schweidnitz at any time, and Bevern had no direct way of getting additional reinforcements into the fortress. And, by this point, the duke had made heavy detachments to garrison other important points in the province, and no longer possessed the strength to face Charles and the main Austrian army in the open field. Thus the situation still looked bleak for the bluecoats, in spite of Bevern’s success in reaching Breslau. Worse, neither Schweidnitz nor Breslau could withstand a prolonged siege, and the enemy had lots of opportunities with the Prussian king still battling it out on the side of Saxony.

  Breslau’s walls were crumbling, and, with all of the trouble, an unusually enlarged civilian population at the moment made it particularly vulnerable. Bevern could not go forward or back without sacrificing the Silesian capital, and Schweidnitz would require help as well. Bevern, nonplused, resolved to go recover Klein Masselwitz. October 3, a Prussian detachment went directly at the village. The Austrian force at that site consisted of Esterhazy, with 800 infantry while Lt.-Col. Franz Carl von Riese had some Croats and two guns nearby. The Prussians attacked with much vigor, but that old warhorse Beck pushed reinforcements to the scene. This eventually forced the Prussians to call off the effort; for the moment.

  Bevern was left in bad straits. His field army was effectively hemmed in by that point, and without its support the various Prussian detachments scattered throughout Silesia must soon fall. Back in Austria, Maria Theresa was bragging Silesia was as good as Austrian again, and even some of the Prussians had to confess she might be right.

  While these events were transpiring in Silesia, we need to look at Saxony to see what Bevern’s abandonment of that province had wrought. Dresden itself was secure enough; General Finck was there with a garrison of good Prussians, busy levying contributions and strengthening the defenses of the Saxon capital.4 October 11, word reached the king that the Austrian forces left in Saxony at Stolpen under Hadik and Marschall were moving on Berlin. This was not exactly accurate: only Hadik with 3,500 men were marching. Hadik had sent 300 hard-riding hussars to Luckau under Colonel Johann Franz von Ujházy. These riders lost no time in making for the Prussian capital. With good reason. In order to expedite their movements as much as possible, the raiders did not bring any tent or camp equipage, and everything else was at a bare minimum. The men would camp out under the stars, in all but the worst weather. In the event of the latter, they would “commandeer houses.”5 Nonetheless, a successful raid on Berlin had the capability to really boost Austria’s fortunes in this fighting.6

  Another force, under Major Franz Chevalier de Bosfort, was sent from Lubben to divert Prussian attention. He was to let it be known he was heading for Frankfurt-on-Oder, there to join up with the Russians. Ultimately, the total forces for the raiding party amounted to more than 6,000 men, but these were the necessary detachments to keep t
he operation feasible. Ujházy stormed through Mittenwalde, aiming at Teltow. The axis of his advance appeared to threaten Potsdam, or at least give the impression he was coming at Berlin from a different direction. With him and Bosfort, Hadik hoped to shield his movement up past the seldom traveled swamps, lakes and sandy tracts of the Spreewald in order to surprise the enemy.7 Major-General Kleefeld, with some 1,900 men (including 500 cavalry among that number), would hold Elsterwerda as a base, while Marschall stayed put at Bautzen. Hadik was at Elsterwalda himself on October 9, and, by October 15, had reached Wüsterhausen.

  Before Hadik, the road to the Prussian capital basically lay open, and the only real defenses for Berlin were a few entrenchments and a garrison of some 4,000 men under Lt.-Gen. Hans Friedrich von Rochow. This is not as impressive as the numbers might suggest, since these troops, being of garrison duty, were basically unfit to be in the field units for the most part. Garrison troops during this era were usually the least trained, least-desirable of any army; Prussia’s was no exception. Frederick could spare little from his main army, to either guard the approaches to the city or prop up additional men to defend it.

  Hadik skirted past the plains of Brandenburg, arriving outside of the Prussian capital early on October 16. The king pressed off Prince Moritz to the rescue of Berlin, and a force of cavalry during the night of October 11–12. Nor was Hadik and his little band alone. Ujházy was coming up the road from Potsdam to the west, while Bosfort, who had never intended to join the Russians, was coming from the east. At this point, the nearest substantiative Russian force was back in Poland, and Marshal Apraxsin had no intention of advancing again without direct prodding.

  Hadik had four small guns with him, with a host of light troops moving through the line-of-march. The gallant gentleman put his men under strict instructions not to loot or loiter with the civilian population. The same rule did not apply to inflicting as much harm as possible upon Prussia’s ability to wage war or the finances it needed to do so. Lt.-Col. Baron Stephen von Vecsey was unbuckled to go to the foundry at Alt-Schadow (some 50 miles south-southeast of Berlin) and do his worst. A great quantity of shot and shell, including over 4,000 cannon shot and 15,000 howitzer shells,8 were outright destroyed, while much more was carted off.

  Hadik glided through the woods to the south and southeast of Berlin (primarily to conceal the small size of his force); he emerged at the southeast gate of the city at Köpenik about 1100 hours on October 16. He began by demanding ransom money. Rochow, without hesitation, ordered out Major von Tesmar with six companies from Garrison Regiment #7 (Colonel Christian Henning von Lange), about 650 men, to battle with Hadik.9 The bluecoats arrived in time to bar the gate and to get the drawbridge raised before the Austrians could put a stop to the operation. There ensued, however, a most desperate tussle, which ended with Tesmar dead and his men in retreat. Hadik, who had already sent out a summons to the city fathers for a ransom of 300,000 talers (thalers), was encouraged at this turn of events.

  From the proceedings, it was clear that Rochow did not realize the small size of the enemy force before him, even though Ujházy and Bosfort were also factored in. What was clear to all, Rochow and the Austrians alike, was that a relief force would soon be on its way. Stalling for time could be very productive. Conversely, Hadik knew time was definitely not on his side. An attack squad, led by Colonel Johann Heinrich von Ried, some pressed into action, backing up the 3-pounder guns of gunner Georg Joseph Thun. The latter fired three well-placed rounds, and the drawbridge came down. Ried’s men rushed over the drawbridge and drove back the surprised Prussians, who left 14 of their number at that critical post. While this was going on, the Silesian Gate was forced open by the riled-up troopers of Hadik, after the Austrian 6-pounders worked the gate over, that is. A blocking force at the Cottbus Gate now threatened to interfere. The Prussian covering force was either shot down or made prisoners, almost to a man. Hadik’s stroke was so successful the reserve force of Colonel Prince Franz Sulkowski, holding two small regiments and two more of the 6-pounders, only provided mopping up. Rochow, with nothing working, issued orders to pull his remaining forces back upon the works at Spandau, without hesitation.10

  With Rochow withdrawing as was his want, the Austrian success was almost complete. The intruders “occasioned some consternation.”11 The casualty lists for the Austrians consisted of Major-General Baboczay, mortally wounded during the fracas that day, and “10 soldiers.”12

  Then Hadik pulled off one of the master bluffs of history, making sure, of course, that his men were visible to give the decidedly false impression his force was some three times more than it actually was. Remarkably, the Austrians respected Hadik’s ban about entering Berlin itself, with the exeption of a small party of officers who were on official business. Rochow left so soon as he could get the royal household packed up (they ultimately took refuge in Magdeburg after a short stay in Spandau) with his small force, leaving Berlin without a valid defense. This partially contributed to Hadik being able to maintain the delusion of a large force at his disposal. However, Rochow’s move gave Hadik control of the suburbs, so that the capital got another visitor, this in the form of one of Hadik’s officers, Captain Baron von Walterskirchen, demanding the unreasonable sum of 500,000 talers.13 Only 200,000 had been raised by 2200 hours, but Hadik ordered a fast retreat towards Saxony (as “fast” as a retreat could be when the intruders were hauling their ‘loot’ in 14 carriages taken from the enemy), crossing the Spree and making for Storkau, where his men arrived on October 17. Hadik had heard of Prince Moritz’s approach, and was determined not to face the Prussian detachment if he could help it. Even though he would have liked to put the squeeze on the city’s magistrates.14

  Prince Moritz did indeed arrive late on October 18, but as his men were utterly exhausted from the forced marches, there was no hope to catch the Austrian intruders, who were well out of reach. Nonetheless, Moritz’ advanced units tangled with Ujhák’s hussars, inflicting some two dozen casualties on a force that was acting as cover for Hadik’s men. The latter reached Beeskow late on October 18–19. Cottbus was occupied on October 20, where the men took a short rest break before they finally got to Hoyerswerda, after bypassing the little Prussian fortress of Peitz. Moritz broke off any further thought of pursuit, and the Berlin episode was over.

  Although the capital was safe again, the incident did demonstrate how much the survival of Prussia depended upon the Prussian army and just how little upon the geographical features of the country, including the capital. This was a fundamental rule that would manifest itself over and over again.

  Back in Silesia, the Duke of Brunswick-Bevern was still being pressed by the Austrians. On October 1, the Prussian commander, feeling he had little choice, drew out from the Silesian capital and posted his army near the southern suburbs of Breslau. The one saving grace was the typical Austrian consolidation, which would give the Prussian force time to better prepare for the coming battle of Breslau. The campaign stagnated for nearly a month, since the overwhelming superiority of the enemy made any forward moves by Bevern impractical.

  The army of Prince Charles now turned its attention to Schweidnitz, where the Prussians were keeping the only other considerable body of men in the province. Schweidnitz fortress was a key to the Prussian defense of Silesia. Its capture by the Austrians would be a major coup in their caps. General Nádasti was to have charge of the siege, while the main Austrian army would be close by to provide support if the need arose. Nádasti had at his disposal some 43,000 men, along with a great array of big guns.

  This would provide an impressive array of firepower, and the Prussian defenders suffered from a shortage of men and maneuvering room beyond the fortress. The actual command of the siege forces on the site devolved upon the Duke of Arenberg, who put his headquarters at Bögendorf, while other forces surrounded Schweidnitz to prevent either the Prussians entering or exiting. The whole of the artillery devolved upon Colonel Walther. Walther had at his disposal 24 12-
pounders, 30 24-pounders, along with 26 mortars and assorted ordnance.15

  Much has been written about the design of the then brand-new Schweidnitz fortress, and a look at the physical features betrays a large central work surrounded by numerous smaller forts. The size of the whole structure, drawn up as early as 1747, betrays the importance Frederick attached to the place, as a key post within Silesia.16 However, in the late fall of 1757, with the very existence of Prussia at stake, the Prussian force ensconced in the fortress was nowhere near what was needed to form a proper defense. The commandant of Schweidnitz, Major-General Philipp Lothar von Seers, had at his disposal some 6,000 men, in nine battalions and eleven squadrons of hussars. Seers was fortunate in that the hussar leader on the scene was none other than the capable Colonel Carl Emmanuel Warnery. Seers himself was uniquely qualified to command Schweidnitz, since he was intimately acquainted with its construction as well as any weaknesses that might manifest themselves. But he had a greatly inferior force, with no back-up available. The saving grace was the ignorance of the enemy in that Schweidnitz, being the first fortress of its kind, with no template, was entirely foreign to the Austrian engineers.