The Battle of Long Tan

by David W. Cameron

  The different approach that US and Australian soldiers took in combating the enemy can be seen in the strict rules-of-engagement regulations that the Australians enforced, even when in villages and hamlets known to be well infiltrated with Viet Cong. Operation Sydney 2 was one such operation. The village of Duc My was a known hub of Viet Cong activity and on 19–20 July 1966, the men of 5 RAR and supporting units conducted a successful cordon-and-search mission. Before the operation began, Lieutenant Colonel John Warr (who had been seriously wounded in Korea) provided strict rules of engagement. It must be stressed that Duc My was no ‘sleepy village’ but a known facilitation hub of Viet Cong activity.

  Rules of Engagement

  (a) Fire only:

  (i) When fired at.

  (ii) When a suspect is about to commit a hostile act.

  (iii) If a suspect attempts to run through a cordon and fails to halt after challenge.

  (b) If in doubt don’t shoot. [author underline]

  (c) Don’t fire into the cordon area unless the fire is controlled and the target can be clearly seen.

  (d) If fired on from a house:

  (i) Take cover.

  (ii) Call interpreter forward.

  (iii) Get loud hailers.

  (iv) Have interpreters advise occupants to surrender.

  (v) If no success, call for the village chief and have him speak to the house-holder.

  (vi) If the occupants still refuse to surrender, burn the house.

  (e) These are the only circumstances under which houses are to be burnt.

  (f) All males of military age are to be taken to the Bn cage [in order to identify likely Viet Cong].

  (g) Don’t harass women and children; and

  (h) Soldiers will not be used to search women.22

  ‘If in doubt don’t shoot.’ During this mission, Lieutenant John Carruthers, commander of 4 Platoon, saw two Viet Cong moving on a track into the centre of the village. He did not open fire as the cordon was not completely in position and any noise would alert the enemy and give them an opportunity to escape. A few minutes later, three Viet Cong moved towards him and in the semi-darkness Carruthers personally and silently captured them and disarmed them. He would later (on 24 February 1967) die from wounds sustained during Operation Renmark.23

  Once the Viet Cong became alerted to the presence of the Australians by Vietnamese translators using loudhailers ordering them to surrender, one Viet Cong with an ammunition belt wrapped around his waist was seen to dive into a nearby tunnel. A tear-gas grenade was thrown into the entrance but the man did not come out. Sounds of distress were heard, but instead of throwing in a high-explosive grenade to collapse the tunnel, an unnamed sapper from Lieutenant Dennis Rainer’s platoon donned a gas mask and at great personal risk went in after the enemy combatant. The Australian dragged him out; the combatant had been overcome by the gas and was unconscious. The battalion medical officer, Captain Tony White, was summoned and the man was revived with mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and then handed over for interrogation. Captain Robert O’Neill of B Company recalled that word of the incident was soon doing the rounds ‘among the villages and by the end of the day our soldiers were getting along very amicably with many inhabitants of the former Viet Cong village’.24

  General Wilton increasingly recognised that with his troops now operating beyond Bien Hoa, the Australian force should be increased to a task force so that they would have greater national recognition. More importantly, however, it was recognised that the Australian and US forces had very different approaches to fighting the war.25 Increasing Australia’s involvement to a task force would enable the Australians to use their own tactics.

  Wilton was also concerned to hear that the Americans planned to use 1 RAR in operations close to the Cambodian border, but Brigadier Jackson objected and 1 RAR was withdrawn. Wilton approved of Jackson’s decision, later writing to Edwin Hicks, secretary of the defence department, that this was the ‘first occasion on which it has been necessary for Brigadier Jackson to exercise his responsibility, laid down in his Directive for the safety and well-being of AAFV’.26 Wilton had also become aware of the ‘gung-ho’ reputation of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade, to which 1 RAR was attached, and his own experiences in the Korean War made it clear to him that the US was prepared to sustain greater casualties than the Australian government would tolerate or could afford.27 He was right to be concerned, as Brigadier General Ellis Williamson, who commanded the 173rd, stated that his job ‘was not to pussyfoot around the jungle hoping to bump into the Viet Cong. Our job was to get in there and bring him to battle – to keep him off balance.’28

  In early March 1966, the new Australian prime minister, Harold Holt, confirmed an increased commitment to Vietnam with the creation of 1 Australian Task Force (1 ATF). Holt considered this the upper limit of the Army’s capacity in the conflict.29 A Cabinet paper from the time stated: ‘the prime consideration for Australia is the continued commitment of the United States to the defence of South East Asia, and thus [for Australia] to play what the United States will recognise as a full part in the defence of South Vietnam’.30 This would be the largest overseas commitment of Australian defence force personnel since World War II. General Wilton, who now replaced Air Chief Marshal Frederick Scherger as chairman of the chiefs of staff committee in Canberra, was adamant that neither the committee nor the politicians should interfere in the operational matters of 1 ATF. He emphasised:

  having set down the policy and the tasks which could be done the local man on the spot should be allowed to get on with it. It’s not the kind of war which you can run even at battalion level let alone company level from Canberra. This is ridiculous, you would get nowhere. It’s quite contrary to all military practice to try and run the war from Canberra, you just can’t do it . . . And remember we have . . . three lots of judgment there: an experienced COMAFV [Commander Australian Force Vietnam], . . . experienced brigadiers [Task Force commanders], [and] . . . good battalion commanders and good company commanders.31

  The Task Force would consist of an APC squadron, 1 Field Regiment (consisting of the Australian 103 and 105 field batteries and the New Zealand 161 Field Battery), 1 Field Squadron, 21 Engineer Support Group, 103 Signals Squadron, two infantry battalions (5 RAR and 6 RAR), 3 Special Air Service (SAS) Squadron, 1 Australian Logistics Support Group (which included medical personnel of the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps), 161 (Independent) Recce Flight, and a detachment from 1 Division Intelligence Unit. To help facilitate communication with the Americans, signallers and liaison officers were linked to US headquarters in Saigon and elsewhere. New Zealand would subsequently expand its commitment to two infantry companies and a unit from its SAS squadron.32

  Because 1 ATF did not have any heavy artillery, the Americans provided a battery of six 155mm self-propelled howitzers from A Battery 2nd Battalion 35th Artillery (US 2/35th). One of the two forward observation officers attached to this unit, Lieutenant Gordon Steinbrook from Nebraska, was on board a troopship just off the coast of Vietnam when he was told that his battery would be assigned to supporting the Australians and New Zealanders. That night he wrote to his wife of just eight months, Frances, telling her of the news:

  All of us are happy about joining the Australians rather than the Vietnamese div. At least we’ll know who our friends are. Not only that, but the Australians are an elite group especially trained and sent to Vietnam for this type of war. Rumor has it that they are tremendous fighters and actually better soldiers man for man than the American soldier in Vietnam. I just can’t say how pleased I am to be going to such an elite group of men. Of course this will be quite an experience for us. We’ll have to get used to their rough and tough methods of doing things. From what I understand, they are truly professional hard-core type people, and because of this we’ll have to work our butts off to keep up with them.33

  6

  ‘. . . started swimming for home, clutching a bottle of gin’

  With the expansion t
o 1 ATF, the Australians were now granted a semblance of independence from the US forces. Although 1 ATF remained under the operational control of American HQ II Field Force Vietnam at Long Binh, the Australian commander could veto the inclusion of Australians in any US-led operation. Brigadier Jackson, who had been based in Saigon commanding AAFV, was now assigned to command 1 ATF, while Major General Ken Mackay arrived in Saigon as commander of Australian Force Vietnam (AFV), which replaced the AAFV – Australia’s commitment had grown to include Australian air-force and naval personnel and was no longer just an Army operation.1

  1 ATF was given responsibility for Phuoc Tuy Province (meaning, in Vietnamese, ‘prosperous and peaceful’), which was a known Viet Cong stronghold just south-east of Saigon. It may have been prosperous, but it was anything but peaceful. Even so, the majority of people in the district were neutral in that their allegiance was dictated more by pragmatism than ideology. Overall, they favoured the side that could best provide the conditions that would enable them to get on with their life without harassment or disruption. The main role of 1 ATF was to win the allegiance of, or at least acceptance by, the locals – to try to neutralise the ongoing violence of the Viet Cong, which would enable the RVN government to reassert some authority within the province and improve its social and economic circumstances. Given all of the competing priorities, this was a big ask.2

  Operationally, Phuoc Tuy fulfilled Wilton’s criteria as it was an area of significant enemy activity and Australia would be seen as pulling its weight. The importance of Phuoc Tuy was its dominating position in relation to the city of Vung Tau and Route 15, the highway connection between the port and Saigon. As the Saigon docks became increasingly congested, Vung Tau grew in strategic importance as a site of commerce and a means of entry for military supplies. However, the enemy controlled the province, except for the capital, Ba Ria, and the narrow strip connecting it to the Vung Tau Peninsula. The region was critical for the South Vietnamese government not only for the security of the province itself, but because while it remained in enemy hands it contributed to the isolation of Saigon. The terrain and vegetation suited the Australian operating method of patrolling and ambush; it also favoured the separation of enemy forces from the population and their sources of replenishment – a basic element in Australian counter-revolutionary warfare.3

  Of crucial importance to the Australians was that the province did not border Cambodia or Laos; they did not want to get involved in cross-border conflicts. It also provided ready access via air and sea. Wilton and Westmoreland agreed that the main task for 1 ATF was to secure and dominate the ‘tactical area of responsibility’ (TAOR), extended out 4 kilometres from the base (maximum enemy mortar range), which defined Line Alpha; it would later be increased to 9 km (maximum enemy artillery range), which defined Line Bravo. 1 ATF would conduct operations to keep Route 15 open, conduct operations within the province as needed, and be prepared to conduct operations within III Corps Tactical Zone, and potentially in Binh Thuan, which lay in II Corps Tactical Zone, further north.4 Westmoreland and Wilton discussed the area of operations for the Australians: Westmoreland’s emphasis was on keeping open Route 15 and the Rung Sat Zone (which included Long Tau River, the main shipping channel from Saigon to Vung Tau). However, Air Chief Marshal Scherger, before stepping down as the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee in Canberra, directed Major General Mackay to take over Phuoc Tuy Province and not just protect Route 15 and the Rung Sat Zone.5

  An Australian regular, Private Terry Burstall, who had originally been a late replacement for 1 RAR and was later assigned to D Company, 6 RAR, recalled his first memory of hearing about Phuoc Tuy. It was far from reassuring. He and others from 1 RAR had heard stories from US troops that the Viet Cong were strong in Phuoc Tuy – some troops from 1 RAR had been on operations there with the US 173rd Airborne Brigade. The word was that the Viet Cong force in the area was extremely well equipped, well trained and disciplined, and that the 173rd had suffered heavy casualties there.6

  Indeed, Phuoc Tuy Province was no easy assignment. Virtually all of its 100 000 inhabitants had lived under communist control, and the forces of South Vietnam had kept clear of the area, knowing it had a strong insurgent presence. Indeed, Viet Cong cadres had established a strong operational and political presence there since the time of the French. Australian sergeant Bob Buick recalled how he heard that the ‘Viet Minh had done the French over so many times in this province during the Indo-China War that the French only occupied the towns. We were going to an area which the Viet Cong controlled and where they were now conducting large-scale and successful military actions against the government forces supported by the USA.’7

  Indeed, any movement along Route 15 was extremely hazardous, requiring a strong escort, and going off the main route was even more dangerous, if that were possible. The borders of the province were defined by mountains and jungle, which provided bases of operation for the Viet Cong. Within the province itself mountains and hilly areas abounded, including the Long Hai Hills in the south, the May Tao Mountains in the north-east, the Nui Dinh and Nui Thi Vai hills overlooking Route 15, and the Hat Dich area along its north-western borders. All of these provided additional bases for Viet Cong operations. Overall, the province was defined by deciduous rainforest with patches of primary jungle and lightly wooded undulating areas, with numerous areas providing for rice, banana and rubber cultivation.8

  At first, 1 ATF set up base at Vung Tau and most were pleased, as recalled by a first-intake national serviceman, Private Harry Esler, D Company, 6 RAR. ‘We landed on a beach and I thought, “This is it. This is going to be great. A nice little beach at Vung Tau”.’9 Not all were pleased, however, as recalled by Private Robin ‘Pom’ Rencher, D Company, 6 RAR, an Englishman who had enlisted in the Australian Army. He thought Vung Tau was hot and humid and a lousy place to be stationed. He clearly wasn’t the only one, remembering that one of his mates in his company, Private Ian ‘Tubby’ Campbell, had enough and ‘started swimming for home, clutching a bottle of gin. He was eventually shepherded back to shore by a passing helicopter.’10

  The Australian commanders had other plans about staying in Vung Tau: 1 ATF would soon be relocated to an abandoned rubber plantation, smack bang in the middle of the province. This was designed to disrupt Viet Cong operations. The main geological feature of what would define 1 ATF base was a 70-metre-high volcanic vent called Nui Dat (which can be translated as ‘bald hill’). Two small streams originated on the slopes of Nui Dat, one flowing south-east and the other west. Seventy per cent of the area was rubber plantation and the remainder either banana plantation or covered in waist-to-chest-high grass.11 The surrounding ground was typical red basaltic soil with laterite of varying quality, which would result in the characteristic red dust and mud that all Australians and New Zealanders based there would become familiar with. Private Douglas Bishop, C Company, 5 RAR wrote home: ‘The soil in our area is Red Mud, RED-BLOODY-MUD. It drives me mad. I put on clean greens. 2 minutes later I’m wearing RED greens . . . It’s the only place in the world where you can be bogged down in mud up to your neck and get dust in your eyes.’12

  Another consideration for the selection of Nui Dat was communications, as recalled by the appropriately named Major Peter Mudd. The decision was ‘based on a wide variety of factors. One of these was the requirement for a position which would allow communications coverage of the area of operations . . . so we were forced towards [Nui Dat hill]’.13 Indeed, in the commander’s log books (now housed in the Australian War Memorial), many pages are marked and smudged with the red mud of Nui Dat.

  Nui Dat would be occupied in three phases as part of Operation Hardihood. First, the province’s leaders were required to resettle all locals within a 4000-metre radius of Nui Dat. This would be followed by the US 173rd Brigade, 1 RAR and advance elements of 5 RAR securing the base area. Finally, the main body of the Task Force would move forward from Vung Tau. The clearance of the inhabitants around the bas
e was done to provide a protective zone in which close patrols could operate freely without fear of causing civilian casualties. Also, it would deny the Viet Cong the ability to use one of their favourite tactics – deploying mortars within inhabited areas and thus preventing retaliatory fire for fear of civilian casualties. The perimeter of this cleared zone was called Line Alpha.14

  The Australians were well aware that establishing their base of operations at Nui Dat would not sit well with the Viet Cong, and this was one of the reasons they chose it. The enemy needed to maintain control of the people, food supplies, intelligence-gathering capabilities, recruitment, clothing, medicine, labour, money, and whatever else was required or demanded of them.15 The location of Nui Dat also enabled the nearby ‘friendly’ provincial capital, Ba Ria, to be protected, and facilitated communications with local Vietnamese authorities, thereby further isolating the enemy. Indeed, Viet Cong Commander Chau, the leader of D445’s Reconnaissance Platoon, later stated that they were angry at the Australians as the base was located precisely on the route the platoon used when going from the ‘western part of the province, past Nui Dat, to visit Long Tan and Long Phuoc villages’.16 Years later the commander of this battalion, Major Nguyen Van Kiem (a local), who would command the battalion after the Battle of Long Tan and was not present during the battle itself, stated that ‘establishing . . . the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat and the evacuation of the nearby “revolutionary villages” of Long Tan and Long Phuoc had threatened to separate the guerrilla forces from the local people’.17 He admitted it was precisely the action he would have taken in the Australians’ place.18

  From May to June 1966, 1 RAR, with 5 RAR and two battalions of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade, as part of Operation Hardihood had the mission of clearing the Viet Cong strongholds of Long Tan and Long Phuoc villages, which lay within Line Alpha of Nui Dat. The initial phase of removing the populations from these villages, which had been assigned to the provincial authorities, soon devolved to the US brigade, as the local South Vietnamese did not have the resources to accomplish it. However, events had already overtaken the initial phase of Operation Hardihood, as a month earlier, as part of Operation Abilene, three brigades of the 1st US Infantry Division (the famous ‘Big Red 1’), 1 RAR and elements of the South Vietnamese Army had been assigned to locate and destroy Viet Cong 274 and 275 regiments operating in the province. As part of this operation, South Vietnamese troops entered the village of Long Tan and found it to be honeycombed with tunnels and bunkers; weapons and equipment were recovered and destroyed. The villagers had already been relocated by South Vietnamese troops to the villages of Dat Do, Long Dien, and Hoa Long 2.19