Victory in the East

by John France

  39 See below p. 272; Aleppo Chronicle, p. 579.

  40 BD, 18; OV, 5. 31 (using BD), 271; RA, p. 134–5.

  41 RA, pp. 134–5 and see above p. 138; BD, 65.

  42 RC, 649.

  43 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 141–2; AA, 489.

  44 OV, 3. 68–75.

  45 RC, 649; RA, p. 105.

  46 A. Lewis, Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean 500–1100 (Princeton, 1951), pp. 225–49 suggests that Byzantine mercantile and naval power was in decline at this time especially relative to that of the Italian cities, and this may well be true but the Greeks made a major effort from Cyprus. On Byzantine naval power see H. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la Mer, Bibliothèque byzantine, Etudes 5. (Paris, 1966).

  47 BD, 80; Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, pp. 180, 304, 305.

  48 GF, p. 72; AA, 435.

  49 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 141–2, 146–9; RA, p. 56; Caffaro 49.

  50 RC, 681; AA, 417; Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, 387, p. 237; BD, 73, n. 17; such large figures need to be treated with caution for ships were quite small carrying of the order of eighty passengers, fifteen crew and forty horses in the twelfth century. Later vessels could carry up to 1,000: S. M. Foster, Some Aspects of Maritime Activity and the Use of Sea-power in Relation to the Crusading States, D. Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1978, pp. 109–20; AA, 446.

  51 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 165–7.

  52 HBS, 181, 206; AA, 383; GF, pp. 37–8, 42 speaks of the Egyptian envoys being at the coast.

  53 Caffaro, 49–50; RA, 49; GF, p. 30.

  54 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 165–7; RA, p. 59; GF, pp. 39–40 mentions the decision but not the fleet; AA, 383 refers to ships without specifically mentioning any new arrival.

  55 Caffaro, 56–7; RA, pp. 141, 147; GF, p. 88.

  56 AA, 467, 377; RC, 688–9; RA, p. 139; GF, p. 88.

  57 Rogers, Siege Warfare, p. 126, suggests that the coming of the ships transformed the crusaders’ engineering capacity; see above p. 163.

  58 On Cyprus see P. Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191–1374 (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 1–5. On the strength of Egyptian naval power on the Palestinian littoral see below p. 327, n. 7.

  59 See above p. 98 and below p. 336; Foster, Maritime activity, p. 56, points out that the only firm figures we have of Western naval strength are thirteen Genoese ships which put into St Symeon in October 1097, the thirty English ships mentioned by RA and six ships which entered Jaffa of which two were Genoese: see above p. 98, below pp. 214, 336.

  60 Caffaro, 50; this reads very like other descriptions of the fighting on 6 March 1098, but only Bohemond is mentioned as escorting the sailors. Caffaro mentions some of the Genoese knights as fighting on horseback, which could mean that they had transported horses from the west – but not necessarily.

  61 RC, 639.

  62 RA, p. 134, Hills’ own translation, The History of the Frankish Conquerors of Jerusalem (Philadelphia, 1968), p. 113; Niermeyer, Mediae lalinitatis lexicon minus (Leiden, 1976), p. 733.

  63 On Laodicea see David, Robert Curthose, pp. 230–44; Aleppo Chronicle, 578; Florinensis Brevis Narratio Belli Sacri, RHC Oc. 5. 371.

  64 See above pp. 98–9.

  65 See above p. 134.

  66 RC, 649; RA, p. 50; AA, 380–2 lists him as being at the Lake Battle in February 1098, but Albert’s lists of names are often erratic. Tudebode, p. 43, says he was told to defend the camp; Shepherd, ‘The English in Byzantium’, 52⏻93.

  67 OV, 5. 271.

  68 GR, 2. 366, 310; Barlow, William Rufus, p. 371; N. Hooper, ‘Edgar the Aetheling: Anglo-Saxon prince, rebel and crusader’, Anglo-Saxon England 14 (1985), 208–210, emphasises that Edgar left England with an army to support the claim of his nephew Edgar to the Scottish throne in 1097 and thinks it unlikely that he could have reached the east as Ordericus suggests, but accepts William of Malmesbury’s account of the pilgrimage of 1102 when he fought at Ramla.

  69 Edgar was the son of Edward the Exile and grandson of Edmund Ironside (died 1016): Hooper, ‘Edgar the Aetheling’, 197–214; GN, p. 254.

  70 Bohemond persuaded Daimbert of Pisa to lend his fleet for this enterprise: AA, 500–1; Yewdale, Bohemond, pp. 87–9.

  71 Caffaro, 66.

  72 RA, p. 128.

  73 AA, 348–9, 357.

  74 AA, 380, 447

  75 AA, 500–1.

  76 David, Robert Curthose, pp. 237–8 handles Albert’s account very roughly and makes some of these points.

  77 Lambert of Hersfeld pp. 121–5 is the chief source for the stories which are analysed by C. Verlinden, ‘Le chroniqueur Lambert de Hersfeld et les voyages de Robert le Frison, Comte de Flandres’, Annales de la Société d’Emulation de Bruges 76 (1933), 83–94.

  78 See above p. 101.

  79 M. Brett, ‘The military interest of the battle of Haydaran’, in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp, eds., War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London, 1975), pp. 60–77; Chansond’Antioche, 1. 143–70 and see also S. Duparc-Quioc’s ‘La composition de la Chansond’Antioche’, Romania, 83 (1962), 11–12; AA, 331.

  80 RA, pp. 140–2.

  81 AA, 503–4.

  82 Alexiad, pp. 353–4; David, Robert Curthose, p. 238 rightly criticises P. Riant, ‘Inventairecritique des lettres historiques des croisades’, Archives de l’Orient Latin, 1 (Paris, 1881), 189–91 and Chalandon, Alexis I Comnène, pp. 212–17 for assigning this letter to the first half of 1099. In fact Anna’s account of the later stages of the First Crusade is a mess – she confuses their victory at Ascalon on 12 August 1099 with the near disaster of Baldwin I at second Ramla on 17 May 1102; the letter makes much more sense if read as part of the Provençal-Greek alliance as it developed after the crusade.

  83 BD, 18; RA, pp. 134–35. Ordericus’s references to fleets are based on those of Bauldry 5.31 – BD, 18, 5.99 – BD, 65, 5. 161 – BD, 98, except for the story of Edgar Aetheling p. 271.

  84 AA, 414; BD, 80.

  85 As Rogers, Siege Warfare, p. 83 points out; on the siege of 969 see Bouchier, Antioch, pp. 216–19.

  86 RA, pp. 46–7, 54; the matter is discussed by France, ‘The departure of Tatikios from the Crusader army’, 138.

  87 RA, p. 48.

  88 G. Downey, A History of Antioch in Syria (Princeton, 1961) pp. 528–9, 545–552.

  89 RA, pp. 47–8; GF, pp. 76–7; Ibn Butlân cited and tr. G. Lestrange, Palestine under the Moslems, p. 370; G. Rey, Étude sur les monuments de l’architecture militaire des croisés en Syrie etdans l’île de Chypre (Paris, 1871), Pl. 17.

  90 AA, 365 describes the city as two miles long and 11/2 wide. On Antioch see: Rey, Étude sur les Monuments, pp. 183–204 and Pl. 17; Lestrange, Palestine under the Moslems, pp. 367–77; the massive account of the excavations done in the 1930s, G. W. Elderkin et al., eds. Antioch-on-the-Orontes: the Excavations of 1932 (Princeton, 1934–48), is skilfully distilled in Bouchier, Antioch, and for the walls see especially p. 220. Antioch has expanded enormously since these books were written. The old city (to the east of the Orontes) has grown far beyond the line of the walls on the plain and the lower slopes and their remains have vanished. It is only on the ridge high above the city (Mounts Staurin and Silpius) that there are substantial remains, most notably of the citadel, as modified by the crusaders. On the southern side these extend down into the edge of the town by the Hastahane, the city hospital, where the remains of the aqueduct remain a notable feature. The west bank of the Orontes forms the new city and here all evidence of the past has been buried under a carpet of concrete flats and shops. The various water courses have all been culverted and therefore we are reliant on the observations of the pre-war and earlier scholars, though the Parmenian torrent remains evident above the city. In 1972 the ancient bridge over the Orontes was demolished and replaced. At present the citadel and the walls high on Mount Silpius are approached by what I have called the ‘back road’ which goes via Altinözü to the Syrian plain through the mountains. It may give readers so
me sense of the scale of the ancient enceinte to know that from the Bridge Gate to the wall above the city on this road is a drive of fourteen kilometres.

  91 AA, 367–8; 407–8.

  92 Ibn Butlân writing in 1050 cited and tr. Lestrange, Palestine under the Moslems, p. 370; RA, pp. 48, 51–2, 58, 60–2; Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 149–52; GF, pp. 32, 39–41; on the Bridge of Boats see below p. 230 and on the fighting on the St Symeon road p. 254.

  93 See below pp. 263–4.

  94 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 166.

  95 GF, 14–15 provides some information but RA, p. 43 is much fuller for Nicaea.

  96 AA, 364–5; GF, p. 28.

  97 AA, 366;RC, 641–2, 643.

  98 RA, pp. 48–9.

  99 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 149–52 Krey, First Crusade, p. 155; RA, pp. 48–9; FC, p. 93.

  100 Bouchier, Antioch, p. 218; Cahen, Turkey, pp. 76–7.

  101 AA, 367–8.

  102 RA, p. 51

  103 Tudebode, pp. 50–1.

  104 RA, pp. 49–51; AA, 367–73, 419; GF, pp. 29–30.

  105 GF, pp 29–30; RA, p. 49 tells us that Robert of Flanders went on this expedition; Tudebode, p. 36; HBS, 187.

  106 AA, 368, 366.

  107 See above p. 224.

  108 RA, p. 48 comments on this, though it should be noted that AA, 366 says that some had returned to Godfrey’s army from Mamistra.

  109 See the map p. 221.

  110 AA, 370, 374; RC, 64–45; RA, p. 63; GF, pp. 32, 43.

  111 AA, 370–1.

  112 AA, 372.

  113 AA, 372; Hugh and Engelrand figure in the Chanson d’Antioche, 11. 1354, 1377, 1380, 2638, 2673, 2729, 2890, 3651, 4704, 4724, 6135 which develops the theme of the rivalry between the father and son enormously.

  114 AA, 368–70.

  115 GF, pp. 29–30, 35, 39, 43–46; RA, pp. 46–7, 49, 56, 58, 59, 64.

  116 AA, 374.

  117 On the make-up of the Council which governed the crusade see above pp. 20–1; FC, p. 93; RA, p. 74; GF, pp. 39, 58–9.

  118 For example see above pp. 41–3.

  119 al-Mulk, pp. 111–13.

  120 See above p. 231; RA, pp. 54–5.

  121 See above pp. 229–32 and AA, 372; RA, p. 50, Krey, The First Crusade, p. 134.

  122 See above pp. 147–8; Latham and Paterson, discuss this technique of firing backwards in Saracen Archery, p. 74 and illustrate it in their ‘Archery in the lands of Eastern Islam’, in R. Elgood, ed. Islamic Arms and Armour (London, 1974), 82–4.

  123 RA, p. 51; AA, 371–3.

  124 RA, pp. 51–2; see above pp. 192–3.

  125 RA, pp. 51, 56, 57, 63; AA, 363; GF, p. 36.

  126 RC, pp. 639–41; AA, 331, 373, 397.

  127 GF, pp. 29, 41.

  CHAPTER 8

  The siege of Antioch; crisis and delivery

  * * *

  The siege was significantly tighter by December 1097 but by that time operations were running into a new phase for the sources are unanimous – food was desperately short. This crisis of supply saw the crusade come desperately close to failure. Albert of Aachen says they had simply eaten up the resources of the countryside and the surrounding cities round about. Ralph of Caen speaks of shortage, stressing how food had to come from afar: Syria, Cilicia, Rhodes, Cyprus, Chios, Samos, Crete and Mytilene. It was a bitter winter, quite unexpectedly like home as Stephen of Blois would remark, and Ralph speaks of its harshness rotting the weapons of the army. Even Stephen of Blois, who was an incorrigible optimist, speaks of the suffering and starvation amongst the North French from which many were rescued only through God’s aid and the wealth of the leaders. Anselm recalled that bitter winter: ‘Why recount the trials of many kinds, which, even if passed over in silence, are sufficiently evident in themselves – hunger, intemperate weather and the desertion of faint-hearted soldiers.’1 Such hardship must have had a devastating effect on the army encamped in the plain outside Antioch and exposed to the worst of the weather. In December 1099 Baldwin of Edessa and Bohemond met at Baniyas south of Laodicea and marched south to Jerusalem where they arrived in fulfilment of their crusading vows on 21 December. During this march of only some three weeks in winter weather Fulcher records deaths due to exposure. The attrition in the crusader camp must have been appalling. The nature of casualties has already been discussed but it is worth remembering that in the American Civil War 200,000 men died in battle, and twice that number from disease.2 Moreover, the enemy were pressing hard, especially from their bases beyond the Iron Bridge, so that the Anonymous confesses: ‘No-one dared to go into the land of the Saracens except with a strong force.’3

  A strong force led by Bohemond and Robert of Flanders was accordingly assembled and sent off to ravage for food towards the lands of Aleppo only to encounter a powerful enemy army led by Duqaq of Damascus. The Anonymous says that Bohemond volunteered, but both Raymond of Aguilers and Albert report that he and Robert of Flanders were sent by the leaders, Raymond noting that Godfrey was ill and Robert of Normandy absent. It is not clear who was in command, and probably neither leader was. It was a substantial force but surely not as large as the Anonymous’s 20,000 infantry and knights nor Albert’s reported 2000 knights and 15,000 foot; Raymond of Aguilers says there were 400 knights, which sounds reasonable in view of what we know of loss of horses, and mentions the infantry, whose numbers we cannot estimate, only in passing when he says that Bohemond was alerted to the presence of the enemy by some of his peasants. His figure of 60,000 for the enemy must be regarded as a gross exaggeration.4 The expedition entered the valley of the Orontes, for according to the Arab sources it met the army of Damascus near Albara and later fell back on Ruj, the base which Raymond of Toulouse had captured on the eve of the siege of Antioch. This suggests that they aimed to ravage the rich area of the Jebel Barisha where they would later establish a strong lodgment.5 It is likely that the expedition reached Ruj by taking the road via Daphne to the Orontes crossing at the Jisir ash-Shogur, for Bohemond came back over ‘Tancred’s mountain’, which is crossed by the Antioch – Daphne road and so-called because Tancred later blockaded the St George Gate there.6 This route must have been the normal line of communication with Ruj and explains how they managed to keep such an exposed area in their control through the bitter winter of 1097. Harem effectively cut them off from the plain of North Syria (see fig. 4). The force which they encountered was that of Duqaq who had left Damascus about the middle of the month and was accompanied by his great atabeg, Tughtigin, and Janah-ad-Daulah of Homs. He was responding to the supplications of Shams-ad-Daulah who, as we have noted, had been sent by his father to seek aid for Antioch.7

  The Franks were completely unaware of the presence of an enemy force in the vicinity of Albara; according to Raymond of Aguilers the crusaders were attacking a village when some of their footmen cried out that the enemy was at hand and Robert of Flanders and a small group which included some Provençals rode out to chase them off. They were successful, then suddenly saw the enemy main force, notably many foot, on a nearby hill. Albert says they awoke one morning to find the enemy all about them. The Damascus army was making its way north and had reached Shaizar when news came of the Frankish incursion and it moved to the attack.8 The Arab accounts tell us little else about the battle. Amongst the Western sources Ralph of Caen makes no mention of it at all, perhaps because Tancred was not present, and neither does the second letter of Stephen of Blois, written in April 1098. Anselm of Ribemont, writing in July 1098, gives it only a brief mention. The Anonymous was not present and was obviously reporting second hand. He does not mention surprise and simply says that as the enemy approached they divided into two forces with the intention of surrounding the Franks, but that Robert of Flanders and Bohemond charged shoulder-to-shoulder in a single line into the enemy who took to flight, and so ‘we came back in great triumph’ and Our men took their horses and other plunder’. It all sounds very straightforward – a brief hard fight and to the victor the
spoils. But it is precisely on this point that equivocation sets in, for having told us that they were victorious and seized spoil, the Anonymous goes on to say that when they returned to Antioch very few of Bohemond’s men had any plunder.9 Raymond of Aguilers was not an eyewitness either and presumably got his information from the Provençals who accompanied Robert of Flanders. He says that enemy scouts caught Bohemond unawares when he was plundering; they were driven off by Robert of Flanders who then confronted the enemy main force. Robert was reinforced and sent against the enemy as a vanguard while Bohemond trailed behind to prevent the enemy surrounding them: ‘For the Turks have this custom in fighting: even though they are few in number, they always strive to encircle their enemy. This they attempted to do in this battle also, but by the foresight of Bohemond the wiles of the enemy were prevented’. According to him when the enemy saw that the Franks were determined to close they fled and were pursued for 3.2 km, while Bohemond joined in the execution. However, this account suffers from the same strange inconsistency as that of the Anonymous – the admission that there was no plunder, and Raymond’s explanation strains credulity – it was he said: ‘A strange result of this achievement … after the enemy had been put to flight the courage of our men decreased, so that they did not dare to pursue those whom they saw headlong in flight’.10 Surely, if there had been any pursuit at all the enemy camp would have been looted? These two accounts are fairly compatible if we take the Anonymous’s reference to Bohemond and Robert riding to battle side-by-side figuratively rather than literally, but it is a strange battle in which the victor gains no spoils. This can be explained in part; the crusaders had fought a hard battle and avoided encirclement but, unable to destroy the enemy, they feared to press and fell back on Ruj. This theory of a drawn battle is perfectly plausible and the Moslem sources which simply say that the Franks fell back to Ruj and Duqaq to Homs can be read as substantiating it. In this view the Anonymous and Raymond were claiming victory when the reality was rather different for almost any victory would have yielded the plunder of the enemy camp.11