Gold Run: The Rescue of Norway’s Gold Bullion from the Nazis, 1940

by Pearson, Robert

  Using the cover of darkness the train made as much progress as it could, but with dawn now pushing aside the obscurity and safety of the night the bullion train sought the relative safety of a siding at Otta to hide from German bombers. The guards though hidden, remained alert to any danger. Haslund knew he could not risk making a run for the coast during daylight hours as at any moment a well-aimed bomb could wreck the whole operation. He had also been made aware of German paratroopers further up the Gudbrandsdal Valley, which again presented issues for the transport, despite Norwegian troops and snipers from the local rifle clubs having dealt with the majority of them. The source of real unease though was that isolated elements of the paratroopers ahead of them could set explosives across the line to wreck the train and then ambush any survivors. With the Germans searching for the King and perhaps knowing he was on a train, Haslund could not risk the chance of the Germans mistaking his train for that of the Royal entourage. Capture of the gold would be seen as a massive coup for the Germans.

  Lillehammer Railway Station seen from trackside. Picture credit: unknown.

  Later on the 19th Haslund, together with Lund and Pettersen, managed to secure a car and journeyed carefully up the Ottadalen to rendezvous with ministers Torp, Lie and Koht, as well as MPs Colbjørnsen and Størstad and other assorted officials at a small hotel. The purpose of the meeting was for Haslund to hand over to Torp the complete inventory list of the bullion confirming that all the gold was now in transit and under the guard of the Norwegian Army. Lund also secured the approval of Torp to add two large crates of cash from Norges Bank at Gjøvik, which amounted to nearly 10 million Krone. The evacuation of Lillehammer Bank was also advised and that the bank staff should remove all local valuables as they departed. This was agreed. The same day two lorries and two cars departed from Lillehammer with cash, valuables and as many bank employees they could squeeze in travelling to Hundorp, some 70km north of Lillehammer.

  A false sense of optimism permeated its way through the Norwegians: the British were coming, the Norwegian Army was holding the Germans …and soon the Allies would be kicking the Germans out of Norway and the war would be over. Nordahl Grieg also experienced that sense of shared optimism amongst the guard and later wrote perhaps with some naivety:70

  At Otta we waited for 24 hours while the railway line over the Dovrefjeld was being cleared of parachutists. About 200 Germans had come down; the majority were killed in the air, but a few had entrenched themselves in the farms. Major Arne Sunde (brother of Major Bjorn Sunde – leader of the military on the gold train) commanded the ‘mopping up’ of the Germans across the mountain. The line was now free and the first of the trains from the north came trundling in to Otta Station. There were three carriages chock full of British soldiers. They had their thumbs in the air, and we thought that help was now arriving and that this was only the beginning. We talked of being sure to celebrate May 17th in Oslo, and while we were running by night across the mountain down towards Romsdal, sentiment got the better of us, and we felt almost sorry for the Germans who were caught in the south as in a trap with the Skagerrak (Sea) blocked from the outside. Some of us considered that, to save a senseless slaughter of human beings, we ought to be able to give these unfortunates a chance of getting back to Germany across the sea with some kind of safe conduct. The night passed in thoughts like these, and we reached Åndalsnes in the morning…

  Darkness once again draped its protective cloak over Norway, but more importantly over the train affording it the much-needed cover to move out of Otta. With the boiler fired and ready the train pulled slowly out of the station. It was 22:00. Trygve Sørlie takes up the story.71

  The train left Otta round 10pm. I was curious and excited and looked through the window for traffic from the road. White spookily dressed Norwegian soldiers manned the station at Dovre and on the level crossing towards Dombås in the cold spring night. We continued through Lesja towards Romsdal. At Bjorli we left 5 empty trucks and these were checked by Haslund and Sunde. They had to be sure that the right trucks were left behind. These trucks were to be used for military transport. The train arrived at Åndalsnes approximately 04:30. Also, between Otta and Åndalsnes the drivers Kristiansen and Schou were driving ahead of the train in a car along the road to check ahead that the railroad was clear. This part of the transport went quite smoothly with no accidents and no enemy attacks.

  7

  Åndalsnes

  During the late evening of the 8th and early hours of the 9th April, and certainly by April 10th, it had dawned on the British that the German invasion of Norway was in full progress and that they, the British, had been well and truly out-foxed. Churchill stated:72 ‘We have been completely outwitted’. What was even more galling for those in the War Office was that there was no reliable and accurate information coming out of Norway. Indeed, contact had been temporarily lost with Sir Cecil Dormer, the British Minister to Norway as well as with the Norwegian Government. London had absolutely no idea what was happening and who was where; communication via telephone was non-existent. This dire situation however, was remedied on April 12th when Captain (later Major and CMG) Francis (Frank) Foley, a so-called Passport Control Officer of the British Legation in Oslo, but in reality an officer with MI6 (Military Intelligence), reached the port of Åndalsnes and made contact via a transmitter to London.73 Foley was later instructed to give the Commanding General Otto Ruge his every assistance. Foley did not disappoint and was to prove a very decisive and valuable link between Norway and London.74

  The War Cabinet in Britain was now in a state of flux as it desperately began planning for a counter-invasion. The Chiefs of Staff, absolutely stunned by the latest events in Norway, met at 06:30 at the War Cabinet Offices on April 9th. General Ismay, having been woken by the Duty War Cabinet Officer, was later quoted as saying.75 ‘As I hurried into my clothes, I realised, for the first time in my life, the devastating and demoralizing effect of surprise.’ One by one, amidst a tense and sombre atmosphere the Chiefs of Staff took their places to discuss the latest events and to fathom out some sort of military response, but it was to be a few days before something tangible in the way of a full counter-attack could be implemented.

  National Archives: WO 106/191. Picture credit: author

  Meanwhile, the Norwegians would have to fight on virtually alone until the Allies could muster an invasion force. Norway, with increasing regularity and alarm, was desperately calling for Allied assistance in some form, any form.

  Prior to the German invasion of Norway the British and French Chiefs of Staff had drawn up ‘Plan R 4’, the allied invasion of Narvik, albeit a limited one – to cut off the iron-ore traffic coming out of Norway via Sweden. Plans also included simultaneous invasions of strategic Norwegian ports. Troops of the 24th Guards Brigade had been embarked at Clyde, Scotland in preparation for Narvik. Another battalion, 146th Infantry Brigade was bound for Trondheim with other battalions planned for Bergen; two battalions of the 148th Brigade were destined for Stavanger. However, with the German invasion of Norway ‘Plan R4’ was thrown into complete and utter disarray and troops were hastily disembarked whilst their cruisers headed out to sea in a sorry attempt to thwart the Germans. In the confusion and hurry to leave port, crucial war material and kit was taken off, placed on the wrong ship, accidentally remained onboard after the disembarkation of troops in Norway or inadvertently stowed incorrectly with essential parts missing. Food was mixed with ammunition, tools mixed with medical equipment. Mortar range finders and associated ordnance, communication equipment, vehicles and maps for the wrong areas had either been left behind dockside or were in the wrong ship. It was a nightmare scenario and certainly not the ideal preparation for war. It would take days to sort out under normal conditions, but these were not normal conditions and it was whilst the force was at sea that it was realised that the chaotic inventory mess was nothing but a logistical disaster of immense magnitude.

  Eventually, a force was cobbled together with two bat
talions of trained regular soldiers from the 24th and 15th Brigades and five battalions of Territorial soldiers from the 146th and 148th Brigades. The Territorials, proud, wholehearted soldiers, had not been trained with Norway in mind; indeed, they had only received between two and seven months training prior to Norway.76 Ten ‘Independent Companies’ (forerunners of the commandos) were also sent, but again these were made up of men from the Territorials, albeit specially selected. They were certainly to prove their worth in Norway, but it really was a case of too little too late. French ‘Chasseurs Alpin’ and a Polish Brigade made up the allied force.

  By April 14th the matter of where to invade Norway was becoming a little clearer for the British although as the following plan will show the fog of confusion was slow to lift:

  1. A small ‘reconnaissance’ force of 300 men would land at Namsos – a town some 80 miles from Trondheim. The code name for this operation was ‘Operation Henry’.

  2. A ‘diversionary’ force of 600 plus men under the name of ‘Operation Primrose’ would be landed at Åndalsnes – some 150 miles south of Trondheim – and led by Colonel Simpson.

  3. A force of 5000 men to be landed at Namsos – ‘Operation Maurice’ – who would then march on to Trondheim.

  4. Sickleforce – to land at Åndalsnes under the command of Brigadier Morgan.

  Unfortunately, 146th Territorial Brigade, which was originally destined for Narvik, was diverted when at sea to support ‘Operation Maurice’.

  The allied counter-invasion was hardly a surprise to the Germans as since April 10th the British newspapers had been falling over themselves to announce an imminent invasion at Ålesund, Åndalsnes, Molde, Namsos, Narvik and Trondheim.

  On April 17th, British forces landed at Åndalsnes (‘Operation Primrose’). Originally destined for Ålesund their destination was changed at the request of the Norwegians. Numbering 680 Royal Marines and seamen led by 45 officers, they would become the guard for the British base. Brigadier Morgan, who arrived with ‘Sickleforce’ on the 18th April, had been tasked with landing at Åndalsnes. He was subsequently issued with the following order:

  Small force British guerrillas operating your right flank. About 600 sailors landing Åndalsnes night 17/18. Their role after landing will be communicated to you later.

  3. Your role to land Åndalsnes area secure Dombås then operate northwards and take offensive action against Germans in Trondheim area. Not intended that you should land in face of opposition… However, these orders were changed whilst the task force was at sea to, ‘… when you have secured Dombås you are to prevent Germans using railway to reinforce Trondheim: am sending small demolition party. Secondly, you should make touch with Norwegian G.H.Q., believed to be in area Lillehammer, and avoid isolating Norwegian forces operating towards Oslo.’

  The securing of Åndalsnes was good news for the Norwegians involved with the gold transport. With the area around Dombås being cleared of German paratroops the railway line would soon be free for operational use. The single railway line from Dombås follows through the Romsdal valley to Åndalsnes, which is at the head of the fjord.77 A small jetty of some 150 feet in length serviced the harbour permitting a ship to tie up alongside, with the lower water level at the port’s termination being approximately 18 ft in depth. A 5-ton electric crane serviced the quay, but it was of little use to the Allies as the power from the town to the quay had been severed. To the west of the port was a small wooden quay of some 60 ft. in length. The railway station, which is situated only a matter of metres from the quay, provided relatively easy access for goods and passengers, but it was only possible to run one train each night as movement during the daytime was impossible due to the German air activity. There was however a reasonable amount of rolling stock for the defending forces to make use of. A major restriction in the use of the trains was that the gradients were severe and trains of sizeable length required two or more engines.

  The Allies noted that it was relatively easy for the Luftwaffe to put a halt to rail traffic by merely bombing the single line and several bridges to achieve their goal of cutting off Åndalsnes. The road that serviced Åndalsnes was formed from rock covered with a sandy soil; when wet the sand would freeze thus permitting a reasonable surface, but the surface was also prone to rutting badly and with the thaw well in progress the road became virtually impassable at times.

  Communication with Molde was via various W/T sets as well as with ship’s radio. There was also a telephone line, although this was thought infiltrated by Norwegians with pro-German sympathies. The strikingly picturesque mountains that stand watch over Åndalsnes offered some protection from attacking aircraft that had to be almost overhead before they could bomb. Nevertheless, for the 2,000 or so townspeople of Åndalsnes, the Norwegian forces and the allied military, the mountains would not be enough to stop the onslaught that was to come. Åndalsnes was unsecured against air attack and this really was the crux of the problem for the defending forces. The only solution of sorts was the use of Royal Navy anti-aircraft cruisers in the fjord.

  The Germans, quickly assessing that Åndalsnes was of major strategic importance, and acutely aware that the Allies had made landfall, unleashed the might of the Luftwaffe upon the town on April 20th. Sergeant Alf Pahlow Andresen, an NCO (non-commissioned officer) on the gold transport, later wrote about what happened:78

  It was a beautiful, sunny day when we rolled in to Åndalsnes early morning on the 20th April. There was no sign of the Germans bombing anywhere. The British we met were confident even if they knew that a lot of war material had been lost in the transfer from Britain to Norway and laid at the bottom of the ocean after German bombers had sunk some of the transport.

  A few Bofors guns were in position outside the railway station. We were curious as they were manned by reservists. They had been given three weeks training in using anti-aircraft firing. We thought about our own training.

  Around 9am the first Heinkel 111 roared overhead. The British destroyers in the harbour immediately left towards the mouth of the fjord firing every gun they had. Where I was hiding behind some railway sleepers near the station and some carriages I could hear the howling of the first bombs and I did not feel happy about it. I felt less than helpless. Splinters were howling through the windows of the coaches. The four or five of the German aircraft were totally dominating the scene.

  Air attacks increased dramatically and life at Åndalsnes was continually disrupted. Men fought hard against the odds to keep the port open, but losses mounted steadily. The British employed two anti-aircraft cruisers, HMS Cairo (D87) and HMS Curacoa (D41) in an attempt to provide some form of aerial explosive umbrella of protection for the port and town. Over ten days these ships expended a vast amount of ammunition in their quest to ward off the bombers, which in turn were careful how they approached their bomb run. On the 24th HMS Curacoa was hit and badly damaged. Other ships were drafted in to provide additional support; anti-aircraft sloops, destroyers and armed trawlers, but they were all vulnerable, though in drawing the attentions of the bombers towards the ships they managed to reduce the amount of bombs originally destined for the harbour and town. Their actions were gallant in the extreme, but without an established air defence, lack of air superiority and an inability to strike back and strike hard at the enemy, the noble cause was heading for an early curtailment.

  Lieutenant (later Commander D.S.C and Bar) William Donald was No.1 to Captain A. L. Poland D.S.C on the sloop HMS Black Swan (L57), which was positioned in Romsdalsfjord, steaming round in the confined waters to avoid becoming a sitting duck when she came under sustained attack. Donald notes:79

  At first it was quite exciting. The bombs always managed to fall well clear, and no harm was done. It seemed more like a game than anything serious, and on the second morning I was quite sure we had shot at least one aircraft down, if not two.

  But then things began to change; the same afternoon one stick of bombs fell mighty close, and, due to an error on my part, the
guns failed to open fire and the plane flew away unscathed. Not anticipating such an extensive period of firing, we blazed away merrily even at extreme ranges, and it became increasingly clear that we were going to run short of ammunition…It began to dawn on everyone that the whole Norwegian campaign was not going as well as might be expected…Events were moving so fast ashore on the overall picture that by the time any signal had been written out, enciphered and transmitted, the situation had completely changed.

  Donald could see from the many signals that were flooding in that the campaign was rapidly getting out of hand.80 But there were lighter moments and after the bombers had left the Chief Boatswain’s Mate requested permission to lower the whaler to so that he could collect the dead fish that lay on the surface and organise the ship’s company’s tea. Permission was granted, but as the Chief was going about his business the whaler was requested to collect the Admiral, who at that time was aboard HMS Carlisle (D67).81 The Admiral was duly collected, but unfortunately was forced to share his trip to shore-side with a load of dead codfish. It was noted that the Admiral was not impressed.82

  An unnamed British Sergeant at Åndalsnes who was working transport between Åndalsnes and Dombås was quoted as saying:83

  German bombers raided the troops every day from 7am to 5pm. There was never a break in the attacks” he said. “I never thought even Germany possessed so many bombs. At Åndalsnes they dropped at least a thousand in a couple of days. Their objective was the landing field, but on the day we left the only part of Åndalsnes they had missed was the jetty. Our chief trouble was that we were smashing hard at something with really nothing. If we had tanks and fighter aircraft we could have done really good work.