The Pentagon's New Map

by Thomas P. M. Barnett

  314 In fact, we do well to encourage specialization . . . and peacekeeping.

  For the best example of a country whose military is embracing that sort of specialization, see Matthew Brzezinski, “Who’s Afraid of Norway?: She May Look Like G.I. Jane, but Defense Minister Kristin Krohn Devoid Has Made Her Country’s Military the Model for Small Nations That Want a Meaningful Role in World Affairs,” New York Times Magazine, 24 August 2003, pp. 24-28.

  THE SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR

  315 He wanted a copy of an article I had written immediately following Y2K.

  Thomas P. M. Barnett, “Life After DoDth or: How the Evernet Changes Everything,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, May 2000, pp. 48-53.

  317 The Coast Guard is essentially lost . . . tasks the U.S. Navy is keen to avoid.

  For a good description of this, see John Mintz and Vernon Loeb, “Coast Guard Fights to Retain War Role: ‘Slack-Jawed’ over Criticism from Rumsfeld, Service Cites Its Battle Capabilities,” Washington Post, 31 August 2003.

  318 But this time, many were used . . . military installations around the world.

  For a good overview of what eventually unfolded, see Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Reserve Call-Up for an Iraqi War May Equal 1991’s: To Guard Against Terror: Activation of Around 265,000 Would Help Protect Sites in U.S. and Overseas,” New York Times, 28 October 2002.

  318 Then came the hard part . . . manage the transition and eager as hell to leave.

  See Steven Lee Myers, “Anxious and Weary of War, G.I.’s Face a New Iraq Mission,” New York Times, 15 June 2003.

  318 The warrior force was . . . into an occupation force.

  Some of the best immediate coverage of this turn of events is found in Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Inexperienced Hands Guide Iraq Rebuilding,” Washington Post, 25 June 2003; William Booth, “Ad-Libbing Iraq’s Infrastructure: U.S. Troops Face Daily Scramble in ‘Bringing Order to Chaos,’ ” Washington Post, 21 May 2003; and David Luhnow, “Amid Shortages, New U.S. Agency Tries to Run Iraq: Miscues on Advance Planning Draw Fire, but Electricity and Police Patrols Are Up,” Wall Street Journal, 5 June 2003. For a Bush Administration reply to such criticism, see Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Beyond Nation-Building,” Washington Post, 25 September 2003.

  319 “Military operations other than war” . . . country’s entire defense budget.

  The President’s request of 7 September 2003 included approximately $65 billion for defense and intelligence requirements related to the occupation of Iraq. By comparison, the highest credible estimates of Chinese defense spending are in the $60 billion to $70 billion range, or severalfold above the official Chinese figure of approximately $15 billion.

  319 Outside of Vietnam . . . way below .500, and that has to end.

  A Carnegie Endowment study on U.S. nation-building efforts following invasions across the twentieth century estimated that in only four of sixteen cases did the U.S. effort leave behind a functioning democracy ten years later. See Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, Lessons from the Past: The American Record of Nation Building, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief No. 24, May 2003.

  320 The Leviathan’s speed of command . . . to mount coherent defenses.

  My earliest descriptions of the Leviathan force are found in my article “The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1999, pp. 36-39.

  321 These groups . . . in any postwar or disaster environment but safe as well.

  This was not the case in the early months of the U.S. military occupation of postwar Iraq. For details, see Ian Fisher and Elizabeth Becker, “The Reconstruction: Aid Workers Leaving Iraq, Fearing They Are Targets,” New York Times, 12 October 2003.

  321 The Sys Admin’s decision loops . . . live with each other over the long haul.

  For an excellent overview of this troubled relationship, see Adam Siegel, “Civil-Military Marriage Counseling: Can This Union Be Saved?” Special Warfare, December 2002, pp. 28-34.

  321 All the broken windows will be fixed . . . after we “bring the boys home.”

  The best single exploration of this subject is by Bradd C. Hayes and Jeffrey I. Sands, Doing Windows: Non-Traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997). As a side note, the Defense Department continues to rethink the use of certain ammunition so as to diminish the postconflict dangers not only to civilians but also to its own troops. For a good example, see Michael M. Phillips and Greg Jaffe, “Pentagon Rethinks Use of Cluster Bombs: Thousands of Unexploded Bomblets Impede Military Movement, Kill Civilians,” Wall Street Journal, 25 August 2003.

  321 It will remain a secret society . . . military operations within the homeland.

  The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 basically prohibits U.S. military forces from acting as a domestic police force, except when allowed by Congress.

  322 Moreover, as the world’s largest . . . a moneymaker for developing nations.

  UN peacekeeping missions pay approximately $1,100 per soldier per month to governments supplying troops. According to Michael Sheehan, former UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping, “The cash flow has a huge impact on budgets, so there is enormous incentive to be involved.” For details, see Alix M. Freedman, “First World Nations in Effect Pay Those of Third to Handle Missions: U.N. Peacekeeping Allowance Can Add Up to Real Money for Developing Countries,” Wall Street Journal, 1 October 2003.

  323 The Sys Admin force will be civil affairs-oriented . . . international protocols?

  For an example of what the U.S. military was missing in its approach to occupying postwar Iraq, see Christopher Cooper, “As U.S. Tries to Bring Order to Iraq, Need for Military Policy Is Rising,” Wall Street Journal, 21 August 2003.

  325 Nuclear weapons will not be sanitized . . . sources of existential deterrence.

  For some background on this issue and the current efforts within the Defense Department to rethink the utility of nuclear weapons, see Michael R. Gordon, “Nuclear Arms: For Deterrence or Fighting?” New York Times, 11 March 2002; and Walter Pincus, “Future of U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Debated: Arms Control Experts Worry Pentagon’s Restructuring Plan Means More Weapons,” Washington Post, 4 May 2003.

  THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

  327 In January 1998 . . . “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future.”

  Arthur K. Cebrowski, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, and John J. Gartska, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1998, pp. 28-35.

  327 So much so that my first act . . . where Art’s article had been published.

  Barnett, “The Seven Deadly Sins,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1999.

  332 When Art Cebrowski and I . . . war on terrorism will be won.

  Arthur K. Cebrowski and Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The American Way of War,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, January 2003, pp. 42-43.

  333 Here is how I choose to define them:

  This section is based on a list of such rules (“The Top 100 Rules of the New American Way of War”) that I published with Henry H. Gaffney, Jr., in the British Army Review (Spring 2003), pp. 40-45. I acknowledge this list is, at times, more prescriptive than descriptive.

  Chapter 7. THE MYTHS WE MAKE (I Will Now Dispel)

  THE MYTH OF GLOBAL CHAOS

  347 Apparently, despite all this conflict . . . at the end of the Cold War.

  For World Bank figures, see most recent edition of World Development Indicators.

  347 According to the University of Maryland’s . . . since the early 1960s.”

  Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Conflicts 2003: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy (College Park, Md.: University of Maryland, 2003), found online at www.cidcm.umd.edu/peace_and_conflict_2003.asp, p. 12. This annual report is hands down the best of its kind.

  348 That would be us—the United States.
/>
  Data compiled by SIPRI. For details, see Web site of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at www.sipri.se/.

  348 So busy, yes, but all over the planet? Not exactly.

  Data drawn from Cobble et al., For the Record, p. 33 and Appendix 1.

  348 When measured as a percent . . . 20 percent of the time in the 1990s.

  Cobble et al., For the Record, pp. 40-41.

  349 Today, the total is . . . the lowest numbers since 1960.

  Marshall and Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2003, p. 30.

  THE MYTH OF AMERICA AS GLOBOCOP

  351 For example, Colombia is a dangerous . . . who gets to control particular regions.

  For a description, see Scott Wilson, “Venezuela Becomes Embroiled in Columbian War: Reports of Bombed Villages on Northeastern Frontier Point to Military Support for Guerillas,” Washington Post, 10 April 2003.

  352 Add it all up . . . of 191 states currently belonging to the United Nations.

  Marshall and Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2003, pp. 9-11.

  353 This theory of crime prevention . . . emboldened and commit more crimes.

  For one of the earliest and best descriptions of this crime-prevention strategy, see James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” The Atlantic Monthly, March 1982, pp. 29-38.

  THE MYTH OF AMERICAN EMPIRE

  357 So there are those who speak of . . . to ensure order and stability.”

  Stephen Peter Rosen, “The Future of War and the American Military: Demography, Technology and the Politics of Modern Empire,” Harvard Magazine, May-June 2002, pp. 29-39.

  359 Most nationalism around the world . . . linked to current grievances.

  Minxin Pei, “The Paradoxes of American Nationalism,” Foreign Policy, May-June 2003, pp. 31-37.

  359 Perhaps the worst definitions . . . and desires to become stronger.

  The most thoughtful version of this frequent argument comes from Robert Jervis, “The Compulsive Empire,” Foreign Policy, July-August 2003, pp. 83-87.

  359 Somehow, the fact that America . . . peacekeepers after the fact.

  For a glorious example of how these sorts of data calculations can be pursued to absurd conclusions, see the Center for Global Development and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s “Commitment to Development Index” in Foreign Policy, May-June 2003, pp. 56-66.

  361 We topple the extremist regime . . . and the Taliban finds it perverse.

  Erik Eckholm, “In Kandahar, a Top School Reopens, and Girls Are Welcome,” New York Times, 23 December 2001; Carlotta Gall, “Long in Dark, Afghan Women Say to Read Is Finally to See,” New York Times, 22 September 2002; and Pamela Constable, “Afghan Women Take Radio Liberties: Tiny Station Transmitting Message of Support to a Largely Illiterate Female Populace,” Washington Post, 3 November 2003.

  362 But clearly, the most radical change . . . Donnelly so aptly describes it.

  Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, “Toward a Global Cavalry: Overseas Rebasing and Defense Transformation,” American Enterprise Institute Online, 20 June 2003, found online at www.aei.org/publications.

  362 This radical repositioning of U.S. military bases . . . Core-Gap divide.

  For a good overview of how the distribution of U.S. military bases around the world has changed since the end of the Cold War, see Bruce Falconer, “The World in Numbers: U.S. Military Logistics,” The Atlantic Monthly, May 2003, pp. 50-51.

  363 Concerns over American “empire” . . . Kennedy at the end of the Cold War.

  Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987).

  364 If America offers a convincing case . . . defined by the Gap’s elimination.

  The “unipolar moment” concept originates with Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990/91, pp. 23-33.

  Chapter 8. HOPE WITHOUT GUARANTEES

  368 I know not everyone . . . “hope without guarantees.”

  J.R.R. Tolkien used this phrase when describing his treatment of the character “Gandalf” (Lord of the Rings) in a letter to Michael Straight, New Republic editor, January 1956, found online at www.tolkienonline.com.

  369 We will accomplish this best by being explicit . . . we enter the Gap.

  I first explored this concept in Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The ‘Core’ and ‘Gap’: Defining Rules in a Dangerous World,” Providence Journal, 7 November 2002.

  370 As Art Cebrowski likes to say . . . combat is bigger than shooting.”

  Quoted in John T. Bennett, “Cebrowski Calls for New Training Methods for Combat, Postwar Ops,” Inside the Pentagon, 11 September 2003.

  373 Full of regional area experts . . . then doing its best to fulfill that prophecy.

  True to form, the State Department “foresaw” all the difficulties of the postwar occupation of Iraq, and just as true to form, the Defense Department ignored their concerns because State always tells Defense that what they are trying to achieve is virtually impossible. For details on this case, see Eric Schmitt and Joel Brinkley, “State Dept. Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq: Some Say Pentagon First Ignored Warnings on Security, Utilities and Civil Rule,” New York Times, 19 October 2003.

  374 Here I agree with Newt Gingrich . . . complete overhaul and now.

  See Newt Gingrich, “Rogue State Department,” Foreign Policy, July-August 2003, pp. 42-48.

  374 The model of this approach . . . peacekeeping forces were locally derived.

  For a good overview, see Alex de Waal, “S.O.S. Africa,” Wall Street Journal, 6 August 2003.

  374 Here, the best example comes from Chad . . . economic development.

  Roger Thurow and Susan Warren, “In War on Poverty, Chad’s Pipeline Plays Unusual Role: To Unlock Buried Wealth, Nation Gives Up Control over Spending Its Cash,” Wall Street Journal, 24 June 2003.

  374 Finally, the Core’s foreign aid . . . connectivity throughout the Gap.

  For examples of this general trend, see David Barboza, “Development of Biotech Crops Is Booming in Asia,” New York Times, 21 February 2003; and Justin Gillis, “To Feed Hungry Africans, Firms Plant Seeds of Science,” Washington Post, 11 March 2003.

  375 These approaches, when combined . . . redirecting that time toward education.

  For a good example, see Roger Thurow, “Makeshift ‘Cuisinart’ Makes a Lot Possible in Impoverished Mali: It Can Do Work in a Flash, Leaving Time for Literacy and Entrepreneurship,” Wall Street Journal, 26 July 2002.

  375 This organization would focus . . . once bad leadership has been removed.

  Sebastian Mallaby, “The Lesson in MacArthur,” Washington Post, 21 October 2002.

  376 The fact that UN Secretary General . . . before the decade ends.

  Annan broached the subject in his annual report to the General Assembly, delivered 8 September 2003; see Felicity Barringer, “Annan Wants Security Council to Grow to Better Reflect World,” New York Times, 9 September 2003.

  377 The outlines of the great compromise . . . and foreign direct investment.

  Some commentators, like Thomas Friedman, go so far as to say that the U.S. government’s continued subsidization of U.S. farmers indirectly fuels terrorism around the world; see his “Connect the Dots,” New York Times, 25 September 2003.

  378 This group was led by China, India . . . all key pillars of the New Core.

  For details, see Steven Pearlstein, “Trade and Trade-Offs,” Washington Post, 10 September 2003; Elizabeth Becker, “Coming U.S. Vote Figures in Walkout at Trade Talks: American Farm Provisions Are a Key Issue,” New York Times, 16 September 2003; Pascal Lamy, “Post-Cancun Primer: My WTO ‘Q & A,’ ” Wall Street Journal, 23 September 2003; and Larry Rohter, “New Global Trade Lineup: Haves, Have-Nots, Have-Somes,” New York Times, 2 November 2003.

  378 When the United States needed to sell . . . or well over $100 billion.

  Details co
me from Floyd Norris, “Foreigners May Not Have Liked This War, But They Financed It,” New York Times, 12 September 2003; and Peter S. Goodman, “U.S. Debt to Asia Swelling: Japan, China Lead Buyers of Treasuries,” Washington Post, 13 September 2003.

  379 He has treated his own people . . . countryside in the late 1990s.

  For descriptions, see Carl Gersham, “North Korea’s Human Catastrophe,” Washington Post, 17 April 2003; Robert Windrem, “Death, Terror in N. Korea Gulag,” MSNBC, 15 January 2003, found online at www.msnbc.com/news/859191.asp; Doug Struck, “Opening a Window on North Korea’s Horrors: Defectors Haunted by Guilt for the Loved Ones Left Behind,” Washington Post, 4 October, 2003; and Peter Maass, “The Last Emperor Kim Jong Il,” New York Times Magazine, 19 October 2003, pp. 36-47.

  380 If that is not enough, then Iran . . . and al Qaeda in particular.

  For details on the Iranian government’s “Jerusalem Force,” which trains, arms, and collaborates with foreign terrorist groups in the region, including al Qaeda, see Dana Priest and Douglas Farah, “Iranian Force Has Long Ties to Al Qaeda,” Washington Post, 14 October 2003.

  380 Once this happens . . . rebel groups within that failed state.

  For a description of the most recent American effort to effect a “Colombianization” of the war effort there, see Scott Wilson, “U.S. Makes Plans to Give War Back to Colombia: Involvement Will Decline After Hunt Ends for Americans,” Washington Post, 9 March 2003.

  380 The shift to natural gas alone . . . “trust fund” model of nondevelopment.

  For examples of how the Saudis are rethinking foreign investment with regard to natural gas, see Heather Timmons, “Saudis Trying to Drum Up Investment in Gas Fields,” New York Times, 22 July 2003.

  381 U.S. pressure in this regard . . . and non-Muslims with great suspicion.”

  Zakaria, Future of Freedom, p. 145.

  381 The biggest danger China faces . . . a collapse of its financial system.

  For details, see Kathy Chen, “Surge in Lending in China Stokes Economic Worries: Spending Investment Sprees Point to Overheating; Bad Debts Are on the Rise,” Wall Street Journal, 3 October 2003.