Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  Ron Reid-Daly recognised that this suited Selous Scouts pseudo work perfectly, so he decided to deploy a large number of pseudo callsigns to the north, west and south of the base. Once in position, and under Ron’s direct command from his own forward HQ set high on a border mountain, the callsigns would interrupt ZANLA’s supplies and, coupled with Air Force bombardment, induce fire-fights that would have CTs in a jitter. Ron expected that the CTs would not know who was pseudo and who was genuine, thus forcing them to indulge in attacking one another on sight. To the east of the base, RLI paratroopers would form a line of ambushes to take on any CTs breaking east in contravention of FRELIMO orders.

  The plan was wonderfully unconventional and would certainly have prevented the imminent launching of large numbers of ZANLA intent on influencing the Lancaster House talks. However, General Walls rejected the idea, initially preferring to employ well-proven operational methods. This soon changed because there was considerable apprehension over Soviet advice and planning for ZANLA’s defences. Those that we could see were clearly superior to any ZANLA defences encountered before.

  Besides, we remembered how in 1967-8 Soviet studies of Rhodesian tactics and operational methods had led ZAPU and SAANC to use difficult crossing points over the Zambezi River where gaps existed in our border control. The reader will recall that large groups were deep inside Rhodesia before Ops Nickel and Cauldron got underway. More recently, we had seen the effectiveness of Soviet planning at Mapai; so now we wondered if those Russians killed by the SAS had prepared a deadly trap for us at New Chimoio. It occurred to the planning team that the well-proven vertical envelopment of bases by paratroopers and helicopters might be exactly what the Russian advisors would expect, particularly as the base was less than twenty kilometres from the border and a mere fifty kilometres northeast of Umtali. We simply could not take the risk of running our helicopters and slow fixed-wing aircraft into a well-laid Soviet trap.

  Consequently it was decided to go conventional by employing Selous Scouts in their vehicle-borne fighting role with large-calibre guns and jets in support. Since this would involve moving many men and vehicles into position before launching Op Miracle, there was concern that the CTs in nearby New Chimoio would be fully prepared for the attack. So, to mask our true intentions, it was decided to mount high-density operations to create as much noise and movement as possible in the Mutasa and Holdenby Tribal Trust Lands whose eastern boundaries were the international border nearest to New Chimoio. As the HD Op got under way on 27 September, Selous Scouts pseudo teams moved in amongst the African population along and across the border to prepare for the expected westerly breakout from New Chimoio.

  The high-density operation ruse undoubtedly worked, but it cost us dearly when three fine men and a K-Car were lost. Air Lieutenant Paddy Bate was flying down a river-line in the Mutasa TTL when his K-Car was pulled to the ground by power-lines he had not seen. Paddy, his gunner Sergeant Gary Carter and RLI Major Bruce Snelgar were all killed.

  Wilky crash.

  This was the fourth incident of helicopter crashes through cable- and power-lines that I can recall. In November 1973 Squadron Leader Eddie Wilkinson and Sergeant Woods were returning from an action flying low level directly towards the setting sun. Eddie spotted troops waving madly next to a stationary vehicle. He thought they were in distress and turned back to investigate. Blinded to some extent by the sun, Eddie failed to see the telephone lines that snagged his nose wheel as he came into the hover. Feeling himself being drawn downward he increased collective to climb but this simply resulted in the aircraft being somersaulted into an inverted crash. Though he and his technician were lucky to escape alive, Eddie was annoyed with himself when he learned that the soldiers had only been waving in friendly manner at the passing helicopter.

  Then in December 1975, SAAF Lieutenant van Rensburg was the only survivor of the Vumba cable incident in which General John Shaw and Colonel Dave Parker died. In March 1977, Mike Mulligan suffered head injuries in a crash following collision with power-lines near Mrewa. According to fellow pilots this brought about a substantial change to Mike’s character. This was because he had ended up inverted and, as would happen later to Mark Dawson, choked on his armour vest.

  Returning to Op Miracle. Two days later, in the early hours of 29 September 1979, the Scouts fighting column commenced the difficult task of crossing the Honde River border into Mozambique. This constituted the only major obstruction between Rhodesia and the ZANLA base. The mobile force of Selous Scouts, Armoured Car Regiment and Rhodesian Artillery comprising one command vehicle nicknamed “the Pig”, nine Eland armoured cars, twelve infantry vehicles carrying 320 infantrymen, and six 25-pounder artillery guns.

  In the absence of suitable bridging equipment, crossing the Honde River proved more difficult than expected. A bulldozer had to be used to pull every one of the vehicles through deep water and heavy mud resulting in a delay of almost seven hours. Whereas the column should have reached target to coincide with the first airstrikes at 07:00, they did not get there until mid-afternoon.

  Ron Reid-Daly in his elevated command post on the border was no less frustrated by the delay than Air Commodore Norman Walsh and Lieutenant-Colonel Brian Robinson in the high-flying Command Dakota. They need not have worried! ZANLA did not budge in the face of air attacks and were well prepared for the first ground actions that occurred too late in the day to produce any meaningful results.

  The jets revisited target a few times before the vehicle column eventually reached the western outskirts of the huge base. Extremely heavy and accurate fire greeted every striking aircraft, though miraculously none was hit. In the meanwhile, RLI paratroopers had been dropped well to the east of target and had walked in to set up a series of ambushes to cut off any CTs breaking eastward. Because breakout was expected to be westwards, the RLI was very thin on the ground. Events were to show that this was a major tactical cock-up because, whilst the mobile column was digging-in for the night in the face of a fair deal of enemy attention, the RLI was actively killing many CTs breaking their way.

  From the outset it had been clear that the high mountain features overlooking the bases would be key to the outcome of Op Miracle. At the northernmost end of the range lay a prominent domed granite mountain stronghold the Scouts nicknamed ‘Monte Casino’ after the famous, strategically important defences on the Italian mountaintop monastery that the Germans defended so aggressively during WWII.

  Monte Casino not only gave the defenders an excellent view of the Rhodesians below, it contained the majority of heavy guns and mortars defending the entire area of bases that swept in an arc from west through north to east. Within the area of bases there were many other anti-aircraft guns, all well sited and widely dispersed.

  The base and defences lay between the vertical grid lines north to south 11 to 05 and the lateral grid lines west to east 06 to 12. Rhodesia lies to the left of this photograph.

  Just to the northeast of Monte Casino was a small isolated hill feature lying between two of the bases. This was nicknamed ‘Ack-Ack Hill’ because it contained a cluster of concentrated anti-aircraft gun positions. Then, to Casino’s south, a high ridge running southward gave a number of other anti-aircraft gunners and mortar teams superb visual command of all ground approaches to the base and to Monte Casino itself.

  Early on the morning of Day Two the troops came under heavy and accurate fire from Monte Casino, making progress very slow. Low cloud disallowed air support; but then the same cloud lowered and blinded the defenders. This allowed the Elands to move closer to provide assault troops support from their incredibly accurate 90mm guns.

  It was past midday before the Hunters could return to target, by which time a good assessment had been made and troublesome positions were pinpointed for their attention.

  By mid-afternoon one particularly troublesome promontory (photo grid 070050) near the western CT base had been overrun by Scouts, but not before it had been hurriedly vacated, weapons and all. Ne
vertheless this vantage point gave improved observation of Monte Casino (photo grid 085065), allowing accurate direction to be passed to Hunter pilots, the mortars and Elands firing against enemy emplacements that had survived earlier attention.

  Following one concentrated bombardment of Monte Casino, an attempt to overrun its heights was thwarted by intense fire from Ack-Ack Hill (photo grid 095110), together with hand-grenades lobbed down from the unseen defenders above. Meanwhile, widespread fighting continued all day as troops laboriously worked through two large bases lying closest to Monte Casino (centred on photo grids 065098 and 060115).

  By nightfall of Day Two, Rhodesian forces had established themselves for a renewed attempt against the main defences the next day. Otherwise a situation of stalemate appeared to exist in the target areas with both sides settling to wait out the long night. Meanwhile the RLI had another busy night shooting an increased number of CTs fleeing east. To the west, the Scouts pseudo teams waited patiently, but nothing came their way.

  Captain Peter Stanton, having transferred from the Special Branch to the Selous Scouts, spent the night interrogating a captured CT who turned out to be the man responsible for ZANLA’s base defences. Again the Rhodesians had managed to secure a key man at a critical time. From him, Peter Stanton acquired all the details of the ZANLA defences, which were then passed to unit commanders before they launched into action on Day Three. The first of these involved clearing all the defences of a long ridge south of Casino (commencing at 072039 and extending well off the photograph through 077028).

  Also revealed by the captured CT was the fact that Rex Nhongo had been at the base when the first airstrikes went in on Day One. He had crashed his Land Cruiser (around photo grid 050110) in his hurry to get away. He had then taken another vehicle and departed for Chimoio. The Selous Scouts found the crashed vehicle exactly where Peter Stanton said it would be and, following temporary repairs, it was brought back to Rhodesia at the conclusion of the operation.

  Hunter strikes were placed on each defended position before Scouts moved in to secure them. In a series of surprisingly smooth-flowing actions, the entire ridge was cleared. Ack-Ack Hill was all but neutralised by Hunters delivering Golf bombs before troops overran it. These actions made it possible to mount a second attempt on Monte Casino.

  When the assault took place, however, the troops were amazed to find the mountaintop deserted. Survivors had left behind many of their dead in trenches and crevasses. Wrecked guns lay strewn about the pulverised ground, which had been totally denuded of vegetation. The fact that the trees immediately outside of the anti-aircraft gun sites were still standing bore testimony to the accuracy of ground and airstrikes.

  Incredibly, the soldiers came upon Jamie and Amie off to one side of the devastated area. The two baboons immediately settled down when the Scouts took them into their care. Also taken into care were a few surviving anti-aircraft guns that had been moved but then abandoned.

  A small sector of the Monte Casino gun emplacements.

  Some of the guns captured in the camp areas.

  Following sharp actions that neutralised odd pockets of resistance, all the bases had been overrun by the end of Day Three. As they progressed through the bases burning and destroying all structures, the troops could see how well the defences and bunker systems had been prepared. Huge quantities of cooked food, found uneaten in the large kitchens, confirmed the estimated occupancy on Day One to be somewhere between 6,000 and 10,000 male and female CTs.

  The great majority of ZANLA had left the area in what appeared to be an ordered easterly withdrawal. Had this been anticipated, more troops would have been positioned east of the base. As it was, the gaps between the RLI ambush locations were too wide to prevent the outflow, though many CTs had fallen to the sharp-shooting soldiers.

  Thought was immediately given to mounting a new operation as it seemed certain there would be many vehicles moving along the main tar road running north from Vanduzi to collect fleeing ZANLA. The Selous Scouts’ mobile column could be expected to have a fine time if diverted to this new task, but it was too late to do this as Day Three drew to its close.

  During the night of Day Three, an early-warning callsign posted to the south reported FRELIMO tanks with deployed infantry advancing towards them along the narrow vehicle track leading to the base. The 25-pounder guns were given appropriate co-ordinates and commenced firing. Following two corrections, the guns straddled the tanks with a full salvo. This had the desired effect. The infantry scattered and the tanks, one trailing smoke, high-tailed back from whence they had come.

  Unfortunately no details were available to undertake a follow-up operation on fleeing CTs with any degree of certainty. In the meantime, our eavesdropping services reported considerable FRELIMO radio traffic that showed FRELIMO was moving in strength towards the ZANLA base. The risks involved in pursuing ZANLA outweighed the advantages to be gained because, by driving ZANLA from its main base and substantially disrupting its incursion plans, Op Miracle’s primary objectives had already been achieved. It was decided instead to recover forces in daylight on Day Four with small stay-behind parties remaining in hiding to watch for opportunity air targets.

  The stay-behind units remained on the high ground around the base to observe activities throughout the following week. During the morning of 3 October 1979, Day Five, they reported the presence of a large FRELIMO armoured column that had interrupted its northbound journey towards Cruzamento village to give Monte Casino a thorough going-over with accurately placed cannon fire.

  At Cruzamento village the armoured column based up and was joined by additional FRELIMO forces that came in from the east. There was a great deal of activity amongst the men and vehicles of the concentrated force, which appeared to be preparing to launch a night-time retaliatory attack against the nearby RSF permanent base at Ruda. In COMOPS we decided it was important to break up the force to drive FRELIMO back east. The Air Force was tasked to do this.

  First strikes went in at around 13:00 against concentrated men and vehicles. First over target were Canberras flying low and fast to deliver Alpha bombs against exposed personnel. Next came Hunters attacking with Golf bombs, Matra rockets and 30mm cannons. The strikes inflicted high casualties with the destruction of a number of vehicles, but this only had the effect of bringing about a limited dispersion of the force.

  A heavy haze lay over the entire area due to smoke still drifting from the ZANLA base and dense black smoke rising from burning vehicles. Although these conditions made observation of FRELIMO’s activities difficult, the Scouts OPs could see enough to establish that FRELIMO was regrouping in preparation for their planned action. The Air Force returned as soon as the jets had rearmed; but this time disaster struck in consequence of poor visibility caused by smoke and heavy haze.

  It started when Flight Lieutenant Kevin Peinke and his navigator, Flight Lieutenant ‘JJ’ Strydom, struck one section of FRELIMO forces that were straddled either side of a section of road. They were on top of the first men and vehicles before seeing them but managed to release half of the bomb load amongst others ahead. Kevin decided to reverse direction and, using the dust and smoke from his first strike, bomb that part of the target he had seen first. This was an unusual and fatal error of judgement. Other enemy elements concentrated close by had seen the Canberra turning back and were fully prepared with every gun when the bombs were released.

  The Canberra lost both engines, forcing Kevin to convert excess speed to height for a powerless glide towards the border. It can only be assumed that Kevin waited for ‘JJ’ to get from his bomb-aimer position in the aircraft nose back to his ejector seat, but time was too short. Both men died when the Canberra crashed short of the border.

  Brian Gordon.

  Hunter pilots flying that afternoon said they had experienced great difficulty in judging their height above ground due to the appalling haze. This is possibly why Air Lieutenant Brian Gordon was seen to fly into the ground when making a rocket
attack against armoured vehicles. His recovery from the dive was either made a fraction too late or he may have been hit. The sad facts were that we had lost another fine airman and our Hunter fleet was now reduced to eight aircraft.

  Op Miracle had been successful but the cost to Rhodesia was unacceptably high. Two airmen and an RLI officer had been lost, together with an Alouette, in the high-density operation performed in direct support of Op Miracle. One Selous Scout was killed whilst clearing trenches on Day One. Another was killed and three seriously injured on Day Three when a captured weapon exploded as it was being made safe. Then on Day Five the Air Force suffered the loss of three officers, a Canberra and a Hunter.

  Chambeshi bridges-Zambia

  PRIOR TO MY ARRIVAL IN COMOPS, plans had been made to pressurise Zambia into making better use of its southern rail route through Rhodesia to the ports of South African. Although an economics issue, it fitted well with military plans to deny ZIPRA the rail and road facilities needed to transport war equipment from Dar es Salaam to Lusaka. The plan involved the destruction of the Tanzam rail and road bridges across the Chambeshi River situated a great distance northeast of Lusaka. Whereas the SAS had been fully prepared for this task, it had been shelved because ‘political repercussions’ remained a big concern at that time.

  By August 1979, there had been substantial changes in political thinking and, because world reaction to our recent external operations had been less than expected, Operation ‘Cheese’, was on the action board again. Although there were other externals on the go, Op Cheese was the most exciting one to follow because it was so audacious and was the longest-range operation ever undertaken by any of our ground forces. The two Chambeshi bridges, lying half a kilometre apart, were almost 800 kilometres from the still-secret Air Force base at Fylde from which the operation was launched.