Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  SS-Das Reich, to the north of Balusevicz, on the Beresina; 10th Panzer Division, Cherven; Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, to the north of Baranovicze.

  18th Panzer Division, Borissov; 17th Panzer Division, Koidanov; 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, Stolpce; Machine-gun Battalion 5, south-east of Baranovicze.

  On July 3rd the Russians inside the Bialystok pocket surrendered. I could now concentrate my attention on the advance to the Dnieper.

  I spent July 4th visiting the XLVI Panzer Corps. I drove ze–Cherven–Slobodka, to the headquarters of the 10th Panzer Division and thence to the command post of the division SS-Das Reich. On my way I found the corps commander, who asked where the Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland was located; I could only reply that it was being held back by Fourth Army as army reserve in the area of Baranovicze. Then to SS-Das Reich at St. Rechki. General Hausser informed me that his motor-cyclists, after stiff fighting, had managed to secure a bridgehead over the Beresina, near Brodets, 10 miles to the south of Beresino. The Beresina bridge at Yakchizy had been blown and vehicles could not be got across. The engineers were still engaged in making the swampy approaches to the bridge passable for vehicles. I drove there and found the engineers hard at work; they promised to have completed the job by early on the 5th of July.

  On this day XXIV Panzer Corps reached the Dnieper, near Rogachev, and fought for and secured further crossings over the Beresina. The divisions of the Panzer Group were now disposed as follows:

  1st Cavalry Division, to the east of Sluzk; 3rd Panzer Division, outside Rogachev; 4th Panzer Division, at Starye-Bychov; 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, Bobruisk.

  SS-Das Reich, Balusevicy; 10th Panzer Division, Beresino; Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, to the east of Stolpce.

  18th Panzer Division, to the east of the Natcha; elements of 17th Panzer Division, Borissov, with the mass of the division at Minsk; 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, Koidanova–Stolpce; Machine-gun Battalion 5, to the west of Stolpce.

  On July 6th strong Russian forces crossed the Dnieper, near Shlobin, and attacked the right wing of XXIV Panzer Corps. They were thrown back by the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division. Our air reconnaissance reported further enemy forces advancing in the direction of Gomel, from the area Orel–Bryansk. Wireless intercept picked up a new Russian army headquarters in the Orsha area. It seemed as though a fresh defensive front was being built up along the Dnieper. We would have to hurry.

  Sketch Map 10

  Developments 3.7–10.7.41.

  By July 7th the following places had been reached:

  Panzer Group headquarters was at Borissov.

  XXIV Panzer Corps was at Bortniki.

  1st Cavalry Division, Bobruisk; 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, Shlobin; 3rd Panzer Division, Rogachev–Novye Bychov; 4th Panzer Division, Starye–Bychov.

  10th Panzer Division, Bialynicy; SS-Das Reich, Beresino; Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, Cherven.

  18th Panzer Division, Tolochino; 17th Panzer Division, Senno; 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, Borissov.

  The 17th Panzer Division was held up near Senno in a fierce battle with strong enemy forces which included an unusually large number of tanks. The 18th Panzer Division was also involved in heavy fighting. Since XXIV Panzer Corps had already reached the Dnieper a decision would have to be taken concerning the future course of the operations. I had received no fresh instructions from my superiors and so I could only assume that the original intention by which Panzer Group 2 was to drive for the area Smolensk–Elnya–Roslavl remained unaltered. Nor could I see any reason why this plan should be modified. I had no way of knowing at that time of the widening gulf between Hitler’s opinions and those of the OKH. I only learned of this state of affairs with its far-reaching results considerably later. The friction and confusion that had arisen in the leadership of operations up to date is inexplicable unless a glance is first cast at the true condition of the German Supreme Command during those days.

  Hitler had forgotten that it was he himself who had ordered a rapid offensive with objective Smolensk. During the past few days he had concentrated his attention solely on the Bialystok encirclement. Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch did not dare express his own differing point of view to Army Group Centre, since he knew that Hitler was opposed to it. According to his own statement, Field-Marshal von Bock was anxious that Panzer Groups 2 and 3 be subordinated to Field-Marshal von Kluge, for thus Bock would avoid being directly responsible for their operations. Field-Marshal von Kluge—in agreement with the official Hitlerian attitude—wanted to organise a strongly held ring around the encircled Russians and to wait until they capitulated before once again starting to move eastwards. Hoth and myself—in contradiction to this—were anxious to continue the advance eastwards with our panzer forces according to the original, expressed intentions of the supreme command, and to capture the objective initially assigned us. As already stated, we wished to use a minimum of panzer force for keeping the Russians encircled in the Bialystok area and to leave the final elimination of that pocket to the infantry armies which were following behind us. And while the OKH was secretly hoping that the commanders of the panzer groups would continue to go for their original objectives, whether without orders or even against orders, the OKH yet did not dare to drop a suggestion to the commanders of the army groups which might encourage them to carry out the previously accepted plan.

  This is how it came about that while, on the one hand, Panzer Group 2 ordered that a minimum force be left behind to hold the ring at Bialystok and that all available troops be sent in pursuit of the enemy across the Beresina and the Dnieper, Field-Marshal von Kluge was simultaneously issuing contradictory orders by which all units were to remain in position about the encircled Russians and the advance eastwards was not to be resumed until further instructions were received. A number of units did not receive these orders in time and so continued their advance to the Beresina. It is lucky that no damage to the army as a whole resulted from this state of affairs; but the sequel was to be unpleasantly tense and a considerable amount of ill-feeling was engendered as a result.

  Crossing the Dnieper

  On July 7th I was faced with the necessity of taking a decision. Was I to continue my advance as rapidly as heretofore, to cross the Dnieper with panzer forces only, and attempt to reach my primary objective as quickly as possible according to the original plan of campaign? Or should I, in view of the measures that the Russians were taking to construct a defensive front along the line of the river, break off my advance and await the arrival of the infantry armies before launching the battle for the river?

  At the moment the Russian defence was only beginning to be set up, and was therefore weak: this fact spoke in favour of an immediate attack. However, the enemy held strong bridgeheads at Rogachev, Mogilev, and Orsha, and attempts to take Rogachev and Mogilev by surprise had, in consequence, failed. It was true, too, that the approach of Russian reinforcements had been reported: there was a heavy enemy concentration in the Gomel area, and a weaker one around Senno, to the north of Orsha, where severe fighting was already in progress. But it would be some fourteen days before our infantry could arrive on the scene. By that time the Russian defences would be considerably stronger. Whether the infantry would then be able to smash a well-organised river defensive line so that mobile warfare might once again be possible seemed doubtful. Even more problematical, in this case, seemed the achievement of our first operational objectives, and the ending of the campaign in the autumn of 1941. And this was the real point.

  I was well aware of the importance of the decision to be taken. I calculated the dangers of heavy counter-attacks against the open flanks of all three panzer corps once they were across the river. On the other hand I was so convinced of the vital importance and of the feasibility of the task assigned me, and at the same time so sure of the proved ability and attacking strength of my panzer troops, that I ordered an immediate attack across the Dnieper and a continuation
of the advance towards Smolensk.

  I therefore ordered that the battles on either flank—at Shlobin and Senno—be broken off, and that the commanders responsible be satisfied with keeping the enemy there under observation.

  Owing to the strong Russian bridgeheads on our side of the river, the places available for forcing a crossing were limited: after a discussion with General Freiherr von Geyr we decided on Starye Bychov for his XXIV Panzer Corps and on July 10th as the day: XLVI Panzer Corps was to cross at Shklov and XLVII Panzer Corps at Kopys, between Mogilev and Orsha, both on July 11th. All movements and preparations for the crossings were to be most carefully concealed: there would be no marching, except by night. The fighter planes of gallant Colonel Mölders promised us air supremacy over our concentration areas, and for this purpose air strips were laid out immediately behind the front line. Wherever Mölders appeared the air was soon free of the enemy.

  On July 7th I visited XLVII Panzer Corps in order verbally to explain my intentions for the Dnieper crossing. On the way there I stopped to examine a captured Russian armoured train. Then I went on to the corps headquarters which was at Natsha, 18 miles to the east of Borrissov. I next visited Tolochino, where 18th Panzer Division was engaged in a battle with enemy tanks. I told General Nehring of the necessity of clearing the enemy from the Kochanovo area, west of Orsha, and of the importance of confining the Russians in that area to a narrow bridgehead: this was essential for the success of the forthcoming operation. Our troops here once again made a splendid impression, and I was able to express my deep appreciation to them.

  On July 8th I visited the XLVI Panzer Corps for the same purpose that had taken me to XLVII Panzer Corps on the previous day. The SS Division Das Reich of this corps was still fighting on the western bank of the Dnieper.

  July 9th was marked by exceptionally heated conversations concerning the intended operation. First of all Field-Marshal von Kluge appeared at my headquarters early in the morning in order to hear what my situation and intentions were. He was absolutely opposed to my decision concerning an immediate crossing of the Dnieper, and ordered that the operation be broken off and the troops halted to await the arrival of the infantry. I felt this deeply and defended my plan with obstinacy. Finally, after explaining my reasons as given above, I told him that my preparations had already gone too far to be cancelled: that the troops of the XXIV and XLVI Panzer Corps were already, to a large extent, massed on their jumping-off positions: and that I could only keep them there for a limited length of time before the Russian air force must find them and attack them. I was, furthermore, convinced that the attack would succeed and I expected that this operation would decide the Russian campaign in this very year, if such a decision were at all possible. Field-Marshal von Kluge was clearly impressed by my objective explanation. With the words: “Your operations always hang by a thread!” he unwillingly gave his approval to my plan.

  After this animated conversation I drove straight to XLVII Panzer Corps. They were in a difficult situation and seemed in need of special support. I reached General Lemelsen’s headquarters at Krupka at 12.15 hrs. He expressed doubts whether the 18th Panzer Division and a battle group formed of anti-tank and reconnaissance units, under General Streich, would succeed in capturing the Kochanovo area, since the troops were becoming exhausted. I stood by my original orders and added that when 18th Panzer Division had completed its task it was to turn south-east towards the Dnieper. 17th Panzer Division, when it had shaken free of the enemy at Senno, was to do likewise. I drove from the corps headquarters to the front. On the way I met General Streich and gave him the necessary instructions. I then found Nehring who, contrary to his corps commander, declared that the capture of the desired assembly area could be carried out without difficulty. I next spoke to the commander of the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division who similarly expressed his ability to reach his objective, Kopys, in short order. I impressed on the divisions the necessity of reaching the Dnieper, and their respective assembly areas, during the course of the coming night.

  17th Panzer Division was engaged during the day in heavy fighting with hostile tanks. 100 Russian tanks were destroyed, a fine achievement on the part of this brave division.

  Order of battle on the evening of July 9th:

  Group headquarters, Borissov (to move on July 10th to Tolochino).

  1st Cavalry Division, flank guard to the south-east of Bobruisk; 3rd Panzer Division, assembling in the area Shlobin–Rogachev–Novye Bychov and moving north; 4th Panzer Division, area Starye Bychov; 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, in its crossing-place near Starye Bychov.

  10th Panzer Division, south of Shklov; SS-Das Reich, area Pavlovo with elements providing flank guard on the right, southwards of Mogilev; Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, area Bialynicy.

  18th Panzer Division, to the south of Tolochino; 17th Panzer Division, area Zamosia; 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, south-west of Tolochino, assembling towards Kopys.

  The infantry following behind us had reached the line Bobruisk-Svisloch-Borissov with weak advance guards, while the main body had arrived at the line Sluzk–Minsk.

  Hoth had taken Vitebsk, and Hoeppner Pleskau.

  On July 10th and 11th the Dnieper was crossed according to plan and at the cost of only light casualties.

  During the morning of the 10th XXIV Panzer Corps reported that it had achieved its crossing near Starye Bychov. In the afternoon of that day I visited the XLVII Panzer Corps once again to make sure that the preparations were completed and the troops in good fighting condition. General Streich had reached his covering line, opposite the Russian bridgehead, west of Orsha. To the north-west of that town another battle group, under Colonel Usinger, was also covering the bridgehead. The reconnaissance battalion of the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division had established contact with SS-Das Reich on its right. 18th Panzer Division was in its jumping-off area. Advance units of the 17th Panzer Division had reached the main road, near Kochanovo, at 10.00 hrs. Elements of this division were already fighting on the west bank of the Dnieper to the south-west of Orsha. The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division had arrived in its area. I once again impressed on the divisional commander how extremely vital it was that Smolensk be reached with all speed as soon as the Dnieper was successfully crossed. So in XLVII Panzer Corps, too, the difficult business of assembly and preparation had been successfully carried out, and I therefore anticipated the events of the next few days with confidence.

  For the further advance after the Dnieper was crossed the following tasks were assigned:

  XXIV Panzer Corps was to head for the Propoisk–Roslavl road. It was to take care to guard its right flank against any attacks from the Shlobin–Rogachev area, and its left flank against the enemy in Mogilev.

  XLVI Panzer Corps was to advance through Gorki–Pochinok to Elnya, while guarding its right flank against Mogilev.

  XLVII Panzer Corps was assigned Smolensk as its main objective, while guarding its left flank along the line of the Dnieper, from Orsha to Smolensk, and not forgetting the enemy still inside Orsha. Battle groups Streich and Usinger would, meanwhile, continue to cover the enemy bridgehead at Orsha on the west and north-west of the Dnieper.

  On the evening of July 10th the Italian military attaché, General Marras, whom I already knew from Berlin, visited my headquarters. He was accompanied by the naval Captain Bürkner. I invited these two gentlemen to accompany me to the Dnieper crossing, in the neighbourhood of Kopys, on the following day. Apart from these visitors Hitler’s air adjutant, Lieutenant-Colonel von Below, also arrived during the course of this evening in order to find out the situation of my Panzer Group.

  On July 11th I left my headquarters at Tolochino in beautiful sunshine, at 06.10 hrs., accompanied by my two guests. This place, incidentally, had been Napoleon’s headquarters in 1812. We made for Kopys to watch the crossing by XLVII Panzer Corps. In view of the dense clouds of dust put up by our advancing columns the drive along the river bank was most unpleasant. T
his dust, endured now for weeks on end, was equally hard on men, weapons, and engines. In particular the cylinders of the tanks became so clogged that their efficiency was considerably affected. At the headquarters of the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, near Kopys, I found both the corps and divisional commanders and was briefed on the situation. Regiments 15 and 71 were already over the river and had reached the edge of the woods east of Kopys; we watched them advance against two enemy divisions (the Russian LXVI Army Corps, consisting of the 18th and 54th Rifle Divisions). The enemy was laying down weak harassing fire on the area around the divisional headquarters, which was also mined. We had good observation of the advance of our infantry and of the bridge-building that was being carried on immediately beneath where we were standing. After the departure of the Italian attaché I had myself ferried over to the east bank in an assault boat in order to make sure of our forces’ further progress. I had originally intended to drive on to XLVI Panzer Corps, but had to abandon this idea since there was as yet no safe way of reaching Shklov by land.

  Meanwhile, it had transpired that the 17th Panzer Division had run into such strong enemy forces to the south of Orsha that there seemed no point in the division making further attempts to enlarge the small bridgehead that had been secured on the eastern bank. The regimental commander on the spot, Colonel Licht, had therefore rightly decided to evacuate the bridgehead. The 17th Panzer Division was now ordered to cross at Kopys, behind the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division.

  On the way back to my headquarters I met Field-Marshal von Kluge to whom I was able to describe the latest developments. He approved the orders I had given and I, for my part, asked him to hasten the move of the leading infantry to the Dnieper so that they might take over as soon as possible the task of holding the strong Russian forces on the west bank, confined within their bridgeheads. At my headquarters I found Hitler’s principal adjutant, Colonel Schmundt, with whom I had a conversation.