Shadow over the Atlantic

by Robert Forsyth

  Decision and Proposal of the Kommandeur FAGr 5

  It is proposed from ‘above’ to reinforce operations by FAGr 5 by the end of June 1944. This [interim] timespan [to September] should be used to improve training for flying personnel on aircraft and for operations. Also aircraft can be throughly overhauled during this time and the intended reinforcements take place.

  The Kommandeur is planning for additional aircraft: February 1944 – one aircraft; March two; April two; May four; August five. That equates to 18 aircraft by the end of August (based, of course, on full production). From these aircraft a number, together with crews, will be assigned for other tasks.

  Here, Fischer is probably alluding to the planned deliveries of the anticpiated Ju 290A-7 variant, while the last sentence is most probably an early, veiled reference to the rumoured intended cooperation between FAGr 5 and the Luftwaffe’s covert operations Geschwader, KG 200 which would require Ju 290s for other long-range operations (see Chapter Fourteen). Fischer continued:

  Alternatively, during this time, the aircraft could be taken out of unit service and moved to workshops in Germany for fitting out with improved weaponry.*

  Results and Recommendations:

  To reduce future losses in the Gruppe, sea reconnaissance to be carried out in greater strength (using two to three aircraft at a time). The aircraft could then give each other mutual defensive fire in the event of being attacked by fighters.

  Fischer was forthright:

  But the following questions need to be asked:

  Why is Atlantic reconnaissance being conducted with substantial losses if a) the U-boats cannot sail and b) the Condors of KG 40 at Bordeaux, with bombs, cannot get far enough out to sea to attack? Are our losses not too high already, just to find out about convoys in the Atlantic?

  These will, if reconnaissance is to continue to be flown up to September 1944, when the U-boats are expected to be operationally ready once more, make maritime reconnaissance for the U-boat arm impossible!

  Is it not more appropriate, to familiarize the crews more thoroughly with the Ju 290, its armament and the ‘Hohentwiel’ equipment, so that by September the maximum level of training can be achieved?69

  Perhaps because of Fischer’s visit to Berlin, on 22 February no less a figure than Generalmajor von Barsewisch returned with the Kommandeur to Mont de Marsan. But if Fischer and the officers of the Gruppe expected a sympathetic hearing from the General der Aufklärungsflieger, they were to be disappointed. During an after-dinner address in the officers’ mess that evening, von Barsewisch simply announced that he could not countenance the concerns or wishes of FAGr 5’s personnel, and that ‘further ruthless operations’ were expected of the Gruppe, particularly since the unit’s results were now being studied closely by OKL and senior staffs. From that point on, the subject was to be considered closed.70

  Three days later, on the 25th, Oberst Rupprecht Heyn, the Kommodore of KG 40 and a veteran maritime reconnaissance flier, was the guest at another dinner hosted by FAGr 5. Fischer endeavoured to explain to Heyn his plans for the tactical deployment of his Gruppe and the challenges facing it, but Heyn seemed indifferent, claiming he was not responsible for FAGr 5’s operations. As Oskar Schmidt noted, ‘One got the impression that the Kommodore of KG 40 could not, or would not, understand our difficulties.’ However, generally cooperation between the two units on a day-to-day basis remained good with regular liaison.71

  As February 1944 drew to a close, gradually the weather in western France began to improve. In order to keep the men fit and alert, the Stabskompanie organized various sporting activites and country pursuits, as well as setting up training sessions in weapons and gas mask drill. Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5 organized its own football team and, amongst other fixtures, played Major Walter Nowotny’s JG 101 at Pau.

  Meanwhile, at a higher level, during one of his midday situation conferences at his headquarters at Angers at the end of February, the Fliegerführer Atlantik, Generalleutnant Kessler, was surprised to receive an unexpected visit from Generalmajor Alexander Holle, who entered the room and promptly announced that he was assuming command as Fliegerführer Atlantik with immediate effect. A startled, but courteous Kessler replied that he knew nothing of this and that he would need verification from the Luftwaffenführungsstab. A few hours later, Kessler received a teleprint message advising him of his replacement. He packed his bags and prepared to leave.

  Alexander Holle’s position at this time is not entirely clear; he had been serving as commanding general of X.Fliegerkorps in the Mediterranean, at least until late 1943, but seems to have been transferred to Western Europe in some capacity until his takeover of Fliegerführer Atlantik. Holle was not a popular officer and little would change during his time in command, either with regard to what had been Kessler’s staff or to the units he commanded.72

  With recent losses, increasing Allied air activity, lengthening daylight, lack of aircraft, and the withdrawal of men for front-line duties, the spring of 1944 began a period of great uncertainty for the Luftwaffe campaign to defend and master the airspace over the Bay of Biscay and the eastern Atlantic.

  * * *

  *This most likely means the fitting of external underwing wing racks to the Ju 290A-7 and the installation of Kehl/Strassburg equipment for operations with the Hs 293 glide-bomb.

  CHAPTER TEN

  FADING SHADOWS

  March–May 1944

  I pressed home my own attack, hitting the Junkers repeatedly at close range. It crashed into the sea and exploded. All that remained of the Junkers was an oil slick and a few floating pieces of debris.

  Lt. Allen R. Burgham, RNZVR, 835 NAS, May 1944

  Commencing 19 February through to the end of April 1944, there was an almost complete absence of Luftwaffe long-range convoy reconnaissance over the Atlantic.1 In March, most flying on the part of FAGr 5 (and other units under Fliegerführer Atlantik for much of that period) was restricted to air training sorties in which crews practised navigation skills and air gunnery. But even these were few and far between.

  During the afternoon of 4 March, one Ju 290 was picked up by British decrypts carrying out practice-firing along the Biscay coast, but it would not be until 0730 hrs on the 22nd that the listening stations heard the intentions for another to fly out on a six-hour training flight from Mont de Marsan to 14° West 245 to 251. Otherwise very little was heard from FAGr 5.2

  Indeed, in a summary of ‘German Air Force policy against convoys’ in early April, British intelligence gloated:

  There has been no convoy recce in the Atlantic since 18th February. During the week preceding this date three Ju 290s, two Fw 200s and one He 177 are known to have been shot down by 10 Group (Air Defence of Great Britain), 15 Group (Coastal Command) and carrier-borne fighters. This included both the Ju 290s taking part in one operation, and – even more impressive – two different fighter attacks on the same attacking formation of He 177s and Fw 200s by Mosquitos on its way out across the Bay of Biscay (entirely fortuitously) and again by carrier-borne aircraft over the convoy.

  Furthermore, several Ju 290 shadowers were driven off by carrier-borne fighters and prevented from making adequate reconnaissance reports.

  In his summing up after the operation, Captain U-boats attributed the failure of the U-boats to the failure of air cooperation … This appears to be a strategical success of some significance and might almost be deemed a ‘turning point’ in the war against ocean convoys.3

  The month of March started badly for FAGr 5: the US Eighth Air Force made itself felt for the first time at Mont de Marsan when B-24 Liberators of the 2nd Bomb Division attacked the airfield as part of a wider-ranging operation against airfields in western France.4

  However, it seems the Gruppe had received advanced warning of the raid, and managed to get its small number of Ju 290s into the air in advance, and thus they escaped destruction or damage. Furthermore, because of cloud, Mont de Marsan escaped the effects of the bombing relatively unscathe
d. However, it was to be a portent of things to come and a sign that western French airfields were now a target for the Allied strategic air forces.

  Despite the raid, in early March, FAGr 5 mounted a few more practice air-firing flights off the French coast, with usually one aircraft up at a time.5

  On the 10th, Generalleutnant Kessler visited Mont de Marsan to bid the officers and men of Fernaufklärungsgruppe 5 farewell. Oskar Schmidt recalled: ‘The outgoing General thanked FAGr 5 for its operations to date and told us that we had written a glorious page in the history of the German war effort over the Atlantic.’6 Kessler would be shipped off to Tokyo where he would serve as German air attaché. He was awarded the Ritterkreuz in April 1944 in recognition of his leadership skills.7

  The quiet period continued into the second half of March, with more air gunnery and navigational exercise flights being undertaken. On several consecutive days, such practice flights were made along the Biscay coast, sometimes with an aircraft taking off every two hours.8 On the 17th, a Sunderland flying boat of No. 10 Squadron, RAAF, was on an ‘uneventful’ patrol over Biscay out of Mount Batten in Devon when, according to the squadron’s record book, ‘a dark camouflage, unidentified aircraft was sighted flying at a height of 2,000 ft on course 180° at a distance of ten miles on the starboard beam. The aircraft was a four-engined monoplane with twin square fins. Correct recognition could not be made as the unidentified aircraft turned on a westerly course and was lost in cloud. Nothing further was seen.’9 From their description, the crew had probably seen a Ju 290.

  Another reminder of the dominating strength of American airpower came on the 15th, when the Staffelkapitän of 2./FAGr 5, Hauptmann Eckl, and his crew, together with Oberleutnant Schmidt of the Stabskompanie, flew to the supply base of the Gruppe at Achmer in order to collect some replacement vehicle engines from the main military vehicle park at Osnabrück. While Eckl and Schmidt were at Achmer, the airfield suffered an Allied air attack and the accommodation buildings where FAGr 5 had established itself the previous year were heavily damaged. The base had already been subjected to a bombing raid by 103 B-17s and 11 B-24s of the US Eighth Air Force on 21 February, which dropped 317 tons of bombs. Workshops to the north-east of the field had either been destroyed or left badly damaged and the runways were still scarred with hurriedly filled-in craters.10

  On the 21st, Hauptmann Fischer initiated a wargame at Mont de Marsan in which the Stabskompanie played the role of ‘enemy paratroops’ in an ‘airborne assault’ on the airfield. The personnel of 1. and 2.Staffeln ‘fought’ to defend and retain the airfield, but in the process many ‘shortcomings’ were revealed, especially in the transmission and carrying out of orders. But aside from wargames, the airfield air raid alarm was sounded almost daily from late March 1944.

  On 23 March, Kessler’s successor, Generalleutnant Holle, still commander of X.Fliegerkorps, visited Mont de Marsan and stayed for a ‘gentlemen's evening’.

  ‘The air raid warning sounded in good time,’ remembered Oskar Schmidt, ‘and the airport was largely cleared of personnel and equipment. A few French civilian workers who had ridiculed our defensive preparations lost their lives through their own carelessness in the attack. Hauptmann [Jochen] Wanfried, a pilot in the Gruppenstab, left the Stab motorcycle near the main accommodation buildings and it was hit by bombs. The surrounding pine forests were set on fire by the bombing and there were some major wildfires.’

  The airfield Flak defence managed to hit and damage several of the raiders. FAGr 5 suffered the loss of its single Bf 108 courier aircraft, as well as the motorcycle. While these losses may have been light, the reality was that such raids marked the beginning of a ‘softening-up’ process by the Allies.

  By late March 1944, there was a growing recognition and acceptance within the German military, at all levels, of the fact that the Allies would probably launch an invasion on the French coast during the spring or summer months of that year. At this time, Grossadmiral Dönitz, who, on 22 March, had withdrawn the Preussen boats from a large area of the central Atlantic, was instructed to assemble a force of 40 U-boats intended for inshore operations in the event of an Allied invasion – what would become known as the Landwirt grouping, a measure which resulted in a decline in the number of boats passing across the Bay of Biscay. The reality, however, was that U-boats would have little effect against determined, strongly protected landing forces, as demonstrated off Italy in 1943 and 1944. The few boats that did go into the Atlantic in April would serve only as weather reporters or thinly veiled decoy boats to disguise the overall German withdrawal. Dönitz further told Hitler that operations against the convoys could not be resumed until improved boats were available, as well as improved Luftwaffe reconnaissance.11

  The Allied and Soviet vices were beginning to tighten on Nazi Germany, and Oskar Schmidt recorded: ‘The retreat in the East continues and the air attacks in the West grow more intensive day by day.’

  Indeed, Mont de Marsan itself had been on the receiving end of its first major bombing attack on the afternoon of the 27th when 47 B-24 Liberators of the US Eighth Air Force dropped 1,500 general purpose and fragmentation bombs, totalling 137 tons, directly on the airfield, striking hangars, various buildings, stores and a dispersal area to the north of the airport. The USAAF post-mission report noted: ‘There are four concentrations of fragmentation bursts running north from the wooded area in the south end of the field, across the landing area and north-east dispersal area.’ Nine Ju 290s were observed on the ground, two of them under camouflage netting, but they seemed to have escaped major damage.12

  On 29 March, as the ground personnel of the Gruppe, Hiwis and local civilians worked to clear the damage at Mont de Marsan, Hauptmann Fischer held a meeting with his Staffel commanders and Stab officers to establish contingency measures for the Gruppe in the event of an enemy assault against western France from the coast and/or from the air, and if necessary a plan to effect a quick relocation to another base. It was agreed that an evacuation of Mont de Marsan by air and road was preferable to, and more practical than, by rail. Railway rolling stock was not always available, it had to be prepared and it always ran the risk of air attack. However, once in the air, although a Ju 290 could carry a reasonable load of extra men and equipment, it too would be vulnerable. In the end it was agreed that aircrews would fly out in the aircraft that were available, together with certain equipment, but that the bulk of FAGr 5’s personnel and equipment would move by road.

  The tension caused by a mix of anticipation and uncertainty over the future, combined with some boredom, was relieved a little by a small festival held on 5 April and organized by former KG 40 man, Oberleutnant Otto-Karl Kremser. ‘For a few hours,’ recorded Oskar Schmidt, ‘it took the mens’ minds off the war.’

  On 8 April, Hauptmann Fischer held a detailed meeting with his Gruppenstab to discuss the short and medium-term future of the unit, and beyond that, to what extent FAGr 5 could expect to be equipped two years ahead. However, in Schmidt’s view, whilst ‘anticipatory planning was certainly good, to try to forecast such a period in the present war situation was hardly worth discussing.’13

  The meeting was interrupted by an air raid warning, which although causing much disruption, brought no sign of the enemy. The following day, however, according to Schmidt, one Ju 290 undergoing overhaul at Achmer suffered 40 per cent damage as a result of enemy air action, but it is not possible to verify which machine this was.14

  The 10th, however, did see another precious Junkers suffer damage when Ju 290A-4 Wk-Nr 0166 9V+DH, flown by Hauptmann Emil Sachtleben of 1./FAGr 5, made an interim stop at Bourges while heading for Dessau. The big four-engined aircraft was hit on the ground as B-24 Liberators bombed the airfield; it was lucky to sustain just 20 per cent damage and the crew was fortunate to escape injury.15

  The Gruppe had between ten and 14 aircraft by this stage, but not all of these were operationally ready.16 Indeed, because of the low amount of flying conducted in April and May 19
44, the Gruppe found it economical to concentrate operational flying on just a few aircraft whilst leaving others standing idle. This policy enabled each aircraft to build up its necessary flying hours before being sent back to Achmer or Dessau for overhaul.17

  The remainder of April saw the unit conducting a limited series of air-firing flights and navigational excercises. One such example on the morning of the 27th involved Leutnant Nagel of 1.Staffel flying a 90-minute air-gunnery practice flight in Ju 290 (KR+LQ) 9V+FH.18 This is noteworthy, for it was a freshly delivered aircraft, Wk-Nr 0186, and only the second or third of the eagerly awaited A-7s to be delivered to FAGr 5 – the first being Wk-Nr 0188 (KR+LS) 9V+FK, which arrived on 3 April.19 In terms of size and weight similar to, and, with four BMW 801D engines rated with 1,700 hp at take-off, powered like the A-4 and A-5, this variant was intended from the outset as a maritime reconnaissance/anti-shipping aircraft. With a crew of ten, it featured an armoured cockpit, improved braking system and provision to carry two cameras in the left and right waist gun positions. It also heralded the incorporation of a distinctive, bulbous, glazed nose into which was fitted another 20 mm MG 151 cannon (semi-rigid). In addition to FuG 200 radar, the A-7 could be rigged to carry the offensive load of three air-launched Henschel Hs 293 or three Ruhrstahl SD 1400 Fritz X guided stand-off bombs which Hermann Fischer so badly wanted for long-range missions over the Atlantic, one such weapon mounted on an ETC rack under the outer wing panels with a third carried under the fuselage. The reality, however, was that it had arrived too late.