The Pentagon's New Map

by Thomas P. M. Barnett

  If those are the main challenges and dangers faced in this Global Transaction Strategy, then what is a possible story line for this future worth creating? Let me leave you with this hopeful image, albeit one with no guarantees.

  I see ten steps toward this future worth creating:

  1. Obviously, this all starts with our efforts to re-create Iraq as a functioning, connected society within the global economy. Progress here will be measured in the ability of the Iraqi people to assume control over their own destiny as quickly as possible, but likewise in the sheer amount of individual transactions that arise between that battered society and the outside world. Democracy is not the key bellwether, nor is the complete eradication of violent terrorism, which is likely to last for many years. But show me an Iraq that is as globally connected as an Israel in ten years and I will show you a Middle East that can never go back to what it has been these past two decades—overwhelmingly disconnected, populated with dispirited youth, and enraged beyond our capacity for understanding.

  2. Kim Jong Il must be removed from power and Korea must be reunited. I think these dice should be rolled by whatever administration takes power in January 2005, and I believe it inevitable if President Bush is reelected. There is simply no good reason why Northeast Asia should put up with this nutcase any longer. He has treated his own people with a gross negligence that justifies numerous war crimes charges, as Kim presided over the deaths of several million of his citizens during a famine that decimated the countryside in the late 1990s.◈ These deaths were completely preventable, but Kim decided otherwise. Why he must soon go is that he willfully seeks to spread weapons of mass destruction around the Gap, in addition to running an international crime syndicate to prop up his amazingly cruel regime. The world and not just Asia will be a far better place without Kim Jong Il, so he becomes globalization’s enemy number one following Saddam Hussein’s demise.

  3. Iran will experience an overthrow of the mullahs’ rule by 2010, and this still-talented and potentially vibrant pillar of a transformed Middle East will once again assume a position of serious standing in global society. The counterrevolution has already begun, and it will continue to flare up periodically until some trigger sets off the big explosion. Current president Mohammad Khatami is a would-be Gorbachev awaiting his Chernobyl-like spark, which America would do well to engineer by making Iraq the greatest reclamation project the world has ever seen. If that is not enough, then Iran must become the main focus of our pressure for change once Kim is dethroned in North Korea, if only for the regime’s continued support of transnational terrorist groups in general and al Qaeda in particular.◈

  4. There will be a negotiations breakthrough on the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, and this dream will become a reality by 2015. Once this happens, or as a precondition for this happening, the United States will stop its long-term policy of dithering on Colombia’s slow disintegration as a state and finally commit itself to ending the nearly joint rule of the drug cartels and the rebel groups within that failed state.◈ This will be an amazingly messy task, our embracing of which must go all the way if we are determined to succeed. My guess is that a 9/11-like trigger will have to occur to set the endgame in motion, something that the White House can rally support around (and, yes, I know that sounds like another Tom Clancy novel). Colombia will not rise to the top of the list, however, so long as North Korea and Iran sit at the top two positions.

  5. The Middle East will be transformed over the next two decades. The rehabilitation of Iraq will be a major trigger, but a far greater one will be the world moving beyond oil and into natural gas and hydrogen. The shift to natural gas alone will increase connectivity between the region and the outside world, as we are already seeing in Saudi Arabia, but the shift to fuel cells powering automobiles will mean the oil-rich states of the region will finally have to develop their economies and move off the “trust fund” model of nondevelopment.◈ A key step in this process will be in the massive revamping and commensurate buildup of their educational systems, which right now do not produce enough young people with viable skills to succeed in a global economy. U.S. pressure in this regard should focus on the House of Saud, getting it to stop its significant support for religious schools that, in the words of Fareed Zakaria, specialize in churning out “half-educated, fanatical Muslims who view the modern world and non-Muslims with great suspicion.”◈

  6. China will almost certainly become the diplomatic near-peer of the United States in global affairs during the rule of the next generation of national leadership, in large part because most of that future crop of senior leaders (known as the “fifth generation”) were educated in the United States, and thus possess a sophisticated understanding of how we operate in the world. Between now and this decade’s end, when the current “fourth generation” will begin yielding power, the Middle Kingdom will continue to behave in this more responsible fashion primarily because Beijing’s confidence will continue to rise as its national economy grows, but also because the United States will learn to treat China more like a serious strategic partner in managing global stability. How Kim Jong Il goes down will be a crucial turning point in U.S.-China relations, so making sure Beijing is comfortable with how this happens is a major determinant of that strategy’s success. Beyond that flashpoint and the persistent issue of Taiwan, we should focus on bolstering military-to-military cooperation with China above all other New Core security relationships save India. The biggest danger China faces in its emergence as an economic superpower comes from within, or basically a collapse of its financial system.◈ The Old Core must do all within its power to steer Beijing away from this danger, and encouraging China’s further adjustment to WTO standards is the best mid-term strategy.

  7. There will be an Asian counterpart to NATO by 2020. The embryonic form of this grand Pacific Rim alliance will be a China-centric free-trade area that appears over the next decade, one that includes India, Australia, and ultimately all of NAFTA. This free-trade zone will help to erase the emerging digital and FDI divide between East Asia and Southeast Asia, and will help India catch up in development to China.

  8. The emergence of an NATO-like alliance in Asia will eventually lead to a Core-wide security alliance that cements Developing Asia’s ties with an ever-enlarging NAFTA and the eastwardly expanding NATO. Once the Core is so explicitly united in security, shrinking the Gap moves beyond simply integrating Central and Southwest Asia and focuses on sub-Saharan Africa.

  9. The United States will admit new members to its union in coming decades, and these will come first from the Western Hemisphere, but over time from outside as well. By 2050, the United States could include a dozen more states. The first president of Mexican heritage will be elected directly from a Mexican state. But this historical pathway will not be contiguous, as we have learned in the cases of Hawaii and Alaska, and there is nothing wrong with cherry-picking the best economies as an inducement for harmonizing economic policies throughout the Western Hemisphere.

  10. Africa comes last because Africa offers least. Saying that does not diminish the suffering that will rage on in this part of the world over the coming decades. Nor should that stop the Core from doing everything it can in the near term to integrate Africa piecemeal into the global economy far more than it is today. But from a practical security standpoint, the only way America will focus on sub-Saharan Africa is if the global war on terrorism becomes centered on that part of the world. When a Middle East is transformed beyond recognition, radical Muslim groups dreaming of a chunk of humanity they can break off and isolate under strict sharia may well turn to Central and East Africa out of desperation. To the extent that development pushes Africa to the top of the list, the Core is well served by moving ahead on all fronts to systematically transform the Middle East, for beyond that task Africa, in great pain, waits its turn.

  Perhaps all this qualifies me as a dreamer, but I do believe that all meaningful borders can be erased, and all religious differences re
ndered harmless as sources of mass violence. I believe the end of war is within our historical grasp, and that I will live to witness this achievement. But nothing worth that much for so many can come without real sacrifice. America must convince itself and the rest of the Core that it is worthwhile shrinking the Gap, and that the leading edge of that effort must be extending the Core’s collective security rule sets into those regions suffering the worst deficits.

  America has made this effort before and changed the world. Now is the time to rededicate this nation to a new long-term strategy much as we did following World War II, when we began an exporting of security that has already made war only a memory for more than half the world’s population, enabling hundreds of millions to lift themselves out of poverty in the last couple of decades alone. It is our responsibility and our obligation to give peace the same chance in the Gap.

  Acknowledgments

  THIS BOOK SERVES AS an autobiography of a vision I have labored to articulate across a professional career extending fourteen years, and as such, it deeply reflects the influences of numerous mentors and colleagues along the way. It became my practice very early in my career not to push my ideas where they were not wanted, but to follow them wherever they took me, letting the “market” discover me at its own pace. As such, I delivered briefings only to those who asked, wrote articles only when colleagues urged me to do so, and penned this book only after all of my closest mentors advised me to take this great step. It is not that I am passive regarding the shaping of my career path, so much as it has been my experience that others judge my particular talents far better than I. So whatever this book accomplishes, the credit goes primarily to those who have shaped me as a strategic thinker. In many ways, I offer this work first and foremost as a thank-you for everything these individuals have given me over the years in terms of their wisdom, support, and affection.

  Three great mentors, all of whom appear in this book, have done the most to shape the message it carries, although any fault in its articulation lies completely with me.

  The first is Henry H. Gaffney, Jr., a national security expert whose wealth of knowledge on the subject surpasses that of any other I have either read or known. Hank’s influence on my work is so profound that I could list him as coauthor on virtually everything I have ever produced as an analyst. The numerous articles we have cowritten remain my most cherished memories of my career in this field, and I feel very privileged to have worked at his side for so many years.

  The second is Admiral William J. (Bud) Flanagan, U.S. Navy (retired), who introduced me to the world of global economics through the research partnership he established between the Wall Street broker-dealer firm Cantor Fitzgerald and the Naval War College in the mid-1990s. Through his brilliant descriptions of how the global economy works, Bud did nothing less than make globalization come alive for me as a world-historical process, imparting to my research a focus it previously lacked. It is no accident that my career effectively took off the moment Bud first took me under his wing.

  The third is Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, U.S. Navy (retired), who is probably most responsible for making all the seemingly disparate strands of my thinking come together in the vision presented in this book. Art’s ability to connect the dots in my work enabled my successful articulation of the grand strategy that flows naturally from these concepts. Without his guiding hand, I simply never would have made it to this point. He has elevated my game immeasurably, doing so with a generosity that defines him as a person.

  All three of these amazing individuals are so much more to me than just career mentors; they are genuine father figures who have shaped my life, both inspiring and comforting me in ways they will never know. It is my sincere hope that this book does justice to everything they have imparted to me.

  Across my professional career, there have been a host of others who have, in various forms, likewise helped shape the vision presented here, either in word or deed. Of this number I would cite for special recognition and gratitude the following: Phil Ginsberg, David Granger, Fred Rainbow, Jeff Sands, Andrew Chaikivsky, Susan Haeg, Hank Kamradt, Lawrence Modisett, Bob Wood, Peter Long, John Petersen, Jerry Hultin, Jim Caverly, Mitzi Wertheim, Tony Pryor, Gary Federici, Jack Mayer, Ken Kennedy, Jim Blaker, Bob Murray, and Critt Jarvis.

  Deserving special mention and thanks is my longtime colleague at the Naval War College, Bradd Hayes. Bradd played a crucial role in my original development of the many strategic concepts presented in this book, being my frequent collaborator in the major research projects I directed at the college from 1998 through 2003. Bradd likewise oversaw the publication of the government report entitled A Future Worth Creating: Defense Transformation in the New Security Environment, by the Office of Force Transformation (Office of the Secretary of Defense). This compendium of articles and essays written (or coauthored) by Bradd, Art Cebrowski, Hank Gaffney, and me served as a sort of testing ground for almost all of the strategic concepts I offer in this volume.

  With specific reference to the production of this book, I would like to thank Neil Nyren and everyone else at Putnam who not only made it happen but approached the project from start to finish with an enormous amount of enthusiasm for the message contained within. It was a great experience to collaborate with such an amazingly professional outfit.

  My agent, Jennifer Gates, of Zachary Shuster Harmsworth, is probably the one person most responsible for making this publication happen. Prior to her entering my life, I was dead set against ever writing another book, believing I was genetically unsuited for the long form. Many agents knocked on my door prior to Jennifer, but she alone convinced me that this book was not only possible but necessary, and I will remain eternally grateful to her on that score. Our working relationship has been one of the most satisfying of my career, and her steering of the proposal process was nothing less than masterful. I give her my highest compliment: she has taught me much.

  The last person most clearly responsible for the creation of this book is Mark Warren, the Executive Editor of Esquire. It was Mark who hatched the original idea of my writing “The Pentagon’s New Map” for his magazine back in the fall of 2002, selecting from among the myriad strategic concepts strewn across my wide-ranging brief the defining concept of the Core and the Gap as the centerpiece of my strategic worldview. He shaped—from start to finish—that original enunciation of the vision, including its bold title. Moreover, it was Mark who directed the production of the now-iconic map with William McNulty of the New York Times. When it came time to brainstorm the tone and approach of this book, I naturally turned to Mark, making him my intellectual partner in the process. He became my writing coach, my mentor, my sounding board, and so much more than my editor. I wrote this book, but Mark translated it for the reader, allowing me to move beyond the narrow academic confines of most discussions of U.S. national security. To whatever extent this vision speaks to people, connecting to their hopes and fears, the thanks goes first to Mark for guiding me toward the book that only I could write. For that, I will remain forever grateful to this now dear friend.

  Moving closer in, I offer my great gratitude to my brother-in-law, Stephen Meussling, who, along with Mark, was my first reader. Steve’s insights and encouragement throughout the writing process sustained me greatly, and improved the book considerably.

  I would also like to thank my brother Jerome for all his magnificent career guidance over the years. Basically, every major step forward I have taken over the past two decades was first imagined by him. I cannot think how I would have ended up where I am today but for his wise counsel. Along the same lines, I acknowledge the wonderful support I have received from my mother-in-law, Professor Vonne Meussling, throughout many difficult moments in both my career and personal life, and, most recently, in the editing of this book.

  It almost goes without saying that this book is yet another small down payment on the enormous debt I owe my parents, John and Colleen, for everything they have done for me across my lifetime.
All the great convictions expressed in this vision began originally with them, my life being but an extension of their own.

  Finally, I offer my deepest gratitude to my spouse, Vonne, who towers above all others as the great mentor in my life, in addition to being the great love of my life. The optimism of this volume springs primarily from the joy that is our lives together lived, our family now created, and our future still unfolding.

  Notes

  Preface: An Operating Theory of the World

  6 When Esquire magazine named me . . . finance and information technology.

  Andrew Chaikivsky, “The Strategist,” Esquire, December 2002, p. 163.

  6 After I then published an article . . . and private sectors skyrocketed.

  Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map,” Esquire, March 2003, pp. 174-79, 227-28.

  Chapter 1 NEW RULE SETS

  PLAYING JACK RYAN

  16 In it, on page 19 . . . expand cooperation with the Russian Navy.

  Thomas P. M. Barnett with Floyd D. Kennedy, contributor, Redefining U.S. Soviet Naval Ties in the 1990s: The Opportunity for Cooperative Engagement (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1991).

  17 Only about half of the ideas . . . in the “Good” scenario.

  I reviewed the state of U.S.-Russian naval cooperation in the mid-1990s, eventually interviewing a number of Russian naval leaders in Moscow as part of the process. For details, see Thomas P. M. Barnett with Henry H. Gaffney, Jr., and Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., Future Visions of U.S.-Russian Naval Cooperation: What Is to Be Done? (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1996).