Shadow over the Atlantic

by Robert Forsyth

  At about 0500 hrs we give up our altitude of 2000 m and enter the Bay of Biscay at 100 m just north of the easterly low pressure area. We choose this ‘uncomfortable’ height, as we move into the reach of British long-range fighters. We try to detect the German Kriegsmarine coastguard boats early enough so as to give our identification signal in good time.

  Just before we fly over the coast, we advise our position together with increased radio transmissions from both radio operators: QFE, QFF and we also get some weather data from the airfield at Mont de Marsan. There’s voice radio connection: an ‘all-clear message’ from the airfield; and no activity over Bordeaux. We two pilots navigate the Ju 290 based on the navigational data supplied by the airfield radar. We proceed at 200 m over the centre of the airfield … Putting down our landing gear in pretty bad visual conditions, we at last see the airfield lights. The chief of the direction-finder station stands waving in front of the radio direction-finding hut and gives the awaited ‘Z’ signal.

  The landing is successful and we let the Junkers roll to a stop without braking, shut down the engines and at once we have complete silence. The crew bus comes out to us, and the ground personal help us out of the aircraft and into the bus. The technical personnel ask us about the status of the aircraft and the engines as we head towards the command post to give our operations reports. The end of a long busy flight!53

  Astro-navigation was of critical importance to the crews of FAGr 5. The bubble octant to which Nagel refers was a navigation device manufactured by C. Plath of Hamburg, and was used in U-boats and long-range aircraft to aid astronomical navigation by measuring the declination, or the angular height of a star. An artificial horizon was produced by a liquid bubble, similar to that in a spirit level, which levelled the motion of the platform. The measuring time was given by a small, integrated timer.

  Precise time-setting was essential for long-range aircrews for providing accurate astronomical navigation. This was also ensured by the use of an aerial navigation watch, in the case of the crews of FAGr 5, this being an IWC cal. 52T SC. The Ju 290’s commander wore such a watch, while the observer or navigator operated the bubble octant. Nagel mentions a ‘clear Plexiglas cover’ in the central fuselage of the Ju 290; this ‘astrodome’ was fitted between two pivoting, protective stands and could be fully revolved. The transparent cover was free of all optical distortions. Beneath it, on the floor of the fuselage, was a rotating platform approximately 1 m in diameter. This platform could be raised or lowered.

  The observer stood on this platform with the octant in his hand. It was possible to use a hook to fix the octant to the roof to assist in taking a sight, but this was not always practical because it was not always steady and the differing heights of crew members came into play.54

  The wearer of the watch stood nearby. The two men communicated with each other over the aircraft intercom. In operating the octant, when the observer had the square of the crosshairs and a star (which could also be the sun during daylight navigation) in view, he would announce, ‘Zero’, and then switch on his octant timer for the corresponding observation interval of 40, 60 or 90 seconds. The moment the wearer of the watch heard the word ‘Zero’, he would read the hour, minute and second indicators on his watch. Prior to every mission, navigation watches were synchronized with a ground-based chronometer kept in the operations room. The measured values to be read from the octant were: ten-degree setting, degree drum, degree disc in the integrator and minute drum, height of the star observed, half of the octant’s running time added to this, and the current time. When this data was entered into a calculating form that had been prepared earlier by an astronomer, the result was a location line which intersected with the course that was being flown, if the observed star was situated ahead of the aircraft, or which ran parallel to the course, if the star was situated to the right or left of the current course.55 (See also Appendix 5.)

  Meanwhile, at 1945 hrs, Ju 290 ‘E’ sighted a convoy in 24° West 9725 that was probably SL.148/MKS.39 inbound from Freetown and Gibraltar with around 70 vessels. Despite reporting the details of the convoy, it seems Fliegerführer Atlantik was not interested; the priority was ONS.29, against which the U-boats were preparing to attack. ‘E’ was instructed to continue with its planned patrol. Just over five hours later, at 0110 hrs, ‘E’s’ FuG 200 radar picked up ONS.29 in 34° West 3975. But the Ju 290 was unable to determine the number of ships. However, nine minutes later, the convoy’s bearing, as well as the distances the aircraft was from it, were signalled back on the tactical wireless frequency. This information was passed to the Hai boats, but because it was only a radar fix, it lacked details of course and speed. Nevertheless, during the early hours of the 19th, the U-boats chased both ONS.29 and ON.224, which were not far apart, although the presence of Liberators in the air forced several of them below the surface.56 The Ju 290 broke off shadowing at 0210 hrs some 40 km from the convoy. The Junker’s signal was also passed to the lone Bv 222, which was also operating, and the flying boat spent time shadowing the convoy from 0600 hrs before breaking off at 0719 hrs.

  According to the British radio intercept analysis:

  Two bearings taken on ‘E’s’ beacon signals at about 0200 were reported by U-boats and gave an unreliable fix. U-boats failed to include in their reports the bearing and distance of the aircraft from the convoy as reported by the aircraft on the beacon frequency – hence the order to ‘E’ to report these for 0200 on his tactical frequency. At 0200, however, a number of U-boats had been ordered to operate directly on ‘E’s’ beacon signals, presumably without reporting. After this initial deficiency in reports, control at 0300 instructed the next shadowing aircraft ‘D’ and ‘F’ also to give their bearing and distance from the convoy on tactical frequency.

  At 0350 hrs, once in the patrol area, Ju 290A-5 Wk-Nr 0179 9V+FK of 2./FAGr 5 under the command of its senior pilot, Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Schmidt, was instructed to search from 34° West 3973 on a bearing of 50°. At 0500 hrs, new orders were received for the aircraft to fly to 34° West 1976, and an hour later to 34° West 1915. But five minutes before the second of these revised instructions, the Ju 290 spotted the convoy, although it was unable to shadow it because of ‘fighter opposition’, which was reported on three occasions between 0544 hrs and 0630 hrs. Meanwhile, aircraft ‘D’ had also located shipping in 34° West 1915 and commenced making beacon signals at 0420 hrs. On this occasion, the U-boats did report bearings and the Junkers’ distance from the convoy. However, both aircraft were ordered to break off shadowing at 0648 hrs, presumably because of the presence of enemy fighters.

  Schmidt turned his Ju 290 around to the east and made course for northern Spain. Some four hours later, in accordance with tactical directives, as he neared the coast of Galicia, he descended to almost wavetop height to avoid detection from the menace of radar-equipped enemy fighters. On board 9V+FK, as described in other accounts, the crew would have been weary after a long night flight over the Atlantic, but highly alert, and all guns would have been manned. But for Schmidt and his crew, the worst was about to happen.

  Earlier that morning, a formation of four RAF Mosquito Mk IIs of No. 157 Squadron had taken off at 0916 hrs from their base at Predannack on the south-western coast of Cornwall to fly through cloudy skies on a routine ‘Instep’ patrol across the Bay of Biscay to the Spanish coast between Cape Ortegal and La Coruña. According to the subsequent RAF report:

  At 1152 an aircraft was sighted three or four miles ahead, flying at ‘0’ feet in an easterly direction; the formation closed in and the aircraft was recognized as a Ju 290. When about 1,000 yards away, it turned south flying into the sun, and opened fire with self-destroying ammunition, which appeared to come from mid-upper turret.

  F/Lt R.J. Coombs [with Flying Officer G.H. Scobie as Navigator] and F/Lt R.D. Doleman [with Flight Lieutenant L. Scholefield as Navigator – leading the formation] closed in to 600 yards on the starboard and the port side of the enemy aircraft, F/Lt Coombs making a beam
attack of about 60° which was over-deflected. A normal curve of pursuit was carried out and another attack made from 10° to port at 200 yards. Difficulty was experienced in keeping ring in sight, due to the bumpy conditions, and the burst went beneath port wing; another burst was given as range decreased and strikes were seen along the port wing and both motors, and the wing burst into flames. A further burst was given with less deflection and strikes were seen in the mid-fuselage which appeared to cause minor explosion in the fuselage which also caught fire. Pieces of debris flew past the Mosquito which broke off its attack position to make his second attack. F/Lt Doleman attacked from 5° to port at 550 yards range; strikes were seen on the tail unit and all along the fuselage and the port wing. A second burst, with range closing to 250 yards, produced more strikes along the fuselage and starboard wing. The enemy aircraft was seen to be burning inside the fuselage and top, behind the cockpit, and the port wing was also on fire.

  The Ju 290 gradually lost height and hit the sea with its starboard wing and blew up. A large aircraft dinghy upside down on the sea and two smaller ones were seen, but no survivors were observed.

  F/Lt Coombs’ aircraft received strikes on both wings and port engine, and he flew back to base on one engine, making a perfect, one-engine landing with no flaps. He was escorted by F/Lt B.M. Whitlock [with navigator Flying Officer M.B. Hull] and Lt J.B. Noble [with navigator Sergeant McCormick], F/Lt Doleman returning to base alone in order to organize A.S.R. should it be required, in the event of F/Lt Coombs having to ditch.

  In despatching the Ju 290, Coombs and Doleman had expended a total of 2,348 high-explosive/incendiary and semi-armour-piercing rounds of 20 mm cannon and .303-in machine gun ammunition and tracer.57 The description of the Junkers’ demise in the RAF report reinforces what Josef Augustin stated in his earlier account about the danger associated with the installation of the Ju 290’s fuselage fuel tank, which stood between the forward dorsal turret and the astrodome.58

  Meanwhile, Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5 had lost another valued and veteran crew, many of whom had flown with 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.Ob.d.L. in Russia, and another precious aircraft – the third of each in three days. Lost were Oberleutnant Karl-Heinz Schmidt (pilot), Leutnant Hermann Barth (observer), Oberfeldwebel Gustav Albers (pilot), Oberfeldwebel Emil Cudock (flight engineer), Feldwebel Gerhard Hähndel, Feldwebel Max Pötter (both radio-operators), Gefreiter Helmut Eimler, Unteroffizier Andreas Hofmann, Obergefreiter Walter von Soosten and Unteroffizier Bernhard Wermes (all gunners).59

  Two other Junkers, aircraft ‘A’ and ‘H’, were also airborne during the day, but both failed to locate the convoys on account of technical or mechanical problems.

  For the U-boats, the operation against ONS.29 had been nothing short of a catastrophe. They had failed utterly to make an impact on any of the convoys. Furthermore, at 1000 hrs on the 19th, HMS Woodpecker and HMS Starling, both sloops from Captain F.J. ‘Johnnie’ Walker’s renowned 2nd Escort Group, forced Kapitänleutnant Hartwig Looks’ Schnorchel-fitted U-264 to surface and its crew to abandon ship. That afternoon, the frigate, HMS Spey, from the 10th Escort Group covering ONS.29, sank Oberleutnant zur See Rolf Heinrich Fritz Albrecht’s U-386 having firstly blown it to the surface with depth charges, before shooting it up with gunfire as its crew leapt off their stricken boat. Spey had sunk U-406 the day before. This was enough for BdU to dissolve the two Hai groups and to form a new group, Preussen, of 15 boats, four of them newly arrived from France adding to the rest formerly from Hai. Preussen, which was moved to a position 650–800 km north of the Azores, would be the last anti-convoy wolfpack of the war.60

  In his history of the U-boat war in the Atlantic, written under the auspices of the US Navy and the British Admiralty, Gunther Hessler writes of the action against this convoy:

  The take-off times of the ten aircraft then available were adjusted so as to ensure continuous shadowing from dusk till dawn, but the first two aircraft to reach the area missed the convoy, probably because of navigational errors. They made only brief contact on the return flight at about 0100 on the 19th and, although the homing signals sent by succeeding aircraft were received, cross-bearings were too acute to give an accurate fix. It was not until 0500 that a good fix could be obtained, and it then became apparent that some of the aircraft had been far out in their estimated positions. Theoretically, about eight boats could have reached the convoy by daybreak; in practice, however, they merely sighted a few destroyers and established enemy radar activity. The operation was finally broken off at daylight, when the boats had to submerge owing to the presence of an aircraft carrier in the convoy.61

  In total, the Fliegerführer Atlantik had deployed two Ju 88s, 17 Ju 290s, three Fw 200s and two Bv 222s against the convoys between 14 and 19 February – a total of 24 aircraft. Of the 24, the following ten aircraft dropped out (in addition to the three Ju 290s lost):

  four Ju 290s and one Bv 222 due to engine trouble

  two Ju 290s due to radar and radio defects

  two Ju 290s due to compass failure

  one Fw 200 due to other causes

  In the war diary of the BdU, it was noted with some rare conciliation:

  The large number of aircraft defects which developed, especially towards the end, were caused by lack of proper maintenance, in turn due to the high pressure under which the aircraft were operating. Reconnaissance was only made possible by doubling the number of aircraft in a flight and sending one out as a reserve. That so many flights were made, particularly on the last night, was due to the most strenuous and devoted efforts on the part of the maintenance personnel.62

  ____________

  By mid-February, the winter temperatures fell sharply at Mont de Marsan and cold winds blew in daily from the Biscay. The war news was not good. From the Eastern Front, German forces were on the retreat in many sectors: Luga, once the base of 3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.Ob.d.L., had been lost, and from the East came the troops of the 2.SS-Panzer-Division ‘Das Reich’ who moved into the Mont de Marsan area in order to rest and re-equip after an intense period of fighting with heavy losses.63

  With the recent losses suffered by the Gruppe, it was a time of sombre reflection for the men of FAGr 5. Oskar Schmidt recalled:

  In the unit, the question arose as to whether the training on aircraft and armament was thorough and long enough. Could we afford to sacrifice such experienced flying personnel? In a short period of operations, five aircraft (55 crewmen) had already been lost. Reports stated that 200,000 GRT of enemy tonnage had been found in the convoys, but – as far as the Gruppe was aware – 18,000 GRT had been sunk!64

  He also noted, apparently with some frustration, the following:

  Our flying personnel carried out some very good reconnaissance out at sea in February. But one deficiency was that the crews were not sufficiently informed by the relevant commands about their evaluations and the use of our reconnaissance by other branches of the armed services. At the time, the U-boats could hardly cross the Biscay to the open sea, let alone be expected to find the convoys. Question: were we supposed to fly reconnaissance over the Atlantic, just to monitor ships’ movements and tonnage figures?65

  There is evidence to suggest that the technical infrastructure at Mont de Marsan was not always adequate at this time. On 14 February, for example, Leutnant Hellmut Nagel of 1./FAGr 5 flew Ju 290A-5 Wk-Nr 0176 9V+GH on a flight to the workshops at Bordeaux-Mérignac, where presumably there were better maintenance facilities or supplies of tools, parts and equipment.66

  From the 20th to the end of February, there would be no further long-range reconnaissance missions. This was partly on account of the weather, but also because U-boat operations in the Atlantic had almost come to an end as a result of Allied escort and air counter-action. In the last three weeks of February 1944, 12 large convoys had passed through the Western Approaches, at least two of which were saved from heavy attack. For Dönitz, the balance sheet made grim reading; 11 U-boats had been sunk, in return for the torpedoing of HMS Woodpecker,
which resulted in its eventual capsizing (this sloop, it will be recalled, had sunk U-264), the destruction of two aircraft of Coastal Command and the sinking of a straggling merchant vessel.67 Furthermore, the Preussen pack had failed to catch the Liverpool–New York convoy ON.225, which the Allies had re-routed as a result of Enigma decrypts.

  At Mont de Marsan, 20 February saw the arrival of Hauptmann Georg Eckl, a former Seenot (air-sea rescue) flier, as successor to Karl-Friedrich Bergen as Staffelkapitän of 2./FAGr 5, though Eckl’s presence did little to counter the increasing trend for numbers of the unit’s men, mainly its ground personnel, being withdrawn from the unit to bolster other Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe front-line units which had suffered heavy losses in the ground-fighting in the East or in the Mediterranean.68

  Next day, Hauptmann Fischer called the whole Gruppe out for inspection in order to read to his men a message received from Grossadmiral Dönitz via the Fliegerführer Atlantik commending them on the excellent performance that they had put in during their operations over the past weeks, despite mechanical, technical and meteorological adversities. After the men were dismissed, Fischer discussed operational matters with his Staffelkapitäne before departing the next day for Berlin. There he met with Generalfeldmarschall Milch, the Generalluftzeugmeister, and Generalmajor von Barsewisch, the General der Aufklärungsflieger, to present his thoughts on the war against the convoys and the anticipated level of losses. It was a bleak assessment:

  At the present time, there are eight Ju 290s available to the Gruppe. Of these, half are presently in the Reich undergoing repair, so that only three to four machines are operationally ready.

  On present experience, every 16th operational sortie results in a total loss. As the weather improves, so the protection of cloud cover falls away, although against radar-equipped long-range fighters, that is little defence. Also, the nights will become shorter, the days longer, so enemy long-range fighters will be able to monitor the Bay of Biscay in daylight. Our losses will inevitably increase. Also, for the U-boats, it has been a bad time. The Biscay will be covered by radar-equipped British long-range fighters by day and night, and every U-boat will be attacked by bombs and guns. The losses among the U-boats are enormous, and only a few make it out into the open Atlantic. The U-boat command expects it will be September 1944 before boats become available again in greater numbers for operations.