Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot

by Peter Petter-Bowyer

  After the war I learned from ZIPRA that the reason for the withdrawal was that their positions had become known to the Air Force and that the Rhodesian ground forces were known to have moved some distance away. This being so, the ZIPRA commander felt certain all his positions would be annihilated by the Air Force the next day using their ‘silent bombs’. This was the name given to Golf bombs because men who had been just beyond their lethal range claimed they had not heard the bombs go off. They had only experienced high over-pressure and suffered temporary deafness.

  Follow-up operations got under way at first light, but only limited kills were scored against the ZIPRA force, which had taken the precaution of splitting into small groups. Nevertheless the aim of driving ZIPRA from its base had been achieved.

  Operation Dice

  LANCASTER HOUSE TALKS HAD BEEN on the go for six weeks when Op Tepid wrapped up, and General Peter Walls had been called to London. Before his departure, the general listened to his COMOPS planning team’s ideas on how best to counter a ZIPRA invasion. We specifically argued against ambush and harassment tasks in Zambia because this would have limited effect in stemming any large-scale flow and would almost certainly lead to clashes with Zambian forces. Yet to await ZIPRA’s move and deal with each crossing-point on the Zambezi River, from Rhodesian soil, was obviously ridiculous. Not only would ZIPRA make its crossings at night to minimise interference from the Rhodesian Air Force, their powerful Soviet-supplied equipment would easily drive off any protection force during the critical stages of establishing a bridgehead on Rhodesian soil. Thereafter we would be forced to destroy some of our own bridges to hold up the enemy for Air Force attention in daylight.

  Only the destruction of Zambia’s road bridges and culverts on all routes to our border made sense because this would prevent any large-scale movement. Our plans to cut the Great East Road from Lusaka to Malawi, the southern route from Lusaka to Chirundu, and the southwestern route from Lusaka to Livingstone were already complete.

  General Walls needed no persuading. He realised only too well that Rhodesia’s David could only beat ZIPRA’s Goliath in this way. However, he was at pains to make us understand that the destruction of a Commonwealth member’s bridges would wreck any hope of the British Government showing any sympathy to the Muzorewa Government’s cause.

  Whilst, from his understanding of the goings-on at Lancaster House, he doubted that any such empathy existed, we could not rock the boat just yet. General Walls said he would be in a better position to judge all issues once he got to London. In the meanwhile the SAS, Selous Scouts and RLI were to get on with the job of harassing ZIPRA movements. In consequence, Operation Dice started out with ambushing tasks to make access to Victoria Falls, Kariba and Chirundu difficult.

  Masses of bridge demolition gear prepared for Op Manacle in Mozambique lay begging to be used when it was all too obvious to the frustrated SAS that only the destruction of bridges could meet our Zambian objectives. So, even though they had been told Op Dice only called for harassing work, SAS moved all the demolition gear to Kariba; just in case. It is just as well these explosives were immediately available. Without any forewarning during the night of 15 November, a signal from General Walls to COMOPS ordered the immediate implementation of our plans to destroy Zambian bridges.

  Ian Smith had returned home from the Lancaster House talks on 11 November. On his arrival at the airport he told reporters that the British had manoeuvred the Muzorewa Government into accepting a bad agreement. He said there was now no alternative but to make the best of a bad deal. Without actually saying so, he implied (in my mind) that the British Conservative chairman of the conference, that poisonous snake Lord Carrington, had deliberately set the stage for a communist party take-over.

  Lancaster House talks, 11 November 1979.

  Thirteen times Rhodesians had celebrated Rhodesia’s Independence Day on 11 November but this was now a thing of the past—there was no longer anything to celebrate. This is why, even if General Wall’s ‘green light’ on the bridges seemed at odds with what Ian Smith had said four days earlier, we were delighted that Rhodesians were not going to take things lying down.

  Whilst lawyers in London settled down to preparing written agreement for all parties’ signatures at some time in December, the SAS moved in on the bridges with RLI troops in support. We all knew they had to act fast before any political change in direction occurred. In four days, nine primary road bridges and one rail bridge were dumped. The SAS demolition teams had become so expert in their tasks that bridges were downed even before their Cheetah transport had reached their refuelling points back in Rhodesia. This not only resulted in the ground teams having an unnecessarily long wait for recovery, it put our COMOPS planners back to work revising methods, movement plans and time-scales for the destruction of Mozambican bridges in Op Manacle.

  Eight of the Zambian bridges had been specifically selected to curb ZIPRA’s movements to the border. Another two across the Mubulashi River were not. Whereas we were disallowed from taking any action against railway bridges on the line from Lusaka to South Africa, the rail bridge on the Tanzam rail line and an adjacent road bridge over the Mubulashi River were taken out. This was to complement the downing of the Chambeshi bridges on the same line five weeks earlier and to deliberately pressurise the Zambia Government. If this over-stressed Kenneth Kaunda’s economy, it was nothing compared to what was planned next. The same SAS commander who had taken out the fuel refinery at Beira in Mozambique was about to launch a purely SAS raid to destroy Zambia’s large fuel refinery at Ndola. Simultaneous with this, Op Manacle was to go ahead on the Mozambican bridges. This was all very exciting stuff but it came to an abrupt end on 22 November when General Walls signalled COMOPS instructing that all external offensive operations were to cease forthwith. The war in Zambia and Mozambique was over. ZIPRA was out of the game, but General Walls instructed that internal operations against ZANLA were to be intensified until the expected ceasefire came into effect. He said this might occur before Christmas.

  Chapter

  10

  Ceasefire

  A TOTAL CEASEFIRE WAS TO come into immediate effect when all parties to the Lancaster House agreement signed the enacting document. As soon as this happened, the warring forces would cease hostilities and all BSA policemen were to revert to normal policing duties. The RSF were to return to barracks whilst ZIPRA and ZANLA forces were to move into sixteen (later increased to seventeen) assigned Assembly Points (APs) inside Rhodesia. The APs were to be under the control and protection of a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF). Nothing was said of the Pfumo re Vanhu auxiliaries though, ultimately, they also remained in their bases.

  In addition to his main duties, the Commanding General of CMF was to head a Ceasefire Committee. This committee of eight, comprising two officers each from the British Army, the RSF, ZIPRA and ZANLA, was to facilitate inter-force co-operation and deal with any ceasefire violations that might occur.

  When Lieutenant-General Walls returned to COMOPS from London, he called me to his office to tell me that, when the time came, I was to be his personal representative on the Ceasefire Committee. He said, “I refuse to sit with those bloody Brits and communists or give them any sense of equal rank with myself or any of the service commanders.” Because I held the rank group captain (Army equivalent colonel) he decided to lend weight of rank to RSF representation by recalling Major-General Bert Barnard from retirement, but only to attend committee meetings. All executive functions were to be handled by me. My lack of faith in Bert Barnard caused me some concern but, in the event, we got on fine.

  In addition to Ceasefire Committee work, it would be my responsibility to act as the liaison officer between ZIPRA, ZANLA and COMOPS. This meant I had to establish a close personal relationship with the top commanders with a view to providing General Walls feedback on all relevant matters. In addition, I was to do whatever I could to ensure that the senior men were adequately cared for and give them whatever assis
tance I considered reasonable. No funds or other guidelines were given.

  It was such an anticlimax returning to routine operations, though my time was taken up to some extent in preparing for the early arrival of CMF military contingents. From early December, RAF C130 transporters arrived daily at Salisbury Airport and New Sarum ferrying in tons of equipment and Commonwealth soldiers from UK, Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji. Puma helicopters and large trucks came in by USAF C5 (Galaxy) heavy transporters.

  On 12 December 1979, the British Governor and his wife, Lord and Lady Soames, arrived to strains of ‘God Save the Queen’. This all seemed so unreal to us who were once such ardent royalists. Rhodesians did not leap to attention as in times before UDI but simply looked on in stunned silence. The long years of sanctions were over, but it was impossible to fully comprehend that the country was now effectively in British Government hands, for the first time in history.

  After the Governor’s arrival came two senior ZANLA commanders, Rex Nhongo (deputy commander) and Josiah Tungamirai (chief political commissar) who landed at Salisbury Airport to rapturous applause from thousands of black folk who had been forcibly ‘bussed in’ to welcome them. Later, at the same airport, the arrival of Joshua Nkomo with ZIPRA’s commanders, Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa turned out to be a low-key affair.

  I first met the CMF Commander, Major-General John Acland, at a cocktail party given by him to introduce his staff officers to General Walls, his staff officers and their wives. Being a purely military affair with no political overtones, it was a surprisingly easy-going occasion. One of the officers we met was married to a lady whose name was to become well known. He was Lieutenant-Colonel Parker-Bowles.

  Following the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in London by Muzorewa, Mugabe, Nkomo and Lord Carrington, the ceasefire came into effect at midnight on 23 December. The next morning, the first of the ZANLA and ZIPRA men trickled into the Assembly Points that had been made ready by CMF teams during the preceding two weeks.

  Even before this I had been in daily contact with ZIPRA and ZANLA commanders and their staffs who were billeted in the Audio-Visual Centre of the University of Rhodesia. From day one I found it easy to communicate with ZIPRA’s Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa. Both smiled easily and acted in a friendly manner. Their ZIPRA staff members were smart, efficient and courteous. Being the commander of ZIPRA, Masuku dressed in camouflage uniform and wore a Russian officer’s peak cap with no badge or emblem on its red band. Dabengwa wore smart-casual civilian dress.

  ZANLA was very different. It took ages before Rex Nhongo and Josiah Tungamirai opened up to any degree, possibly because they suffered major daily hangovers from heavy drinking. From the moment of our first meeting, Rex pressurised me to arrange for the return of his Toyota Land Cruiser taken by Selous Scouts at New Chimoio. The uniformed ZANLA commanders and men were surly and slovenly. Visits to ZANLA at the Audio-Visual Centre were initially made uncomfortable by particularly mean-looking individuals who delighted in cocking their AK-47 rifles as I passed. Once he got to know me better and having been promised the return of his Land Cruiser, Rex Nhongo put an end to this nonsense.

  Josiah Tongogara.

  On Christmas Day we received news that ZANLA’s top commander, Josiah Tongogara, had been killed in a vehicle accident in Mozambique. He was due to arrive in Rhodesia a few days later, having completed his briefing of all ZANLA forces still in Mozambique. At the time I was unaffected by this news because I thought Tongogara would be no easier to deal with than Nhongo and Tungamirai. I now know I was wrong to think that way.

  Rex Nhongo and Josiah Tungamirai seemed unmoved by the loss of their commander whereas ZIPRA’s hierarchy was visibly shaken and depressed by the news of Tongogara’s death. Masuku told me angrily that this had been no accident—it was nothing more than a deliberate assassination of a powerful military leader by radical members of ZANU’s political wing. Explanation for this was to come later but some time passed before a highly qualified mortician from Doves Morgan Funeral Services in Salisbury was sent to Maputo to view Tongogara’s body. Having done this, Ken Stokes concluded that Tongogara had died as the result of a vehicle accident and that no foul play was involved. You will see shortly why ZIPRA agreed with the vehicle accident aspect, but not with the ‘no foul play’ conclusion.

  Meetings of the Ceasefire Committee were held every Monday and Thursday in a small natty conference room in an outbuilding in the lovely gardens of Government House. General Acland sat at the head of the long table with Brigadier Gurdon at the other end. General Barnard and I were on one side of the table with General Barnard closest to General Acland. ZIPRA and ZANLA sat opposite us. ZANLA’s Rex Nhongo sat closest to General Acland with Tungamirai next to him. Then came Lookout Masuku with Dabengwa sitting nearest to Brigadier Gurdon.

  In this photograph taken at the start of a Ceasefire Committee meeting, Dumiso Dabengwa (left) and Rex Nhongo decided to pose as heads of their military wings whilst Lookout Masuku and Josiah Tungamirai watched from behind the camera. Next are the British Army officers, Brigadier Gurdon and General Acland. Rhodesians are General Barnard and Group Captain PB. The man in the background (left) is Lieutenant-Colonel Parker-Bowles.

  To begin with no staff accompanied General Barnard and me, whereas ZIPRA and ZANLA always had six or more seated and standing behind them. Later we had one intelligence officer and a very good-looking female secretary, Miss Gardener, sitting behind us to record proceedings.

  General John Acland conferred the title ‘general’ on each of the ‘guerrilla’ commanders in an obvious endeavour to give them equal status with himself and General Bert Barnard. In these circumstances I was the most junior man on the committee yet, almost from the start, I became aware of the fact that both ZIPRA and ZANLA looked me in the eye when making any contentious statement or responding to any query concerning cease-fire violations. I found this distinctly uncomfortable as any question from, say, General Acland, would be answered directly at me. Explanation for this took some time in coming.

  Most ceasefire infringements were levelled against ZANLA because, from the very beginning, it was obvious that ZANLA had kept the majority of its forces in the field and sent thousands of mujibas to the Assembly Points under control of a handful of genuine ZANLA juniors. ZANLA managed to fool the British who were only interested in the ‘number of ZANLA soldiers’ inside the APs. However, this situation incensed General Walls and the National JOC, the only Zimbabwe- Rhodesian authority able to challenge the Brits to hold to the rules set out in the Lancaster House Agreement.

  Most ceasefire violations resulted from election campaigning rifts between ZANLA and the Pfumo re Vanhu auxiliaries of Muzorewa and Sitole, whereas a few were undoubtedly generated by Selous Scouts who had kept some men in the field to monitor the extent of ZANLA violations. In the three months preceding elections, only a handful of problems were raised by or against ZIPRA whose forces within the country had moved into the Assembly Points in accordance with the London agreement. We knew however that over 10,000 ZIPRA men had remained in Zambia.

  ZANLA, on the other hand, had withheld some 17,000 men in Mozambique and used the forces in the country to force a Mugabe victory at the polls through viciously applied intimidation on the civilian population together with selective murder. Their line was, “ZANU started the war and only Mugabe can stop it. If Mugabe does not win the elections, the war continues and you will pay for it with your lives”. This was an impelling reason to vote for Mugabe. It was also precisely what we expected from him having known from the start that he would flout any agreement, particularly with Britain.

  Although this was in direct contravention of the London agreement, and in spite of overwhelming evidence to prove it, Lord Soames refused to rule against ZANU’s participation in the elections. Unfortunately General Walls, being a military man, seemed out of his depth in dealing with Soames and a Conservative Government that continued to rely on the manipulations and lies engi
neered by the British Foreign Office.

  Meeting after meeting Rex Nhongo and Josiah Tungamirai whispered to each other in their Shona vernacular. Most of the whispered communications held up proceedings whilst they conspired to find a way out of every accusation levelled at ZANLA and to conjure up counter-accusations. Both ZANLA men seemed particularly concerned not to be overheard by ZIPRA who would understand what was being said, but they were quite unconcerned about the four whites who they were quite certain could not understand their language. They were wrong! I understood all I heard.

  Some time in late February or early March, I foolishly let loose on Rex Nhongo in his own tongue challenging his past and present whispered lies. This had an electrifying effect on the meeting and obviously tickled the ZIPRA commanders who did nothing to suppress their mirth. Thereafter the whispering ceased, but I continued to be the one to whom every difficult communication was directed.

  The general elections were due to take place over three days commencing 27 March. Thereafter the new government would rely on the military to oversee the integration of all armed forces. It was obvious to me that my liaison tasks between our past enemies and COMOPS could not adequately prepare the ground for such a complex process. I conveyed this opinion to General Walls and suggested that a joint headquarters be established to prepare for integration and the calling-in of arms and equipment. It was a relief to learn that he recognised this need and had already earmarked a recently built wing at Army HQ for the purpose, though the move would not take place until the election results were known.