The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  Mixed War Signals

  The rush to get ships to sea made a mockery of the embargo, which was supposed to protect American vessels by keeping them in port. “The great body of the people,” said Niles’ Register, “have acted, as though an adjustment of differences with Great Britain, instead of an appeal to the sword, was at hand.”80 Insurance rates—a good indication of public expectations—remained low in early 1812, even for ships sailing to Great Britain.81 “We hear from all quarters,” wrote William Lowndes in late March, “that the people do not expect war.” “Many people, even Republicans,” wrote William Plumer in May, “do not yet believe the govt is in reality preparing for actual war.”82

  Federalists were particularly skeptical of the war talk. In a highly publicized statement made three years earlier, Josiah Quincy had claimed that the Republican majority “could not be kicked into” war. “No insult, however gross, offered to us by either France or Great Britain,” he said, “could force this majority into the declaration of war.”83 Nothing in the years that followed had altered Quincy’s opinion. Even after the War Congress had assembled, Quincy claimed that the talk of war was “ludicrous” and that even “the highest toned of the war party” conceded privately that hostilities were unlikely.84 Most Federalists shared this view. The Republicans, claimed the Boston Gazette, “are playing a hypocritical part.” Their object was “to provoke the Federalists to their accustomed opposition” so that they could retreat to the restrictive system with the plea that the “British” faction opposed stronger measures.85

  The government was partly responsible for this skepticism. Talk of war in the past had never led to hostilities, and the signals emanating from the administration were still mixed. As late as March 31, Monroe, sounding very much like a proponent of the “scarecrow” strategy, told the House Foreign Relations Committee that the war preparations were designed to “appeal to the feelings of the foreign Govt.”86 At the time Monroe was writing a series of editorials for the Washington National Intelligencer, but not until April 14 did he call unmistakably for war.87 Ten days later, Madison told Jefferson that “great differences of opinion” still existed over the timing and the form of hostilities.88

  Perhaps hoping not to tip its hand, the administration kept the British minister in the dark. When Augustus J. Foster asked if the embargo would be followed by war, Madison demurred, claiming that its purpose was to protect commerce and that “one embargo may be inoculated upon another.”89 This made the embargo seem like a continuation of the restrictive system. As late as May 10, Foster was so baffled by the signals he was receiving that he wrote to a British consul: “So absolutely are they here without Chart or Compass that I really am at a loss to give you news.”90

  Republicans in Congress were also sending mixed signals. “The war fever,” reported a House Federalist, “has its hot and cold fits.”91 It was well known that some Republicans had voted for the embargo as a continuation of the restrictive system, which undermined the War Hawks’ claim that it was a preliminary to war. Moreover, members of both houses showed signs of weariness from the long session and were anxious to return home. “I am so fatigued with the doings and not doings of Congress,” said Nathaniel Macon in March, “that I sincerely wish myself at home and free from all public engagements.”92

  This sentiment was so prevalent that both houses considered a spring recess even though, as one Republican warned, it would “damp the public Spirit, & paralyze the energies of the nation.”93 The proposed recess was defeated, but many members went home anyway.94 “The House of Representatives is now thin,” reported Macon, “and the members are daily leaving the city.” “It is with great difficulty,” added James A. Bayard, that “we can get or preserve a quorum in the Senate.”95

  A rumor was also circulated by a Baltimore newspaper that a special diplomatic mission would be sent to England to avert war. The report, which was widely credited and was repeated as far away as London, said that Great Britain had offered to resurrect the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty, with certain modifications favorable to the United States, as a basis for preserving peace. With rumors like this afloat, it is hardly surprising that so many people remained skeptical about the likelihood of war.96

  British Conciliation

  Great Britain, like the United States, was also sending mixed signals, but she was heading in the opposite direction. While the United States was moving toward war, the British were hoping through a series of conciliatory gestures to avert hostilities. The first step in this direction was the settlement of the Chesapeake affair in late 1811. After more than four years of sparring, the two powers finally managed to divorce this issue from others and reach a settlement. The British agreed to disavow the attack, pay reparations, and restore the two surviving Americans (the third having died in a Halifax hospital).97 But this problem had festered for so long that its resolution gave little satisfaction to most Americans. Returning the impressed seamen, said the Baltimore Whig, was “like restoring a hair after fracturing the skull.” It was “only a sop,” added the Lexington Reporter, “to stop the mouth of Congress.”98

  In the spring of 1812, the British navy began to treat American ships and seamen with new tact. The Admiralty ordered all naval officers to take “especial care” to avoid clashes with the American navy and to exercise “all possible forbearance” toward American citizens.99 The commanding officers at both Halifax and Bermuda ordered their ships to keep clear of the American coast to avoid incidents.100 This was particularly significant because Americans found the search and seizure of ships near the coast so infuriating.

  In May 1812, on the very eve of war, the British offered to give the United States an equal share of the license trade with the Continent. Inasmuch as Britain had issued an average of 10,000 licenses a year since 1807, this proposal was significant.101 In effect, the British were offering to suspend the Orders-in-Council in practice if American merchants would conduct their trade with Europe under British licenses. But the administration summarily rejected this proposal, believing that accepting it would be tantamount to surrendering American independence.102

  The British made their greatest concession in June 1812 just as the United States was declaring war. On June 16—two days before the declaration of war—Lord Castlereagh, the British foreign secretary, announced in Parliament that the Orders-in-Council would be suspended if the United States dropped its ban on British imports. A week later, without waiting for a response from the United States, the British scrapped the whole system of blockades and licenses.103 Had this decision been made a couple of months earlier, it most likely would have averted war. Madison later indicated that the declaration of war “would have been stayed” if he had known about the repeal of the Orders, and Monroe agreed.104 But the news of the British action did not reach Washington until August 13, and by then the die was cast.

  It was not only slow communication that doomed the British policy of conciliation. At no time did the British announce a new policy toward the United States or even hint that concessions might be made. They themselves were not consciously changing the direction of their policy. They simply offered each concession on an ad hoc basis. As a result, they failed to give adequate publicity to some of their concessions (such as pulling their warships off the coast), and most of the others were made too late to be effective. In short, their policy of conciliation failed because it was not carried out in a timely or thoughtful manner.

  American officials were also responsible for the failure of conciliation. The American minister in London had returned home in 1811, leaving only a chargé d’affaires in his place.105 Thus there was no ranking diplomat who might move freely in British circles, no one to perceive that support for the Orders-in-Council was crumbling. Moreover, Republican leaders were so blinded by their distrust of Great Britain and so burdened by the ideological legacy of the Revolution that they saw significant British concessions as meaningless gestures. The offer to share the license trade, for example, opened t
he door to a lucrative trade with the Continent, but Republicans saw the proposal as simply a snare designed to recolonize the United States and restore the old navigation system.

  The President Recommends War

  As much as they distrusted the British, Republican leaders still hoped that the Hornet would bring news of concessions. The long-overdue ship finally reached New York on May 19, 1812. Three days later the dispatches it carried were in the hands of officials in Washington.106 The news, however, was doubly disappointing. Although unofficial reports suggested a softening of British policy, official statements indicated a stubborn adherence to the Orders-in-Council. The news from France was no better. Reports of continued French depredations had been filtering in for months, and American officials were desperately seeking a definitive statement on the suspension of the Continental Decrees. But no such pronouncement was forthcoming.107 “The Hornet arrives from france,” a Republican senator confided to his diary, “and brings to me satisfactory proof of the perfidy of that Govt.”108 For Americans hoping for concessions from at least one of the belligerents, the Hornet’s news was disappointing indeed.

  The War Hawks had long since agreed that if the Hornet did not bring news of British concessions, war would be declared.109 Although the Constitution entrusted the decision to Congress, the War Hawks wanted the president to take the lead. Madison did not disappoint them. On June 1, less than ten days after the Hornet’s dispatches had arrived, he sent a secret message to Congress on the subject of Anglo-American relations.110

  Madison’s message was a well-organized indictment of Great Britain for acts hostile to the United States. The British were arraigned for impressing American seamen; violating American waters; establishing illegal blockades, particularly “the sweeping system of blockades, under the name of Orders in Council”; employing a secret agent to subvert the Union; and exerting a malicious influence over the Indians in the Old Northwest.111

  The emphasis in the message was on maritime issues. Fully two-thirds of the indictment was devoted to the Orders-in-Council and other blockades. The issues were not presented in the order of their importance (since the Orders were third), but rather in a rough chronological order that put the most galling grievances first. Hence impressment and the violation of American waters headed the list.

  In places Madison’s message echoed the Declaration of Independence, a reflection of the Republican view that a second war of independence was necessary to end Britain’s quasi-colonial practices of regulating American ships and impressing American seamen. Fearing the charge of executive influence, Madison did not recommend a declaration of war, but the thrust of his message was unmistakable. “We behold . . . on the side of Great Britain,” he said, “a state of war against the United States; and on the side of the United States, a state of peace towards Britain.”112

  Congress Votes for War

  Madison’s message was referred to the House Foreign Relations Committee, which issued its report behind closed doors through Acting Chairman Calhoun on June 3. The report, which was mainly the work of Calhoun, was more spirited in tone than Madison’s message, though the content was similar, with the emphasis again on the Orders. “The mad ambition, the lust of power, and commercial avarice of Great Britain,” said the report, “have left to neutral nations an alternative only between the base surrender of their rights, and a manly vindication of them.” The report closed with a plea for “an immediate appeal to arms.”113

  Shortly after reading this report, Calhoun introduced a war bill that had been drafted by Attorney General William Pinkney.114 Federalists sought to lift the veil of secrecy so that they could debate the merits of the bill publicly. Although many people suspected that Congress was considering a declaration of war, the Republicans were fearful of debating such an explosive issue openly. Unable to prevail, the Federalists decided to remain silent and to express their views only with their votes. As a result, the Republicans were able to push the bill through the House in only two days—a remarkably short time for so crucial a measure.115

  In the Senate the bill ran into more trouble.116 There was considerable support here for limiting the war to the high seas, a sentiment shared by at least some members of the cabinet. On the very day that Madison sent his war message to Congress (a message that in no way precluded limited war), Monroe penned a note to Gallatin indicating his own views. “I am convinced,” he wrote, “that it is very important to attempt, at present, the maritime war only.”117 Gallatin, who feared the effects of war on the nation’s finances, agreed, and William Lowndes later claimed that other members of the cabinet shared this view, too.118

  A limited maritime war in the tradition of ’98 appealed to many people because it offered a cheap and direct means of vindicating American rights. The nation would avoid the costs of an extended land war, and the president could end the conflict by executive order without resorting to the sort of time-consuming negotiations that drew out so many wars. The only problem with this strategy was that the British were far more vulnerable in sparsely populated Canada than on the high seas. A maritime war might win some concessions, but it could hardly end in decisive victory.119

  James Monroe (1758–1831) joined Madison’s cabinet on the eve of war and during the contest helped shape policy as secretary of state and secretary of war. Although he was competent, on occasion his judgment was clouded by his presidential ambitions. (Based on a portrait by Gilbert Stuart. Library of Congress)

  Although some Republicans favored maritime war, the Federalists were the most vocal proponents of this strategy. Doubtless recalling the successes of the Quasi-War, the Federalists over the years had repeatedly called for arming American merchantmen.120 Their aim was not to resist British cruisers (which would have been impractical for lightly armed merchantmen) but to oppose the privateers sent out by France and her allies. Between 1806 and 1810, the leading proponent of this strategy, Samuel W. Dana of Connecticut, introduced resolutions in Congress on four separate occasions to authorize merchantmen to arm for defense. Dana was also the driving force behind a pair of Senate bills (introduced in the spring of 1812) that would accomplish the same end.121 Most Federalists supported these bills (which passed the Senate but were buried in a House committee) as well as every proposal to expand the navy and to build coastal fortifications. Most agreed with Quincy that the nation had a duty to provide “systematic protection of our maritime rights, by maritime means.”122

  No doubt some Federalists supported maritime war simply as the lesser of two evils—not desirable in itself but preferable to full-scale war. Yet for most a war restricted to the high seas offered the best means of upholding the nation’s rights, especially if (as was widely assumed) France were included in the reprisals. This would enable Federalist merchants to choose their enemy. Unleashing armed merchantmen against both belligerents, said the Baltimore Federal Republican in a widely reprinted editorial, “meets our peculiar approbation.”123

  The Senate referred the war bill to a select committee, which reported it with little change on June 8. The following day, however, Republican Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania moved to send the bill back to committee with instructions to amend it so that it merely authorized warships and privateers to carry out reprisals against Britain. This motion carried by a 17–13 vote. Three days later, however, when the modified bill was reported from committee, the Senate reversed itself. A motion to accept the committee’s changes failed by a tie vote, 16–16, when the president pro tem, John Gaillard of South Carolina, cast his vote against it. The opponents of maritime war prevailed because one Republican (William Branch Giles) changed his vote, while two others who had not voted on Gregg’s motion (Richard Brent of Virginia and Jonathan Robinson of Vermont) now voted to reject the committee’s changes. The tie vote meant that the original bill was restored.124

  Several additional attempts were made to limit the war to the high seas, but these failed. Amendments to include France in a limited maritime war—a “triangula
r war”—failed, too.125 Aside from the drawbacks of fighting two powerful foes at once, such a war would deny American warships and privateers the use of French ports.126 Although proponents of full-scale war prevailed in the Senate, the outcome was long in doubt. It took the Senate two weeks to complete its deliberations, which prompted one member of the House to exclaim that “the suspense we are in is worse than hell—!!!”127 Finally, on June 17, the Senate approved the original bill by a 19–13 vote.128 The following day Madison signed the measure into law. Thus on June 18, 1812, the War of 1812 began.129

  The vote on the war bill—79–49 in the House and 19–13 in the Senate—was the closest vote on any formal declaration of war in American history.130 Only 61 percent of the voting members supported the bill. Most representatives and senators from Pennsylvania and the South and West voted for war, while most from the North and East voted against it. But the sectional breakdown was really a reflection of party strength, for the vote on the war bill was essentially a party vote. About 81 percent of the Republicans in both houses of Congress voted for the measure (98–23), while all the Federalists voted against it (39–0).

  Republican War Aims

  What did the Republicans hope to accomplish with war? Their chief aim was to win concessions from the British on the maritime issues, particularly the Orders-in-Council and impressment. Throughout the winter and spring of 1812, these issues had dominated almost every discussion of American grievances, both in and out of Congress. In the language of the day, war was undertaken primarily to secure “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights.” The advocates of war also hoped to put an end to British influence over American Indians by conquering Canada or at least breaking the power of the British there. But this objective loomed large only in the West, and even in that region many people gave primacy to the maritime issues because they blamed a slump in commodity prices on the Orders-in-Council.131