by DAVID KAHN
555 Deutschen Reichspost: T-175:129:2654865-9, with sample conversation at -70-74. T-175:122:2647449-51 for Churchill-Butcher, -60-62 for Clark, and -52-59 for conversation between British Embassy in Washington and a Mr. Cunningham in London. Hardie translations. Flicke, 233, for Hitler and system changed.
556 F.D.R.-Churchill 1943 conversation: Germany, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Kriegstagebueh des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, eds. Helmuth Griner and Percy Ernst Schramm (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1963), III, part 2, 854; F. W. Deakin, The Brutal Friendship (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962), 501-502.
556 F.D.R.-Churchill 1944 conversation: Schellenberg, 366.
558 early U.S. activities: Koenig, 1.
558 lab, Koenig: Walter Koenig, interview, April 19, 1962; AMS.
558 “Beginners”: Koenig, 33.
558 47 and 76 per cent: Schott, 17.
558 speech safety factor: Miller, 63-65, 69.
559 “The fact that”: Koenig, 33.
559 spectrograph solutions: Koenig.
560 Camp Coles, Japanese scramblers: Koenig, Part II, Preliminary Reports 24, 23, 2; Koenig, letter, June 18, 1965.
560 British 2-D solution: A. D. Fowler and E. C. Thompson, “Project 13-106, Report No. 2: Analysis of Recording of Speech Scrambled by British 2-Dimensional Privacy System,” Bell Telephone Laboratories for O.S.R.D.
560 improvement of privacy: “Project C-32, Final Report: Speech Privacy Decoding,” January 31, 1942, Bell Telephone Laboratories for O.S.R.D.
560 “privacy” not “secrecy”: Marshall in PHA, 3:1213.
560 teletype: Murray Teigh Bloom, “Teletype: The Amazing Mechanical Messenger,” The Reader’s Digest, XXV (December, 1956), 188-194, at 192.
560 Marshall: PHA, 29:2313.
Chapter 17 THE SCRUTABLE ORIENTALS
Notes to this chapter will be considered as an extension of those to “One Day of MAGIC.” All forms, abbreviations, authors’ names, carry over, with these additions: Documents in the Navy Department, Naval History Division, Classified Operational Archives, bear “COA” at the end of the citation. “USSBS (201), 3, 5” means “United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Interrogation Number 201, 3 and 5”; copies are in NA, RG 43. Space prohibits my naming the subject and position of the person interrogated. These mimeographed interrogations are not to be confused with the printed report, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence Division, April, 1946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), cited as Japanese Intelligence. The Operational History of Naval Communications is cited here as just Operational History.
I am grateful to Ikuhiko Hata for reading this chapter and offering some valuable suggestions.
PAGE
561 Japan’s Midway strategy: Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway, The Battle that Doomed Japan: The Japanese Navy’s Story (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1955); Thaddeus Tuleja, Climax at Midway (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1960); Samuel E. Morison, The Two-Ocean War (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963), 147-151. All references to Morison without roman numeral volume numbers will be to this book unless otherwise specified.
562 details of Combat Intelligence Unit and cryptanalytic work: Unless otherwise specified, all from Dyer and Wright, separate interviews, December 12, 1963; letters from them correcting notes to those interviews, December 27 and 19, 1963, respectively; Wright, telephone interview, May 14, 1964.
562 three days after Pearl Harbor: 18:3336; also Wright letter.
563 Dyer, Wright: Navy biographies; 36:247, 261.
564 Japanese attempts to change code: Dyer.
564 Navy Code Book D, administrative confusion: Operational History, 76, 91, 78.
565 April 17: Morison, 141. General foreknowledge of Coral Sea: 3:1132; Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (Department of the Army: Office of the Chief of Military History) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 275.
565 code pad error: Morison, 143; Chester W. Nimitz and E. B. Potter, eds., The Great Sea War: The Story of Naval Action in World War II (Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), 216.
566 Holtwick: Navy biography; 35:46, 36:262 (transcribed incorrectly as “Hopewick”).
566 monitoring: 23:677-678.
566 Holmes: Navy biography.
566 Holmes to Draemel to Nimitz: Admiral Milo F. Draemel, U.S.N., Ret., letters of November 29 and December 4, 1963.
567 200 ships in operation, more fuel: Fuchida, 79, 68.
567 Nimitz scents offensives: Samuel E. Morison, Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, May 1942-August 1942, Vol. IV, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1949), 80, 165-166; Morton, 280.
567 Nimitz, King views: Tuleja, 58.
568 naval forces: Tuleja, 51-52, 62.
568 May 20 order: Fuchida, 108, 80-84.
569 CHI-HE system: Operational History, 245-246.
569 coordinate AF, fresh water: J. Bryan, III, “Never a Battle Like Midway,” The Saturday Evening Post, CCXXI (March 26, 1949), 24-25, 50, 52-75 passim, at 50; independent recollection by Wright.
570 Finnegan: 36:251.
570 “The enemy is expected”: United States Navy, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Operation Plan 29-42, May 27, 1942, p. 2, COA. Nimitz’ estimate of enemy forces in this plan omitted the entire main body of battleships and heavy cruisers that Yamamoto planned for the coup de grâce. Why this should have happened, in view of the apparently complete cryptanalytic intelligence available to him, has never been explained. Perhaps the error was corrected after his plan was promulgated. Morison, IV, 84, notes but does not explain this.
571 Theobald suspects: Nimitz, 227.
571 Nimitz never mentioned cryptanalysis: Vice Admiral William Ward Smith, U.S.N., Ret., letter, November 17, 1963.
571 mail for Midway: Admiral Toshiyuki Yokoi, Teikoku Kaigun Kimitsushitsu (“The Black Chamber of the Imperial Japanese Navy”) (Tokyo: Shinseikatsu Publishing Co., Showa 28 [1953]), ch. 9, “The Midway Naval Battle,” at §3, trans. Flo Morikami; 3:1158 for “bit too thick.”
571 “Japanese are adept”: Operation Plan 29-42, 19.
571 Midway battle details and assessment: Morison; Fuchida; Tuleja; Nimitz
573 “I must also tell you”: Tuleja, 30.
573 “Midway was essentially”: Nimitz, 245.
573 “We were able”: 3.1132.
573 Goggins: Navy biography.
573 Melbourne unit: Fabian Navy biography; 35:87.
573 OP-20-G split-up: 9:3962, 8:3776-7; Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Laurance F. Sajford, Report No. 1473 to accompany S. 1524, 85:2 (April 28, 1958), 11-12 for Safford inventions.
574 Navy cedes diplomatic: 37:1083.
574 Nebraska Avenue: 29:2371.
574 Navy crypto growth: 4:1794, 3:1147.
574 Army cryptologic growth and organization: Harris, ch. 11, “Signal Security and Intelligence,” 327-350; The Origin and Development of the Army Security Agency, 14-17. Marshall gives very slightly different figures at 3:1146-7.
574 Vint Hill Farms: Thompson, 444, 445; Fred Paulmann, interview, April 19, 1962. Paulmann served at Vint Hill.
575 mechanization: Harris, 442, 443, 584, 592.
575 traffic volume: Harris, 49, 65, 90, 259, 585.
577 C.B.: Harris, 241-242, 340.
577 Sinkov: Army biography; Wilson Yulson, interview, May 18, 1963. Yulson served with the 138th Signal Company (Radio Intelligence), which trained briefly at C.B.
577 101st: Thompson, 298. He also lists the 117th, 121st, 122nd, 123rd, 128th, 849th, and 955th Signal Companies (Radio Intelligence) and the 860th Signal Company (Radio Intelligence, Aviation).
578 138th: Yulson. Nimitz, 344, for Hollandia; Harris, 258, for value of signal intelligence.
579 1925, Naval Ministry building: Naotsune Watanabe, untitled
manuscript dealing with his experiences as a wartime Japanese naval cryptanalyst of American systems (spring, 1962), trans. Flo Morikami, at 13. All references are to pages of Japanese text. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Watanabe for preparing this memoir for me.
579 “Tokumu Han”: Japanese Intelligence, 29.
579 Morikawa, Kamisugi, and all early details: Shiro Takagi, “Nippon No Black Chamber” (“The Black Chamber of Japan”), All Yomimono (Showa 27, Juichigatsu [November, 1952]), 157-175, at §§1-5, and Shiro Takagi, “Nippon Kaigun No Kimitsushitsu” (“The Black Chamber of the Japanese Navy”), Shukan Asahi (Showa 36, Junigatsu 8 [December 8, 1961]), 24-26.
580 Owada built: Operational History, 5; Takagi, “Nippon No Black Chamber,” §5.
580 10 full time, 10 part time, 60 recruits: Watanabe, 15.
580 Tokumu Han expansion and training: Watanabe, 16, 8, 7, 3-4; USSBS (433), 1, (437), 3.
580 fleet units: USSBS (219), 2, (437), 3, (309), 3.
580 Owada equipment: Operational History, 57.
580 20 prisoners of war: Watanabe, 18.
580 several thousand: Watanabe, 17.
580 nisei girls: Watanabe, 66: Takagi, “Nippon Kaigun No Kimitsushitsu.”
580 1943 move: Watanabe, 17; USSBS (431), 5.
580 2nd Branch, its sections: Japanese Intelligence, 30; Watanabe, 9.
581 3rd Branch, Morikawa: USSBS (208), 2, (431), 2; Watanabe, 10, 13.
582 Tokumu Han command: Japanese Intelligence, 29.
582 Kakimoto: Watanabe, 12.
582 Nomura: USSBS (208), 2.
582 failed on solving U.S. messages: Yokoi, ch. 9, §1.
582 no medium or high-echelon: Takagi, “Nippon No Black Chamber,” §7.
582 AN 103: Watanabe, 23-25; Takagi, “Nippon No Black Chamber,” §6.
582 BAMS: USSBS (208), 4, (201), 7, (238), 8.
582 worked most on strip cipher: My supposition, based on emphasis in sources.
582 CSP 642: Senate, Laurance F. Safford, Report No. 1473, at 12. Methods of use deduced from Japanese cryptanalytic techniques.
582 strips captured at Wake and Kiska: USSBS (208), 4; Shiro Takagi, untitled manuscript dealing with his experiences as a wartime naval cryptanalyst of American systems (spring, 1962), trans. Flo Morikami, at 1. Referred to henceforth simply as “Takagi” to distinguish it from his published articles. References are to pages of Japanese text. I am grateful to Mr. Takagi for preparing this memoir for me. Rear Admiral W. Scott Cunningham, who surrendered Wake to the Japanese, says in his Wake Island Command (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1961), that the Japanese read the coded dispatch ordering Cunningham to put War Plan 46 into effect after Pearl Harbor. Cunningham says that he destroyed all codes and ciphers before surrender and that the Japanese boasted that they had broken a code. I think it more likely that they found one that had not been destroyed.
582 I.B.M. tabulators: Takagi, 33-34
582 BIMEC, FEMYH: Watanabe, 36.
583 Shimizu, Oda, methods of solution: Takagi, 21-36.
583 solvers of strip ciphers: Takagi, 19.
583 Tokumu Han gives up on strips: Watanabe, 59; Yokoi, ch. 9, §1.
583 “Our whole analysis”: USSBS (431), 5. Operational History, 320-326, illustrates the poverty of fleet communications intelligence as well.
583 graphing: Watanabe, 35, 53; USSBS (431), 2-3.
583 bulge: USSBS (369), 7, (431), 3-4
583 Philippines, Marshalls: USSBS (437), 4, (208), 3.
584 Arisue: USSBS (238), 10.
584 Army communications intelligence: Japanese Intelligence, 31. I cannot locate any of these places in the Lippincott Columbia Gazetteer.
584 Yofuen, Machida: Takagi, 41-42.
584 Army field units, wiretapping: USSBS (451), 5, (450), 5.
584 “We did not break”: USSBS (450), 3.
584 14th Army cryptanalysts: United States, Navy, South West Pacific Command Headquarters, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Japanese Ten Day Period Reports on Monitoring of Allied Wireless Communications in the Philippines … Issued II January 1943 to 28 December 1943 by Watari Group (Shudan) (14th Army) Staff Section Counter-intelligence Squad, Limited Distribution Translations, No. 31, March 29, 1945, COA.
585 U.S. cipher disk: George E. Sterling, Intelligence Articles, 36; Harris, 272, says this was the M-94.
585 M-94s captured: Yokoi, ch. 9, §1.
585 “If you know”: John Keats, They Fought Alone (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1963), 181-182.
585 seven-page cipher: Colonel Allison Ind, Allied Intelligence Bureau: Our Secret Weapon in the War Against Japan (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1958), 122, 139.
585 Cebu number cipher: Japanese Ten Day Period Reports, 18.
585 “a special code”: Ibid., 27.
585 Peralta system solution: Ibid., 36.
585 double transpositions: Ibid., 46 (called “double substitution,” the use of which seems highly improbable here).
585 “on the general organization”: Ibid., 55.
585 “standstill”: Ibid., 61.
585 214 messages: Ibid., 65.
585 back files solved: Ibid., 75.
585 captured American yields keywords: Ibid., 77.
585 direction-finding units: Ibid., 58.
585 raids: Ibid., 75-76, 73.
585 “Although enemy wireless”: Ibid., 84.
585 “a fatal blow,” “as always”: Ibid., 99.
586 Heindorf House, Ferguson, impressive proportions: Ind, 193, 209.
586 outline of Japanese naval cryptography: Adapted from Operational History, 91-94. That D and RO are JN25 and that KO is the flag officers’ system are my suppositions.
587 Taiho code: Operational History, 326.
587 Japanese Army codes: 37:1061; IMTFE, Exhibits 833, 3729; United States, Navy, Pacific Fleet, South Pacific Force, Combat Intelligence Center, Item 964, “Excerpt from Notebook of Unknown Owner,” captured near Bougainville, November 27-29, 1943, COA.
588 code revision and code areas: Operational History, 11, 91, 81-84; Dyer for JN25’s dozen editions: “By the end of the war, they had gone through half the alphabet in new editions.”
588 administration and distribution: Operational History, 77-81, 63-64.
589 security lapses: Operational History, 86-89.
590 I-1: Operational History, 85-86; Halsey, 148-149.
590 water-soluble ink: Operational History, 64-66.
591 Army code exhortation: United States, Navy, Pacific Fleet, South Pacific Force, Combat Intelligence Center, Item 2a, “Translation of Captured Japanese Documents: ‘Revision of Codes, December 1, 1942,’” 34-39, at 35, 36, 39, COA.
591 Kiska “proof”: Operational History, 90-91.
591 2,000,000 copies: Operational History, 89.
591 PT-109: All noncryptologic details from Robert J.Donovan, PT-109: John F. Kennedy in World War II (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961). Cryptologic details from my reconstruction of the cipher system and key squares from plain and cipher messages in log of Arthur Evans, photographs of which he kindly supplied.
593 direction-finding system not solved, 75 solutions: Dyer.
594 direct line, noon positions, complaints: Lockwood, letters, May 22 and November 25, 1964; Lockwood, Sink’ Em All: Submarine Warfare in the Pacific (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1951), 110; 29:2403.
594 importance of submarines, Tojo statement: Nimitz, 422-423; Morison, 493.
594 primary contribution: Dyer.
594 40,000 soldiers: Congressional Record, XCI (October 25, 1945), 10053.
594 Yamato: Dyer; Nimitz, 223, 537-539.
595 Yamamoto presence in the Solomons: Nimitz, 285.
595 additive changed April 1: Lieutenant Commander Tatsuo Sagara, Taihei Yo Senso (“The Pacific War”) (Tokyo: Chuokoron Publishing Co.), III. Citation supplied by Ikuhiko Hata.
595 date and text of itinerary message: War History Office, National Defense College, Japan Defense Agency, Tokyo. The present translati
on was very kindly supplied by Fred C. Woodrough, Jr., of Silver Spring, Maryland, a wartime translator of Japanese for the Navy. Sagara says message was sent in the most secret code; this, together with the use of the additive, virtually confirms that the code was JN25. I do not think that the conclusion of a Japanese Navy court of inquiry after the war that an Army code was at fault need be taken seriously.
595 cryptanalytic details: Wright and Dyer; confirmed Lasswell, telephone interview.
595 Lasswell: Marine Corps biography.
598 pros and cons: Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton, letter, October 26, 1964.
598 Yamamoto personal details: Fuchida, 73-76; Zacharias, 92-93; James A. Field, Jr., “Admiral Yamamoto,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXV (October, 1949), 1105-1113; Halsey, 155.
599 Nimitz authorization: Layton, who states that the decision to shoot down Yamamoto was Nimitz’ alone, with no approval required of higher authority in Washington.
599 Wilkinson query: 4:1737.
599 cover story: Layton.
599 cryptologic dangers: My suppositions, confirmed by Dyer.
599 reply to Wilkinson: 4:1737; Layton.
599 Mitchell-Lanphier mission: Lanphier’s own story in The New York Times (September 12, 1945), 1:6, (September 13, 1945), 5:1, (September 14, 1945), 7:1-3, from which all quotes are taken; The Army Air Forces in World War II, eds. Wesley F. Craven and James Lea Cate, Vol. IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), 213-214.
601 burial, “There was only one”: Field, 1111; Andrieu d’Albas, Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II, trans. Anthony Rippon (New York: Devin-Adair, 1957), 254.
601 major victory: All sources agree on this evaluation: Nimitz, 285; Morison, 274; Morton, 415; Masanaro Ito with Roger Pineau, The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1962), 92.
601 “particularly high plane”: United States, Navy, Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force, C. W. Nimitz, first endorsement to Serial 00740, April 26, 1943, forwarding Combat Report of Air Command Solomon Islands, April 21, 1943 [the Mitchell-Lanphier mission], COA; Halsey, 157.
