The Pentagon's New Map

by Thomas P. M. Barnett

  NEW RULES FOR A NEW ERA

  21 I’ve long daydreamed . . . worst-case planning procedures.

  No kidding, I’ve actually thought about this! See my Nine Issues Concerning USAID’s New OPS System: How Recent Institutional Experiences Within the U.S. Military Might Point to Some Useful Solutions (Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Public Research, 1997).

  24 I’ve been reading . . . eventually everything will happen.

  One crucial exception in the intelligence community is the National Intelligence Council, or NIC. Their analysis is the best in the business and the most balanced by far. In general, the NIC attracts the best talent in the intelligence world.

  31 But around 1980 . . . heavyweight of that class China.

  The best single World Bank publication on this story is by Paul Collier and David Dollar, Globalization, Growth, and Poverty (copublication of Oxford University Press and the World Bank, 2002).

  32 While the world’s population . . . cut in half.

  Cited in Andrew S. Natsios, administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, in “Alleviating Poverty and Hunger in the 21st Century” (March 2002), found online at usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0901/ijee/natsios.htm.

  34 So, yeah, global nuclear war . . . new era of dominant threats.

  Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Liberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), pp. 15-16.

  PRESENT AT THE CREATION

  35 Present at the Creation.

  I borrow this title from Dean Acheson’s memoir of the immediate postwar era entitled Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).

  36 I wanted to become one of the “wise men.”

  The “wise men,” as identified by Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas in their book The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made (1986), were Dean Acheson, Averell Harriman, George Kennan, John McCloy, Jr., Charles Bohlen, and Robert Lovettin. As profiled by the authors, the six served as behind-the-scenes architects of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the strategy of containment.

  39 The notion that . . . prior to the Cuban missile crisis.

  As Lawrence Freedman points out, it was known in official circles in the late 1950s as the “stable balance of terror.” See his The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), pp. 247-49.

  41 Again, why this story . . . between America and Islam.

  Michael Vlahos, “Enemy Mine,” Tech Central Station, 29 July 2003, found online at www.techcentralstation.com/1051/defensewrapper.jsp?PID=1051-350&CID=1051-072903A.

  43 The most frightening form . . . “the age of sacred terror.”

  See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002).

  44 The eight-year period . . . the total jumped to 27,608.

  See annual State Department reports entitled, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (p. 163), found online at www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/; and the DCI Counterterrorism Center’s March 1998 report, “International Terrorism in 1997: A Statistical View.”

  44 I won’t even mention . . . predicting terrorist strikes.

  See Reuters, “U.S. Army Seeks Hollywood Theories: Directors, Writers Asked for Their Ideas on Terrorist Scenarios”, MSNBC, 9 October 2001, found online at www.msnbc/news/639928.asp; and Bradley Graham and Vernon Loeb, “Pentagon Drops Bid for Futures Market: Investors Could Bet on Terrorism, Coups,” Washington Post, 30 July 2003.

  44 We should do what . . . rule-set gaps as quickly as possible.

  For a good example of this, see Kenneth D. Rose, “Bunker Mentality: Stock Up. And Remember, We Got Past It Before,” Washington Post, 16 February 2003; and Nicholas Kulish, “Obscure U.S. Agency Seeks Novel Gizmos to Combat Terrorism: Air-Conditioned Undershirt, Dishwasher-Safe Laptop Get Government Funding,” Wall Street Journal, 4 March 2003.

  45 There’s a reason . . . babies from former socialist states.

  Ten of the top twenty source countries for international adoptions in 2002 were former socialist bloc states (China, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Vietnam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Belarus, Romania, and Poland). Together they accounted for just over two-thirds (68 percent) of all international adoptions (20,099) that year, according to the Office of Visa Processing, U.S. Department of State.

  45 As U.S. Trade Representative . . . “No future is inevitable.”

  Quoted in David Wessel, “War Poses Risks for Globalization Trend,” Wall Street Journal, 20 March 2003.

  A FUTURE WORTH CREATING

  51 In his seminal 1999 volume . . . that mountaintop).

  Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999).

  51 At the other end . . . “fault-line wars”).

  Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

  52 His 2003 book . . . or even that they occupy the same world.”

  Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003), p. 3.

  53 So when I hear journalist . . . I get more than a little nervous.

  Robert D. Kaplan, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos (New York: Random House, 2002).

  53 Let’s not kid ourselves . . . the military management of “empire.”

  For examples, see Robert D. Kaplan, “Supremacy by Stealth: Ten Rules for Managing the World,” The Atlantic, July/August 2003, pp. 66-83; Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

  55 So when China, India, and Brazil . . . that is a bad sign.

  For example, see John Kifner, “India Decides Not to Send Troops to Iraq Now: A Preference for Medical Aid; An Eye on Local Politics,” New York Times, 15 July 2003.

  55 According to the National Intelligence . . . India, China, Brazil, and Russia.

  David F. Gordon, The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China (National Intelligence Council Intelligence Community Assessment 2002-04D, September 2002), found online at www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/index.htm.

  55 Not surprisingly . . . stem this rising tide without bankrupting themselves.

  For details on the tenuous agreement finally reached on this subject, see Scott Miller, “WTO Drug Pact Lifts Trade Talks,” Wall Street Journal, 2 September 2003.

  Chapter 2. THE RISE OF THE “LESSER INCLUDEDS”

  THE MANTHORPE CURVE

  63 This group of “flags,” . . . strategic naval vision for the post-Cold War era.

  The five members of the flag-level working group were Rear Admiral E. B. “Ted” Baker, Rear Admiral R. C. “Sweetpea” Allen, Rear Admiral D. R. “Dave” Oliver, Major General M. P. “Matt” Caulfield, and Brigadier General C. E. “Chuck” Wilhelm. The three-star cochairs were Vice Admiral L. W. “Snuffy” Smith and Lieutenant General H. C. “Hank” Stackpole.

  67 The chart featured two axes . . . threat, gauged from low to high.

  The original chart was entitled “ASSUMPTIONS.” The vertical axis was labeled, “INTENTIONS/CAPABILITIES TO CHALLENGE U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS,” and the horizonal axis was labeled, “U.S. PLANNING HORIZON” (with the three tics being just as I have displayed in my re-creation: 1990, 2000, and 2010). The exact label for the left-hand side of the curve was “GLOBAL (SOVIET) THREAT—COLLAPSE,” and for the right-hand it was “GLOBAL THREAT—20 YR REVIVAL.” The Rest of the World line was labeled, “ROW CHALLENGES—GRADUALLY INCREASING CAPABILITIES/LESS RESTRAINED INTENTIONS.” It was the Pentagon standard at that time to put all bullets and labels in ALL CAPS!

  72 Oliver had previously warned . . . with his bare teeth (which he did).

  Admiral Oliver was not only a colorful figure and major strategic thinker within the Navy, he also served a
s technical consultant to director John McTiernan during the filming of the Paramount Studios film Hunt for Red October. Oliver kept a framed movie poster, signed by the director, in his Pentagon office.

  73 In 1992, the idea seemed sacrilegious . . . implemented by the Navy today.

  Four Ohio-class SSBNs, or ballistic-missile submarines, are currently being refitted as SSGNs, or guided-missile submarines. Each submarine will feature the capacity to launch 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles and deploy five dozen to six dozen Navy SEALs, or Special Operation forces. For details on this experiment, see David Nagle, “Giant Shadow Experiment Tests New SSGN Capabilities,” Navy Newsstand: The Source for Navy News, 28 January 2003, found online at www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=5559.

  74 In the final version, . . . to use command of the seas.”

  That slide is found in Enclosure 2, “The Strategic Concept of the Naval Service: A New Era—A New Course,” in Thomas P. M. Barnett and Ferd V. Neider, Center for Naval Analyses Memorandum for the Record 92-0527 (Final Report of the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort [Phases I & II]), 23 March 1992.

  THE FRACTURING OF THE SECURITY MARKET

  83 In my career, I have found . . . transnational terrorists).

  I came across these three levels of perspective first in Kenneth Waltz’s seminal volume Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954) and have employed it ever since.

  84 Despite the fact that the Cold War . . . paradigm is one of my-army-against-your-army.

  I have long called this tendency of the military to focus their gaze on the nation-state level the “Willie Sutton effect,” after the famous bandit who, when asked why he robbed banks, replied, “Because that’s where the money is.” In other words, nation-states have long served as the preeminent collection point (i.e., taxes) for collective security efforts (militaries).

  86 State-to-state arms transfers . . . backward states

  For the story on the ballooning global trade in small arms in the early 1990s, see Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed, eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995). For analysis of its cost in lives, see the working paper entitled “Global Trade in Small Arms: Health Effects and Interventions,” jointly published by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Small-Arms/Firearms Education and Research Network (SAFER-Net), found online at www.guncontrol.ca/Content/Temp/IPPNW-Global_health_.PDF.

  86 According to the Small Arms Survey . . . of military small arms.

  For more details, see their Small Arms Survey 2003 found online at www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb_2003.htm.

  86 Factor in the growth . . . their security needs in the post-Cold War era.

  For example, in the United States alone, the private sector is estimated to spend somewhere in the range of $50 billion to $60 billion annually on security, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; see Roy Harris, “What Price Security?,” CFO Magazine, 1 July 2003, found online at www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,9859%7C%7CM%7C626,00.html. What could logically be added to that is all the spending by individuals for home security systems, personal firearms, etc.

  HOW 9/11 SAVED THE PENTAGON FROM ITSELF

  98 I reunited with . . . the Transitioneers, Big Sticks, and Cold Worriers.

  Thomas P. M. Barnett and Henry H. Gaffney, Jr., “It’s Going to Be a Bumpy Ride,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1993, pp. 23-26. The article was cited in 1998 in Proceedings’ 100th-anniversary issue as one of the best articles in the history of the journal.

  98 By showing naval leaders . . . had to be made given budgetary constraints.

  Thomas P. M. Barnett and Henry H. Gaffney, Jr., Reconciling Strategy and Forces Across an Uncertain Future: Three Alternative Visions (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993).

  102 These long overseas deployments . . . greater workload for the same pay.

  For recent overviews on this growing issue, see Kevin Sullivan, “ ‘Weekend Warriors’ No More: National Guard’s Expanded Role in Iraq Means More Combat Time, Greater Risks,” Washington Post, 19 July 2003; Christine Dugas, “When Duty Calls, They Suffer: Self-Employed Reservists Can Return to Fiscal Devastation,” USA Today, 17 April 2003; and Steven Greenhouse, “Balancing Their Duty to Family and Nation: For Some, Overseas and Overextended,” New York Times, 22 June 2003.

  104 As Secretary of Defense . . . regarding a transformation that “cannot wait.”

  Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Beyond This War on Terrorism,” Washington Post, 1 November 2001.

  104 In effect, 9/11 signaled . . . long-term desires and near-term realities.

  Bill Keller, “The Fighting Next Time: Why Reformers Believe That Preparing the Military for Next-Generation Warfare Is Radical and Crucial—and One More Casualty of 9/11,” New York Times Magazine, 10 March 2002, pp. 32-36.

  105 As Washington Post columnist . . . well-motivated boots on the ground.

  David Ignatius, “Standoffish Soldiering,” Washington Post, 5 August 2003.

  105 As author Max Boot points out . . . two world wars in rapid succession.

  Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, p. 351.

  Chapter 3. DISCONNECTEDNESS DEFINES DANGER

  HOW I LEARNED TO THINK HORIZONTALLY

  112 For example, in my Ph.D. dissertation . . . foreign policy independence.

  My dissertation, which was overseen by Professors Adam Ulam, Joseph Nye, and Houchang Chehabi, was later published as Romanian and East German Policies in the Third World: Comparing the Strategies of Ceausescu and Honecker (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishing, 1992).

  118 Then the military would rapidly . . . virtually no warning time.

  In reality, studies of such crisis responses indicates that “warning time” is substantial as a rule. For details, see H. H. Gaffney, Warning Time for U.S. Forces’ Responses to Situations: A Selective Study (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Strategic Studies, 2002).

  119 Think about our secretaries of state . . . aid package in return.

  For a good example of this, see Peter Baker, “Iraq’s Neighborhood Thick with U.S. Arms: Weapons and Technology Traded for Support,” Washington Post, 5 February 2003.

  MAPPING GLOBALIZATION’S FRONTIER

  125 If you are one of . . . escape the mullahs’ censorship.

  Nazila Fathi, “Taboo Surfing: Click Here for Iran . . . ,” New York Times, 4 August 2002.

  126 Barbie has become a doll on the run.

  Associated Press, “Barbie Dolls Confiscated in Iran,” 22 May 2002.

  126 By the time the wave of violence . . . people lay dead in the streets.

  Marc Lacey, “Fiery Zealotry Leaves Nigeria in Ashes Again,” New York Times, 29 November 2002.

  126 Soon after, the Miss World . . . from the Functioning Core of globalization.

  Alan Cowell, “Religious Violence in Nigeria Drives Out Miss World Event,” New York Times, 23 November 2002.

  126 But most modernizing societies . . . boomlet among international investors.

  Matt Krantz, “Internet Investors Go All the Way to China for Latest Boom,” USA Today, 21 July 2003.

  126 By that I mean deny . . . sites that criticize the Communist leadership.

  Erik Eckholm, “. . . And Click Here for China,” New York Times, 4 August 2002; and Peter S. Goodman and Mike Musgrove, “China Blocks Web Search Engines: Country Fears Doors to Commerce Also Open Weak Spots,” Washington Post, 12 September 2002.

  127 Then came President Vladimir Putin’s . . . because it was now safe for it to do so.

  James Brooke, “Russia’s Economy Building on 3 Solid Years of Solid Growth,” New York Times, 25 June 2003. See also Gregory L. White, “Russia Wins Nod From Moody’s: Investment Grade: Rater’s Two-Tick Revision on Foreign-Currency Debt Marks Dramatic Turnabout,” Wall Street Journal, 9 October 2003.

  128 Thus, the second-
quarter capital inflow . . . outflow of almost $8 billion.

  Figures cited in David Ignatius, “Loot Turned Legitimate,” Washington Post, 4 November 2003.

  128 It happened because the Soviet Union’s first great technocratic . . . comrade China.

  I first explored the notion of a rising technocracy in the Soviet Union and its potential impact on political and economic reforms in a graduate paper I wrote for Professor Loren Graham of M.I.T. in his “History of Russian and Soviet Science” class in 1986. The paper, entitled “The Concept of Technocracy and the Soviet Politburo,” earned me an A grade and later citation in one of Prof. Graham’s published articles (“Toward a New Era in U.S.-Soviet Relations,” Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 1989, pp. 36-42) as “recommended reading.” Alas, I could not get my own article published because, as one editor (Problems of Communism) told me, the field of Soviet studies had already examined that issue during the Brezhnev era, so there was no need to revisit the concept! Obviously history turned out a little differrent in the Gorbachev era, thus leaving us with no more “problems of communism.”

  129 In terms of economic freedom . . . the same in terms of its legal rule sets.

  Erik Eckholm, “Petitioners Urge China to Enforce Legal Rights,” New York Times, 2 June 2003; Peter Wonacott, “Poisoned at Plant, Mr. Wu Became a Labor Crusader: Legal Reforms in China Have Created an Army of Self-Taught Attorneys,” Wall Street Journal, 21 July 2003; and Chris Buckley, “Capitalists in Chinese Legislature Speak Out for Property Rights,” New York Times, 12 March 2003.

  131 As Dani Rodrik points out . . . protectionist economies until quite recently.

  Dani Rodrik, “Globalization for Whom: Time to Change the Rules—and Focus on Poor Workers,” Harvard Magazine, July-August 2002, p. 30.

  132 Good evidence of a lack . . . or a recent state bankruptcy.

  Using historical data, Jeffrey D. Sachs argues that state financial failures are a very strong predictor of subsequent U.S. military interventions; see his “The Strategic Significance of Global Inequality,” Washington Quarterly, Summer 2001, pp. 187-98.