The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  Republicans also saw the struggle as a second war of independence—a contest that would vindicate American sovereignty and preserve republican institutions by demonstrating to people both at home and abroad that the United States could uphold its rights. In addition, the Republicans saw war as a means of preserving power, unifying their party, and silencing their critics. Political considerations loomed large because (like the Federalists in 1798) the Republicans in 1812 identified the interests of their party with those of the country.

  In sum, the Republicans went to war in 1812 to achieve a variety of closely related diplomatic, ideological, and political objectives.132 The need to take some action was so urgent that Republicans did not wait for their war preparations to mature. This appalled some members of the party, including War Hawk Peter B. Porter, who told the secretary of war in April that it would “be an act of Madness fatal to the administration, to declare war at this time.”133 Most Republicans, however, were willing to take the risk. In the words of Congressman Robert Wright, they were willing “to get married, & buy the furniture afterwards.”134

  For some Republicans—members of the “scarecrow” faction—the risks posed by war did not seem great because they expected the British to cave in to American demands. Monroe expressed a common view when he complained that the British had not taken the American threat seriously. “We have been so long dealing in the small way, of embargoes, non-intercourse and non-importation, with menaces of War &c that the British Government has not believed us. Thus the argument of War, with its consequences, has not had its due weight with that Government.” A New Hampshire senator made the same point more emphatically. “I have long since adopted the opinion,” Charles Cutts wrote, “that if Great Britain would be once convinced that war with this country would be inevitable unless she receded from her unjust pretensions all causes of irritation would be be [sic] speedily removed.”135 Given the speed with which Madison later sent out peace feelers, he too may have expected a bloodless victory.136 In this respect, the declaration of war was a bluff, designed to shock the British into concessions.

  The Debate Over Trade Restrictions

  After the decision for war was made, Congress remained in session to deal with related matters. The most pressing problem was the future of the restrictive system. Although economic coercion had often been defended as an alternative to war—as a peaceful means of upholding the nation’s rights—most Republicans were reluctant to give up the system even after war had been declared. The president himself was the chief architect of the restrictive system, and the war in no way dampened his ardor for these measures.137 Even some of the War Hawks shared his views. Six months into the war, Henry Clay conceded that the nation might be defeated in battle. “But if you cling to the restrictive system,” he said, “it is incessantly working in your favor,” and “if persisted in, the restrictive system, aiding the war, would break down the present [British] Ministry, and lead to a consequent honorable peace.”138

  Although the ninety-day embargo and non-exportation act were due to expire in July, the non-importation law of 1811 would remain in force unless Congress acted. Ever since the embargo had gone into effect, the Treasury Department had been flooded with requests from merchants seeking permission to send ships abroad to bring their property home. Gallatin asked local customs officials to investigate the legitimacy of these requests, and, if they seemed valid, he granted the necessary permits.139 But because of a specie shortage in Britain, property could be repatriated from that country only in the form of British-made goods, which would violate the non-importation law. Many people, however, expected Congress to suspend the law, both to enhance the nation’s stock of goods and to secure additional revenue to pay for the war.140

  The drive to modify the non-importation law had the support of the Federalists and commercial Republicans, but it was the South Carolina War Hawks who spearheaded the drive. John C. Calhoun claimed that the non-importation law would “debilitate the springs of war,” and Langdon Cheves insisted that its suspension would be “a war measure in the strongest sense of the word.”141 Both to reconcile merchants to the war and to enhance the nation’s war-making capacity, the South Carolina War Hawks sought to repeal the non-importation law in early 1812. Their proposal was defeated, at least partly because some Republicans considered it premature.142 The day after the declaration of war, Cheves renewed the struggle, introducing a bill to permit the importation of most British goods.143 Cheves sought to put his bill in the best possible light by portraying it as an anti-tax measure, and he produced a letter from Gallatin showing that several classes of the proposed war taxes—including the hated internal duties—could be dispensed with if non-importation were lifted.144 The House, however, postponed the measure by a five-vote margin.145 The following day Republican William M. Richardson of Massachusetts offered a resolution to permit all British imports, but this proposal went down to defeat when Speaker Clay, announcing his “decided opposition to the measure,” refused to break a tie vote.146 The defeat of these measures showed that the Republican majority was determined to use commercial restrictions as well as armed force to bring the British to terms.

  Having settled this matter, Congress turned to a closely related one: the complex and murky issue of trading with the enemy. There were many Americans, merchants and farmers alike, who opposed any legislation that would limit their wartime economic opportunities. Thomas Jefferson, for one, thought that the preservation of agricultural prosperity was vital to the success of the war policy. “To keep open sufficient markets,” he told Madison, “is the very first object towards maintaining the popularity of the war.”147 Toward this end, Jefferson was willing to sanction a broad range of trade with the enemy under special licenses. Madison, however, took a different view. There was an enormous demand for American grain in Spain because of the presence of British troops there, and Madison had no objection to feeding these soldiers. But he preferred to rely on neutral ships to carry the grain, believing that the use of licenses was “pregnant with abuses of the worst sort.”148 Madison’s solution would please American farmers but not those merchants who engaged in the carrying trade.

  Shortly after the declaration of war, Calhoun, who favored minimal restrictions, introduced a narrow enemy trade bill that merely prohibited the export of war material and provisions to Canada—the only place where British and American armies were likely to meet. As it made its way through Congress, however, the bill was broadened considerably. The final version prohibited not only exports to Canada but also any seaborne trade with the British Empire. Only one concession was made to the anti-restrictionists: the bill did not prohibit the use of British licenses to trade in non-British ports. This assured that the shipment of provisions to the Spanish Peninsula in American bottoms would continue.149

  The Revenue Shortfall

  Another issue that Congress had to deal with before adjourning was that of finance. The $11 million loan authorized in March had brought in only $6.5 million.150 Hence the administration faced a revenue shortfall. To remedy this, Congress authorized the issue of $5 million in treasury notes. These were one-year notes bearing 5.4 percent. Although not legal tender, the notes (like those of the old national bank) could be used to pay taxes or to buy public lands. They were expected to serve as a kind of paper money that government creditors would accept in lieu of other forms of payment.151

  Congress also passed a bill raising the customs duties. The taxes on imported goods (which hitherto had averaged about 17 percent) were doubled, a surcharge of 10 percent was imposed on goods imported in foreign bottoms, and the duties on foreign ships (heretofore 50 cents a ton) were quadrupled.152 The Republicans, however, postponed any action on the internal taxes.153 “It was admitted by the ruling party, in debate,” said a Virginia Federalist, “that to impose them now, would endanger their success at the next election.”154

  Federalists raised a howl of protest, claiming that Republican tax policy discriminated against
the North, where most of the nation’s imports were consumed. “Is it just and fair,” asked Congressman Harmanus Bleecker of New York, “to abandon the internal taxes and impose so much of the burden of the war upon the people of the Northern and Eastern States, the majority of whom are known to be opposed to it?”155 In effect, the region that opposed the war was being saddled with taxes to pay for it.

  Federalists also argued that Republican financial policies were irresponsible. Raising the specter of runaway inflation, Abijah Bigelow of Massachusetts said: “The public credit must be supported, or you put at hazard the best interests of the country—you hazard, indeed, the very existence of the Government.”156 Certainly the refusal to adopt a broadly based tax program coupled with the failure of the loan and the issue of treasury notes augured ill for Gallatin’s whole plan of war finance. Indeed, within two years public credit collapsed, and the result was financial chaos.

  Final Measures

  Congress closed out the session by establishing regulations to govern privateers, appropriating an additional $500,000 for coastal fortifications, and giving the president the authority he had earlier sought to appoint the officers of the U.S. Volunteer corps.157 Congress finally adjourned on July 6, 1812. “The two Houses,” said the Boston Yankee, “ended their fatiguing and tedious Session of eight months continuance, on Monday Evening.”158 No doubt most Congressmen were thoroughly exhausted, having adopted 143 laws in a session that was longer than any since the Quasi-War.159

  The National Intelligencer predicted that historians would rank the Twelfth Congress next to “the immortal Congress” of 1776. “Under the auspices of the one this nation sprung into existence; under those of the other it will have been preserved from disgraceful recolonization.”160 Although the comparison with ’76 was exaggerated, it illustrated how difficult it was for Republicans to shed the ideological baggage of the Revolution. For most Republicans, the War of 1812 was very much a second war of independence.161 Whether the United States could actually vindicate its independence against a foe as powerful as Great Britain, however, remained to be seen.

  Chapter 3

  The Baltimore Riots

  According to Samuel G. Goodrich, a Connecticut Federalist who later gained fame writing children’s books, news of the declaration of war hit “like a thunderbolt.”1 Everywhere people were taken by surprise. Ever since 1805 the nation’s leaders had talked of war, and yet always the result was more commercial restrictions. Many people—Republicans and Federalists alike—assumed that war would again be averted, that some excuse would be found to continue diplomatic negotiations.

  Reactions to War

  Most Republicans found the news exhilarating. In Washington, an observer reported “felicitations, shaking of hands, and rejoicings as were never exhibited here before.”2 In Kentucky, there was much cheering, muskets and cannons were fired, and houses were illuminated.3 In Pennsylvania, “pleasure beam[ed] in the eye of every friend to the government,” and in Baltimore people “heartily greeted” a public reading of the president’s war message.4 Not all Republicans shared this enthusiasm, but even the pessimists were relieved that at long last a decisive step had been taken. “War is declared,” said Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts; “God be praised, Our country is safe.”5

  Federalists, by contrast, greeted the news with alarm and foreboding. In New England, bells were rung, shops closed, and flags hung at half-mast.6 In the middle and southern states, Federalists seemed confused and unsure of what to do. In New York they talked of pursuing a policy of benevolent neutrality, of not obstructing war measures, and in Pennsylvania they considered supporting the war.7 Many agreed with Felix H. Gilbert of Maryland that even though the declaration of war was an “astounding act of Madness” everyone ought to “rally round the Standard” and contribute to the nation’s success.8 “Honor, and patriotism, and love of country,” said the Philadelphia Freeman’s Journal, “will now steel every honest heart and nerve every arm, to support our country through her present difficulties.”9

  This proclamation was issued by the president the day after war was declared. Widely distributed as a handbill and reproduced in newspapers, it helped spread the word that the nation was now at war with Great Britain. (Library of Congress)

  Federalists in Congress also talked of supporting the war. On the eve of the final vote, Senator James Lloyd of Massachusetts told Republicans that “whatever may be the issue of your vote, I, for one, will be found in the ranks of my country.”10 After the decision was made, Lloyd and other Federalists reportedly declared “that as the die is now cast, we must all hands play for our country.”11 For a brief moment it looked like the opposition would simply melt away. “The opposition to Government,” exulted a Republican paper, “is crumbling to pieces like a ‘rope of sand.’”12

  Republican celebrations, however, were premature. In New England Federalists were never reconciled to the war policy, and in their speeches, sermons, and newspapers, their criticism was unrestrained. The Massachusetts House called the decision for war an act “of inconceivable folly and desperation” that was “hostile to your interests, menacing to your liberties, and revolting to your feelings.” The Connecticut House said a nation that declared war “without fleets, without armies, with an impoverished treasury, with a frontier by sea and land extending many hundreds of miles, feebly defended . . . hath not ‘first counted the cost.’”13

  The best way to bring the war to an end, New England Federalists believed, was to oppose it, using every legal means available. The doctrine of non-opposition was considered “heresy” in New England, Harrison Gray Otis of Massachusetts told a friend in South Carolina. The declaration of war was like any other bad law. “It must be obey[e]d but its mischief may be and ought to be freely discuss[e]d and all due means taken to procure its repeal.”14 New England Federalists attacked not only the war but also those responsible for it. “A president who has made this war, is not qualified to make peace,” said the Massachusetts House. “Organize a peace party throughout your country, and let all party distinctions vanish.”15

  These words were taken to heart by Federalists elsewhere. Several of the leading newspapers in the middle and southern states—the Baltimore Federal Republican, the Alexandria Gazette, the Philadelphia United States’ Gazette, and the New York Evening Post—already had come out against the war, and they were soon joined by the Charleston Courier.16 Instead of crumbling, opposition to the war got stronger as the summer progressed. Although there were some exceptions, by the fall of 1812 Federalists in the middle and southern states had joined their friends in New England to present a united front against the war.

  Federalists in Congress also closed ranks. Talk of supporting the war evaporated when Federalists in Washington saw what kind of war it was to be. Attempts to limit the war to the high seas and to include France in the hostilities had been defeated; the restrictive system had been retained and even expanded; and a tax program had been adopted that discriminated against the North. Under these circumstances Federalists in Congress lost all heart for supporting the war. Instead, they united against it.

  Address of the Federalist Minority

  House Federalists aired their views in a widely circulated address published shortly after the declaration of war. “An Address of Members of the House of Representatives . . . on the Subject of War with Great Britain” appeared in pamphlet form in more than twenty editions and was reprinted in virtually every Federalist newspaper. This document became a rallying point for Federalists across the nation. Written by Josiah Quincy, it was signed by all but two of the thirty-six House Federalists. The only exceptions were Robert Le Roy Livingston, who had left Congress before the declaration of war to take a commission in the army, and Daniel Sheffey, a former Republican who still occasionally expressed independent views.17

  The address opened with an attack on Republican parliamentary tactics: the use of the previous question to cut off debate, the employment of secret sessions to conc
eal proceedings, and the arbitrary treatment of motions offered by the minority. House Federalists claimed that these practices posed a threat to republican government. “Principles more hostile . . . to . . . Representative liberty,” they said, “cannot easily be conceived.”18

  Next the address explored the “momentous question of war with Great Britain.” Although conceding that the Orders-in-Council and impressment were legitimate grievances, the Federalists argued that these issues would neither justify nor be remedied by a Canadian war. Echoing a familiar refrain, they asked: “How will war upon the land protect commerce upon the ocean?” A far better course, they said, would be to lift the restrictions on trade and unleash American merchantmen. “It is well known that from the gallantry of our seamen, if merchant vessels were allowed to arm and associate for self defence, they would be able to repel many unlawful aggressions.”19

  Instead, the nation was “rushing into difficulties, with little calculation about the means, and little concern about the consequences.” To declare war against such a powerful foe with the people divided and the nation unprepared was to invite disaster. “Let us not be deceived,” the address warned. “A war of invasion may invite a retort of invasion.” Moreover, war against Great Britain might throw the nation into the arms of France. “It cannot be concealed, that to engage in the present war against England is to place ourselves on the side of France, and expose us to the vassalage of States serving under the banners of the French Emperor.” War with Britain, the address concluded, was unnecessary and unwise. It was required by neither “any moral duty” nor “any political expediency.”20