by DAVID KAHN
640 Information Administration: Wolin and Slusser, 199. The agency which received suspicious coded letters from this administration is here called the “Special Administration (SPEKO)”; SPEKO is the acronym for the Spets-Otdel (Agabekov, 263); “administration” may be an almost synonymous translation of otdel (“department”).
640 Spets-Otdel: Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Commission on Espionage, Official Transcript of Proceedings (various places and printers, 1954-1955), 68. Henceforth cited as Transcript.
640 quasi-independent, responsible to central committee: Agabekov, 257.
640 attached to foreign directorate: Vladimir and Ekdovia Petrov, Empire of Fear (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1956), 55. The Petrovs declined to answer some questions about their cryptologic experience that I wanted to put to them (Australian Embassy, letter, 1964).
640 as 5th Directorate: Petrov, 80. I cannot find any description of an N.K.V.D. 5th Directorate to confirm this.
640 Boki: Petrov, 129-130; Transcript, 68-69, 99; Agabekov, 264; Orloff, 173; Bolshaya Sovietskaya Entsiklopediya (first ed.), VI (1927), cols. 686-687, trans. Mrs. Albright. He is not listed in the second edition.
640 buildings: Petrov, 86, 126-127, 129; Transcript, 68.
641 cryptographic sections: Transcript, 69-70; Petrov, 101.
641 section 6, Koslov, Petrov: Transcript, 68-69; Petrov, 153.
641 Ilyin, Degtjarov, Shevelev: Petrov, 60, 80, 84.
641 Section 6 growth: Petrov, 56; Transcript, 69.
641 Petrov’s job: Petrov, 56; Transcript, 69.
641 Bokov: Petrov, 80-82.
641 linguistic subsections: Petrov, 134, 142.
641 Kharkevich section: Transcript, 151; Petrov, 127.
641 Gusev: Transcript, 151; Petrov, 129; Bolshaya Sovietskaya Entsiklopediya (first ed.), XX (1930), cols. 27-28, trans. Mrs. Albright. He is not listed in the second edition.
641 Japanese section: Petrov, 128-129.
642 aristocrats, Krivosjies: Petrov, 127, 134, 140.
642 security: Petrov, 127, 129.
642 précis: Agabekov, 263.
642 Madame Moritz: Petrov, 149.
642 “carries on the work”: “OGPU—Reminiscences of the Chekist, G. Agabekoff,” trans. from Novoye Russkoye Slove of New York (October 13, 1930), in House of Representatives, Special Committee to Investigate Communist Activities in the United States, Investigation of Communist Propaganda, Hearings, 71:3 (December, 1930), Part I, Vol. 5 (GPO, 1931), 147-154 at 149.
642 “first-class lot”: Agabekov, 263.
642 section 8: testimony of Ismail Ege in Senate, Subcommittee on Internal Security, Hearings on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, 83:1 (GPO, 1953), XV, 1012-14.
643 Soviet military intelligence: Igor Gouzenko, The Iron Curtain (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1948), 120, 67-68.
643 O.R.D.: Dallin, 14. Transcript, 76, mentions a Colonel Vorobiev as head of a similar Otdel Radyosluzhby of the Komitet Informatsyi, a merger of the secret police and military intelligence (or at least of some of their foreign political intelligence functions) under the Foreign Ministry from 1946 to 1951.
643 Kravchenko: Gouzenko, 68-69, 168.
643 “I well remember”: Gouzenko, 65.
643 cipher-clerk training: Gouzenko, 59-61, 120, 150-151; Petrov, 49-55; Transcript, 67.
644 Leningrad signal school, Sokolniti institute: Ege testimony, 1002-3.
644 “We are being fired on”: General Gunther Blumentrjtt in The Fatal Decisions, eds. Seymour Friedin and William Richardson (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1956), 56.
644 enciphered code: Arne Beurling, interviews, September 17 and November 9, 1963; Paschke, May 3, 1962; NA Microcopy T-311, Rolls 83 and 84, Frames 7109028, 7110093-4. Henceforth this series of monthly reports of cryptanalytic activity of the German Army Group North on the Russian front from May 1943 to May 1944, trans. Hardie, is cited only by frame number. I think it likely that the O.K.W.’s translucent light device for solving enciphered codes, at first two-digit codes, was probably devised for this Russian system.
644 replacement: Many of the monthly reports refer to new systems solved, as 7109555 and 7109719.
644 reappearance: 7109555, 7109880.
644 shared and separate systems: Beurling interviews; 7110323.
644 Beurling solutions: Beurling interviews.
645 Swedish cryptanalytic help at Suomussalmi and Salla: Gyldén interviews.
645 44th Division advance, “the enemy’s casualties”: [Field Marshal Baron Carl Mannerheim], The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, trans. Count Eric Lewenhaupt (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1954), 340. Mannerheim says only that the “news” of this advance reached Finnish headquarters.
645 Red Air Force solutions: Segerdahl interview.
645 Finnish-German intercept exchange: 7109555.
646 no 5-digit solutions: 7109028, 7109123, 7109213.
646 no radio-intelligence service: Colonel-General Franz Haider, quoted in Heilbrunn, 147.
646 good order-of-battle information, Air Force betrayal: Flicke, 146.
646 “The best and most reliable,” “In those days,” “The Russians were,” “The Red Army”: Major General F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War, trans. by H. Betzler (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 246,260,261,260.
647 November, December, January new systems: 7109555, 7109719, 7109880.
648 table of solutions: Compiled by me from 7109028, 7109123, 7109213, 7109313, 7109446, 7109555, 7109719, 7109880, 7110093, 7110236, 7110321,7110432.
649 February 1944 report: 7110094.
649 German cryptanalytic failure, cryptanalysfs judgment: Flicke, 146-152, 166, 206, 209.
649 Enigma solved, “it is forbidden”: 7108488-9.
650 no Russian Foreign Office messages read: Paschke, Friedrich, and Beurling interviews; Selchow testimony, 20479 (and, by implication, omission of the Soviet Union from his affidavit listing those countries whose messages Pers Z solved); United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Japanese Intelligence, 31. Paschke for 1930 start of one-time pad. Beurling cited some technical details of how he failed to solve the messages but recovered some serial numbers that indicated a one-time pad to him. These independent, widespread, repeated, and highly circumstantial admissions make the failure to solve Russian diplomatic messages perhaps the best attested fact of World War II cryptology. Yet during 1941 at least, the German consul at Harbin, Manchuria, repeatedly forwarded to Berlin “intercepted” Soviet diplomatic messages from Moscow (DGFP, XII, 250-251, 793; some telegrams from Harbin are at T-120:105:113116-7, T-120:107:113431-2, which I have examined). Harbin was usually forwarding German translations of the Russian messages three days after they were sent from Moscow. Though none of my sources indicated that the Russians used ciphers of a lower grade than the one-time pad for diplomatic purposes. I think that this is the most likely explanation, particularly in view of the fact that all the Harbin intercepts appear to be circulars to all missions.
650 standard Soviet spy cipher: Clausen described his system in detail and deciphered the message of March 3, 1940, for his Japanese captors; an abstract is given in the official Japanese transcript of the Sorge ring interrogation, Gendai-shi shiryō (Materials on Modern History) (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1962), I, 93-98, kindly communicated by Chalmers Johnson. In addition, complete descriptions of the cipher are given in Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1949), 250-256, and in the Eriksson case, Case 13-1941, Rådhusrätten of Scheelegatan, Stockholm, with appeal in Nedre Justitie Revisionen. Dr. Käärik examined the court papers and very kindly made his notes and his analyses of the cipher available to me. Dr. Käärik also independently recovered the SUBWAY keyword from a photograph of a Clausen encipherment in Major General Charles A. Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1952),97.
651 keys: Willoughby, 98, for Clausen. Foote, 25
3; Dallin, 216, for Swiss. Eriksson case papers.
654 Sorge ring: general information from Willoughby and Johnson.
655 Clausen radio abilities: Johnson, 164-166; Willoughby, 39-44, 96.
655 “My heart jumped”: Willoughby, 235.
655 transmission details: Willoughby, 63, 98, 236.
655 Sorge teaches cipher: Johnson, 101.
655 “I always encoded”: Willoughby, 235.
656 Sorge discovered date of Nazi attack: Willoughby, 105; Johnson, 155-156.
656 groups sent: Johnson, 167; Sorge, 121.
656 Japanese interception, no solution: Willoughby, 96, 98; Johnson, 165; Schellenberg, 164; F. W. Deakin and G. R. Storry, The Case of Richard Sorge (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), 208-209, 212.
656 “There will be no attack”: Johnson, 158.
656 importance of Sorge information: John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941 (London: Macmillan & Company, 1962), 631; “Soviet Admits Sorge Was Its Spy in Wartime Japan,” The New York Times (September 5, 1964), 3:1-4; Deakin and Storry, 233.
657 Rote Kapelle: Dallin, 141-143,152-155, 243-253; Flicke, 174-184; Erickson, 638.
657 Schulze-Boysen in Forschungsamt: Shirer, 1043.
657 June 26: Flicke, 174.
657 six direction-finders: Heilbrunn, 24-25.
657 “proctor”: Schellenberg, 280-281; Flicke, 176; Dallin, 153.
658 Teramond: W. F. Flicke, Spionagegruppe Rote Kapelle (Kreuzlingen: Neptun Verlag, 1949), a fictionalized account of the spy ring, refers at 147 to “proctor” and at 131 to Le miracle du Professeur Teramond by Guy de Lecerf. No such book or author seems to exist, and it seems to be a juggling of the author and title of the Teramond opus, which has a zoologist Lecerf as a character and a geometer Dartifol, which is the name of the landlady in Flickers story. The book was published at Paris: Édition du Monde Illustré, 1910. I skimmed its 286 pages but did not find “proctor,” though its subject matter makes its presence likely.
658 120 messages: Dallin, 252-253.
659 Swiss network: Foote; Dallin, 182-233; Pierre Accoce and Pierre Quet, La Guerre a Été Gagnée en Suisse (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1966.)
659 sources: Accoce and Quet, 80-81, 176.
659 March 12: Foote, 60.
660 “Having returned”: Foote, 125-126.
660 six a day: estimate from Dallin, 198.
660 100 words: examination of “250 Intercepted Messages to and from Moscow,” a selection of the Swiss ring messages, in Dallin D Papers.
660 radio procedure: Foote, 76-77.
660 “My transmission time”: Foote, 126.
660 “On October 19”: Foote, 126-127.
660 “Moscow very largely”: Foote, 95. Erickson, 638, quotes this approvingly.
661 “splintering crash”: Foote, 165.
661 keys in Canada: Gouzenko, 190; Dominion of Canada, Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust, of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power, Report, June 27, 1946 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1946), 12. Henceforth cited as Canada, Report.
661 security in Australia: Transcript, 97, 100-101, 130, 157; Commonwealth of Australia, Royal Commission on Espionage, Report, August 22, 1955 (Sydney: A. H. Pettifer, 1955), 85. Henceforth cited as Australia, Report.
661 Ottawa fire: “Russians Scored on Embassy Ruin,” The New York Times (January 3, 1956).
662 photographed documents, burning, P.M.V.: Transcript, 21, 49, 121-123, 126.
662 acid: Pawel Monat with John Dille, Spy in the U.S. (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 55-56.
662 new cipher keys: Transcript, 9-92.
662 one-time pads in embassy: Australia, Report, 86.
662 different branches, different ciphers: Canada, Report, 13; Transcript, 117-118.
662 semisecret jargon: Australia, Report, 53; Transcript, 111-112.
662 codenames: Australia, Report, 53, 116; Transcript, 20; Canada, Report, 731-733, and 685 for “we have been unable.”
662 sensitive terms removed and separately enciphered: Transcript, 27, 122, 162, 208; Australia, Report, 86. This system was used during World War II by the French Resistance (Renault, Comment devenir agent secret, 117-118.)
662 letter of November 25, 1952: Australia, Report, 41-55, with photographs.
663 one-time pad types: Postage stamp is Abel’s, size given on F.B.I, photograph; scrolls are Krogers’, size given in Wide World Photos photographs; 1954 pad is that of Gregory Liolios, and 1958 is that of Eleftherious Voutsas, both Greek Communists, information from Greece’s General Security Police via Apostle G. Millis of Amarousion in letters of September 27, 1962, and January 8, 1963, for which I am greatly indebted; 1957 pad is Abel’s; 1961 pad belonged to a group of North Korean Communist spies captured November 20, 1961, by Japanese police, who sent me a photograph of it; booklet pad is Abel’s, with details from James B. Donovan, Strangers on a Bridge: The Case of Colonel Abel (New York: Atheneum, 1964), 47, 84, and United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Criminal Case 45094, United States of America vs. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, transcript of trial, 424-426.
664 typists: study of a page of the Voutsas one-time pad by Dr. Käärik, December 31, 1963, corroborated by Howard T. Oakley.
664 wastebasket: Donovan, 47.
664 Krogers’ pads: “An Innocent Looking Suburban House was the Hub and Bank of Spy Ring, Prosecution Allege,” The [London] Times (March 14, 1961), 4:1-7.
664 Martelli: “Britain Says Nuclear Scientist Had Spy Equipment in Office,” The New York Times (May 16, 1963), 4:4-5.
664 spy for East Germany: “Briefkasten an der Weser-Fähre,” Der Spiegel, XVIII (February 26, 1964), 24, 26; trans. Hardie.
665 Abel radio details: Donovan, 150, 211, 55-56.
665 Kroger radio details: London Daily Telegraph (February 10, 1961), 24; The [London] Times (March 16, 1961), 7; (March 17, 1961), 7; (February 8, 1961), 5, for “Mrs. Kroger showed.”
666 microdots: Donovan, 164-165,
666 Swedish Communist ciphers: Night Lead “Spies,” United Press dispatch UP41 (March 15, 1955).
666 Iran: “170 More Seized in Iran in Drive on Red Spy Net,” New York Herald Tribune (September 8, 1954); “Red Spy Network Smashed by Iran,” The New York Times (September 11, 1954); “Iran Forms Court for Spying Trials,” Ibid. (September 17, 1954); Isaac Don Levine, “The Anatomy of a Red Spy Ring,” Life, XXXIX (November 21, 1955), 172-174, 177-178, 181-182, 187-188, 191. Mr. Levine kindly sent me photographs of messages in the trigonometric code; these were analyzed by Howard Oakley.
668 drops, soft microfilm: Sanche de Gramont, The Secret War: The Story of International Espionage Since World War II (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962), 227, 227-228.
669 Hayhanen cipher: David Kahn, Two Soviet Spy Ciphers (Great Neck, N.Y.: privately printed, 1960), 4-12; reprinted in slightly altered form with some additional details as “Number One From Moscow,” Intelligence Articles of the Central Intelligence Agency, V (winter, 1961), A15-A28; diagrammed in David Kahn, “Modern Cryptology,” Scientific American, CCXV (July, 1966), 38-46 at 45.
670 “riddle”: Winston Churchill.
671 Russians solve American cipher: Senate, Subcommittee on Internal Security, The Wennerstroem Spy Case: A Translation Prepared for the Subcommittee, 88:2(GPO, 1964), 151.
Chapter 19 N.S.A.
To save space in the following notes, I use the following abbreviations: “GOM” for Office of the Federal Register, United States Government Organization Manual, 1964-1965 (GPO, 1964), with years being indicated only for other annual volumes; “AR” for Army Regulation and “AFR” for Air Force Regulation; “Martin-Mitchell” for “Text of Statements Read in Moscow by Former U.S. Security Agency Workers [William H. Martin and Bernon F. Mitchell],” The New York Times (September 7, 1960), 10. (As printed there, typographical error
s wrongly cite Harry Howe Ransom’s Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) as the source of a great deal of information. In fact the Ransom quote is two paragraphs long and ends with “world-wide scale.”)
I have relied extensively upon the following Department of the Air Force Manuals dealing with Air Force Communications-Electronics Doctrine (CED): Basic Concepts, Missions, and Functions with Communications-Electronics Applications, Air Force Manual 100-11; C-E Publications and Training, Air Force Manual 100-12; Communications-Electronics Policy, Air Force Manual 100-13; Utilization of USAF Communications Services, Air Force Manual 100-16; and USAF Communications Complex (AIRCOM), Air Force Manual 100-32, published at times ranging from 1959 to 1962. They categorize their topics according to a CED number, such as CED 1105.4b. The first two digits are the same as the number of the manual in the 100 series; CED 1105.4b is thus in Air Force Manual 100-11. The other digits refer to sections, paragraphs, and subparagraphs. I use CED numbers in all my citations because of their brevity and because they are more likely to remain unchanged through various editions and corrections than page numbers.
All government agencies issuing the documents cited are understood to be those of the United States, except in the case of a few British agencies, indicated as such.
At several points in this chapter, I have used the word “probably” or the verb “may” to indicate that the statement is my own supposition.
PAGE
672 Defense Communications System: wall display at headquarters of Defense Communications Agency, Arlington, Virginia; GOM, 201; CED 1107.5h.
672 Annapolis: “ ‘Network’ Casts Off for Atlantic Fleet,” The New York Times (March 8, 1964), 84:4; “Seagoing Pentagon Is Ready,” New York Sunday News (July 16, 1961), 10, for a similar vessel.
672 helmet radios: Department of Defense, Getting the Word … Military Communications, Pamphlet 1-8 (GPO, 1957), 6.
673 Air Force networks: CED 3201-3219.
674 N.S.A. origin: PHA, 35:87 for Willoughby, 9:4499 for Clausen, 10:4909 for Layton.
674 Dulles memorandum: quoted in Ransom, 218, 223.
