The American Military - A Narrative History

by Brad D. Lookingbill

  A second Militia Act in 1908 eliminated a number of service restraints in exchange for a provision to activate Guardsmen as “hometown” units – not as a pool of individual replacements. The martial tradition for localism endured, even if citizen soldiers deployed abroad. However, the language for compulsory militia service outside the continental U.S. appeared to violate the Constitution. Owing to the inadequacies of the mobilization plan, the War Department began crafting an “independent” federal reserve. For example, the Medical Reserve Corps enlisted skilled personnel on inactive status. Commensurable with an expansible force, members of the reserve would augment the regular Army only in a time of war. Progressives increased federal authority, but they did not replicate European models for the force structure.

  If strengthening the Army's “body” required revisions to the force structure, then reforming what Root called the “brain” involved reorganizing the General Staff. He wanted to reduce the independence of the bureau chiefs, who became overburdened with responsibilities during mobilization. Instead, he preferred a staff of 45 officers to administer the War Department in addition to commanding the Army's geographic departments. He also intended to eliminate the division of authority between his office and the Commanding General of the Army. Replacing the latter with a Chief of Staff, he suggested, would enable a high-ranking officer to serve as a responsible advisor and executive agent for the commander-in-chief and the Secretary of War. Unlike the German Grosser Generalstab, however, American military policy, planning, and logistics remained directly under civilian control.

  Approved in 1903, the General Staff Act largely reflected Root's scheme of organization in spite of congressional antipathy toward German militarism. Although the bureaus did not consolidate in the manner that he advocated, a group of senior officers rotated in select roles as the “supervisory” and “coordinating” authority within the War Department. An opponent of the reform, Miles decided to retire from the Army. Thereafter, the exalted post of Commanding General of the Army ceased to exist. General Samuel B. M. Young, who presided over the Army War College after its founding, became the first Army Chief of Staff. In the beginning, the War College Board acted as the embryonic General Staff. Consequently, Root disseminated the regulations to shape the Army staff system that he envisioned.

  After Root left the War Department in 1904, the staff system provided a laboratory for reform without revising Army doctrines. Under Secretary of War William Howard Taft, the Coast Artillery Corps separated from the Field Artillery. Serving as Chief of Staff from 1910 to 1914, General Wood challenged subordinates to implement initiatives for logistical consolidation. The Quartermaster Department incorporated the functions of the Subsistence and Paymaster Departments. Likewise, the Service Corps began to facilitate operations for all echelons. Faced with congressional hostility to additional reforms, though, the high command of the Army remained mired in paperwork and bureaucracy for years.

  Meanwhile, innovations in technology promised to enhance the capabilities of the Army. The M1903 Springfield rifle became the standard firearm for combat operations, while the M1902 3-inch gun incorporated a recoil mechanism comparable to European field pieces. Moreover, U.S. industries increased the domestic output of smokeless powder. Most regulars appreciated the lethality of the rapid-firing machine gun, including the models designed by Hiram Maxim, John M. Browning, and Isaac N. Lewis. However, procurement decisions curbed large-scale acquisitions of automatic weapons. Despite early doubts about the internal combustion engine, the “horseless carriage” appeared on military installations. Many officers jumped behind the wheels, but poor roads deterred greater interest in motorization. In 1908, the War Department ordered its first airplane from the celebrated Wright brothers. A few years later, the Signal Corps formed an aeronautical unit to operate all kinds of “flying machines.” The progressive era produced technological marvels, yet the Army lacked the expertise to fully exploit the applications.

  Gunboat Diplomacy

  After rising to the U.S. presidency in 1901, Roosevelt encapsulated his approach to military policy with the adage: “Speak softly, and carry a big stick.” He comprehended the essential but unpleasant fact that great power conferred enormous responsibilities upon a nation. His platitudes also complemented the assumptions of Anglo-Saxon dominance. The Roosevelt administration touted what became known as “Gunboat Diplomacy,” that is, the pursuit of international objectives with conspicuous displays of military strength.

  Figure 9.4 U.S. interventions in Latin America, 1900–1935

  Military strength became a necessity after the Spanish–American War, especially in regard to administering the former colonies of Spain. In 1901, the Platt Amendment to an Army appropriations bill stipulated the right to preserve “a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty” in an independent Cuba. In addition, a proviso granted U.S. control over the naval base at Guantánamo Bay. When an insurrection erupted on the island a few years later, American troops quickly suppressed it. U.S. forces reduced their footprint in the Philippine archipelago but endeavored to make the inhabitants “fit for self-government.” The commander-in-chief insisted that “our whole attention was concentrated upon the welfare of the Filipinos themselves, if anything, to the neglect of our own interests.” As arranged by the War Department, the U.S. maintained “peculiar relations” with Cuba and the Philippines.

  Transit across the Isthmus of Panama excited interest in the U.S., even though some Latin Americans balked. The Hay–Herrán Treaty of 1903 established a Canal Zone, but the government of Colombia rejected it. Because the Colombian province of Panama revolted that fall, Americans seized the opportunity to negotiate a deal with the separatist government in Colón. On November 4, the U.S.S. Nashville ported, showed the flag, and placed boots on the ground. Two more U.S. warships blocked the sea lanes from Colombia. A week later, Roosevelt received the Panamanian ambassador, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, and agreed to a new deal. The Hay–Bunau-Varilla Treaty that year gave the U.S. a 10-mile-wide Canal Zone for $10 million down and $250,000 a year “in perpetuity.” After Congress created the Isthmian Canal Commission, the Army began to make the “dirt fly.” Colonel George W. Goethels, the chief engineer, constructed the locks and administered the project. Creating a pathway for the interoceanic cruises of the Navy, the Panama Canal opened on August 15, 1914.

  Even before the armed intervention in Panama, Roosevelt appreciated the military implications of the Monroe Doctrine. Great Britain and Germany took action in Venezuela to collect unpaid debts, spurring him to send the Navy to monitor their exit in 1902. When another debt crisis occurred in the Dominican Republic two years later, the Roosevelt Corollary refined an enduring strategic concept. As an addendum to the Monroe Doctrine, his annual message to Congress declared that the U.S. intended to exercise “international police power” in the western hemisphere. To forestall “chronic wrongdoing,” the U.S. temporarily took over the Dominican customs and revenue service and ensured that the unstable government repaid its debts. Over the years, U.S. presidents used force to stabilize Latin American regimes again and again.

  Before retiring from the presidency, Roosevelt wanted to form a first line of defense commensurate with the doctrine of sea power. Indeed, American shipyards turned out new battleships with impressive capabilities. Nevertheless, technical flaws occasionally resulted in catastrophic explosions and sparked public debate about the costly vessels. Line officers known as the “Young Turks” gained the upper hand in regard to naval policies, as the General Board in the Navy Department began to organize a battle fleet. Along with making upgrades in firepower and in machinery, the Navy also grappled with emergent technologies such as fixed, floating, and mobile torpedoes and submarine mines. With the British launch of H.M.S. Dreadnought in 1906, the U.S. accelerated plans for manufacturing all-big-gun capital ships. For the foreseeable future, the “big stick” undoubtedly meant a “big navy.”

  The rapid gro
wth of a “big navy” did not result in adequate numbers of sailors to man the ships, though. Most vessels lacked about 10 percent of the intended complement, while shortages in petty officers and skilled technicians persisted over time. Though precluded from other jobs, women joined the Navy Nurse Corps after 1908. The Navy's sister service, the Marine Corps, officially created an Advanced Base Force under Commandant William P. Biddle. Whereas the Navy Department had established the Office of Naval Militia years earlier, Congress sanctioned a reserve component with the Naval Militia Affairs Act of 1914. Recruiting for maritime service continued to lag, which undermined U.S. efforts to keep pace with the Royal Navy and the German High Seas Fleet.

  To make warfare beneath the waters possible, the U.S. commissioned its first submarine in 1900. John R. Holland, an engineer living in New Jersey, designed the Type VI craft. He combined the internal combustion engine for surface cruising with a battery-powered electric motor for submerged operations. Christened the U.S.S. Holland, it constituted an effective weapon for close-to-shore coastal defense. However, it lacked the capacity for attacking battle fleets on the high seas. Since the submarine possessed no significant commercial applications, its technological development depended almost entirely on appropriations from Congress. By 1914, generous federal expenditures enabled the Navy to acquire 34 underwater vessels.

  Ranking second in the world to Great Britain, the Navy abandoned its dispersed squadron deployments to concentrate its battle fleet in the Atlantic Ocean. Painted white with gilded scrollwork on their bows, the 16 battleships inspired the nickname, “Great White Fleet.” Under the command of Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, the U.S.S. Connecticut served as the flagship. His crew expected “a feast, a frolic, or a fight,” or so he said. They departed from Hampton Roads, Virginia, on December 16, 1907, for a world tour. Manned by 14,000 personnel, the steamers covered some 43,000 miles on the voyage and made 20 port calls on six different continents. With a rousing celebration, Roosevelt welcomed them home on February 22, 1909. Thus, the “Great White Fleet” symbolized American military strength in a progressive era.

  Conclusion

  No longer insulated from international affairs, the armed forces of the U.S. encountered a dynamic world by the end of the nineteenth century. Americans expressed enthusiasm for the doctrine of sea power, which insisted that naval assets determined the outcome of armed conflicts. After a battleship sank one hot night in Havana, Congress declared war on Spain. U.S. forces won a swift victory over the Spanish military during 1898, when their offensives in the Philippines, Guam, Cuba, and Puerto Rico proved decisive. In addition to winning battles, they built hospitals, schools, roads, and canals on foreign soil. Technological and organizational changes enabled them to flex their proverbial muscles, although their reach sometimes exceeded their grasp. Civilian authorities provided an administrative framework for managing a more robust military. Instead of remaining an unassailable yet isolated nation, the U.S. competed in a race for empire with offshore holdings that spanned the globe.

  The U.S. experienced a power surge inadvertently, even if the new proponents of Manifest Destiny considered it a godsend. While the Army and the Navy adapted to the emergent trends, only the latter seemed prepared for military action. Because the former lacked a grand strategist comparable to Mahan, U.S. commanders fielded what amounted to a constabulary force to wage war. The War Department maintained a defensive shield, but only the Navy Department honed capabilities akin to an offensive sword. Unlike Europeans in an age of imperialism, Americans seldom worried about the threat of either a land invasion or a naval assault. Likewise, only a few appreciated the tactical or logistical challenges of countering insurgencies. Facing the prospect of foreign adventures for years to come, many repeated ideological statements about America's mission that sounded like jingoistic nonsense. In other words, the U.S. would not become a truly great power without more “savage wars of peace.”

  The Spanish–American War represented a small war in many respects, but its impact on the U.S. was large. To a remarkable extent, the expansionists of 1898 helped to resolve a domestic crisis caused by the disappearance of a frontier region and the panic of an economic decline. With Washington D.C. taking the initiative, the momentous turn seemed bold and purposeful. Service members liberated a number of colonized people under Spanish dominion, although the evolving missions revealed a combination of harshness and conciliation. Defending national interests led soldiers, sailors, and marines to plant the U.S. flag in faraway places. They inspired the myth of an imperial republic, which mixed aggressive acts with anti-colonial sentiments. With each step into a new century, Americans in the military found themselves, as Roosevelt famously put it, “in the arena.”

  Because of Americans in the military, the U.S. represented not only an unrivaled power in the western hemisphere but also a leading actor on the world stage. From the Atlantic to the Pacific, intellectuals dismissed the cruelty of war as an aberration of a “less civilized” age. Global partnerships made the clash of arms nothing if not unnatural. International conferences at The Hague forged agreements to “humanize” combat, although the congenial rhetoric resonated mostly with elites. Even the pugnacious Roosevelt earned a Nobel Peace Prize, making him the first American recipient of the award. As for the use of force in peacetime, a host of bureaucratic rules and regulations attempted to impose order upon military operations within diverse environments. The nation soon learned that newfound responsibilities for overseas possessions and the commercial interests of industrial societies made any reversion to insularity unrealistic.

  Essential Questions

  1 How did the doctrine of sea power influence strategic thought before 1898?

  2 In what ways were U.S. forces improved by progressive reforms?

  3 Did the Spanish–American War mark a turning point in American military history? Why, or why not?

  Suggested Readings

  Abrahamson, James L. America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power. New York: Free Press, 1981.

  Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

  Challener, Richard D. Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1914. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.

  Cirillo, Vincent J. Bullets and Bacilli: The Spanish–American War and Military Medicine. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999.

  Hoganson, Kristin. Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish–American and Philippine–American Wars. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

  Linn, Brian McAllister. The Philippine War, 1899–1902. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999.

  McBride, William M. Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865–1945. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.

  McCartney, Paul T. Power and Progress: American National Identity, the War of 1898, and the Rise of American Imperialism. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006.

  Musicant, Ivan. Empire by Default: The Spanish–American War and the Dawn of the American Century. New York: Henry Holt, 1998.

  Preston, Diana. The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China's War on Foreigners that Shook the World in the Summer of 1900. New York: Walker & Company, 2000.

  Reardon, Carol. Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990.

  Shulman, Mark Russell. Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882–1893. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

  Sibley, David. War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine–American War, 1899–1902. New York: Hill & Wang, 2007.

  Spector, Ronald. Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977.

  Tone, John Lawrence. War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895–1898. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006.

  Trask, D
avid F. The War with Spain in 1898. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996.

  10

  The War to End All Wars (1914–1918)

  Introduction

  Corporal Alvin C. York, a conscript from the backwoods of Tennessee, hugged the ground near Hill 223 in the Argonne Forest. Because a draft board rejected his legal claim as a “conscientious objector,” he found himself among the millions fighting the Great War in Europe. He was part of a detachment from the 82nd “All American” Division, which groped its way through rain, mud, and underbrush. Around 6:10 a.m. on October 8, 1918, he watched German machine guns cut down comrades “like the lawn grass before the mowing machine back home.”

  Sergeant Bernard Early led York and 16 others on a patrol around the enemy defensive position while attempting to take the machine-gun nests from behind. They captured a headquarters battalion, but Early fell under hostile fire from the hillside. Suddenly, York became the “acting sergeant” for the patrol. He took cover on the slope, where he saw the Germans shooting from a nest above him about 25 yards away. Because of the slope, however, the gunners were forced to raise their heads above their earthworks just to see him.

  Taking a knee, York began to skillfully work his rifle. He emptied several clips in a matter of minutes. Six Germans rose up and charged downhill with bayonets, assuming that no American would be able to kill them all. Calmly, he pulled his pistol and shot them one at a time. “That's the way we shoot wild turkeys at home,” he mused.