The American Military - A Narrative History

by Brad D. Lookingbill

  General Abrams, who left Vietnam in the summer of 1972 to become the Army Chief of Staff, linked the “total force” policy to fighting wars in the future. With the Army outfitting 16 divisions, he insisted that the National Guard and Reserves supplied personnel to “round out” active units. Moreover, he integrated the reserve with the active component so closely as to make the latter dysfunctional without the former. Once conscription terminated on July 1, 1973, no commander-in-chief would be able to take the nation to war without mobilizing citizen soldiers. According to what was called the Abrams Doctrine, any large-scale mobilization of the reserve component would affect communities nationwide and engage almost everybody in the war effort. Struggling with declining health, his last directives gave form to a new and improved Army. After the draft ended, military leaders rebuilt the force structure based upon Abrams's refrain: “The Army is people.”

  The Fall of Saigon

  After Congress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1971, the balance of power in Southeast Asia shifted rapidly to North Vietnam. By the end of the following year, American troop levels in South Vietnam fell to 24,000. Once withdrawn, they seemed unlikely to return.

  While Nixon campaigned for re-election in 1972, Kissinger resumed private talks with the North Vietnamese representative, Le Duc Tho, in Paris. They generally agreed on a final withdrawal of American troops while allowing the North Vietnamese to retain their forward positions in South Vietnam. Hanoi dropped the demand for the removal of Thieu, as the U.S. signaled a willingness to abandon Saigon. Upon hearing word that “peace is at hand,” Thieu threatened to sabotage the deal. In one White House briefing session, Kissinger shouted: “I want to end this war before the election!”

  After Nixon won a landslide electoral victory, the talks in Paris stalled once again. Hanoi suspended negotiations, which prompted the U.S. to unleash air strikes to end the delay. Dubbed the “Christmas Bombings,” Operation Linebacker II constituted the heaviest aerial assault of the entire war. Starting on December 18, it included 729 sorties by high-flying B-52s as well as more than 1,000 by F-105s, F-4s, and F-111s. Over the course of 11 days, around-the-clock bombardments destroyed rail yards, power plants, radar sites, petroleum stores, supply depots, installations, roads, bridges, and vehicles. Owing to the massive application of air power, the Air Force soon found no more “worthwhile” targets. Hanoi reversed course and agreed to return to the table. Privately, the Nixon administration assured Thieu that the American military would take swift and severe retaliatory action against North Vietnam if its leaders violated any multilateral agreement.

  The next month, all parties finalized the Paris Peace Accords. The framework provided for the release of American POWs and the dissolution of MACV within 60 days. Military activities in Laos and Cambodia ceased temporarily, while an international commission monitored the ceasefire in Vietnam. Kissinger promised extensive aid to the regime in Saigon but accepted the formation of a Council of National Reconciliation and Concord to address internal political matters. On January 27, 1973, the U.S., North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam signed the accords.

  Within weeks, American POWs began to return home. Although a number remained missing, North Vietnam returned at least 591. More than five years earlier, Lieutenant Commander John S. McCain III, a naval aviator, was shot down, badly injured, and immediately captured. The enemy transported him to Hanoi's main Hoa Lo Prison – nicknamed the “Hanoi Hilton.” Like many other POWs, he suffered abuse and torture throughout his years of captivity. The son of Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, he remained a POW until his release on March 14, 1973.

  Later that year, Congress crafted a joint resolution to limit the authority of any president to make war. Called the War Powers Resolution, it required the commander-in-chief to report to the legislative branch within 48 hours of committing American troops to combat. Unless approved by Congress within 60 days, military action must end immediately. Without a declaration of war or another authorization, the executive branch must withdraw all troops in a 30-day period. The resolution was vetoed by Nixon, but Congress overrode the veto.

  The “imperial presidency” of Nixon unraveled during the Watergate scandal. Under great stress throughout 1974, he evinced the symptoms of a nervous breakdown. At the Pentagon, Secretary Schlesinger issued instructions to military commanders around the world to disregard orders from the commander-in-chief without his countersignature. On August 9, Nixon resigned from office to avoid impeachment. His successor, Gerald R. Ford, calmed Washington D.C. while refusing to resume military actions in Southeast Asia.

  Even though Hanoi repeatedly violated the Paris Peace Accords, communist leaders postponed a final offensive to defeat Saigon until Ford succeeded Nixon. The NVA launched artillery attacks in South Vietnam that December, and their divisions captured the Phuoc Long Province near the Cambodian border on January 5, 1975. They waited for a military blow from the U.S., but none came. Because Congress previously terminated funding for bombing campaigns in Southeast Asia, all war plans remained on the shelf. No additional military aid for Saigon was forthcoming. Thieu began to abandon the Central Highlands and redeployed ARVN to defend the cities near the coast. From the vantage point of Hanoi, the situation seemed ideal for renewing the war for national unification.

  War raged across Southeast Asia. The Khmer Rouge guerrillas in Cambodia seized power, while the Pathet Lao forces achieved dominance in Laos. By March, the North Vietnamese launched a full-scale invasion across South Vietnam and quickly captured Hue, Da Nang, and Cam Ranh Bay. Within days, they controlled the northern half of South Vietnam. Civilians fled in panic, but not until communist forces had massacred thousands. ARVN hastily established a defensive perimeter around Saigon. Thieu soon resigned from office, and Duong Van Minh became the last president of South Vietnam. As the closing campaign to overrun the capital began, ARVN units disintegrated. The end was near.

  In Washington D.C., the Ford administration authorized Operation Frequent Wind to evacuate Saigon. Helicopters transported 7,100 Americans and South Vietnamese to Navy vessels waiting off shore. At least 70,000 South Vietnamese reached the safety of U.S. warships in the South China Sea. Television cameras recorded the last airlift out of the capital, which departed from the roof of the U.S. embassy. On April 30, 1975, Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese, who soon renamed it Ho Chi Minh City.

  Conclusion

  While winning the international race to the moon, the U.S. stumbled badly in the Third World. Following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Johnson administration counted on graduated pressure to secure South Vietnam. North Vietnam survived the attrition, because the Soviet Union and China replaced many of the assets that U.S. firepower destroyed. Hanoi paid a high price in lives for the Tet Offensive, but Washington D.C. decided to pursue a settlement thereafter. The war in Vietnam divided the American people and demoralized the armed forces. As the troops exited Indochina, the Nixon administration ended the draft. Instead of “peace with honor,” the fall of Saigon seemed indicative of American decline. “You know you never defeated us on the battlefield,” said Colonel Harry Summers to a North Vietnamese officer after the war. “That may be so,” replied his former adversary, “but it is also irrelevant.”

  The American experience in Vietnam left citizens with a sense of frustration, shame, and disillusionment about the war. The majority associated the policies of national security with the bleakness of an impossible mission, thereby denying responsibility for what happened. Many expressed outrage about governmental authorities, who refused to allow U.S. forces to achieve victory in a decisive way. Others assigned blame to the national media for delivering a constant barrage of bad news. Some acknowledged the illegitimacy of the Saigon regime as well as the futility of nation-building. A few heaped scorn on the returning veterans by spewing curses or expectorate. Millions continued to visit the Vietnam Veterans Memorial known simpl
y as “the wall,” which rendered the dead into an abstraction of polished black granite. In almost every post-mortem on the tragedy, Americans fixated upon the myth of an unwinnable war.

  Remembering Vietnam as unwinnable obscured the ways in which Americans actually failed to win. No commander-in-chief wanted to lose, yet the application of military power in the “Land of the Blue Dragon” revealed arrogance, dishonesty, and recklessness. The decision to not mobilize the reserve component left important elements of the military establishment disengaged from the protracted struggle. The helicopters, fighters, bombers, tanks, and howitzers failed to make the war any more bearable for conscripts of the Selective Service system. The Pentagon conflated the tactics for killing the enemy with a plan for countering an insurgency. Nothing was gained by the gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces that could not have been achieved by declaring victory and going home in 1969. Even though MACV gave South Vietnam the capacity to defend the country, ARVN gave up the fight against existential threats. A better war was possible, but the American strategy remained a losing one.

  The losing strategy forced a new generation of military professionals to rethink the doctrines of the Cold War. Informed by the diversity of their experiences in uniform, they came of age while serving tours of duty in Southeast Asia and elsewhere around the globe. Given the variance in where and when they served, soldiering through the uncertainty imparted the vision necessary to imagine a different kind of war – one that appreciated the human and psychological dimensions of a prolonged conflict. They learned valuable lessons about the efficacy of counterinsurgency operations. While devising ways to improve the readiness and the capabilities of the armed forces, they also gained insight into the relationship between the civilians and the military in Washington D.C. After the bombings stopped, they began to rebuild the Army, Navy, and Air Force and eventually helped the nation to move beyond the tragedy of Vietnam.

  Essential Questions

  1 What sustained the communist insurgency within South Vietnam?

  2 How did the Tet Offensive impact U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War?

  3 Was ending the draft a mistake? Why, or why not?

  Suggested Readings

  Appy, Christian G. Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993.

  Beattie, Keith. The Scar that Binds: American Culture and the Vietnam War. New York: New York University Press, 1998.

  Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of American Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1989.

  Heardon, Patrick J. The Tragedy of Vietnam. 3rd edition. New York: Pearson Longman, 2008.

  Herring, George C. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975. 4th edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002.

  Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Press, 1983.

  Kindsvatter, Peter S. American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

  McMaster, H. R. Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins, 1997.

  Moise, Edwin E. Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

  Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945–1995. 5th edition. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.

  Prados, John. Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009.

  Santoli, Al, ed. Everything We Had: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Thirty-Three American Soldiers Who Fought It. New York: Random House, 1981.

  Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

  Sorley, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt, 1999.

  Sorley, Lewis. Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of his Times. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

  Spector, Ronald H. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 1993.

  Vuic, Kara D. Officer, Nurse, Woman: The U.S. Army Nurse Corps in the Vietnam War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

  15

  A New Military (1975–2001)

  Introduction

  A sandstorm blew across southern Iraq, which reduced the visibility of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment to less than 220 yards. Captain H. R. McMaster, commander of Eagle Troop in the 2nd Squadron, navigated using a Global Positioning System, or GPS. While crossing the longitudinal reading of 70 Easting, his M-1 Abrams tank operated in the center of a wedge formation with nine tanks. “As a platoon leader or company commander,” the West Point graduate observed, “you must be forward to have a clear picture of the situation.”

  At exactly 4:19 p.m. on February 26, 1991, McMaster saw eight T-72 tanks of the Iraqi Republican Guard ahead. He barked a command to Eagle Troop: “Fire, Fire Sabot.” In less than a minute, his men and machines destroyed everything in their range.

  Amid the deafening noise, multiple fireballs, and thick smoke, McMaster pressed forward without hesitating. With M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles to the rear, the American tankers sped through minefields. Machine gunners mauled Iraqi infantry running for trenches or shouldering rocket-propelled grenades. As an enemy tanker traversed to fire on Eagle Troop, a round stuck in the chamber of an Abrams in McMaster's wedge. The loader grabbed hold of the hatch and kicked the round, which allowed the breech to close and the gunner to fire. Another Soviet-built T-72 exploded in flames.

  While McMaster cleared the western defensive position, he received a radio message from an executive officer voicing caution. The line of 70 Easting marked his limit, but the commander of Eagle Troop rolled onward. “Tell them I'm sorry,” he radioed back.

  McMaster reached 73 Easting, where the enemy's reserve included more tanks as well as the brigade commander's bunker. After capturing the commander, Eagle Troop took the entire position in 23 minutes. The firing ceased, reported McMaster, once “we had nothing left to shoot.” In the Battle of 73 Easting, Americans destroyed 50 T-72s, 25 armored personnel carriers, 40 trucks, and other equipment without suffering a single casualty.

  Figure 15.1 M-1A1 Abrams main battle tanks of Co. A, 3rd Battalion, 32nd Armored Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, December 9, 1990. Photo DA-ST-92-07289, Department of Defense, http://www.defenseimagery.mil/

  Americans in the desert displayed awesome military prowess, which helped the U.S. to leave behind the unpleasant memories of the previous war. Before the war in Iraq, widespread opposition to fighting “another Vietnam” made the commander-in-chief less likely to use force overseas. President Jimmy Carter, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, offered pardons to Vietnam-era draft resisters and expressed support for international human rights after taking office. While the Pentagon attempted to restore the fighting capabilities lost in the jungles of Southeast Asia, military professionals vowed to discourage armed conflict without the backing of the American people. Economic weakness further undermined national confidence, as ambivalence toward foreign adventures continued to raise doubts about American power.

  Owing to the buildup of American power in the 1980s, U.S. forces regained the respect of the nation. Force modernization not only reinvented the battlefield but also revised strategies, tactics, and logistics. Faith in nuclear deterrence and collective security flagged, but the Army, Navy, and Air Force tested new doctrines and concepts. With a rising tide of patriotism, conservatives such as President Ronald Reagan promised to secure peace through strength. “Freedom is for everyone around the world,” wrote a service member deployed to Saudi Arabia, “not just Americans.” American troops stood strong at the end of the Cold War, when the world no longer seemed divided by the narrowness of ideology.

  Watching the world turn in the blink of an eye, a ge
neration raised in the shadow of the Cold War remained anxious about national defense. In the absence of conscription to replenish the armed forces, it seemed imperative to devise ways to win future wars without heavy casualties. It also became clear to many that downsizing the force structure posed a serious problem for a nation preoccupied with all-or-nothing wars. Equipped with high-speed networks for communication and high-tech weapons of precision, men and women in uniform found themselves conducting peace operations in faraway lands such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

  Revival

  The cultural fallout from the social movements of the 1960s left young Americans prone to question authority. In the absence of a draft, replenishing the military required savvy appeals attuned to the marketplace. Competing with civilian occupations for labor, each of the branches struggled initially to attract qualified recruits. The all-volunteer forces eventually became smaller, leaner, and better, which revived the nation's defense posture in the wake of Vietnam.

  By 1976, potential volunteers were required to complete the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Test, or ASVAB. Given to all high-school seniors for free, the pencil-and-paper test helped to determine an appropriate Military Occupation Specialty, or MOS, for a prospective recruit. Generally, recruiters earned incentives for those scoring in the superior categories and holding high-school diplomas. Because fewer males with the highest aptitudes appeared willing to volunteer, officials in Washington D.C. worried about fielding “hollow” forces.