Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  We were still getting over the shock of the Canberra and Hunter losses that day when Jack Malloch set off from Fylde to drop a four-man SAS free-fall pathfinder team from his DC7 into the target area. Things did not work out as planned near the bridges because one parachute failed to open, costing the team the loss of its canoes. In consequence, there was a long walk to recce the bridges and an equally long walk back to the rendezvous point to take the night drop of another twelve men.

  This drop was successfully conducted when the DC7 returned around midnight on 8 October. From there the sixteen-man team had to make its way upstream to the bridges in heavily laden canoes and a powered inflatable dinghy. The Chambeshi River was flowing more swiftly than expected and this delayed arrival at the targets until the night of 11 October. Once there, the bridges were rigged for demolition in the manner the SAS had pre-planned and practised. Whilst the explosive charges were being placed, two of the team members set up a roadblock to hijack a suitably large vehicle. This was necessary to transport the whole team with canoes and dinghy to a remote position in far-off Luangwa Game Reserve for uplift to Rhodesia by Cheetah helicopters.

  The hijacking of a twenty-ton truck driven by its white owner was successful but became complicated when the brother of the driver, noticing that the twenty-tonner was no longer following his own truck, turned back to investigate. This man refused to leave his brother.

  In the meanwhile, a third white man stopped, believing the twenty-ton truck had broken down. As if this was not bad enough, a ten-year-old white boy was accompanying one of the brothers, his uncle, as a special birthday treat. Consequently, for security reasons, the SAS had to hold captive the three white men, two black co-drivers and the ten-year-old birthday boy. Once the charges were set and fuses lit, the twenty-ton truck carrying twenty-two people with canoes and dinghy set off down the main road towards Lusaka. Some way from the bridges the satisfying sound of a single huge explosion reached the men; but they had no way of knowing if the bridges were down. When dawn was breaking a little short of the small town of Serenje, the truck turned south down a secondary road towards the Luangwa Game Reserve.

  Unhappily they came upon a power station in the middle of nowhere and the SAS were forced to shoot security guards who came to investigate their presence. From there they managed to bundu-bash their way to a position where the Cheetahs collected them, captives and all. By this time the SAS team was relieved to get the news via their HF radio that Canberra reconnaissance had confirmed both bridges were down.

  The hapless Zambians were noticeably apprehensive about their own safety right up to the moment they were ushered into the Cheetahs. Thereafter they relaxed and were treated to Rhodesian hospitality until suitable arrangements were made for their safe return to Zambia.

  Moatize bridges

  THE OP MANACLE PLAN TO destroy all Mozambique’s bridges was initiated with the downing of three rail bridges on the line north of the Zambezi River. Apart from denying ZANLA any rail transport for men and munitions from Beira to Tete Province, severing the line at this particular time complemented the cutting of the Tanzam rail at the Chambeshi River. With this rail line also cut, Zambia would have no Mozambican outlet as an alternative to the South African ports.

  Ten months had passed since the SAS destroyed the Mecito bridge and the train that was crossing it. No attempt had been made to repair the bridge or recover the engine that remained nose down in the riverbed, but trains were being run to each side of the river to transfer passengers and porter goods from one train to another. The destruction of another three widely separated bridges would put an end to this practice.

  Dakotas delivered three SAS teams to the bridges during the evening of 12 October 1979. Early next morning, Cheetahs brought in the heavy explosive packs and the three bridges were dropped in daylight on the same day.

  FRELIMO guards at the biggest bridge had fled when their fire was answered with overwhelming aggression. Apart from this, no opposition occurred save from a swarm of bees. Stirred to anger by detonation pressure waves, thousands of bees attacked all the members of one team, causing two to be hospitalised. Also stirred to anger was the FRELIMO Government.

  Improved methods of packaging and laying demolition charges had worked so well for the SAS on the five bridges in Mozambique and Zambia that the same principles were adopted and tailored for each of the bridges assigned for destruction during Op Manacle. When all was ready however, the Mozambican op was postponed at short notice. The SAS were about to launch from Chipinda Pools in southeast Rhodesia when analysis of intelligence confirmed the imminence of a ZIPRA invasion. Understandably the SAS Regiment was incensed by the eleventh hour deferral of an operation for which they were so well prepared. It had happened many times before but, in this case, there was a general belief amongst the SAS officers that there were sinister reasons for calling off their biggest job which, for the first time ever, involved every available member of the SAS.

  Encounter with conventional

  ZIPRA forces

  FOR SOME TIME SELOUS SCOUTS teams had been operating inside Zambia on recce and disruption tasks south of the main road from Lusaka to Livingstone. Helicopters were used for all deployments and recoveries and a limited amount of assistance was given to Scouts by Lynx pilots making visual recce sorties to assist in the selection of unpopulated routes.

  First indications of a ZIPRA conventional force in the remote dry country northwest of Kariba came from one Lynx pilot who reported encountering heavy anti-aircraft gunfire when he was returning to base from a recce task. Little notice was taken of this until two helicopter pilots were subjected to the same treatment from precisely the same location.

  The Canberra tasked to photograph the spot did so at midday on 10 October when the sun was directly above the aircraft. The Kariba area had remained completely dry in spite of heavy rains in the eastern areas of the country. In consequence, the dry white soil of the region reflected the sun’s rays so strongly that images on the photographs blended all features in a manner that made distinguishing between rocks, scrub and open ground difficult—even through stereoscopic viewers.

  Apart from a single vehicle track leading to the area, the JSPIS photo-interpreters could find little of interest on or near the prominent ridge the pilots reported as being the source of enemy fire. So one of the pilots was called in to view the photographs to clarify what he had seen coming from where.

  Bill Buckle was considering re-tasking a Canberra recce for 10:00 the next day to overcome the glare problem by bringing shadows into play. Whilst he pondered this with others, Norah Seear was taking another close look at the southern end of the ridge where the pilot said at least two of the guns were positioned. Vaguely, very vaguely, Norah saw lines that might be trenches—but she could not be sure.

  In COMOPS we knew that the pilot reports were accurate and that ZIPRA had certainly been where the anti-aircraft fire had come from. It was decided therefore to send in the SAS to investigate rather than run another photographic sortie, which might cause ZIPRA to move away.

  Captain Bob MacKenzie moved to Kariba and, on 18 October, launched two SAS patrols by helicopter. One patrol landed well to the north of the ridge to ambush the track and the second team was put down well to the south of the ridge. Once they were down, Hunters and Canberras put in strikes. As the jets cleared, a high-flying Dakota ran parallel legs each side of the ridge, dropping incendiaries in a failed attempt to burn vegetation and deny the enemy bush cover. Orbiting high over the ridge in a Lynx piloted by Air Lieutenant Trevor Jew, Bob MacKenzie took a good look at his area of operations.

  Apart from the main north/south ridge-line, a lesser ridge ran parallel to it two kilometres to the west with a bone-dry water pan surrounded by thick bush occupying much of the space between them. The vehicle track from the north passed the pan on its eastern side. Bob came to the conclusion that the main base, if occupied, was on the low ground around the dry pan with primary defences high on the ridges
.

  Bob and all the pilots saw trenches but no sign of people or anti-aircraft fire. The SAS patrols agreed that not a shot had been fired at any aircraft. So, all in all, it looked as if ZIPRA had vacated the position. Nevertheless, Bob MacKenzie instructed his teams to continue as briefed. This was to move closer to the base then listen and observe from ambush positions—a classic SAS task.

  The southern SAS patrol had only just established its ambush after sunset when a ZIPRA patrol came their way moving through thick bush in extended formation. One ZIPRA man was killed before the main group scampered into deep cover. Blood spoor showed that others had been wounded and dragged to safety.

  Because of this action, Bob ordered both patrols to break ambush and commence a move towards the main ridge. They were to link up on the high ground at first light before descending into the suspect base area. Faced with thick jesse bush conditions on a dark night, the southern patrol opted to move along the vehicle track. In doing so it ran into a ZIPRA ambush in which one of the SAS men, Lance-Corporal McLaurin, was fatally wounded. In consequence, and because another soldier was down with severe heat fatigue, the patrol moved to safety and held position until a helicopter casevac was made at first light.

  Because both patrols were still well short of the ridge, helicopters moved the troops closer to their objective. At the time, the commanders of both groups were sure that ZIPRA must have pulled out of the area following afternoon and night encounters. They were seriously mistaken!

  Unbeknown to the Rhodesians, a large conventionally trained and highly disciplined ZIPRA force, dug in on the ridges and pan area, awaited them. All command posts were linked by landline telephones that allowed the progress of the two SAS patrols to be relayed by those who could see them to others who could not. Not a sound could be heard by the SAS as they climbed the steep-sided ends of the ridge.

  As they were nearing the top, the southern group came under unexpected intense and accurate fire from a host of weapon types. The group was pinned down and could not move in any direction without attracting angry attention. Jet support was called for.

  Trevor Jew and Bob MacKenzie immediately got airborne from Kariba in a Lynx. They aimed to establish the position of the pinned-down group as well as the ZIPRA elements containing them. They arrived ahead of the jets and picked up the flash and dust of a ZIPRA recoilless-rifle firing at the trapped soldiers. In an attempt to relieve the hard-pressed soldiers, Trevor turned in with the intention of neutralising the enemy position with Frantans. Showing great discipline, the enemy had patiently withheld their fire against aircraft the previous day; but now they opened up with a vengeance the moment Trevor commenced his attack dive.

  The weight of fire was too great to continue the attack and, as the Lynx pulled up and turned, it took critical strikes which forced Trevor to turn for home. On the way his damaged front engine quit and at Kariba he was forced to make a relatively high-speed belly landing because severed hydraulic lines had disabled undercarriage and flaps functions.

  In the meanwhile Hunters drew all enemy attention to themselves when they put in attacks on the pan area. This allowed the southern patrol sufficient breathing space to make a hurried withdrawal. Both patrols were then recovered to Kariba, but not before the northern group had a short contact near their helicopter pick-up point. Three ZIPRA were killed and one was captured. Miraculously, as had happened before, the captured man turned out to be a key figure. He was the logistics officer for the base.

  From this important man a number of issues came to the fore. The base contained part of a battalion of ZIPRA’s 1st Brigade from Mulungushi comprising over 200 conventionally trained men with another 100 men expected to arrive soon. This particular base had been established recently as the forward element for an intended invasion of Rhodesia across the Kariba dam wall. The logistics officer said the present force would definitely not abandon its position even knowing an attack was coming. Whilst plans were being made for this, the commander of the southern SAS patrol was redeployed with a smaller callsign to keep an eye on ZIPRA developments from an OP on a prominent hill feature.

  Operation Tepid

  WE HAD STUMBLED UPON THIS forward base at a time when disturbing intelligence was reaching COMOPS. It concerned the movement of large numbers of ZIPRA’s conventional forces from Luso Boma in Angola and from Mulungushi in Zambia. Most appeared destined for CGT 2 base, which was obviously another forward launch-point for the impending invasion. In addition, large quantities of arms and equipment, including MiG 21 fighters, were reported to be arriving in Zambia.

  Joshua Nkomo was obviously pulling out all the stops to get his large invasion force into Rhodesia before the Lancaster House talks progressed to a point where this might no longer be possible. Those forces he had in the country were small and ineffectual whilst the forces of his rival, Robert Mugabe, already dominated all of the Shona tribal areas and large sections of his own Matabeleland. Considering the imminent possibility of a ceasefire agreement to be followed by all-party elections, this was not a happy situation.

  There was also the probability that, following a ceasefire, Kenneth Kaunda would prevent Nkomo from expatriating his weapons and equipment—particularly after having been caught out for hiding the war materials that the SAS destroyed in July.

  After the war was over, we learned that Joshua believed his only hope was to launch all his forces immediately with a view to overrunning Salisbury in two fast-moving drives. If successful, he hoped to secure Rhodesian forces to his cause so that, together, the RSF and ZIPRA could destroy the common enemy ZANU. Thereafter, an interim government would be established to prepare the country for all-party elections that excluded ZANU.

  At COMOPS we obviously knew nothing of this. All we knew was that we had to stem the flow of ZIPRA men and equipment to the border areas, and secure the three permanent bridges at Victoria Falls, Kariba and Chirundu. But first the troublesome base near Kariba had to be taken out in an operation codenamed ‘Tepid’.

  Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Bate.

  The RLI and SAS were assigned to Op Tepid. Since the RLI outnumbered the SAS, command of daytime operations from a high-flying Lynx was given to OC the RLI, Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Bate. Command at night vested with OC the SAS, Lieutenant-Colonel Garth Barrett.

  The basic plan was for two RLI assault groups, both moving from the north, to drive the enemy off both ridges. Once these were secured, an SAS assault force would move, also from the north, through the main base below the ridges with RLI giving supporting fire from their elevated positions.

  The assault forces were choppered in at dawn on 20 October. Once they had moved forward to their start positions, SAS and RLI mortar teams were brought in to the west of the western ridge. There were tense moments when the helicopters came in to land within sight of the enemy. ZIPRA had made an excellent appraisal of likely helicopter LZs and had prepared their long-range mortars for the very positions the helicopters landed. The enemy must have enjoyed the sight of Cheetahs making a hurried departure and the mortar teams scurrying for cover.

  No attempt was made to prevent ZIPRA breaking out to the south because the whole aim of the operation was to drive ZIPRA from its base and, hopefully, to force the abandonment of heavy equipment. In the event, the RLI force on the eastern ridge only reached the centre of the feature at its highest point when it was stopped dead in its tracks. Troops became pinned down by accurate fire from both their own ridge and from the western ridge. Before long, the western assault force was also bogged down through intense fire from both ridges.

  The distance between the two assault forces was almost two kilometres but the enemy gun positions responsible for holding them up were less than 200 metres from each force. In consequence the use of Golf bombs was impossible, yet only Golf bombs would have been effective against the entrenched enemy who had good overhead protection.

  The Rhodesians were at a distinct disadvantage. They were exposed and only had light infantry weapons, wherea
s ZIPRA were dug in with vastly superior heavy weapons. It was just like Mapai all over again, and a situation of stalemate existed. Yet, even though the Rhodesians were out-gunned and could not move forward, ZIPRA preferred to remain in their defensive positions, fearing to expose themselves to the jet-strikes we could not have made so close to our own forces.

  Attempts to outflank enemy gun positions on the eastern ridge resulted in a number of RLI soldiers being wounded. On the western ridge, an RLI trooper had been killed. Hunters, limited to 30mm cannons and 68mm Matra rockets, were employed on numerous occasions, but no strike was really successful. ZIPRA simply dived under cover when a Hunter turned in, accepted the explosions above them and immediately emerged to continue firing at anything that moved. By sunset nothing seemed to have been achieved and the RLI was ordered to make a tactical withdrawal, under cover of darkness, to regroup.

  When Garth Barrett took command that evening, nothing suggested that ZIPRA had been rattled. Everything pointed to the Rhodesians having to reorganise, bring in extra troops with heavier weapons and make another push next day. Garth realised that, even though ZIPRA seemed too strong to even consider moving out, he should position a force for this eventuality and ordered the positioning of ambushes on the vehicle track south of the base.

  Between nightfall and midnight the area was quiet, but then ZIPRA unleashed a full-scale mortar bombardment on likely Rhodesian positions and even fired two 122mm rockets to add to the noise and excitement. At the time the Rhodesians had no idea that this was a cover-up to an orderly withdrawal of the entire ZIPRA force. During its move southwards, the enemy force was allowed free passage by one of the RLI’s southern ambushes because the unit commander realised his force of twenty men was too weak to take on nearly 200 closely grouped ZIPRA. For this he was strongly criticised!