The Battle of Long Tan
Page 4
The long-term development of the Viet Minh and, later, the Viet Cong political and military cadres in the south, placed the Americans and their allies at a serious disadvantage and ensured that the conventional military approach was doomed. The cadres consisted of local leaders who knew the area, knew the people and had established their own cells of supporters, operatives and fighters. They were responsible not only for conducting local insurgent operations against the military and government targets, which included assassination and intimidation, but also improving local logistics; gathering intelligence; conducting propaganda and education campaigns particularly aimed at the young; and increasing agriculture production, which benefited the people and the cause. All of this was in line with the principle of ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the people. Only an effective cadre could hope to achieve this.
While the US military would also set about trying to win hearts and minds, the inherent contradictions in running a conventional military campaign with defined battle zones, bases of operation and lines of communication meant that this was an impossibility, as the people continually got in the way of military operations that took precedence over political considerations.15 As succinctly put by Bruce Davies, it was all well and good for staff officers and others to dictate how the war should be fought and for them to write about the ‘political war back in Canberra or Washington or Saigon without putting their arse on the line in a lonely hamlet while attempting to “guide” the Vietnamese in the ideals of western democracy’.16
Unlike the Americans, the Australians had a relatively successful record of counterinsurgency operations in South-East Asia. Much of this collective experience came from members of the regular army who had conducted such operations in Malaysian Borneo, many of whom were veterans of the communist Malayan Emergency, the Korean War, and fighting the Japanese in the jungles of South-East Asia during World War II.17 Lessons learnt were published in a number of army manuals, such as Ambush and Counter Ambush; Patrolling and Tracking; and The Division in Battle: Counter Revolutionary Warfare.18 Indeed, in Malaya the Australians had become known as leaders in the art of jungle warfare, tactics and training. Many of these lessons were being passed on to the next generation of Australian soldiers at the Jungle Training Centre at Canungra in Queensland, which focused on physical fitness and instinctive shooting and had the men living in similar conditions to those they would experience in Vietnam. Large numbers of national servicemen who would make up substantial parts of 5 RAR (formed in New South Wales) and 6 RAR (formed in Queensland) were being trained by veterans of counterinsurgency operations, and their experience was priceless. By the time the announcement was made that Australian combat troops would be sent to Vietnam, soldiers of these battalions either had direct experience in counterinsurgency operations or had been trained to conduct such operations. Even so, they had little experience of working with helicopters and armoured personnel carriers (APCs), and lacked training in attacking enemy troops entrenched in bunker and tunnel complexes.19
While Australian troops had gained a wealth of experience fighting against the insurgents in what was still then Malaya, Vietnam was different. The insurgency in Malaya had been relatively small and was principally generated by local Chinese insurgents, who were not well equipped, could readily be identified and were small in number. Just as crucially, they had little local support. Also, home-grown food was relatively scarce in Malaya and almost unobtainable in the jungle; thus, the control of logistical supply was crucial, and once insurgent supply ‘routes’ had been identified they could be dealt with effectively and the insurgents would ‘wither on the vine’. The Viet Cong, however, were well trained and experienced; had a vast cadre network that might include mothers, fathers, siblings, uncles, aunts and village friends; and could not be readily identified. Also, they usually had ready access to food and were not greatly hampered by logistical supply routes – they could live off the land, and frequently did. Even so, the NVA and Viet Cong at times faced serious logistical challenges and there were confrontations between the southern Viet Cong and the northern NVA in terms of ‘who got what’. During those periods when they were forced to live off the land for extended periods, morale and health deteriorated. Malaria was one of the greatest medical problems and sometimes reduced units to ineffectual levels.20
Unlike the Americans, the Australian force would not be relying on overwhelming firepower and an abundance of ‘high tech’. The Australian troops going to Vietnam were well trained, disciplined and professional, but very much a traditional infantry force that used tactics based on patrolling and ambushing – tactics they had perfected since World War II. In many ways, the Australian force was better suited to deal with the Viet Cong than the Americans. The American forces at first would be frustrated with the Australian tactics – the Americans were tasked with getting in, clearing out the enemy and getting out of Vietnam as quickly as possible. The Australians, however, knew there would be no ‘quick fix’. They knew from experience that you had to fight an insurgency with like tactics – upfront and personal. The Australians would focus on having boots in the jungle on patrol, conducting anti-logistics operations, trying to keep a light footprint in the area and, wherever possible, conducting civil action projects to help garner political support. This would not always be possible, as the Australians were trying to walk a line between their own tactical priorities and those of the Americans. Like the Americans, they set up bases of operations, which required at least some focus on territorial security at the expense of the local population.
The starkness in contrast between the American and Australian approaches to the war in Vietnam is perhaps best summed up by an observation made by Australian brigadier Stuart Graham when he was serving as the Task Force commander and attending a senior US briefing. The opening remark was that the key objective of winning the war was to ‘kill VC’. Graham’s objectives were much more nuanced: his task was to help ensure the ‘security of the main areas of population and resources of Phuoc Tuy [a province assigned to the Australians] and so enable the Government to restore law and order and get on with the job of developing the social, economical, and political life of the province’.21
5
‘Keep those bloody choppers away from us’
In early June 1965, Australian Combat troops arrived in South Vietnam to fight the communist insurgents. Australia’s commitment at this stage consisted of an infantry battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Brumfield. The battalion group was built around 1 RAR; Australians of 2 RAR, 3 RAR and, more recently, 4 RAR were being rotated through the conflict in Malaysian Borneo.1 In addition, New Zealand deployed a field battery that served alongside 1 RAR – the Anzac connection was re-established. At this point the battalion was staffed by regular personnel only, as the first intake of conscripts were then being trained in Australia. Command of the force was assigned to Brigadier David Jackson of Australian Army Force Vietnam (AAFV), based in Saigon to facilitate communications with US forces. The chief of the general staff in Australia, Lieutenant General John Wilton, directed Jackson to place the AAFV under the operational command of General Westmoreland, who assigned 1 RAR to the 173rd Airborne Brigade based at the American air base at Bien Hoa.2 Members of the AATTV, which had first arrived in South Vietnam in 1962, were still working in small dispersed units throughout the south, assisting US forces to bring the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) up to scratch. An ARVN battalion had an advisory group, usually of three US advisers and one Australian adviser. AATTV members were also assigned to operational units, including ARVN battalions, Special Forces units and some activities controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency.3
Jackson’s initial orders from Wilton were that his force was not to venture beyond the Bien Hoa area unless ordered to do so by Army headquarters in Canberra. As such, Westmoreland assigned the Anzac contingent to defend the air base, but this was an inappropriate use of a well-trained battalion. Restricting the soldiers to
garrison duty meant they did not suffer the same risk as the Americans, which minimised Australia’s role in the war and negated one of the government’s prime reasons for the deployment: that Australia needed to be seen to be pulling its weight.4 By September 1965, Wilton and Westmoreland agreed that 1 RAR’s area of operation would include the entire tactical zone assigned to the American III Corps, which included the provinces around Saigon. While Westmoreland remained in operational control, Jackson had the right to veto his forces’ involvement in any operations that violated Australian national interests.
1 RAR was involved in a number of significant actions working with American forces. It continually outmanoeuvred and outfought the Viet Cong, culminating in a major success in early 1966 when, as part of Operation Crimp (8–14 January 1966), 1 RAR assaulted a large Viet Cong headquarters complex in the Ho Bo Woods that was found to contain a mass of tunnels. Soon Australian infantry and engineers of ‘small stature’ were assigned to descend into the tunnels; they became famous as the much-admired ‘tunnel rats’. Among those selected for this dangerous and fearful task was Corporal Lex McAulay, one of two linguists in the battalion. He later wrote a detailed, fascinating account of Operation Crimp:
By the end of the day [day two of Operation Crimp] it was obvious to all concerned that the tunnels posed a complex problem, about which there was no background of experience, lessons learned, or published policies. The narrowness of the tunnels, the small size of the trap doors, the twists and turns, the different levels, the lack of airflow, the darkness, dead ends, and the strong possibility of enemy in the form of armed people or booby traps, combined to present an operational problem outside any previous experience of the Australian forces, or their allies. The tunnels would have to be attacked with what was available close by, and by men who would literally crawl down into the darkness and into the unknown, equipped only with an electronic torch and a pistol. The qualifying factor was size – only slim agile men could enter.5
Another qualifying factor was guts. Corporal Bruce Davies of 1 RAR, who also took part in Operation Crimp, recalled that after smoke and/or tear gas was pumped into the tunnels, the tunnel rats of 3 Field Troop, Royal Australian Engineers, ‘went down inside the labyrinth in search of the hiding enemy, a terrifying task given that their only weapons were a 9mm Browning pistol and a torch. The tunnels were just over half a metre each wide and high . . . Some of the troop passed out from the lack of oxygen.’6 During Operation Crimp, Corporal Bob Bowtell came across a small trapdoor and in ‘his usual way of leading from the front went first. Apparently the tunnel became a dead-end – there was no airflow, and what air was in the small enclosed space had become foul.’7 Despite urgent attempts to get him out, Bowtell died in the narrow, dark tunnel. Corporal Trevor Hagan of 1 Platoon recalled: ‘We heard that Corporal Bob Bowtell had been killed in a gas trap at the bottom of a tunnel. This was a shock to me, as I had put Bob through [recruit training at] Kapooka in 1963. It was a waste of a very good soldier.’8 The Australian tunnel rats in Vietnam were in a class all of their own, undoubtedly tasked with one of the most stressful and dangerous jobs in the whole war.
The Americans hailed Operation Crimp and the capture of this headquarters with its tonnes of military supplies and thousands of documents as their first strategic intelligence victory of the Vietnam War. The Australians spent several days discovering more supplies and documents while they destroyed an extensive three-level tunnel system.9 Indeed, although it was unknown at the time, this tunnel system was then the largest in South Vietnam. Casualties also occurred above ground, with B and D companies of 1 RAR sustaining the heaviest casualties – many caused by grenades rigged as anti-personnel mines with trip-wires strung among trees from ankle to head height. Not only this, but steel punji sticks were buried in concrete blocks.10
By the time 5 RAR and 6 RAR arrived in Vietnam in May and early June 1966, the men of 1 RAR had been on continuous active frontline service for almost 12 months. They returned to Australia a month later, but 18 young Australians of the battalion were not with them. The battalion would provide the core of combat-hardened officers, NCOs and soldiers who would train the next intake of men to be sent to Vietnam.11 Indeed, many of these veterans not only made sure ‘their protégés knew what was ahead of them, but also commanded and supported them during their tours of duty’ in the war zone.12
American and Australian troops got on well overall, but one major difference between them was the cockiness of many US soldiers. The American forces were overconfident, with a gung-ho attitude that they backed up with a scale of weaponry beyond anything the Australians had seen.13 The US was keen to bring its military might to the fore, believing it would quickly clear the south of communist insurgents. However, with the Viet Cong refocusing on ‘hit and run’ tactics, such firepower became less critical in terms of defeating the insurgency. It was the disruption of the cadres and political organisations that needed to be confronted, not the conventional warfare doctrine using large-scale forces against the fluid Viet Cong in order to temporarily occupy a province.
American troops patrolled in an aggressive and obvious manner, ‘like a noisy hunting party – eagerly seeking battle’.14 They set about trying to clear vast areas using overt military presence and according to predetermined timetables drawn up by staff officers, patrolling along tracks, smoking and talking, wearing flashy bright and colourful unit patches, firing their weapons into suspicious areas and making sure that the whole province knew they were there, looking for a fight. They actively encouraged the Viet Cong to ‘take them on’, which the VC often did in set hit-and-run operations and ambushes, disappearing before the Americans could bring their firepower to bear. Many Americans seemed to have a complete disregard for their enemy’s fighting abilities. Once a US force had ‘cleared out’ an area and moved on, the Viet Cong invariably moved back in.15
By contrast, the Australian force, by training and necessity, was far more cautious and much leaner. Australian commanders were just not prepared to pay the price the US commanders seemingly were for inflicting casualties against the enemy – they would examine likely tactical success before committing their men. Sometimes this planning and assessment resulted in lost opportunities to inflict casualties against the Viet Cong; however, this was preferable to suffering casualties. Australians had the patience to wait for another opportunity. One soldier remarked about having to patrol with the US paratroopers: ‘It was a bit too bloody dangerous. They talk and smoke and generally set themselves up as pretty good targets. The Americans are good blokes but not when they are on patrol.’16
Australians were not only about patrolling a province but also about controlling it. They avoided tracks and moved with stealth, patrolling slowly and silently, fanning out in sections, keen not to give away their position. Indeed, while the Americans regularly used helicopters in support, the Australians avoided using them when on patrol. One Australian observer declared: ‘Keep those bloody choppers away from us – they give away our position’.17 Australian patrols were also not dictated by a timetable but were fluid, taking into account local and unforeseen circumstances. Australian troops wore just one set of their drab green clothes during an operation: those they went out in. They wore army greens, a bush hat, a sweat scarf, socks and boots. Unlike US troops they did not wear flak jackets or helmets; both were uncomfortable, were considered almost useless and hindered movement, and the helmet made it difficult to hear.18
The enemy often found it difficult to ambush Australian patrols successfully because of their unpredictability, usually having no idea where the Australians were until it was too late. The Vietnamese themselves described the Australian soldiers as ‘very experienced mercenaries having fought a counter-guerrilla war in Malaya . . . Different to the Americans, the Australian troops were very proficient in ambush tactics, small-scale raids, operating dispersed in half-section and section groups, and striking deep into our bases. They acclimatised to the weather and adapted to the
tropical jungle terrain. They could cut through the thick, thorny jungle and would hide in the swamps and marshes – lying in ambush for many days at a time.’19
It was not long before the Americans recognised the Australians as masters of patrol and ambush, as recalled by US Lieutenant Colonel George Dexter, commander of the 2/503rd Battalion:
When we found something, we shot at it. We did not wait and establish the patterns, looking for opportunities after out-thinking the local Viet Cong commander. We were just not patient enough – there was too much to do in too little time. We did not use reconnaissance enough. Our ambushes were for security, not to kill. Australians were quiet hunters – patient, thorough, trying to out-think the Viet Cong. I would not have liked to operate at night and know there was a chance of ending up in an Aussie ambush.20
Even so, going out on patrol was nerve-racking. With every operation there was a real chance of death or serious wounding – not just from engaging the enemy directly, but from suffering casualties from deadly booby traps. No one enjoyed going out on patrol. Despite the courageous work of sappers in trying to clear these deadly obstacles, from June 1966 to May 1970, 87 Australians were killed and 481 were wounded, many severely, by mines and booby traps.21