Victory in the East

by John France

  There is another weakness in these two accounts; they both report a battle of knights – whatever happened to all the infantry whom Raymond mentions and the Anonymous says were present in large numbers? Albert of Aachen tells us about them. He was dependent upon Lorrainer knights for information and as far as we know none were present, but the Lorrainers were later to enjoy close relations with the Flemings, so we cannot just dismiss his account. According to Albert, on the morning of 31 December the crusaders found themselves surrounded. Bohemond called the knights together and formed them into a phalanx, ‘a tightly-packed front, a tortoise of shields’, and broke out of the enemy encirclement abandoning their booty and leaving the foot to be massacred – presumably the heavy casualties mentioned in the Arab sources. The following day Robert of Flanders, who had become separated from Bohemond, gathered 200 knights and attacked the enemy who were by now thoroughly dispersed, and recovered some of the plunder but was forced to abandon it. The main difficulty of the account is Bohemond’s role – he is said to have returned to Antioch crestfallen and what little glory there was thereby went to Robert of Flanders, but Raymond of Aguilers, otherwise no friend of Bohemond, says that he gained a great reputation at this time. However, Albert generally minimises Bohemond’s deeds, perhaps consciously in order to exalt Godfrey – this shows most clearly in the battle against Kerbogah.12 If we allow for this bias Albert’s account explains the salient facts rather better than any other, especially the lack of plunder and the fate of the infantry. Moreover, his explanation of the fate of the infantry receives a kind of endorsement from Raymond of Aguilers who says that when six weeks later the leaders were planning the Lake Battle, they decided not to send infantry out against Ridwan’s approaching army for fear that some in their ranks would panic.13 This is rather puzzling, because by this time a large number of horseless knights could have provided high-quality infantry but it becomes much more understandable if there were clear experience that infantry could not stand in the open, and anyway they were likely to remember, by recent example, that knights could abandon them all too easily. Moreover, in a more general way the accounts of this conflict are sketchy, which suggests that it was something less than a glorious victory. Since we do not even know where the battle took place and are faced with contradictory and vague accounts, it cannot be reconstructed with any certainty.14 The foraging battle was a drawn battle; the crusaders were surprised but their cavalry broke out of an enemy trap and fought well, in close order and perhaps with a rearguard. They even returned to the fray again the next day, but they were unable to gather food and their victory was gained at the expense of a massacre of infantry. The enemy, for their part, were either unable or unwilling to follow up their advantage and contented themselves with having repulsed an attack. From the crusader viewpoint the result of the battle was in a sense victory, for survival was victory and it may well have been from this perspective that a rather inglorious episode was later written up by those chroniclers who mentioned it, albeit with inconsistencies. It was ignored by others or dismissed briefly. Albert was not personally involved and simply recorded what he had learned, with all its limitations and confusions, some years later. But the episode shows that the crusaders were learning to deal with Turkish attacks. They knew the need for close order at Dorylaeum. The use of a rearguard was in a sense developed during the attack on Harem in November 1097 when knights attacking the castle fell back upon Bohemond’s main force which then crushed the enemy.15 That such a sensible adaptation to the needs of war against the Turks could be employed in an army taken by surprise points to a high degree of discipline and order at least amongst the knights. A factor in instilling this was undoubtedly the sense that they had to win together or die separately, and this was probably an even more powerful incentive on the next occasion when they met an enemy army, at the Lake Battle some six weeks later. The Foraging Battle was a near-disaster for the crusader army, perhaps because of the lack of a single command. They suffered heavy losses and returned victore et vacuo, victorious but empty-handed, as Raymond of Aguilers puts it, with little food for the army.16

  The check administered to the army deepened the crisis. Starvation continued with appalling losses, we have already observed. There was unrest and the crusader leaders established judges to impose order and peace. Associated with this were the ecclesiastical celebrations in early January 1098, called for by Adhémar, whose most notorious measure was the expulsion of women. This was a desperate effort to revive morale which had plummeted in the wake of the failure of the foraging expedition. To reassure their followers the princes promised to see out the siege. Even so there were deserters, most notably William the Carpenter, Lord of Melun and Peter the Hermit who fled ‘because of this great wretchedness and misery’. Bohemond caught both of them but William later sloped off anyway.17 Others secretly considered leaving and even Bohemond wavered, announcing that he could not bear to watch his men and horses dying of starvation. Louis, archdeacon of Toul fled with 300 followers to a place about 4.8 km from Antioch which was well-supplied, only to be slaughtered by the Turks.18 The fact that food was to be found reminds us that this was the period of the wanderings of Peter Bartholemew in search of food.19 Food was available – the Anonymous says that after the failure of the foraging expedition Syrian and Armenian merchants bought up supplies and sold them at high prices.20 The problem was not just lack of food, although that was to a degree inevitable in winter, but getting it to the camp. For in the winter sea travel was difficult and the Turks were stepping up their attacks on the crusader army. Albert says that it was at this time of great misery that the crusaders got into the habit of foraging in well-protected groups of 200–300, but even so there was terrible carnage.21 The Provençal knights refused to cover such foraging expeditions in January 1098 because of the loss of horses, and Count Raymond was obliged to offer them compensation. The military significance of this event has escaped notice somewhat. It was a profoundly ominous sign for the crusader army – that knights were fearful of escorting foraging expeditions. In the war of attrition this was a clear sign that the strain was telling, the balance tilting away from the crusader army in favour of the enemy. If this continued then the army would starve to death. It was not something confined to the Provençal army – all the leaders were obliged to offer compensation for lost horses in the same way as the Count.22 It cannot be too heavily emphasised that the first object of war is to get food and to deny it to your enemy; if the crusaders were becoming unwilling to fight for it they faced starvation and collapse. This is a tribute to the skill of the Turks in Antioch and their allies in Harem and along the Aleppo road. The absence of Robert of Normandy, who remained at Laodicea, and the illness of Godfrey and Raymond of Toulouse could not have helped matters while the departure of Tatikios, the imperial representative, in early February 1098 must have depressed morale even further.23

  The Anonymous says Tatikios departed promising to fetch supplies and reinforcements and, according to Raymond of Aguilers, to bring imperial aid. Their comments are, however, deeply informed by hindsight; the general tenor of their remarks is a charge of cowardice but it appears that Tatikios left before news of the approach of a major enemy relief force reached the army. Albert lists Tatikios amongst those present at the start of the siege, remarks that he took up a position behind the others because he was ‘ever ready for flight’, and draws attention to his presence later at Philomelium as one who had deserted the army; however he gives no account of his actual departure, a subject on which Ralph of Caen is also silent. The letters of Stephen of Blois and Anselm of Ribemont, which are contemporary documents, do not mention his departure at all. Perhaps, in the circumstances, it seemed quite a good idea for him to seek imperial aid and this story was accepted at the time. In retrospect the event assumed a quite different importance and indeed it was to have disastrous implications for the Byzantine alliance.24 It is likely that Tatikios had resurrected his idea of a distant blockade of Antioch, precipitati
ng a quarrel with the count of Toulouse who was obliged to develop a scheme whereby he compensated knights who lost horses on foraging expeditions, thus depriving Tatikios’s policy of its chief rationale. Tatikios thus found himself isolated, suspicious of Bohemond and at odds with the count of Toulouse, and so he decided to leave the army to seek help. In the circumstances of isolation and starvation in which the army found itself this must have appeared pretty reasonable at the time.25 Albert of Aachen mentions further efforts to mount foraging expeditions by Godfrey de Bouillon and Raymond of Toulouse, both of which failed. So severe was the crisis of morale that in the face of disorders in the army severe measures had to be taken to enforce discipline and morality; one of the victims was an adulterous couple who were whipped and paraded naked round the army as per the arrangements made in the New Year.26 This appalling winter of 1098 with its severe losses was a terrible test of the will of the crusader army and in these dark hours efforts to tighten the siege all but came to a halt.

  Albert of Aachen records what may have been one effort to close a major gate of the city early in 1098. He is vivid in his descriptions of the savagery of the enemy raids coming out of Antioch. He believed that the main source for these raids was in the mountains and far away from the St Paul Gate which was besieged by Bohemond, this suggests the St George Gate, but his topography is always weak and it is possible that the Bridge Gate was intended. Here, he tells us, Count Raymond made an effort to establish a redoubt and one day ambushed an enemy attack, capturing a young man of noble family. The princes tried to use him to get his family to betray the city but Yaghisiyan heard of the matter and stopped negotiations. The unfortunate young man, accused by native Christians of having persecuted them, was tortured and decapitated. This may be the same person whom the Historia Belli Sacri describes as an Emir who had put to death twelve pilgrims by throwing them off the city wall; he was captured by Peter Raymond of Hautpoul and an effort was made to use him to gain a lodgment in the city. When this failed he was killed.27 Albert’s dating is very confused and it is possible that the story relates to Raymond of Toulouse’s tower, the Mahommeries, built in March 1098 outside the Bridge Gate, especially as Raymond of Aguilers says that until this tower was built the Count had done little due to illness and was accused of laziness.28 It is probable, however, that this was an earlier effort to tighten the siege for Albert later refers to the construction of the Mahommeries in the clearest terms.29 However, there can be no doubt that the starving army was quite clearly on the defensive in January and February 1098 and indeed perilously close to defeat. The Anonymous’s comment on the situation of the army at this time is eloquent and apposite:

  We were thus left in the direst need, for the Turks were harrying us on every side, so that none of our men dared to go outside the encampment. The Turks were menacing us on the one hand, and hunger tormented us on the other, and there was no-one to help us or bring us aid. The rank and file, with those who were very poor, fled to Cyprus or Rum or into the mountains. We dared not go down to the sea for fear of those brutes of Turks, and there was no road open to us anywhere.30

  It was at this point that the crusaders heard of the approach of a strong enemy relief army under Ridwan of Aleppo. Yaghisiyan had sent his son Shams-ad-Daulah to seek assistance and after Duqaq’s failure to relieve the city in December 1097 he proceeded to Aleppo.31 The increased enemy pressure which the Franks seem to have been feeling by the end of January, was probably the result of this diplomacy for from Harem Ridwan was in a good position to mount attacks on the crusaders. Matthew of Edessa suggests that the crusader leaders tried to counter Antiochene diplomacy by telling Duqaq after the foraging battle that they had no designs outside the old Byzantine lands. The Historia Belli Sacri suggests that the battle took place because a converted Turk, who had taken the Christian name Hilary, defected and told the Aleppans of the plight of the crusader army though this seems unlikely.32 The besiegers were now, as the Anonymous makes clear, in some sense besieged. In early February Ridwan’s army was approaching and on 8 February the leaders held a meeting to discuss what to do about the approaching enemy army which was by now very close. Aleppo is only one hundred kilometres from Antioch – Raymond of Aguilers says a mere two days journey and he is supported by Ibn Butlân, who says it was a ‘day and a night’s march’.33 Ridwan achieved a high degree of surprise for the leaders met in the house of the bishop (who presumably was absent) on 8 February, by which time they knew the enemy were encamped at Harem only thirty-five kilometres away (see fig. 4). The central fact about this battle on the crusader side was that they had very few mounted knights at their disposal – only 700 in all and many of them mounted on pack animals and even oxen.34 The leaders then took a highly significant step: for the first time they appointed a single commander for the whole force. They chose Bohemond. Even before the crusade he had enjoyed a great military reputation, as Albert tells us, and Raymond of Aguilers testifies to the glory he had won fighting against Harem and on the foraging expedition.35 The dangers of the situation had forced the leaders to accept one commander against all their instincts for independence. It was almost certainly Bohemond’s plan which they now followed; it was agreed to divide the army taking almost all the knights available (700) out by night under the command of Bohemond so as to avoid warning the garrison, leaving the foot to defend the camp.36 Even the Islamic sources agree with the western accounts that their army was very small as compared to that of Ridwan. Kemal ad-Din reports that the Aleppan army was defeated by a smaller Frankish force.37 We do not know how long it took Ridwan to raise his force nor are there any indications of its size from the Islamic sources. Albert of Aix suggests 30,000 but more impressive is the testimony of two near-contemporary crusader letters, those of Stephen of Blois and Anselm of Ribemont, which suggest that it numbered 12,000.38 That might appear quite modest, and indeed the only major allies supporting him were Sokman the Artukid emir of Amida and the emir of Hamah, but it must be judged in relation to the military strength of the crusader army which had dwindled markedly.

  According to the Anonymous the engagement took place ‘between the river and the lake’ and Raymond of Aguilers agrees, adding that the army used these obstacles on its flanks to prevent the enemy encircling them. They formed, he says, into six squadrons each in a little valley. Raymond’s account of the fighting is very schematic – at first the crusaders pushed forward against an enemy firing arrows and it was pretty hard going with heavy losses, but then the enemy front line became entangled with the main force and the enemy fled to Harem, which was promptly burned. The Anonymous corroborates this account with rather more detail. According to him, Bohemond was placed in command by the council of leaders and at dawn sent forward a reconnaissance force which reported the enemy marching with two squadrons thrown forward of a main force. Bohemond then organised his army into five squadrons thrown ahead with his own held in reserve. The description of the fighting is very vivid – the Anonymous was evidently there and gives dramatic detail from which it would appear that the crusaders charged and hand-to-hand fighting ensued. The enemy main force then came up and at the climax of the battle, at the very moment when the crusader line seemed about to break, Bohemond committed the reserve and the enemy fled, setting fire to Harem in their precipitate retreat.39 This virtual unanimity is impressive, but Raymond did employ the Gesta Francorum as a source, particularly for the period February–March 1098 using no fewer than three passages concerned with the Lake Battle itself, and others with events in this period, which seems to indicate that Raymond was relying on it.40 Moreover, neither of these accounts makes the location of the battle clear, while Raymond’s remark that the army chose to rest its flanks on the river and the lake appears to be an elaboration based on the Anonymous’s statement that the battle was fought between the lake and the river and should be seen in the light of Raymond’s earlier comments about the enemy technique of surrounding. Furthermore, his notion of a defensive battle with the crusaders for
ming a line backed by a reserve is not quite what appears in the Gesta Francorum and is rather vitiated by his statement that the distance between the river and the lake at this point was a mile, for he also tells us that St Symeon was ten miles from Antioch (actually twenty-six kilometres) which appears to mean that a small force of 700 in six squadrons, of which one was held in reserve, was strung out across two and a half kilometres as a blocking force.41 Moreover, if the leaders had wished to fight a purely defensive battle, why did they not take their infantry and hold the Iron Bridge? Raymond and the Anonymous give no real idea of the site, although the latter refers to the enemy coming towards the army from the river. Stephen of Blois who was present says that it was fought in a little plain near the Iron Bridge but does not say which side of it. Ralph of Caen was writing rather later at Antioch and says that the crusaders crossed the Iron Bridge into a little plain where a small hill concealed them. Further, he tells us that Conan of Brittany died in the battle and reports that he had seen his grave on the site in question.42 This is convincing evidence of the location and Ralph’s account of the battle is interesting. According to him the crusaders deployed, hidden from the enemy by a small hill, and charged at them; this disconcerted the enemy who feared that more were concealed behind the hill. The suggestion is that it was an ambush which succeeded because the attack with lances forward (erectis hastis) was fully co-ordinated and the enemy were apprehensive that the little hill might conceal more troops. Albert’s account is suspect because he tells us that Adhémar, who probably was away, played a major role, that Raymond of Toulouse, whom no other account mentions, was present, and that Robert of Normandy, who was probably away at Laodicea, fought. However, we have no very definite evidence of where they all were and Raymond does not mention the count of Toulouse in his account of the infantry fighting back at Antioch. Moreover, Tudebode says that Adhémar, Eustace of Boulogne and Robert of Normandy were left behind to defend the camp.43 Albert agrees with the Anonymous that the 700 knights set out by night. This is an important point for any force crossing the Iron Bridge in daylight would have been observed either by scouts or from Harem. At day-break, Albert says, they sent forward scouts led by Walter of St-Valéri-sur-Somme and Bohemond the Turk on the basis of whose information Adhémar and the other leaders led a charge into the massed ranks of the enemy who fled. Albert’s account tends to exalt the role of Godfrey and ignore Bohemond, but he does add the interesting detail that the enemy’s resistance was somewhat lessened because heavy rain had made their bows useless.44