Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  Sketch Map 8

  Advance eastwards of Panzer Group Guderian. Situation 22.6–28.6.41.

  I next visited the front line in Slonim and then drove in a Panzer IV through no-man’s-land to the 18th Panzer Division. At 15.30 hrs. I was back in Slonim, having ordered the 18th Panzer Division to push on in the direction of Baranovicze, while the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division was instructed to hasten its advance towards Slonim. I then returned to my Group command post. This drive took me unexpectedly through the middle of Russian infantry, which had come up in lorries to the very outskirts of Slonim and was on the point of dismounting. I ordered my driver, who was next to me, to go full-speed ahead and we drove straight through the Russians; they were so surprised by this unexpected encounter that they did not even have time to fire their guns. All the same they must have recognised me, because the Russian press later announced my death; I felt bound to inform them of their mistake by means of the German wireless.

  I rejoined my staff at 20.15 hrs. There I found messages waiting for me concerning fierce fighting on our deep right flank, where LIII Army Corps had been successfully defeating Russian attacks in the Maloryta area since June 23rd. Between the XXIV and XLVII Panzer Corps elements of the XII Army Corps had managed to establish loose contact. The left flank of the Panzer Group was seriously threatened by an intensification of the attacks on the part of the Russian forces pouring back from Bialystok. To secure this flank rapid commitment of the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division and of the XLVI Panzer Corps was necessary.

  Fortunately, we were unaware that on this day Hitler had become nervous for fear lest the strong Russian forces succeed in breaking out of our encirclement at some point. He wanted to halt the panzer groups and turn them against the Russians in and about Bialystok. On this occasion, however, the OKH proved strong enough to insist on adherence to the original plan and on the completion of the encirclement by a continuation of our advance to Minsk.

  Vilna was captured, as was Kovno.

  The Finns occupied the Aaland Islands. The German I Mountain Corps seized the rich nickel area around Petsamo. Neither of these operations involved any fighting.

  Early on the morning of the 25th I visited the wounded in our hospital. These were the victims of an air attack the previous day on my headquarters which I had escaped as I was away at the front at the time. At 09.40 hrs.I drove to XII Army Corps, at Linovo, 5 miles south of Pruzana, where I examined the situation in that sector. I then went on to the XXIV Panzer Corps, whose headquarters was at Zarzeczne, 22 miles south of Slonim. After talking with General Freiherr von Geyr I visited the 4th Panzer Division, returning to my headquarters at 16.30 hrs.

  Fresh enemy units, including tanks, had appeared on this day, driving from Bialystok towards Slonim. The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division arrived on the battlefield and took over the task of barring the Russians’ advance on Slonim. Thus the main strength of 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions was freed to continue the advance on Minsk. The latter division was already fighting its way towards Baranovicze.

  Early on the morning of June 26th I visited the front in the area of XLVII Panzer Corps as I wished to observe the progress of our advance on Baranovicze and Stolpce. XXIV Panzer Corps was instructed to support the advance of its northern neighbour.

  At 07.50 hrs. I arrived at the 17th Panzer Division which I ordered to push on directly for Stolpce. By 09.00 hrs. I was at the headquarters of the 18th Panzer Division where I found the corps commander as well as the divisional commander. This headquarters was located at Lesna, on the Slonim-Baranovicze road, some 3 miles behind the division’s forward elements. From here I got into wireless communication with XXIV Panzer Corps in order to confirm my orders concerning the support that that corps was to give to the attack on Baranovicze. This support was to be supplied by elements of the 4th Panzer Division which had been formed into a battle group and had been advancing northwards since 06.00 hrs.

  At 12.30 hrs. XXIV Panzer Corps informed me of the capture of Sluzk. This represented a fine performance on the part of both commanders and troops. I sent the corps commander a message of congratulation by wireless and then set off at once for the front of the 18th Panzer Division at Tartak. In the early afternoon a message was received that Hoth had reached a point 18 miles to the north of Minsk.

  At 14.30 hrs. I received orders from the Army Group: the mass of my forces was to advance on Minsk, while XXIV Panzer Corps was to move on Bobruisk. I was able to signal back that XXIV Panzer Corps had already been given orders to capture Bobruisk and that XLVII Panzer Corps was attacking through Baranovicze, towards Minsk. I then ordered that my command staff move forward to Tartak, where it arrived at 23.30 hrs.

  During the afternoon the 17th Panzer Division had signalled that they were advancing along a passable road, towards Stolpce. They reached their objective that evening. Unfortunately the divisional commander, General von Arnim, was wounded during the day’s fighting and had to hand over his command to General Ritter von Weber.

  My Panzer Group was now subordinated to Fourth Army, from which it received the order to occupy the line Zadvorze (5 miles north of Slonim)–Holynka–Zelva–the River Zelvianka, and to hold that line against the enemy advancing from Bialystok.

  On this day advance elements of the XLVI Panzer Corps reached the battlefield near Tartak and took over the task of providing the link between the XXIV and XLVII Panzer Corps. The whole of the XXIV Panzer Corps was thereby freed to carry out its principal mission, the advance to Bobruisk.

  In Army Group North, 8th Panzer Division succeeded in capturing Dünaburg and its bridges over the Dvina.

  On June 27th the 17th Panzer Division reached the southern outskirts of Minsk and thus established contact with Panzer Group 3, which had already on the 26th penetrated into the town that the Russians had largely demolished. The Russian forces which had been in the Bialystok area and had since been attempting in vain to break through our encircling pincers were now completely surrounded. Only weak elements had succeeded in slipping through to the east before the pincers met. The foundations had been laid for the first great victory of the campaign.

  My views concerning the next stage of the operations were as follows: to detach the minimum amount of the Panzer Group for the destruction of the Russians in the Bialystok pocket, while leaving the major part of this operation to the following infantry armies: thus our rapidly mobile, motorised forces would be able to push forward and seize the first operational objective of the campaign, the area Smolensk–Elnya–Roslavl. All my actions during the next few days had this end in view. I was thus in agreement with the original orders that had been issued. It seemed to me of decisive importance for the success of the whole campaign that the initial plan be adhered to despite the accidents and unexpected developments of battle. I was well aware that this plan involved taking certain risks.

  These convictions of mine caused me to drive once again to the XLVII Panzer Corps on June 28th. This was the most immediately threatened of my formations; I therefore wished to be close at hand in case a crisis arose, so that I should be able quickly to arrange for its support. I found the corps commander at Svoiaticze (14 miles southwest of Nieswiez), where I examined the situation of his divisions; I then instructed my staff by wireless to hasten the northward move of the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division and to arrange for air reconnaissance of the roads Novogrodek-Minsk and Novogrodek-Baranovicze-Turzec. I next visited the 18th Panzer Division; one column of this division had gone slightly astray and the division’s advance had been somewhat held up in consequence, though not seriously so.

  My chief of staff, Liebenstein, had meanwhile laid down defensive sectors for the divisions of the various corps against the threatened attempt at a break-out by enemy forces along the line Koidanov-Piaseczna (north-west of Mir)–Horodyszcze–Polonka. I approved the measures he had taken.

  On this day XXIV Panzer Corps reached the outskirts of Bobruisk. Since the 25th its headquarters had been in Filipov
icze.

  On June 28th the headquarters of my Panzer Group moved to Nieswiez, taking up its quarters in an old castle that had once belonged to the Radziwill family and which had previously been occupied by a senior Russian staff. The only relic of the castle’s previous contents was a photograph of a hunting party, at which Kaiser William I had been present, that was discovered in an attic. The population of Nieswiez asked permission to hold a Thanksgiving Service in celebration of their liberation; I was happy to be able to grant them this request.

  On this day units reached the following places:

  3rd Panzer Division, Bobruisk; 4th Panzer Division, Sluzk; 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, Siniavka; 1st Cavalry Division, the area east of Drohiczyn.

  17th Panzer Division, Koidanov; 18th Panzer Division, Nieswiez; 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, the Zelvianka.

  Elements of 10th Panzer Division, the Zelvianka; the bulk of that division, Siniavka; SS-Das Reich, Beresa–Kartuska; Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, the area north-east of Pruzana.

  Panzer Group Hoth now had the 7th and 20th Panzer Divisions in the Minsk area. Far to the south, LIII Army Corps, on my right wing, had brought its battles in the Maloryta area to a successful conclusion. The danger to this flank was now finally eliminated.

  On June 29th the battles continued along the entire front of my Panzer Group. There was particularly severe fighting in the sector along the Zelvianka, which caused Fourth Army considerable anxiety. This resulted in Army attempting to take a hand in my battle, a measure which was rather ungraciously received by me, since I was to a great extent unaware that they were doing this.

  Army Group North captured Jakobstadt, Liewenhof and the southern portion of Riga, together with its railway bridge over the Dvina.

  I spent the next day, June 30th, flying to Panzer Group 3, where I saw Hoth with whom 1 discussed the future co-ordination of our activities. Lieutenant-Colonel von Barsewisch piloted me himself, in a bomber, and we passed over the Puszcza Nalibocka, a large forest, from which Fourth Army was continually anticipating the Russians to attempt a break-out. I gained the impression that there were no considerable enemy forces in the forest and that there was, therefore, no danger from this quarter, I agreed with Hoth that my 18th Panzer Division should work closely with his right wing during the advance to Borissov and the securing of a bridgehead over the Beresina near this town.

  On this date the OKH ordered that combat units advance to the line of the Dnieper.

  The OKH informed the Army Group that a development of the operations towards Smolensk would be of decisive importance; it was, therefore, desired that crossings of the Dnieper in the areas of Rogachev, Mogilev, and Orsha, and of the Dvina at Vitebsk and Polotsk, be secured as quickly as possible.

  On the next day, July 1st, I flew to XXIV Panzer Corps; our only normal means of communication with this headquarters was by wireless, which was insufficient for any length of time. Geyr’s opinion of the enemy on his front was favourable to our future intentions. He was mainly opposed by units that had been hastily thrown together. The enemy’s rail activity was slight. An air battle fought over Bobruisk on the previous day had ended in the defeat of the Russians. All the same the enemy continued, as always, to resist stubbornly. His battle technique, particularly his camouflage, was excellent; on the other hand he did not seem to have re-established a unified command as yet. The corps had succeeded in capturing the bridges over the Beresina, near Svisloch. At 09.30 hrs. a reinforced reconnaissance battalion had moved off from this Beresina bridgehead, eastwards of Bobruisk, in the direction of Mogilev, and was being followed by the mass of the 3rd Panzer Division; according to the way the situation developed General Freiherr von Geyr would decide whether to make his point of main effort towards Rogachev or Mogilev, both of which were on the Dnieper. At 10.55 hrs. strong elements of the 4th Panzer Division also moved off eastwards from Svisloch. The fuel situation was well in hand; ammunition, supply and medical services were all functioning smoothly. Casualties up to now were happily light. But there was a lack of bridging columns and construction troops. Co-operation with Colonel Mölders’ fighters was excellent. Liaison with General Viebig’s close-support planes was not, however, sufficiently rapid. The 1st Cavalry Division had shown itself to be a good unit in action.

  FIG.8. Advancing as though on manœuvres: Tanks move forward (Champagne, June 1940).

  FIG.9. Lieutenant-Colonel Balçk handing over a flag captured at Juniville.

  Apart from all this, air reconnaissance during these days revealed clearly that the Russians were assembling fresh forces in the area Smolensk–Orsha–Mogilev. If the line of the Dnieper was to be captured without waiting for the arrival of the infantry, which would mean the loss of weeks, we would have to hurry.

  Meanwhile, very fierce fighting went on around the Bialystok pocket. During the period 26th-30th June, one regiment, the 71st Infantry of the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, alone had brought in the considerable total of 36,000 prisoners—a proof of the massive scale of the Russians’ attempts to break out. This fact made such a deep impression on Fourth Army that they insisted, henceforth, on the pocket being surrounded by strongly occupied and continuous lines. Field-Marshal von Kluge consequently forbade the departure of the 17th Panzer Division in the direction of Borissov which I had already ordered; he did this despite the fact that the 18th Panzer Division had already reached that town and had secured a bridgehead over the Beresina and that on the consolidation of this bridgehead depended to a large extent the further advance of XLVII Panzer Corps to the Dnieper. Although I disagreed with this order of Fourth Army I forwarded it to the troops under my command.

  The 5th Machine-gun Battalion had the task of maintaining contact between 17th Panzer and 29th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions along the edge of the pocket. On July 2nd I visited this battalion in order, personally, to observe conditions along this front and to get the opinions of the officers on the spot concerning the encircled enemy. I was thus able to form a clear idea of the situation. I next drove to General Lemelsen and ordered him and the commander of the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, who was also present, to make sure that the pocket remained closed, and then went on at once to the 17th Panzer Division at Koidanov. General Ritter von Weber reported that enemy attempts to break through had been successfully beaten off. From there I drove to the new command post of my Panzer Group, which was at Sinilo, to the south-east of Minsk. When I arrived there I found that a mishap had occurred in the transmission of orders to 17th Panzer Division; part of the division had not received the order to remain on the encirclement front and had, therefore, set off for Borissov. I immediately despatched a signal to Fourth Army informing them of this. It was too late to do anything about it. I was then summoned to appear at Field-Marshal von Kluge’s headquarters in Minsk, at 08.00 hrs. next morning. When I arrived there I was strongly taken to task for the accident that had occured. After I had given an ample explanation of how it had happened, Field-Marshal von Kluge informed me that he had actually intended to have Hoth and myself court-martialled, since exactly the same mishap had occurred in Hoth’s Panzer Group and Kluge had, therefore, been led to believe that he was confronted by a generals’ conspiracy. At least I could put his mind at rest on that score. After this interview I drove to XLVII Panzer Corps at Smolevicze (21 miles north-east of Minsk), but since I could not find the corps headquarters I went on to the 18th Panzer Division at Borissov. There I visited the Beresina bridgehead and had a word with the assembled unit commanders of the division. The division sent off an advance party to Tolochino. On my way back I found the corps commander at Smolevicze and discussed with him the next operations by the 17th and 18th Panzer Division. While this conversation was going on the wireless operators in my armoured command vehicle heard news of an attack by Russian tanks and aircraft on the Beresina crossing at Borissov. XLVII Panzer Corps was informed. The attacks were beaten off with heavy losses to the Russians, but not before a considerable impressio
n had been made on the 18th Panzer Division; this was hardly surprising since here, for the first time, the enemy employed his T34 tank, a tank against which our guns at that time were largely ineffective.

  On July 2nd the Panzer Group was disposed as follows:

  1st Cavalry Division, south of Sluzk; 3rd Panzer Division, Bobruisk with advance units outside Rogachev; 4th Panzer Division, Svisloch; 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, east of Sluzk.

  Sketch Map 9

  Developments 28.6–2.7.41.