Frederick the Great and the Seven Years' War

by Herbert J. Redman

  Moreover, the Croat threat was not really all that serious. They did not press their advantage, for, after driving the bluecoats across the Weisseritz Bridge in the Friedrichstadt, the commandant pulled back his men and immediately raised the drawbridge. This effectively ended the “pursuit,” such as it was. There was no concerted effort in any case, as there was no artillery support for this effort. The upshot was, not only did the Prussians hammer the Croats with their own artillery while they carried forth the threat to burn part of the Saxon capital. Although the allied troops did their best, they had to spend about 36 hours battling the flames. This meant while the men were battling the fires, they could not attack the bluecoats. As if the “weather gods” were displaying their loyalty, the skies opened up and drenching rain poured upon the proceedings.

  The final damage assessment was 81 buildings burned or heavily damaged and five people killed from the conflagration. The intensity of the fires actually melted water pipes which originated at the Katzbach leading to the Strehlenbrunnen (the latter a prime source of drinkable water); this created a real problem for the garrison, which could soon run out of drinking water.

  Meanwhile, the Croats who had encroached earlier stayed put in the heavily damaged Friedrichstadt, although the bluecoats made a legitimate effort to expel them, without success. The allies immediately set to work constructing new lines of batteries, a total of 12 batteries all together. A total of three batteries (containing seven mortars and six cannon) were built in the Wilsdruf/Ostra Suburb area, six (of 16 cannon, seven howitzers) in the area of New Town, and three more (of seven mortars and six cannon), in the Pirna area. This was all accomplished by a very efficient construction crew in a mere seven hours.

  While the enemy were so gainfully employed, Schmettau called his officers together on September 1 and finally divulged the king’s letter which had been written after the debâcle at Kunersdorf. That very dispatch may have had more lasting impact on the Prussian cause than the Battle of Kunersdorf itself. The commandant himself thought there was scarce chance of legitimate relief effort. He resisted the temptation to try to play the royal card in that the Saxon royal family was still present in Dresden, and instead opted to do his best to hold out for as long as necessary in order to secure favorable terms as well as to keep Prussian honor intact. Despite the epistle which Frederick had so obviously composed under duress, Schmettau realized the importance of holding on to the capital for the Prussians.3 It was obvious even to the Prussians shut up in Dresden how little advantage the allies had really derived from Kunersdorf. There was another trump card as well. Because of the unique conditions prevailing at the Saxon capital, with the presence of the royal progeny, the commandant was aware the allies would likely not try to pound the city into submission.

  The allies had stood tough, in the meanwhile. Seeing this, the Prussians sent a threat to fire the hay bales piled up on the opposite bank if the enemy shot out one round from their batteries (which they did not). Though not alone for this reason, probably out of consideration for the Royal Palace in Dresden located behind the Prussian battery, the enemy indeed did not discharge a single shot. Same day, August 26, MacGuire arrived, and immediately ordered a projected bridge above the Saxon capital at Pillnitz to be erected, while Zweibrücken started on one of his own, at Ubegau. He arrived near Dresden on the same day, and took formal command of the Imperialists—who were holding positions on the north and west ends of the city. There was a clumsy system of command among the besiegers.

  Zweibrücken was to exercise nominal command on the scene with the forces about to seal off Dresden, his headquarters at Korbitz, but MacGuire had “actual” command, his headquarters at Kesselsdorf. On the southern end of Dresden, Vehla and Brentano had taken post; they were holding batteries consisting of a grand cluster total of 13 cannon and five howitzer batteries. August 30, the Siege of Dresden began. As dawn broke on that date, the sight of an enormous gallows that Schmettau had just had erected greeted those within the place who would speak of surrender. He had also been engaged in building fortifications along the line of the river. The heavy guns of the Austrian army were not yet ready for mounting within the batteries, although the lighter guns did pound the city. The Croats launched an attack with a strength of four battalions against a Prussian force guarding Pirna, driving it out.

  At this, Schmettau sent Captain Joachim Jakob von Kollas on his mission. The bombardment and counter bombardment from the opposing sides at times grew very severe. It was fortunate that damage to Dresden was not great. The bigger Austrian guns were almost never fired during the siege. September 2, at about 1600 hours, Schmettau got word that MacGuire had arrived in the vicinity of the Old Town bridge and wanted to parley with him. He consented, and assembled an escort to go with him. Lt.-Col. von Lange, Major von Lubath, Major Cordier, and Captain Kollas accompanied Schmettau as he ventured to have a short discussion with MacGuire. The latter, boasting a similar escort and realizing time was not on his side, pointedly asked him to surrender. Schmettau answered that he would defend the Prussian hold on Dresden, although he did inquire about the terms of surrender. Now it must be admitted, the exact nature of the negotiations, and what was discussed during their course, are unknown.

  A temporary truce until the following day was arranged by both commanders, and they parted company. MacGuire for one, Zweibrücken for another, were probably relieved by this development that the Prussian garrison was asking for terms. They well knew what was going on about them, even though it is not clear if Schmettau did. Had he been wise to the situation, he could have held out for a while longer, saved Dresden for his own cause, not to mention salvaged his reputation.4

  Rumors swirled that Schmettau was trying to betray Dresden to the allies. If we carefully weigh in on the available “evidence,” such as it was, the hard-pressed man was probably offered some form of bribe. However, the stern-hearted decision to burn the Friedrichstadt area and the tough stand seem to belie the chatter. Lest we forget, the commandant had been instructed by his king to surrender if offered good terms.5 It is worth nothing that Artur Brabant (1870–1936), a noted archivist (and expert) of the period, while dwelling at some length on the matter, left the question open.

  The following afternoon, September 3, at 1500 hours, the truce was punctually broken, the terms that Schmettau had requested had reached him. They were plainly impossible. The Prussian Commandant was resolved to defend himself to the last man if need be. The shelling was resumed, though not as fiercely as before, and, later in the evening, Lt.-Gen. Peter Franz Guasco, deciding on a bluff, appeared outside the Prussian lines. He bore a message for the Prussian commander that, if he did not surrender the city right there and then, he would be blasted away by awesome firepower. One of the faithful stewards, Captain Emanuel von Leutrum, delivered the sealed message.

  Leutrum also brought a request for the condition of the royal progeny, who were quite safe. The nature of the protracted negotiations induced MacGuire to meet with Schmettau again early on September 4. Meanwhile, the Saxon royal family departed from Dresden for “safer” quarters at Töplitz. This town they reached by 0600 hours on September 6. Hardly had the entourage arrived, however, than word was received from MacGuire that it was safe to return to Dresden to their quarters.6

  A major, key sticking point, meanwhile, about this whole surrender business was the disposition of the Prussian war chest stored at the Saxon capital.7 Brabant mentioned the amount of money in that fund could have been 350,000 talers. Another source said the money, in fact, was, “5,600,000 thaler in coin.”8

  Meanwhile, the veteran Schmettau did not buy the ballyhoo about allied bombardment, but about 2230 hours, another truce was arranged to discuss milder terms. The negotiations were summarily concluded by 1800 hours the following day; and the siege came to a successful conclusion for the allies. Schmettau was to be allowed to march out with his men, who were to retain their equipment, and originally to have several days in which to prepare to depart.r />
  Part of the reason for the delay would be the necessary requisitioning of draught animals for the transportation of the Prussian garrison and its ultimate removal; which was to be on Magdeburg. By September 6, although some 2,000 animals were available, this was clearly far from a sufficient number. The providing of transportation teams by the good citizens of Saxony must have been tempered by the almost certain knowledge that the trip would be one-way for most of the animals and their equipment (which turned out to be the case). In other words, the better teams generally were “requisitioned” for some or another military purpose and subsequently not returned to their owners.

  The dillydallying of retiring from Dresden was not agreeable at all to Schmettau. For him, lingering only meant more opportunities for the less loyal members of his garrison to abscond to the enemy—although this was technically against the terms of the agreement.

  When the move did finally commence, on September 8, a total of 970 men left the marching Prussian ranks almost immediately. Before the last of the bluecoats could depart from Dresden, nearly 1,900 men had deserted. Compare that with the actual casualties from the siege itself for the Prussians—135 dead, 109 wounded, and 31 Prisoners-of-war; a total of 275 men.

  Sadly, soon after the siege was officially ended, the Prussian commander received word that a relief force was on the way. But the deed was already done.9

  So the garrison duly marched out of the Saxon capital early on September 8 across the Neustadt, leaving it in the hands of the enemy. This has to be the single most important accomplishment for the allies in Saxony in the entire campaign. While this was occurring, Wunsch had been moving. Evening of September 4, Wunsch’s men had reached Grossenhayn. He had detached a small force, Wolfersdorfe with 1,000 horsemen, earlier in the day to nab Grödel (a small hamlet on the Elbe) before the main portion of his army reached Grossenhayn. Wolfersdorfe’s purpose was strictly to gather information, and to find boats to send Wunsch’s guns to Schmettau by the Elbe. From country folk near Grödel, news was received of the capitulation proceedings but that Dresden was still in Prussian hands so far as they knew.

  However, there were no small water craft for the transportation of the guns. Wolfersdorfe also learned that a small Austrian force of some 30 horsemen were in Grossenhayn. They were likely to flee before Wunsch could draw near with the main body. Hastily as he could, the Prussian, taking 30 riders of his own, struck off the road from Dresden towards Grossenhayn to surprise that force. The remainder of his men (under hussar Captain von Lochstadt) were given orders to move to the westward along the Elbe probing for additional enemy formations. While doing so, they were to try to learn more about just what was happening in the Saxon capital. But when Wolfersdorfe drew close upon Grossenhayn, he found the enemy to total, not 30, but more than 100 strong. He decided to run a bluff, which came off. He pretended to have a strong force nearby; calling out orders to grenadiers, dragoons and artillery teams that did not exist, then promptly stormed forward upon the enemy, who most fortunately were as equally surprised. The latter managed to get off one carbine round and sped off.

  Wolfersdorfe gave chase, catching 68 of the enemy, and left the remainder (maybe 40 riders) to escape to give Zweibrücken erroneous information that a Prussian force of “some 12,000 men” was at Grossenhayn. Actually the sum of Wunsch’s force did not number much over 7,500 men. Wunsch’s main body had reached Grossenhayn early on September 4. After giving his men a rest break lasting much of the day, he pushed off again about 2200 hours, bound for Ubegau.10

  Vehla was dispatched towards the area of Boxdorf and Reichenberg about 1600 hours on the same day. General MacGuire ordered the siege guns to be set up to protect the approaches to Dresden’s New Town. Throughout the night, new reports of Prussian movements kept filtering in. After 0300 hours, Wunsch’s advanced men began engaging Vehla’s attendants. At the news of this Brentano was sent with his men to help contain the Prussian threat. The weight of the Prussian advance gradually pressed the allies back upon the Baumwiese; even here, the inroads of the bluecoat cavalry continued to gain ground. Moreover, as late as 0900 hours, a determined Prussian effort compelled Brentano to abandon the line of Trachtenberge-Trachau. Vehla’s men also felt pressure, and the efforts of the enemy advance were not spent until they reached the ground in the vicinity of Loschwitz. MacGuire did see good to send some reinforcements of infantry and 300 Croats, but these were sandwiched in by Prussian artillery covering fire and were, in the end, unable to help their forward comrades. As they could not pass the bridge at Ubegau, Zweibrücken unaccountably blew up the structure, instead of ordering his own army to cross the Elbe and take on Wunsch.

  This dense move left the left wing of MacGuire’s post exposed to the incursions of the active foe. Wolfersdorfe briefly flirted with the thought of pressing from Ubegau on to the main body of the allies, but this would require some assistance from Schmettau. By that point, Wunsch was aware that the Saxon capital was in enemy hands and a newly reconstituted Imperial force was again threatening the Prussian grip upon Torgau. Wunsch issued orders for a prompt withdrawal on Grossenhayn, completed by 0600 hours on September 6. This left the allies to claim what was certainly a hollow “victory.” Wunsch, in this operation, had suffered losses of approximately 200 men with about 116 more lost in the retreat.

  Soon intelligence was received from Grolmann in Torgau that an enemy force under General St. Andrė was at hand.

  But still there was no further word from Dresden. As the early dawn lightened into afternoon that day (September 6), Wunsch called upon MacGuire to surrender in front. The latter said in reply that within two hours he would send an answer. Wunsch then ordered Wolfersdorfe to strike at the enemy force covering the bridge at Ubegau, which was in fact an Austrian pontoon-bridge, but even as Wolfersdorfe drew near, the enemy was dismantling the bridge. At his imminent advent, they quickened the pace. Wunsch had gotten his answer. A short while later, figuring that since there had been no news from the Saxon capital, and no sounds of firing from that vicinity, Wunsch concluded that Schmettau must have surrendered the city. He promptly ordered his men to assume march formation, and pulled back upon Grossenhayn. There his weary troops, worn by several days of incessant marching and heavy fighting of the past 24 hours, were at last allowed to pause.11 At Grossenhayn, Wunsch received an urgent message from the garrison in Torgau that an Imperialist detachment (Kleefeld and 14,000 men from Leipzig), had marched against the bluecoats there and were threatening to lay siege.

  Wunsch rose and hastened towards Torgau to rescue the troops there. A 40-mile march was covered in just two days (September 6 and 7), the relief force arriving near the works on the north side of the fortress late in the evening of the 7th. About 1600 hours, Wolfersdorfe received instructions from Wunsch to bring his rearguard to Torgau before 1000 hours next morning (he had been left in Grossenhayn). He pushed off with his men at fastest pace, and just on schedule reached his appointed destination. Wunsch, meanwhile, had been out scouting the enemy’s position, which lay in proximity with the Prussian lines at the fortress.

  St. Andrė had been ordered by Zweibrücken, while encamped at Grimma, to proceed to seize Torgau before Wunsch could react. An additional reinforcement of cavalry, the Trautmansdorf Cuirassiers, was sent to help stiffen St. Andrė’s forces. The latter marched through Mützschen (September 5), while the wily Prussian was otherwise occupied. September 6, the allies hitched into Sitzeroda, a bare eight miles south of Torgau. Near 1400 hours on the next day, St. Andrė finally reached the vicinity of Torgau, although there was no panic on the part of the garrison. St. Andrė pulled out all stops, and allowed the garrison to see his force prominently displayed, but this had no effect as the proffered surrender was snubbed by the garrison, which was fully aware that help was on the way.12

  About 0330 hours the very next morning, the allies once more stood in strength before the town/fortress, but Solemnon hushed off the enemy’s representative, with a requested reprieve to thoughtful
ly consider the situation. This was just what Wunsch needed; the space of time he had not been allowed at Dresden.13

  St. Andrė boasted a formidable post, make no mistake. His left was posted at Zinna, while his right was anchored on the secure Gross Tech. Here was deployed some 14,000 men, a number far superior to Wunsch and his reserve host. St. Andrė’s left, under the circumstances, was bound to be the most vulnerable, for General Ried and his body of Croats was subject to undue attention in an unfortified village. Even worse, the low-lying scrubby land near the Röhrgraben prevented easy movement by the allied horse, and really bisected the whole line. Thus the forces on the allied right would not be able to come to the aid of the left flank, in a timely fashion at least.14

  Wunsch, for his part, brought some 5,000 men to the clash, which he sent into action marching as a single line two ranks deep. He faced a clear inferiority in cavalry as well, although the Prussian did bring 12 pieces of ordnance to the mix. In this arm, his opponents were clearly overmatched.

  The Prussians had strengthened Torgau, to prepare for action. At 1100 hours, Kleefeld (with grenadiers and the Croats of Ried) bundled forward on the Rats Weinberg. This blow momentarily gained ground against the bluecoats, who also were somewhat unnerved by some gunfire from the Rats Weinberg. The Prussian 7th Dragoons, initially giving the appearance of making a decisive charge, were gripped by terror; although this was a mere ruse. The allied horse galloped after them, but when the hostile force drew within range of the Prussian fire, they were pounded by artillery and attacked by the “panicked” dragoons (who, in the meanwhile, had ridden around them to attack from the north into the enemy’s rear), who rode them down, capturing 26 officers, 850 men, eight guns, and 16 ammunition wagons, besides forcing them to reel back upon the infantry behind them. This deed cost 190 men as casualties to the regiment.15